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Abstract
Descriptive experience sampling (DES) is a method of describing inner experience (i.e., directly
apprehended thoughts, feelings, sensations, etc.). DES includes “iterative” sequences of random,
natural-environment, beeper-driven sampling of inner experiences followed by an expositional
interview that seeks to apprehend and describe those inner experiences in high-fidelity. DES
investigators claim that these iterative sequences increase the participant’s DES skills. The
present study tests that claim by investigating whether participants demonstrate higher skills in
their very-last-sample interviews than they exhibited in their own very-first-sample interviews.
The very-last-sample and very-first-sample interviews of six participants were quantitatively and
qualitatively examined. We found that participants in very-first-sample interviews used frequent
subjunctifiers that suggested that phenomena were not apprehended, whereas in their very-lastsample interviews they used subjunctifiers that suggested that they had apprehended phenomena
adequately but their descriptions were falling short of describing those phenomena in high
fidelity. Furthermore, very-last-sample interview turns were judged to be cleaving significantly
more adequately to experience apprehended at-a-moment than were very-first-sample interview
turns. These results are consistent with the view that DES skill increases across iterative
sampling rounds. Implications for DES and other first-person methods are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.” – Aristotle
People of all ages, acculturations, education levels, socioeconomic status, physical
ability, and so on describe having inner experience: thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations,
kinesthetic awarenesses, real or imaginary seeings, hearings, tastings, and so on that are directly
apprehended at particular moments. However, science—particularly psychology—has long
struggled with how (and whether) to apprehend, describe, study, and/or analyze inner experience.
On the one hand, much of psychology is dedicated to the study of things that have private,
internal aspects, such as learning processes, personality and emotions, brain systems and nerve
pathways, and psychological distress. Indeed, formal scientific psychology began in 1879 with
the expressed goal of becoming “the exact description of consciousness [Bewusstsein]” (Wundt
as cited in Titchener, 1921, p. 164). Even the word psychology is derived from two Greek
words—psyche for soul and logos for the study of a subject—that literally translates to English
as the study of the soul.
On the other hand, there have been long periods where psychology actively fought
against studying inner experience. The rise of behaviorism in the early twentieth century led to
the near complete abandonment of the study of consciousness for over half a century,
particularly in the United States (Benjamin, 2007). Psychologists such as John Watson argued
that psychology should aspire to be “a purely objective experimental branch of natural science”
(Watson, 1913, pp. 158), and for many decades behaviorists were dominant, leading to an
explosion of research in stimulus-response conditions, animal studies, and other inquiries into the
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laws of behavior while nearly altogether deserting its initial Introspective1 queries regarding the
mental processes that formed consciousness.
However, the hegemony of behaviorism over psychology diminished during the later
decades of the twentieth century, and once again inner-experience-sounding topics—now called
cognition, cognitive science, cognitive-behavioral methods, and so on—became vogue (Hurlburt
et al., 2017). Contemporary psychology expresses interest in investigating aspects of inner
experience such as mindfulness (Reina & Kudesia, 2020), self-talk (De Muynck et al., 2020),
and psychotherapy patient self-reported outcome monitoring (Lloyd, Duncan, & Cooper, 2019).
Attention to the development and implementation of new methodologies to the study inner
experience has grown substantially within the past fifty years, producing various approaches
such as diary studies (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003), natural environment sampling
methodologies (Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977; Hurlburt, 1979), contemporaneous
think-aloud methodologies (Ericsson & Simon, 1980), the micro-phenomenology interview
method (Vermersch, 1994; Petitmengin, 2006) and descriptive experience sampling (Hurlburt,
1990). However, despite the apparent re-emergence of inner experience within current
psychological research—as well as the number of methodologies that have been developed for
the purposes of studying such phenomena—there remains considerable skepticism regarding
science’s ability to apprehend inner experience (Haeffel & Howard, 2010; Hurlburt & Heavey,
2001; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009).
The present study involves an examination of one of those methods—descriptive
experience sampling (DES)—and its claims regarding its ability to provide high-fidelity
1

Note that Introspection with an uppercase I specifically differentiates the formal methods used by Wundt,
Titchener, and other Introspectionists from introspection (with a lowercase i), which refers generally to any
examination and observation of one’s own inner experiences by a variety of methods; Coon, 1993; Hurlburt,
Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, & Kühn, 2017.
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descriptions of participant’s experience through iterative training. In Chapter 2, we begin by
discussing the history of introspective methods within psychology and the known hazards of
introspection that any adequate scientific method must deal with in its procedures. We also
describe each of the major contemporary introspective methods and review whether and how
each method works within the constraints imposed by the inherent hazards of introspection. In
Chapter 3, we will discuss DES in greater detail, providing a detailed review of its aims and
procedures. In Chapter 4, we describe the research question of the current study. In Chapter 5,
we discuss how DES defines participant skill. Chapter 6 outlines the procedures used in this
study. Chapters 7 through 12 present our findings for each participant, and Chapter 13 presents
our overall findings across all participants. Chapters 14 and 15 presents our overall discussions
and broader implications from this study’s findings, and Chapter 16 discusses the limitations of
this study.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
A History of Studying Inner Experience in Psychology
Inner experience has always played a central role within the field of psychology. The first
formal psychological investigations of inner experience began in the mid-nineteenth century with
Gustav Theodor Fechner and his work in psychophysics (Coon, 1993). Fechner was the one of
the first scientific investigators to explore mind-body dualism, in that he was interested in the
experiential differences between physical and mental phenomena. Fechner (1860) described his
work as the “exact science of the functional relations or relations of dependency between body
and mind, or, in more general terms, between the bodily and the mental, the physical and
psychical worlds” (p. 8). Indeed, the earliest decades of the field of psychology saw the
widespread use of Introspection—defined in the most general ways as “looking within to
discover what one was thinking, feeling, remembering” (Coon, 1993, p. 760)—as a major
method of psychological investigation. This is not to say, however, that the Introspective method
was exceedingly subjective or qualitative, as will soon be demonstrated.
Building off Fechner’s and his contemporaries’ successes and failures was Wilhem
Wundt’s Introspective method, which relied on experimental methods (i.e., controlled and
replicable laboratory studies) as well as on highly trained, experienced participants such as
Wundt himself or his graduate students (Danziger, 1980). The goal of Wundt’s Introspective
research was internal perception: how individuals passively observe their inner experience when
prompted by an externally presented stimulus (Danziger, 1980; Lyons, 1986). Notably, Wundt
(as cited in Danziger, 1980) explicitly excluded the “process of thought in themselves” (p. 247).
To Wundt (as cited in Danziger, 1980), this also meant excluding the “feelings and their complex
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connections, affects and process of volition” (p. 247), as Wundt felt such processes were beyond
the scope of Introspection (Aanstoos, 1983; Coon, 1993; Danziger, 1980).
Wundt’s methodology was developed with careful consideration of criticisms of past
introspective techniques, such as the problem of self-observation (in that the mere act of
observation may distort the original experience) and the use of retrospection (in which looking
back on an experience could lead to distorted recollection; Danziger, 1980). Generally, a typical
study conducted by Wundt included four major methodological considerations that sought to
create an empirical approach to studying consciousness:
1) the Observer must, if possible, be in a position to determine beforehand the entrance of
the process to be observed. 2) the introspectionist must, as far as possible, grasp the
phenomenon in a state of strained attention and follow its course. 3) Every observation
must, in order to make certain, be capable of being repeated several times under the same
conditions and 4) the conditions under which the phenomenon appears must be found out
by the variation of the attendant circumstances and when this was done the various
coherent experiments must be varied according to a plan partly by eliminating certain
stimuli and partly by grading their strength and quality (Asthana, 2015, p. 245).
Wundt’s significant contributions to creating a scientific methodology to study consciousness led
many to characterize him as the father of modern psychology and the father of Introspective
psychology (Diamond, 2001).
Following Wundt’s research came a new era of systematic introspection (Danziger,
1980). In contrast to Wundt’s Introspective methods, systematic introspection involved the
acceptance of practices that Wundt specifically avoided, namely (a) a move to accept
retrospective reports, (b) a greater emphasis on subjective reports on mental processes by
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participants (versus Wundt’s emphasis on objective data such as reaction time), (c) a noted
interest in qualitative descriptions of experience, and (d) a greater emphasis on the investigator’s
role in experiments: having investigators, for instance, ask questions about a participant’s
experience versus traditional experiments in which the investigator was simply presenting a
stimulus and the participant responded to it (Danziger, 1980). These changes attempted to
broaden the scope of Introspection to investigate a greater range of human consciousness that
were not possible with the strict limitations of Wundt’s Introspective methods and were practiced
by many important psychologists of the period such as G. E. Müller, Alfred Binet, and Theodor
Lipps (Danziger, 1980).
One particularly prominent practitioner of systematic introspection was the British-born
American psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener, who studied under Wundt in Leipzig.
Titchener is credited with greatly expanding upon Wundt’s investigations of structuralism, which
sought to discover the structure of consciousness by first analyzing the mind in terms of its
simplest constituent parts to then build a greater understanding of how these parts fit together to
form consciousness. It is important to note, however, that Wundt himself never considered
himself a structuralist or even used the term “structuralist” anywhere in his writings—
structuralism was a word coined later by Titchener to describe Titchener’s own theories of
consciousness (Asthana, 2015).
Titchener’s Introspective method was similar to Wundt’s—such as using experimental
conditions and highly trained participants—but differed in how participants were asked to report
about their experience (Boring, 1954). A typical Titchener experiment might begin with the
presentation of a stimulus (e.g., a book) in which participants were tasked with paying close
attention to the stimulus and record their mental processes created by the stimulus. Following the
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presentation of the stimulus, participants were to report carefully the conscious content of their
inner experience, in which they were asked to abstain from referencing any meaning,
interpretation, or inference of their experience (Boring, 1954). Additionally, Titchener tasked his
participants with avoiding stimulus error, in that they were admonished not to report any
statements about the stimulus, which he termed dependent experience. In other words, if
presented with a red book, a report of “book” would have been considered a stimulus error due to
the fact that such aspects were a description of the stimulus rather than an aspect or aspects of
experience (Boring, 1954; Chirimuuta, 2016). In contrast, a report of “red” or “parallelogram”
would have been considered acceptable, as (from Titchener’s perspective) such reports described
the “purely mental sensations” that comprised consciousness (Chirimuuta, 2016, p. 34). The
careful bounds of Titchener’s methods illustrated Titchener’s conviction that psychology was a
natural science, in that he believed that if Introspection could “perform a reduction of complex
experience to elements that were devoid of meaning, [they] were… identical with the sensory
elements that also formed the basis of the data of physical science” (Danziger, 1980, p. 254).
Despite Titchener’s aim to develop psychology into a natural science in the manner of
physics, his methods and theories of structuralism were criticized by his contemporaries and
were abandoned after his death (Beenfeldt, 2013; Boring, 1954). One notable critic was Oswald
Külpe, who developed his own Introspective method in the early twentieth century while
establishing a thriving doctoral training program in Würzburg. Külpe, also a former student of
Wundt, was particularly interested in using Introspection to study phenomena that Wundt had
explicitly ignored, such as meaning, qualitative descriptions, and complex experiences (Coon,
1993; Danziger, 1980). Breaking significantly from Wundt’s method, Külpe developed
systematic experimental introspection, a laboratory method that presented participants with a

7

complicated stimulus or series of events and asked them to provide retrospectively a
comprehensive account about their thought processes (Boring, 1954). This method allowed the
exploration of what previously had been considered off-limit phenomena in psychology:
association (see Mayer & Orth, 1901), judgement (see Marbe, 1901), feelings (see Orth, 1903),
thought (see Watt, 1905), and action and thought (see Ach, 1905; Boring, 1954).
In spite of the numerous advances made in Introspective methods by the early twentieth
century, Introspection was all but abandoned as a legitimate psychological method soon after the
start of the century. In addition to scathing criticisms of introspection by prominent behavioral
psychologists of the period (e.g., Watson, 1913), the emergence of new psychological disciplines
incompatible with Introspection (e.g., applied/industrial psychology, behaviorism), and
economic pressures to industrialize psychological research (Coon, 1993), perhaps one of the
most discrediting aspects of the Introspective method was the disagreement that occurred
amongst Introspective researchers about key issues related to consciousness—specifically, about
imageless thought (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).
The imageless thought controversy involved disagreement between Külpe at Würzburg
and Titchener at Cornell. Following his tenure as the director of the Institute of Würzburg from
1896 to 1909, Külpe believed his fellow researchers had discovered a new, previously
undescribed mental phenomenon—his graduate students described it as:
knowledge [that] exists in an imageless form, that is, no phenomenological components
are demonstrable—neither visual, acoustic, nor kinesthetic sensations, nor their memory
images—which would qualitatively define the content of this knowledge” (Ach, as cited
in Beenfeldt, 2013, p. 60).
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In contrast to Külpe’s findings, Titchener believed in sensationalism, a viewpoint within
psychology that posited that the core of experience was rooted in sensations and sense
perceptions. Titchener (1926), for instance, believed that ideas differed from perceptions (e.g.,
sensory experiences) “only by the fact that [an idea] is made up wholly of images” (p. 376) and
that, “sensation [perceptions] is the raw material from which ideas are built up” (Titchener, 1895,
p. 428). That is, Titchener did not accept the possibility of imageless thought. Ultimately, the
inability of these major Introspective schools to settle the imageless-thought controversy was one
particularly important factor (among many) that led to the downfall of Introspective methods
(Danzinger, 1980; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).
Following the demise of Introspection in psychology came the era most notably
characterized by the widespread prevalence of behaviorism, taking place roughly between 1925
to 1970 (Hurlburt et al., 2017; Schultz & Shultz, 2008). As previously mentioned, Watson’s
consequential 1913 paper, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” and his 1914 book,
Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, was a watershed moment for psychology,
particularly in America2. In both his paper and his book, Watson—considered by many
historians to be the father of behaviorism—challenged psychologists to abandon Introspective
methods and to adopt a new experimental methodology focused only on observable behavior
(Hothersall, 2004). Watson’s assertion was that psychology as a field had failed to be recognized
as a natural science due to its interest in consciousness, which Watson considered to be “neither
a definable term nor a usable concept” (Hothersall, 2004, p. 465). Watson argued that the study
of consciousness had been fraught with contradictions, confusion, and a general sense of
2

European psychologists continued to pursue investigations that were similar in spirit to the Introspectionists, such
as Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Koffka’s contributions to the development of gestalt psychology (Hatfield, 2002).
However, despite such investigations, behaviorism was still the dominant paradigm throughout much of the
twentieth century.
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unproductiveness; instead, Watson advocated a study of psychology in which the goal was “the
prediction and control of behavior,” where “introspection forms no essential part of its methods,
nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend
themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness” (Watson, 1913, p. 158). Watson was not
the first to propose a more “objective” psychological science (indeed, the field was already in the
midst of shying away from introspective techniques as a central method of psychology around
the time of Watson’s published critiques; Costall, 2006; Danzinger, 1980). However, Watson’s
provocative stance that “what we need to do is to start work upon psychology, making behavior,
not consciousness, the objective point of our attack” (Watson, 1913, p. 176) was a critical
assertion that galvanized a strong response from a field hungry for change.
In spite of Watson’s forcefulness, it was not until the 1930’s and 1940’s that the
behaviorism paradigm found its dominance within psychology. Modifying and expanding upon
Watson’s behaviorism, researchers such as Edward C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull, and B. F. Skinner
strengthened key parts of Watson’s behaviorism by defining psychology as a science of
behavior; by collecting only objective, observational data; and eschewing any study of
consciousness (Greenwood, 2015; Hothersall, 2004; Schultz & Schultz, 208, p. 493; Trull &
Prinstein, 2012). These psychologists, particularly Skinner, concerned themselves primarily with
formalizing laws of behavior, such as operant conditioning, and with behavior acquisition and
modification. Additionally, the behaviorists were among the first to develop behavior therapies
that—in contrast to earlier psychological interventions such as psychodynamic therapy—also
focused clinical attention solely on observable, discrete behavior. During this period of
psychology, investigations concerning inner experience became rare (Schultz & Schultz, 2008),
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and journal articles’ use of words such as “conscious*,” “introspect*,” and “cogni*” plummeted
(Hurlburt, Heavey, & Seibert, 2006).
The field of psychology began to slowly shift again, however, as researchers once more
became interested in the cognitive contents underlying behavior. Beginning in the 1950’s,
psychologists such as E. R. Guthrie—who was long considered a behaviorist—criticized the
overt stress placed on physical and/or external stimuli by his behaviorally-focused colleagues,
and instead began to advocate for the description of stimuli in cognitive terms (Guthrie, 1959).
At around the same time, Albert Ellis began to develop one of the first therapies (Rational
Emotive Therapy; RET) within clinical psychology that focused on cognitive approaches to
various emotional and behavioral problems (Ellis, 1957; Trull & Prinstein, 2012), followed
closely by Aaron Beck’s Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) in the 1960’s (Beck, 1963).
Indeed, various researchers began investigations into a wide variety of studies that blended
components of external and internal domains, such as information processing, cognitive
development in children, and language acquisition (Leahey, 1991). This era of psychology—
often reported as the “third” wave in psychology from 1970 to the present—has been referred to
as the cognitive revolution, in which the field has seen a resurgence in explorations of the
contents (e.g., thinking, feeling, information processing) of the mind (Hurlburt et al., 2017;
Leahey, 1991).
With the renewed interest in the cognitive and cognitive-behavioral topics in psychology,
investigations in individual’s inner experience regained popularity. During the 1960’s,
researchers such as Jerome Singer and his colleagues began exploring features of daydreaming
and other aspects of cognition and personality (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2008; Singer & Antrobus,
1963). By the 1970’s, technological advances allowed investigators to invent (Hurlburt, 1976) or
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use (Klinger, 1978-1979; Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977) portable signaling devices
to sample thoughts in natural settings, along with more traditional studies that used various selfreport measures (e.g., diaries, questionnaires) to study internal states (Szalai et al., 1975,
Campbell, 1976). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, researchers continued to use the latest technology
(e.g., personal palmtop computer devices) that randomly signaled participants in natural
environments to complete digital questionnaires (Stone, Neale, & Shiffman, 1993) about their
inner experience. In the 2010’s, researchers began to use smart phones to create personalized
methods for psychological assessment and intervention, such that phenomenological data
collected over time about an individual’s inner experience is used to create a model of
personalized intervention for that specific person via statistical modeling (Fisher et al., 2017).
Hazards of Introspective and Experience Sampling Methods
As demonstrated by the history of the scientific study of inner experience, a throughline
throughout the history of psychology has revolved around the best methodological practices for
understanding inner experience. Although the popularity and scope of inner experience within
psychological research has waxed and waned over the decades, methods that rely on participant’s
self-report (i.e., introspection broadly defined) have had an undeniably long and varied history in
psychological science. However, despite their ubiquity, the validity of self-reports in science has
long been scrutinized (Bernard et al., 1984; Dodge, 1912; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007;
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009). Indeed, research in many areas and topics
over the decades have identified many known hazards that are unavoidable if science wishes to
develop systematic ways of investigating inner experience. For example, retrospective
reconstructions of past events have been found to be influenced by emotional arousal levels
(Sillars & Scott, 1983; see hazard 1 below). Additionally, eyewitness testimony research has
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demonstrated a number of shortcomings related to misinformation and false memories (Frenda,
Nichols, & Loftus, 2011; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Many other
confirmatory bodies of research additionally demonstrate the limitations regarding self-report
methodologies.
Although there are quite literally a hundred or more hazards to consider (Hurlburt, 2011),
Heavey, Hurlburt, and Lefforge (2010) have discussed 10 fundamental hazards that threaten
inner experience research:
1. Distortions caused by retrospection. It has been extensively demonstrated that human
memory is often fallible, particularly when the retrospection is taking place for an event
that happened long before (Conway et al., 1994; Tourangeau, 2000; Thomas & Diener,
1990).
2. The influence of assumptions, heuristics, or other preconception (i.e., presuppositions)
that distort the apprehension and/or report of pristine (naturally occurring,
unmanipulated) inner experience. A presupposition can be defined as:
… a notion about the world that is so fundamental that it exists prior to critical
examination. It is something accepted without controversy as being true, something that
shapes perception, behavior, and affect without the fact of that shaping being noticed or
recognized. It is an unquestioned manner of relating to the world that chooses what is
seen and what is not seen, what is experienced and how it is experienced, so invisibly that
what is seen and experienced seems to be the world itself, not aspects of the world
selected, shaped, and distorted by the presuppositional process (Hurlburt & Heavey,
2006, p. 151).
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3. A reliance on semantic memory versus episodic memory, in which semantic memory
overrides, obscures, and/or distorts episodic memory for a specific moment. Episodic
memory refers to the storage of specific situations, details, or events bound by time and
place (Tulving, 1984). In contrast, semantic memory refers to the storage of nonspecific
general concepts that are not bound by time and place (Tulving, 1984). A series of studies
conducted by Robinson and Clore (2002) present evidence that participants used
semantic memory when asked to rate the intensity of their emotional experience over a
long period of time (i.e., several months, years), whereas participants used episodic
memory when asked to rate the intensity of their emotional experience over a short period
of time (i.e., past several hours or days). In other words, rather than relying on a
chronological recollection of a specific moment, there is some warrant to believe that
individuals may rely more on their (perhaps mistaken) general knowledge of a moment,
which may or may not accurately reflect what occurred.
4. A failure to differentiate between directly apprehended phenomena and things that are
assumed to be directly apprehended phenomena but are difficult or impossible to
apprehend directly. Participants and/or researchers may not adequately distinguish
between directly apprehended inner experience (i.e., thoughts, sensations, and feelings
that presents itself “before the footlights of consciousness”; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006)
and constructs, processes, and/or concepts that may be challenging to access or may not
exist at all in experience. For example, many topics in psychological research—such as
racism, extroversion, and anxiety—exist as constructs; these constructs cannot be directly
observed and must thus be approximated by the measurement of other phenomena that
are theorized to relate to the construct (Furr, 2018). Additionally, processes such as
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identifying the motivation of actions have been shown to be difficult for participants to
identify (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
5. Objectifying the individual such that individual characteristics are lost in favor of group
averages. A preference for summative/group analyses (e.g., means, sums) that are
widespread within nomothetic methodologies may not sufficiently allow for the nuanced
description and exploration of unique individual-to-individual variations in inner
experience (i.e., idiographic methodologies).
6. Reluctance of participants to share their inner experience. Participants may not be honest
in their descriptions of experience. Due to the inherent nature of inner experience,
participants may be wary of describing phenomena that are private, disturbing,
embarrassing, or sensitive in nature. Past research on factors that affect participant’s selfreport—such as the social desirability response bias—has demonstrated that individuals
tend to portray themselves in a positive manner, thus confounding the true relationships
between variables (van de Mortel, 2008).
7. The pitfalls of language. Participants may not be able to speak discriminately about their
inner experience. In fact, even those who are widely believed to be relatively skillful in
apprehending their own inner experience (e.g., long-time meditation practitioners) may
not—and likely will not be—skilled in providing verbal descriptions of their inner
experience due to the fact that such reports are not at all an intended goal of meditative
practices (Petitmengin, 2006). Skinner (1974) noted that verbal reports on inner
experience—in contrast to verbal reports on publicly observable things—may be underdifferentiated due to the fact that it is difficult to shape a person’s speech about private
events. For example, one can learn to differentiate between many shades of blue by the
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presentation of various hues of blue (e.g., azure, cyan, cobalt blue) which can be
appropriately reinforced only when the correct stimulus is presented (Hurlburt, 2011;
Skinner, 1953). This type of precision is difficult or impossible when building a
vocabulary for inner experience, as it is impossible to differentially reinforce various
types of inner experience to better specify such phenomena, such as differentiating
between various types of affectively “feeling blue” (e.g., depressed, morose, dejected).
This is evidenced by the use of the same word (“thinking”) by participants across many
DES studies to describe disparate types of inner experience: Participants (typically in the
earlier parts of the DES sampling process) often describe their experience as “thinking”
(e.g., “I was thinking about what was said in class”), in spite of the fact that “thinking”
may refer to any private event (e.g., hearing an inner voice, seeing a visual image,
experiencing a bodily sensation; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).
8. Experimental manipulations fail to establish ecological validity. The contrived or
retrospective accounts of experience do not constitute the same process of direct
observation. Laboratory studies, armchair introspection, and methods that rely heavily on
analog situations are built on a strong—and perhaps unwarranted—assumption that such
stand-ins are generalizable or equal to pristine inner experience (Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2007; 2011a).
9. Apprehending inner experience requires considerable investigator skill. Given the
numerous hazards that have been so far discussed (in addition to those that remained
discussed elsewhere but not outlined here; see Hurlburt, 2011), it takes a significant
amount of training, persistence, and a willingness to be corrected by others in order to
strive for a principled science of inner experience (Heavey et al., 2010; Hurlburt, 2011).
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Both skeptics and supporters of inner experience research have been united in their
repeated concerns about the major time- and labor-intensive limitations placed upon
research methods that take seriously the hazards of inner experience research (Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2011a; McKelvie, 2019).
10. The assumption that participants’ accounts of their inner experiences are infallible. Due
to the deficit of both informal interest in ongoing pristine inner experience and formal
scientific explorations into pristine inner experience—in addition to many of the hazards
previously listed, such as the pitfall of language, the influence of presuppositions, and the
pitfalls of memory—it cannot be assumed that people are able to easily apprehend or
report their inner experience without repeated opportunities to do so, or without prior
training. Indeed, it has been observed elsewhere that inner experience often takes place
below the threshold of conscious awareness; although participants are able to perform
mental operations (e.g., memorizing a list) or carry out a practical action (e.g., making a
sandwich), participants may only be able to consciously report a very small part of how
they go about performing such acts (Petitmengin, 2006). Even early psychologists such as
Wundt and Titchener recognized both the difficulty in apprehending inner experience and
thus insisted on using only highly trained subjects (e.g., Wundt or Titchener’s graduate
students, or the psychologist themselves) in their investigations.
Taken together, Heavey et al.’s (2010) hazards of inner experience research offer a litany
of cognitive, theoretical, methodological, and interpersonal risks involved in introspective
methodologies. Other important risks were discussed by Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009), who
divided them into two major areas: methodological difficulties related to inner experience and
distortive hazards. In regard to methodological difficulties, Petitmengin and Bitbol highlighted:
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•

The disconnect between external stimuli and inner experience. There is an inherent gap
between what may be externally present to a person and what may be internally present
to a person. In developing his own Introspective technique, for instance, Titchener was
sensitive to the difference between observing and describing external stimuli versus the
noticing, observing, and description of one’s actual experience (which may or may not be
related to the external stimuli)—Titchener referred to the former as stimulus error.
Research on inner experience is concerned not with whether or not reports of inner
experience correspond with external stimuli but is instead concerned with whether or not
reports of inner experience correspond with the individual’s “true” inner experience.

•

The “impossible split” (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009, p. 365) of self-observation.
Introspection requires participants to “cut [themselves] into two” (p. 365) in order to
observe ongoing inner experience. This act of “splitting” has called into question the idea
of “regressio ad infinitum” (p. 365, emphasis in original): the seemingly endless loop of
one observing oneself observing oneself.

•

Blindness of introspection. Similar to hazard 10 outlined in Heavey et al. (2010),
Petitmengin and Bitbol noted that many researchers across the history of psychology
have commented on the difficulties of accessing inner experience. Notably, Nisbett and
Wilson’s (1977) seminal paper argued that while we are able to apprehend the results of
our decision-making processes, we are unable to apprehend that decision-making process
itself. Further evidence could be proposed by citing the exacting interview methods of
Wundt and Titchener, who explicitly created such Introspective protocols and used highly
trained participants to mitigate the known difficulties involved in describing ongoing
inner experience. Additionally, mind wandering research has demonstrated that
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participants may unintentionally and unknowingly stray from explicit directions to stay
focused on a task (e.g., reading; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2005) and that
participants may also vary in their ability to comment authoritatively on the validity of
their self-reports of their inner experience (Seli et al., 2015). Ultimately, humans find it
easier to report the “what” (i.e., content) about our private events, but not to the “how”
such things present themselves to us (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009, p. 371).
•

The non-verifiability of results. Because inner experience is inherently (a) private and (b)
“singular [and] unrepeatable, neither by others nor even by myself who is experiencing
it” (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009, p. 371), a “legitimate” science of inner experience is
severely hampered by its inability to verify or falsify the phenomena of interest. As such,
inner experience research struggles to meet the prerequisite attributes of a scientific
methodology.

In regard to distortive hazards of inner experience research, Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009)
highlighted:
•

Observation distortion. Grounded in the ideas of phenomenology and Schooler (2002),
Petitmengin and Bitbol mention of two types of consciousness: basic consciousness and
meta-consciousness. Basic consciousness refers to an individual’s immediate, “organic,”
and immersed “flow of experience” (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009, p. 365). Metaconsciousness refers to any reflection, observation, introspection, or any other means in
which “consciousness is directed towards itself” (p. 365). This proposed two-tiered
nature of consciousness reflects the “impossible split” problem of self-observation—
namely, that meta-consciousness should be an accurate account of basic consciousness.
However, it has been theorized that the mere act of observing one’s basic consciousness
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may disturb and/or distort the inner experience. Petitmengin and Bitbol outlined four
major ways in which observation may alter inner experience:
o Objectifying the subject, such that participants remove the subjective,
experiential, and “human” nature of self in an attempt to “sanitize” the act of
introspection of its subjectivity. Ultimately, this can lead to a loss of the subject.
o “Immobilizing” inner experience. In spite of the fact that consciousness is
believed to always be in motion and fluctuating as time unfolds, the act of
introspection may force participants to “petrify” their inner experience into still
and isolated reports, thus losing important “flow” qualities of experience.
o Observation disrupts ongoing inner experience, which could fundamentally alter
inner experience that otherwise would occur unheeded, uninterrupted, and
pristine.
o Observation may enrich or create phenomena that may not have previously
existed. There remains debate around the extent to which one’s observation of
their inner experience either (a) apprehends ongoing, naturally-occurring
phenomena that existed previous to (or in spite of) observation, or (b) creates
phenomena due to the fact that one is suddenly paying attention to experience.
Given the considerable hazards that inner experience research faces, care must be taken in order
for any science (or method) of inner experience to flourish. Towards this end, Hurlburt and
Heavey (2015, 2018) have proposed four fundamental constraints that any adequate introspective
method must work within:
1. Cleave to (relentlessly focus on; not stray from) specific moments. Because inner
experience changes dramatically from moment to moment—at one moment we are
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hearing, the next moment we are seeing, the next moment we are itchy, and so on (James,
1890)—it is necessary for any exploration of inner experience to clearly focus on
identifying a specific moment to consider at the exclusion of all other moments, periods
of time, or in-general, temporally non-specific reports. Therefore, cleaving to a specific
moment is a prerequisite to the adequate study of inner experience.
2. Cleave to (relentlessly focus on; not stray from) pristine inner experience. Pristine inner
experience refers to directly apprehended, ongoing, naturally occurring inner experience
in everyday environments (in contrast to experience that is artificially distorted by
laboratory investigations and/or intentional introspection). Directly apprehended refers
only to phenomena that are unambiguously and directly present to an individual at a
particular moment—by this definition, things such as an inner speaking, a seeing of an
internal or external thing, a bodily sensation, and so on may all be directly apprehended
phenomena, whereas things such as psychological constructs (e.g., conscientiousness),
explanations/intentions of experience, behavior, self-theories, in-general
characterizations, and so on are not directly apprehended phenomena. Considering only
directly apprehended experience is essential because all else must be inferred or based on
a blend of heuristics, presuppositions, and (perhaps) some kernels of directly
apprehended phenomena.
3. Relentlessly bracket presuppositions about experience. Presuppositions are a priori, deepset, invisible personal blind spots, assumptions, and self-theories that are blindly accepted
to be true without question (Hurlburt, 2011, Kaneshiro and Hurlburt, 2020).
Presuppositions are delusions (not mere ignorance): they are a persistent preconceptions
about the world that are immovable to alternative perspectives because they are held
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without any questioning (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011b).
Presuppositions can affect both participants and investigators, and their presence thwarts
the apprehension and description of inner experience. Presuppositions are, by their
nature, distortive; they impede any ability at apprehending with fidelity. Thus, any
adequate introspective method must use some principled method that seeks effectively to
bracket (i.e., set out of play; Hurlburt, 2011) all presuppositions.
4. Iteratively train participants. Despite the ubiquity of inner experience, multiple streams of
scientific investigations have demonstrated that without adequate training, people are
often unable to apprehend and faithfully describe their experience. For example: the
Introspectionists relied on highly-trained participants as part of their investigations, and
Hurlburt and colleagues (through the use of DES sampling) have consistently found that
nearly all participants naïve to the DES procedure fail to cleave to a moment, cleave to
experience, and bracket presuppositions upon their first day of sampling. Hurlburt has
argued that a method that implements some form of iterative training is necessary for
high fidelity apprehensions of any pristine experiences (Hurlburt, 2011), where iterative
training refers to the acquisition of skill through:
... successive approximations trained on the participant’s home turf, using examples
of distortions and misunderstandings in the participant’s own vocabulary, discovered
and explored as they present themselves in the participant’s own failure to cleave
and/or bracket, successively approximated as the participant gradually acquires skill
and reveals additional levels of distortion or avoidance (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2018, p.
173).
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Thus, iterative training is not merely repetition; iterative training successively refines
participants’ skill, such that each instance of apprehending and describing their
experience may improve the participant’s ability to apprehend and describe their
experience on some future opportunity. Thus, any adequate introspective method must
ensure participants are able to improve on their ability to apprehend and describe their
experience (and consider how they may go about doing so in their procedures).
Although Hurlburt and Heavey’s recommendations of the four constraints of introspective
methods are by no means complete, they provide a foundational set of methodological
considerations that are directly influenced and work within the constraints imposed by the
various known hazards of introspection. And, although all introspective methods must work to
consider how its procedures work within all of the constraints imposed by the hazards of
introspection, we will, out of convenience, use these four constraints as an initial means by
which we may analyze the adequacy of current introspective methods that seek to study inner
experience.
A Review and Analysis of Contemporary Introspective Methods
Multiple methods have been proposed, developed, and used to study inner experience,
and each offers unique perspectives and widely varying procedures. In the following sections, we
present a broad review of the current, most widely used introspective methods. For each method,
we will present an exemplary study and examine it from the perspective of Hurlburt and
Heavey’s (2015, 2018) four constraints of an adequate introspective method.
Diary Studies
Diary studies refer to a broad group of methods that utilize diaries (or other similar, selfreport mediums) to provide frequent reports on the various events and experiences in
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participant’s lives (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). Perhaps one of the oldest experience
sampling methods, diary studies have existed in some form since approximately the turn of the
twentieth century, in which psychologists such as William James were interested in using
personal documents to study internal, subjective states such as religious experience (James,
1902). In particular, diary studies were popularized by the early personality psychologist Gordon
Allport, who argued that psychology as a field of study should focus on describing and
understanding individuals in an idiographic manner through collecting and analyzing repeated,
longitudinal life documents (Allport, 1937; Allport, 1942). Allport argued that diary studies (and
idiographic methods more broadly) would allow direct investigations of the structure and process
of an individual person’s personality; in other words, such studies could investigate how specific
components of personality (e.g., beliefs, predilections) might lead to or affect behavior, actions,
or other processes within individuals (Conner et al., 2009). By focusing on individuals, Allport
believed it would be possible to illuminate the complex, idiographic aspects of a given
individual’s personality; his arguments stood in contrast to the competing nomothetic approaches
of psychological research, which focused on describing “a non-existent ‘average individual’”
that did not “describe the structure of any actual person’s personality”; Conner et al., 2009, p.
295). In spite of his desire to focus on individuals, Allport hoped that—given the study of
enough individuals and the accumulation of enough data—that such findings would be able to
discern nomothetic aspects of personality (Conner et al., 2009).
The general purpose of diary studies is to use self-report instruments to repeatedly
examine ongoing experience in real-world, everyday contexts and situations (Bolger et al.,
2003). Often, the research goals of studies that use diary methods involve gathering reliable,
person-level information about each research participant, estimating within-person changes over
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time (as well as the degree or nature of change between participants), and/or conducting a causal
analysis of within-person changes and individual differences regarding such changes (Bolger et
al., 2003). Diary studies have been used to study a broad range of populations, domains, and
activities such as marital and family processes (Laurenceau & Bolger, 2005), social interaction
(Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), headaches (Allena et al., 2012), and psychotherapy (Mackrill, 2008).
There is a wide range of diary procedures. For instance, while traditional diary studies
used paper and pencil diaries, contemporary diary studies may use palmtop electronic devices,
personal smartphone applications, or electronic diaries (Barrett & Barrett, 2001). Additionally,
studies can choose multiple types of sampling schedules to collect reports. The three most
popular schedules are interval-contingent sampling, in which participants complete reports at a
pre-specified time(s) every day during the sampling period (e.g., 12:00 pm and 2:00 pm every
day); event-contingent sampling, in which participants complete reports following a particular
event occurring (e.g., after smoking a cigarette); and signal-contingent sampling, in which
participants complete reports following a signal that occurs either at fixed or random intervals
(e.g., following a random beep generated by a paging device; Barrett & Barrett, 2001; Bolger et
al., 2003; Moskowitz & Young, 2006; Nezlek, 2012). Diary entries, moreover, may involve
collecting various types of data via differing means: Some may ask participants to answer a predetermined set of questions using a particular sampling schedule; other studies may ask
participants to create diary entries similar to example entries provided; others still may use a
diary-interview method (Zimmerman & Wieder, 1977), in which participants maintain diaries
over a period of time and discuss entries with investigators at the end of the sampling period
(Nezlek, 2012); and others may use diaries as either the primary data collection methodology or
use diaries in conjunction with other measures (e.g., structured daily interviews).
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For example, Bolger and Schilling (1991) investigated neuroticism and distress in daily
life. They used a daily diary approach because (a) it would allow them to track the “relative
importance of exposure, reactivity, and unmediated explanations” of participants as they
experienced stressful situations (Bolger & Schilling, 1991, p. 358), and (b) it would allow
researchers to study “same-day and later-day reactions to a stressor” in order to “distinguish
people’s initial emotional reactions to a stressor from their speed of recovery from that stressor”
(Bolger & Schilling, 1991, p. 358). Once each day, participants completed a diary entry that
involved documenting two data points: one asked participants to indicate whether a common
daily stressor event (from a list of 22) had occurred within the previous 24 hr, and another asked
participants to indicate how strongly they had felt emotions (from a list of 18 drawn from the
subscales of the Affects Balance Scale; Derogatis, 1975) on 4-point Likert scales ranging from
not at all to a lot over the previous 24 hr (Bolger & Schilling, 1991). Participants completed a
daily diary for 42 days. Each week, participants mailed seven days’ worth of diaries to
investigators, and although efforts were made to have participants complete a diary for each day
of their participation in the study, the researchers allowed participants to complete late diaries
(95% of participants purportedly completed reports within 1 day of the target day, although it
was possible that some participants completed multiple days’ worth of diaries prior to mailing
back their forms; Bolger et al., 1989); once completed, hierarchical linear modeling was used to
analyze the separate estimates.
In general, diary studies have been found to possess good construct validity, and they are
less subject to retrospective bias than are interview methods—largely, however, such analysis
have been conducted exclusively on time-use diaries (e.g., reporting how many hours of a day
one spends performing various activities; Carp & Carp, 1981).

26

However, Bolger and Schilling’s study failed to meet any of Hurlburt and Heavey’s
(2015, 2018) four constraints:
1. The study did not cleave to a moment: they asked participants to retrospect about their
entire experience over a 24-hr period. Moreover, participants could retrospect about the
target day on an entirely different day up to six days after the target day occurred.
2. The study did not cleave to inner experience: they inquired about daily stressors, which
are not descriptive of experience, and they also inquired about emotions, which may or
may not be apprehended as phenomena. The study also attempted to (but did not
successfully) cleave to pristine experience: participants collected information about
themselves as they went about their routines in their natural environments, but since
diaries were intended to capture a person’s experience across an entire 24-hour day,
participants may have self-selected (or otherwise relied on heuristics to decide on) what
to include in their diaries.
3. The study failed to bracket presuppositions: participants were constrained to report only
on whatever things the questionnaires prompted them to report (rather than on anything
that emerged), and the study’s once-a-day report period meant that participants likely had
to rely on their presuppositions to respond to questions (i.e., rely on heuristics and selftheories due to the limitations of memory).
4. The study provided no iterative training. The study did use repeated data collection, but
there was no intercalated critical examination of participants’ ability to cleave to
experience-at-a-moment and to successively improve such abilities.
Experience Sampling Method
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The Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977;
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) is a naturalistic, beeper-based sampling method that asks
participants, when cued by a signaling device, to respond to a questionnaire that records details
about the participant’s situation (e.g., location, time of day) and subjective states (e.g., mood).
ESM, created by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, was one of the first methods to use pagers to trigger
participants to complete self-report logs with the first ESM study conducted in 1975
(Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1977).
The purpose of ESM is to obtain self-reports of both the context and the content of an
individual’s daily life. ESM is described as a method that allows for the examination of the
relationship between changes in individual’s external environment and/or situations and internal
contents of the mind (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi,
2007). In particular, measurements of experience collected via ESM are interpreted through the
lens of systematic phenomenology (Hektner et al., 2007): the combination of modern empirical
science (e.g., statistical analysis, scientific research designs) with data reflecting real-world lived
experience.
ESM studies may vary from study to study (particularly in regards to the types of data
collected and the manner in which such data is collected), but the general procedures for an ESM
study is as follows: A typical ESM study begins with recruiting participants and enrolling them
in a group orientation meeting with other participants to provide information about the study’s
procedure and to strengthen the research alliance (Hektner et al., 2007). Orientation meetings
typically are 45 to 60 min long, in which information is given about the study’s goals, participant
confidentiality and consent, instructions about how to use the beeper, and how to respond to
beeped cues using an Experience Sampling Form (ESF); in addition, participants are usually
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given the opportunity to engage in a practice beep with the researcher available to answer any
questions (Hektner et al., 2007). Guidelines for ESM orientation meetings stress the importance
of pre-sampling participant training, and recommend that investigators walk through each item
on the ESF and allow participants opportunities to respond to a practice beep (Christensen et al.,
2003). The signal device can be as simple as an electronic pager (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi,
2014), or as complicated as a palmtop, handheld computer, Personal Data Assistants (PDA), or
mobile device (Hektner et al., 2007; Van Berkel, Ferreira, & Kostakos, 2018). Often, an ESM
study will use a signal-contingent sampling schedule, in which participants are cued at random
times throughout the day (e.g., once every 2 hours between 8:00am and 10:00pm) over the
course of the sampling period (often seven days; Hektner et al., 2007; Larson &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014).
When cued by the random beep, participants are instructed to complete an ESF that
typically asks questions regarding their situation at the time they were cued (e.g., date, time,
location, what activity was being performed, whether or not they were alone or with others) as
well as questions regarding their internal experience at the time they were cued (e.g., contents of
thought; cognitive, emotional, and motivational states; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987;
Hektner et al., 2007; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). Whereas participants are usually
encouraged to respond to beeps immediately, participants sometimes delay in reporting;
researchers typically restrict responses to no more than 30 mins following a beep (Scollon et al.,
2003). Many studies use open-ended prompts to record external dimensions of their situation and
Likert-type rating scales to record internal components of experience (Hektner et al., 2007). The
scope and type of questions asked on ESF’s differ widely from study to study depending on the
specific research goals of a particular investigation, but all ESF’s are questionnaire-based.
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Once the data are collected, participants are usually given a questionnaire that assesses
how representative the period of sampling reflects a “normal week” in their lives and whether
there were any situations or events that caused participants to be unable to complete an ESF
following a beep (Hektner et al., 2007). Additionally, some studies conduct a debriefing
interview in which participants may be asked to identify any notable beeps or to point out the
normalcy of particular beeps (Hektner et al., 2007). After all data collection is completed, a
numeric codebook is typically developed that allows researchers to assign coding schemes to
participant’s open-ended answers on their ESF’s (Hektner et al., 2007). Although most of the
data are participant-coded Likert-scale ratings, investigators can code any number of variables
using a wide range of categories depending on the research questions (Csikszentmihalyi &
Larson, 1987). For instance, ESM studies have coded activities that participants were engaged in
at the moment of the beep (e.g., “working at work”, “playing with child”) and contents of
thought (e.g., thoughts about work, self, or others; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987).
ESM has been reported to have high sampling accuracy when compared to diary records
that recorded the frequency of activities (r = .93, p < .05), relatively stable test-retest reliability (r
= .45 to .75, p < .05), and sufficient internal consistency for scales of affect (α = .57) and scales
of arousal (α = .48; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). The validity of ESM has also been
studied in terms of the extent to which ESM data match situations and self-reported
psychological measures. One such study—which involved correlating participant’s heartrate
activity with their responses on a self-report 10-point scale that asked, “how physically active
have you been in the past three minutes?”—found that the relationship between these two
measures could vary widely within individuals, with relationships ranging from r = .16 to r = .61
(Hoover, as cited in Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). Other studies have found correlations
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between participant’s ESM reports and their scores on other psychological assessments: For
instance, McAdams and Constantian (1983) found that people with a high need for intimacy as
reported on the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) also reported more thoughts about people
and relationship as collected through ESM (r = .52, p < .001).
Of particular note is the extent to which participants in ESM studies believe that ESM
reports accurately capture their experience. In a sample of American and German participants,
Hormuth (as cited in Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) found that 90% of American participants
and 80% of Germans participants believed that the ESM reports captured their week well.
For example, Janssens et al. (2021) used ESM to examine changes in adolescent’s mood
during the COVID-19 pandemic and its relationship with parent-child relationship quality. They
used a smartphone app (MobileQ; Meers, Dejonckheere et al., 2020) that delivered a “buzz or
beep for 90 s or until the participants opened the notification” (p. 627) to cue the participants to
complete three questions about their ongoing experience: “I feel irritated,” “I feel stressed,” and
“I feel lonely.” Participants were instructed to respond to these items “with the moment right
before the notification in mind” (p. 627). Participants were tasked with responding to each item
using a Likert-scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Prior to sampling, the authors prepared
participants by providing instructions and a full demo on how to use the MobileQ application
and encouraged participants to ask questions. Participants were tasked with responding to 10
semi-random cues for six consecutive days; once completed, linear mixed effect models with
multilevel structure and repeated observations within persons was used to analyze the various
relationship between the study’s variables.
However, Janssens et al.’s ESM study failed to meet any of Hurlburt and Heavey’s
(2015, 2018) constraints:
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1. The study did not cleave to a moment: the use of a “buzz or beep” as a cue does not
unambiguously identify the moment of interest. A buzz has a slow-rise time and may
gradually pull participants out of their ongoing experience towards recognizing the onset
of the buzz (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004).
2. The study did not straightforwardly cleave to inner experience: they inquired about
emotions (irritated, stressed, lonely) which may or may not be apprehended as
phenomena. On can be, for example, in an irritated state without directly apprehending
irritation. The study also attempted to (but did not successfully) cleave to pristine
experience: participants collected information about themselves as they went about their
routines in their natural environments, but the authors used a semi-random sampling
timetable (and so participants may have caught on to the timing of the cues, thus
thwarting the possibility of pristine experience).
3. The study failed to adequately bracket presuppositions. In fact, the study made no effort
to bracket presuppositions; for instance, they only inquired about three pre-determined
emotions such that any and all other things could not be reported on.
4. The study did not provide iterative training: although the study did provide participant
training prior to sampling and involved collecting data over multiple instances, both of
these practices cannot be considered iterative training. First, the only explicit training that
occurred was the single pre-study practice—such one-shot trainings inherently preclude
successive training-and-improvement (as such training only occurs once). Second, there
was no ongoing direct confrontation or examination of participant’s reports—once presampling training was complete, the authors treated all reports as data regardless of
whether those reports were adequate or not (in fact, the authors explicitly stated,
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“participants received no feedback on their ESM compliance” (p. 627), destroying any
possibility of iterative training). Third (and given points one and two) there is little
warrant to expect participants could or would improve simply by completing the same,
identical questionnaires (because there were no means for participants to consolidate
feedback and start anew).
Ecological Momentary Assessment
Closely related to (and sometimes used interchangeably with) ESM is Ecological
Momentary Assessment (EMA). Developed in the 1990’s by Arthur Stone and Saul Shiffman,
and strongly rooted in ESM, EMA seeks to broaden the scope of ESM—which typically focused
on internal states—to include physiological measurements as well as events, locations, activities,
and places within the context of health (Stone & Shiffman, 1994). As a result, EMA is more
commonly used in medical research (Moskowitz & Young, 2006; Stone, 2012). Despite the
different research traditions between ESM and EMA, EMA refers to a broad range of
methods/procedures that are nearly identical to ESM (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008), such
that EMA (a) focuses on assessing phenomena the moment they occur, (b) uses various, carefully
timed sampling schemes (e.g., event-based, time-based, random), (c) typically involves repeated
multiple assessments over time, and (d) collects data in real-world environments that are
typically inhabited by participants (Stone & Shiffman, 1994; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2014).
Generally, differences between ESM and EMA studies are due more to small procedural
changes rather than larger conceptual changes. For instance—whereas most ESM studies will
have participants fill out an ESF to record their experience—EMA may use a variety of
assessments to record data at the moment of a beep, such as paper diaries, personal smartphones,
physiological measures (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate), and so forth, with an emphasis often
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placed on collecting objective, physiological measures (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008; Stone
& Shiffman, 2002). Additionally—whereas ESM studies will often use signal-contingent or
random sampling—EMA studies often utilize a wider variety of sampling schedules such as
time-contingent or event-contingent sampling (Shiffman et al., 2008). It should be noted,
however, that the distinction between ESM and EMA are often not strongly defined in the
literature as certain procedural changes (e.g., differences in sampling schedules) are not
exclusive to each respective method.
Like ESM, EMA has been found across a variety of studies to possess good reliability
and validity. Research conducted by Diener and colleagues have found EMA methods to possess
strong temporal stability and internal consistency while assessing various types of affect (e.g.,
fear, joy; Diener, Smith, & Fujita, 1995). EMA studies on pain have also found moderate but
significant correlations between daily sampling of pain and laboratory pain sensitivity (r = .34, p
= .037; D’Antono, Ditto, Rios, & Moskowitz, 1999).
For example, Shiffman et al. (1994) used EMA to study situational associations between
drinking alcohol and smoking). At the start of the study, participants were trained with a tutorial
and lecture that included hands-on practice trials and electronic trials to learn mastery over using
an electronic diary. Once sufficiently trained, participants were asked to always carry the
electronic diary with them and were tasked with recording data using both event-contingent
sampling (i.e., triggered by the act of smoking) and signal-contingent random sampling (i.e.,
triggered by a signal regardless of whether smoking was ongoing). Participants were instructed
to complete reports using their electronic diary within 20 minutes after being prompted and were
typically randomly sampled approximately five times a day. When beeped by an audible cue,
participants filled out assessments directly on the electronic diary. Items were presented one at a
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time and consisted of several closed-ended questions of which participants could select a
response from a pre-selected list. Branching items were also given based on participant’s
previous responses; participants were required to respond to every item within 30 seconds and
could not skip any questions. When beeped, the assessment collected information about many
variables, particularly those related to smoking and drinking such as alcohol consumption
(scored dichotomously yes or no), mood (from a list of 14 adjectives), activity (e.g., work, eating
or drinking, social interaction), location (home, work, bar or restaurant, vehicle), and so forth.
The results from Shiffman et al.’s investigations primarily consisted of reporting frequencies of
behavior (e.g., how many cigarettes and alcoholic drinks were consumed), temporal
characteristics of behavior (e.g., time of day, location, and activities ongoing when consuming
tobacco or alcohol), self-reported aspects of inner states as apprehended during sampled
moments (e.g., negative affect, arousal, attention), and relationships between frequencies,
temporal characteristics, and inner states.
Shiffman et al.’s study failed to meet any of Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015, 2018)
constraints:
1. The study did not cleave to a moment: Participants were allowed to respond to cues up to
20 min after they occurred, and it is unclear how that time span may have impacted
participant’s memory of whatever was ongoing at the time of the cue.
2. The study did not cleave to inner experience: they inquired about context and behaviors
(which are not descriptive of experience), and they also inquired about psychological
constructs (e.g., arousal, attention) that are never directly apprehended (one may infer
arousal by directly apprehending (for example) a pounding heartbeat, but arousal itself
does not refer to a directly apprehendable phenomena). The study also attempted to (but
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did not successfully) cleave to pristine experience: participants did collect some samples
cued by the random beeper, but the study’s primary aim of event-contingent sampling
(whenever participants smoked) was the exact opposite of pristine inner experience as
participants were not at all blind to their efforts to introspect.
3. The study failed to bracket presuppositions on at least three fronts: first, the study
included a narrowing-of-interest in studying participants’ experience during a particular
event—smoking (and, in so doing, likely overlooked important-but-unexpected
experience at other moments that may related to smoking but are not overtly about
smoking); second, participants were constrained to report only on whatever things the
questionnaires prompted them to report (rather than on anything that emerged). And
third, the study provided no principled method for bracketing presuppositions.
4. The study did not provide iterative training: although the study did provide participant
training prior to sampling and involved collecting data over multiple instances, neither of
these practices can be considered iterative training. First, the only explicit training that
occurred was the single pre-study practice—such one-shot trainings inherently preclude
successive training-and-improvement (as such training only occurs once). Second, there
was no ongoing direct confrontation or examination of participant’s reports—once presampling training was complete, the authors treated all reports as data regardless of
whether those reports were adequate or not. Third (and given points one and two) there is
little warrant to expect participants could or would improve simply by completing the
same, identical ESF form across (some near-identical) situations (because there were no
means for participants to consolidate feedback and start anew).
Think-Aloud Methods
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Think-aloud (TA) methods are types of experience sampling that involve asking
participants to speak aloud whatever words may be present in their mind as they go about
completing a task or process (Charters, 2003). The general purpose of TA studies has focused on
assessing higher-level thinking processes (Olson, Duffy, & Mack, 1984) as well as describing
problem-solving processes both within and across individuals (Fonteyn, Kuipers, & Grobe,
1993). TA has been used across a wide variety of populations and domains, such as studying
problem solving processes in sports and health (Arsal, Eccles, & Ericsson, 2016), computer
design (Jaspers et al., 2004), and education (Oster, 2001), and recent meta-analyses indicate that
TA does not elicit significant participant reactivity (i.e., does not negatively impact participant’s
performance of a task; Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011).
The origins of TA can be traced to early psychological research conducted by John
Dewey (1910) and Edouard Claparede (1917), although they gained prominence in contemporary
psychology via the work of Anders Ericsson and Hebert Simon (1980) (Brouwers & Hurlburt,
2017; Charters, 2003). Early TA methodology developed as a direct response to criticisms of
earlier introspective methods, although more modern studies are based on cognitive
psychology—and in particular—Vygotsky’s research on thought and words (Charters, 2003). In
a paper discussing the TA method (amongst other verbal reports of psychological data), Ericsson
and Simon (1980) expounded upon the theoretical background of TA: Given the informationprocessing paradigm within short-term memory (STM; the information-processing paradigm
posits that at any given moment, there exists a certain subset of information that is being
processed in STM), Ericsson and Simon argued that such information-processing within STM—
reported concurrently (at the moment) rather than retrospectively—is the only information about
consciousness that is accessible, consistent, complete, and able to be described.
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In contrast to other experience sampling methods that have thus far been covered (i.e.,
diary studies, ESM, EMA), TA differs in that it often is used in controlled laboratory settings
rather than in nautral environments (Brouwers & Hurlburt, 2017). The procedure for a typical
TA study, for instance, often begins by selecting a moderately difficult task for participants to
complete. The use of a moderately difficult task is important, given that the task should be
something in which individuals cannot rely on automatic, wordless cognitive processes as a
means to complete the task; in other words, the think aloud method—by virtue of its purpose to
elucidate participant’s ongoing thought process while problem solving—necessitates languagebased activity to be occurring during whatever task is selected (Charters, 2003). The task can
either be simulated (e.g., written, audio-visual), or performed in real life by the participant
(Fonteyn et al., 1993).
For example, Arsal et al. (2016) studied the cognitive control of a skilled behavior, golf
putting. Following Ericsson and Simon (1993), the investigators recruited two groups of
participants (a less-skilled golf group and a more-skilled golf group) and provided all
participants with two training exercises that taught them on how to think-aloud while putting. In
the first exercise, participants thought-aloud while solving simple problems and received
feedback from investigators; this was repeated until participant’s verbalized thoughts were
completed with no explanations and descriptions in them. In the second exercise, participants
were tasked with thinking-aloud during a short warm-up putt that was significantly shorter than
either of the experimental tasks. Participants practiced thinking-aloud from the moment they
retrieved a ball for their first putt until they had completed a second putt. Investigators were
present during warm-up exercises and were tasked with reminding participants to think out loud
if the participant had a period of silence longer than 20 secs.
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Once participants completed their think-aloud training, participants putted across four
conditions (short vs. long putt distance crossed with low vs. high stress conditions). Within each
condition, participants completed a block of five putt trials in which each trial consisted of two
putts for a total of 20 trials (40 putts). Participants were tasked with thinking-aloud from the
moment they retrieved a ball to begin their first putt to the completion of their second putt for
four of the five putt trials. Participant’s verbal thoughts were recorded and subsequently coded
using a coding scheme.
Arsal et al. (2016) performed quantitative analyses that illuminated aspects of golf
performance. For example, they found a significant main effect of group (F (1, 50) = 8.25, p =
.006, 𝜂𝑝2 = .14), such that the more-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant thoughts while
putting (M = 5.97, SD = 2.52) than did the less-skilled golfers (M = 4.08, SD = 2.22). In addition,
the more-skilled golfers verbalized significantly more thoughts related to golf strategy than did
the less-skilled golfers (M = .67, 95% CI [.44, .96]; F (1, 50) = 12.12, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .20). The
authors also found a significant main effect for putt length, F (1, 50) = 28.00, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .36,
in which more task-relevant thoughts were stated out loud during longer putts (M = 5.30, SD =
2.60) than during shorter putts (M = 4.75, SD = 2.54). Ultimately, Arsal et al.’s study provides an
illustrative example of the TA method within empirical studies. Notably, TA provides significant
quantitative data on the frequency, content, and temporal characteristics of verbally reported
accounts of inner experience.
Arsal et al.’s (2016) study failed to meet at least two of Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015,
2018) constraints:
1. The study’s cleaving to a moment is questionable: TA is inherently about putting-towords one’s thinking while engaged in a task across several or many seconds. In Arsal et
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al.’s study, participants spoke from the moment they retrieved a ball to begin a putt to the
completion of their second putt, lasting in the vicinity of 18 to 22 s. Thus, this study
involved experience across a period of time, not one moment. However, it might be said
that each utterance was constrained to its own moment.
2. The study’s cleaving to pristine inner experience is questionable: first, the study was
performed entirely in a contrived, laboratory environment, and participants were given
explicit instructions to intentionally introspect while perform the task (thus failing to
cleave to pristine experience). Second, the data collection favored verbal experience. A
participant could have reported, for example, seeing an image in their imagination, but all
of the subsequent analysis was on the content of thought (e.g., goal statements, taskirrelevant thoughts, strategy thoughts) as opposed to how such thoughts were
apprehended (thus significantly limiting the likelihood of cleaving-to-experience).
3. The study failed to bracket presuppositions on at least three fronts: although the study
allowed participants to report on whatever experience may have been present to them (in
that the study did not restrict reportable phenomena to certain pre-selected categories per
say), it still featured several presuppositions that were not at all bracketed. First,
investigators constrained their interest in studying participants’ experience while engaged
in a particular event—golf putting (and, in so doing, likely overlooked important-butunexpected experience at other moments that may related to putting but are not overtly
about putting); second, the demand for participants to describe their near-concurrent and
ongoing experience with constancy and fidelity presupposes many assumptions about the
nature of experience (e.g., that experience is always or near-always directly present, that
participants can report their experience quickly and/or with ease after limited training);
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third, there are presuppositions in assuming that whatever experience is reported on
within laboratory settings is close to pristine inner experience.
4. The study did not provide iterative training: although the study did provide participant
training prior to sampling and involved collecting data over multiple putting trials, both
of these practices cannot be considered iterative training. First, the only explicit training
that occurred was the single pre-study practice—such one-shot trainings inherently
preclude successive training-and-improvement (as such training only occurs once).
Second, there was no ongoing direct confrontation or examination of participant’s
reports—once pre-sampling training was complete, the authors treated all reports as data
regardless of whether those reports were adequate or not. Third (and given points one and
two) there is little warrant to expect participants could or would improve when
completing the same, identical task during a single experimental session (there were no
means for participants to consolidate feedback and start anew).
Articulated Thoughts During Simulated Situations
Similar to TA, the articulated thoughts during simulated situations (ATSS) method asks
participants to speak aloud their ongoing thoughts and feelings. The distinction is that ATSS
uses hypothetical scenarios rather than actual tasks. ATSS was created by Gerald Davison, Clive
Robins, and Marcia Johnson in 1983. Thus, the ATSS method (also referred to as a paradigm by
Davison and others) involves asking participants to report aloud their ongoing thoughts and
feelings as a response to simulated (i.e., contrived or imaginary) scenarios presented in a
laboratory environment (Davison, Robins, & Johnson, 1983; Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997).
The ATSS method was designed with many criticisms of past self-report in mind: it is
unstructured in response format (in that it encourages open-ended responses of all cognitions), it
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limits retrospection by having participants report on near-concurrent processes, it is situationally
specific (in that simulated situations are designed to evoke specific cognitions), and it allows for
the investigation of a wide breadth of circumstances (Davison et al., 1997). ATSS has been used
in studying cognition across various domains, disorders, and populations, such as in aggressive
and nonaggressive teens (DiLiberto, Katz, Beauchamp, & Howells, 2002), individuals with
anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa (Cooper & Fairburn, 1992), PTSD symptoms in veterans
(LaMotte et al., 2016), and implicit views of self in individuals with social anxiety (Tanner,
Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006).
The reliability, replicability, and validity of ATSS has been evaluated elsewhere
(Davison, Best, & Zanov, 2009; Zanov & Davison, 2009). Generally, however, ATSS’s testretest reliability is often found to be low, as the ATSS paradigm is a state measure interested in
participant’s immediate and changing reactions to specific situations (Zanov & Davison, 2009).
There is evidence that ATTS possesses good replicability: Previous ATSS studies demonstrated
a priori group similarities across participants in that similar cognitive contents were observed
between and within two different groups of participants (Zanov & Davison, 2009). Construct
validity for ATSS has been mixed, in that some studies, for instance, demonstrated high positive
correlation (and thus good construct validity) between participants’ self-ratings of their fear of
negative evaluation and their observed articulations of self-deprecation during socially evaluative
ATSS situations (Williams et al., 1992); in contrast, other studies have found that no correlation
(i.e., poor construct validity) between self-reports and ATSS data, which may be explained by
the fact that questionnaires often assess participants’ general and retrospective assessments of
their tendencies, whereas ATSS focuses on reactions to situation-specific scenarios (Zanov &
Davison, 2009).
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For example, Eckhardt, Barbour, and Davison (1998) used ATSS to study the thoughts of
maritally violent and nonviolent men during situations of anger arousal. Prior to data collection,
husbands (divided into three groups based on self-report: maritally violent, maritally distressednonviolent, and maritally satisfied-nonviolent) were presented with tape-recorded audio
instructions of the ATSS method, in which they would “listen to several taped scenarios, imagine
that they were actually involved in each, and when prompted by a tone, to talk out loud about
their thoughts and feelings into a microphone connected to a hidden tape recorder” (Eckhardt et
al., 1998, p. 262). Participants completed a non-arousing practice scenario and then were
presented with three audio-recorded scenarios of scripted overheard conversations—an angerinducing, jealously-inducing, and control scenario, respectively. Each scenario was divided into
eight, 30 s segments. Participants were to report their articulated thoughts at the end of each 30 s
segment. Each scenario was presented successively on a single tape, with the control situation
always presented first as researchers expected participants might have initially been
uncomfortable with the procedure. At the conclusion of participation, participants were debriefed
and provided with resources to local spouse abuse support groups and psychotherapy resources.
Each participant’s recorded articulated thoughts were transcribed and rated by two
independent raters who read the transcripts and listened to the recorded tape concurrently while
providing their ratings. In particular, each rater provided ratings on four general categories for
each segment of the tape: irrational beliefs, cognitive biases, hostile attributional biases, and
anger-control strategies. Irrational beliefs and cognitive biases—which were composed of four
specific types of irrational beliefs and six specific cognitive biases, respectively—were scored on
5-point Likert scales where 0 = not present at all and 4 = extremely present; ratings for each
segment were averaged from the two coders’ ratings and summary scores for the overall
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scenarios were calculated by summing the averaged ratings across the scenario’s eight segments.
Hostile attributional biases and anger-control strategies were scored as ongoing frequency tallies
across each of the three scenarios. Hostile attributional biases were defined as instances in which
a participant interpreted the cause of an event as stemming from malicious intentions of another
character, and anger-control strategies were defined as any verbally stated statement that
expressed a desire to leave the situation, active attempts to change one’s feelings, etc.
Eckhardt et al.’s (1998) results were largely quantitative and focused primarily on
distinguishing group-level differences among the three groups of men. For instance, maritally
violent men exhibited a significantly higher level of irrational beliefs during the anger scenario
compared to the groups of maritally distressed nonviolent men and maritally satisfied nonviolent
men (F (2, 77) = 7.42, p < .01). Similarly, maritally violent men exhibited a significantly higher
number of cognitive biases during the anger scenario compared to the groups of maritally
distressed nonviolent and maritally satisfied nonviolent men (F (2, 78) = 14.49, p < .001).
Eckhardt and colleagues also used ATSS data to predict group status using direct discriminant
function analysis, finding that they could correctly identify 70% of cases using two discriminant
functions. They also found no significant correlation correlations between cognition endorsed
using ATSS and cognition endorsed using self-reported questionnaires even when controlling for
affective arousal.
Eckhardt et al.’s study failed to meet most of Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015, 2018)
constraints:
1. The study did not cleave to a moment: participants were asked to report on their
experience across 30 s intervals.
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2. The study could not be said to cleave to pristine experience: first, the study involved
asking participants to listen (in a laboratory setting) to staged scenarios (and tasked
participants with pretending (a) the scenario was real and (b) that the participant was
present in the scenario itself; thus, the study failed to cleave to pristine experience).
Second, participants were instructed to “talk out loud about their thoughts and feelings,”
but there was no guarantee that the talk was actually constrained to directly apprehended
inner experience. Furthermore, all subsequent analysis was on the content of thought
(e.g., the four categories: irrational beliefs, cognitive biases, hostile attributional biases,
and anger-control strategies) as opposed to describing the phenomena (thus significantly
limiting the likelihood of cleaving-to-experience).
3. The study failed to bracket presuppositions on at least three fronts: although the study
allowed participants to report on whatever experience may have been present to
participants (in that the study did not restrict reportable phenomena to certain pre-selected
categories per se), it still featured several presuppositions that were not at all bracketed.
First, investigators constrained their interest in studying participants’ experience within
particular (anger-arousing) situations (and, in so doing, likely overlooked important-butunexpected experience at other moments that may related to anger but are not overtly
about anger); second, the demand that participants must describe their experience across
an entire 30 s period presupposes many assumptions about the nature of experience (e.g.,
that 30 s worth of experience can be retained in one’s memory and can be described with
fidelity); third, there are presuppositions in assuming that whatever experience is reported
on within laboratory settings is similar to pristine inner experience.
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4. The study did not provide iterative training: although the study did provide participant
training prior to data collection, pre-study training is not equivalent to iterative training as
one-shot training—inherent by its singleness—precludes successive training-andimprovement. Thus, there is little warrant to expect participants would successively
improve their skill (because there were no means for participants to consolidate feedback
and start anew).
Micro-Phenomenological Interview
The micro-phenomenological interview is a qualitative, interview-based research method
whose origins can be traced to Pierre Vermersch. In the 1990s, Vermersch developed the
elicitation interview3 technique in response to his frustration with apprehending first-person
accounts of consciousness (Vermersch, 1994; Vermersch, 2009) and his interest in philosopher
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology (Vermersch, 2009). Originally created to study the cognitive
processes involved in learning (Valenzuela-Moguillansky, 2013), Vermersch’s elicitation
interview technique is focused on singular moments of lived experience rather than on generic
structures (Petitmengin, Remillieux, & Valenzuela-Moguillansky, 2018). It has been described as
a “form of guided retrospective introspection” (Vermersch, 2009, p. 23) in which interviewers
use the explicitation process to help participants—who are theorized to possess pre-reflective
memories of a particular moment in time (i.e., memories that the participant is unaware of
possessing)—to recall and fill-in aspects of a specific conscious memory (i.e., “rediscover” a
memory; Maurel, 2009). Thus, it can be said that the participant works towards gaining reflective

Vermersch originally named the interview method Entretien d’explicitation in French. It was first translated to
English as “explicitation interview”; however, beginning in about 2013 it has been translated as “elicitation
interview” (Valenzuela-Moguillansky, 2013).
3
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consciousness of their past experience by carrying out a “reflection of [their] past lived
experience” (Maurel, 2009, p. 59), which the participant then describes within the interview.
Inspired by Vermersch’s work, Claire Petitmengin adapted Vermersch’s elicitation
interview method to create an “interview method” (Petitmengin, 2006) which later (Bitbol &
Petitmengin, 2016) became known as the micro-phenomenological interview method. The basic,
fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the majority of inner experience is prereflective (goes by unnoticed; Petitmengin, 2006), such that inner experience is often not part of
reflective consciousness and therefore is not something that is able to be verbally described
(Petitmengin et al., 2018). To access the pre-reflective aspects of consciousness, the microphenomenological interview method uses several methodological techniques that allow
participants to describe their experience more completely. These techniques include evoking past
or recently past events, having participants give repeated descriptions of a single experience, and
having participants focus not on the content of experience but rather on the form (i.e., how)
experience occurs (Petitmengin et al., 2017).
Thus, the stated goal of the micro-phenomenological interview method is to use “specific
prompts and questions... to help interviewed subjects become aware of the unrecognized part of
their experience and describe it precisely” (Petitmengin et al., 2018, p. 4). The founders of the
micro-phenomenological interview method ultimately believe that it is possible—by focusing on
singular experiences—that one can better elucidate the more general structure of experience that
takes into account the pre-reflective dimension of lived experience instead of focusing on
directly observed experience (or on observable, “third person” data collected by an experimenter;
Petitmengin, 2006; Petitmengin et al., 2018). It has been used to study a wide variety of various
types of experience such as intuitive experience (Petitmengin, 1999), meditative experiences
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(Petitmengin et al., 2017), and auditory experiences (Petitmengin et al., 2009) as well as in a
number of different clinical and therapeutic domains (Petitmengin, Navarro, & Le Van Quyen,
2007), cognitive and educational domains (Gould et al., 2014; Valenzuela-Moguillansky,
O’Regan, & Petitmengin, 2013), and artistic domains (Petreca et al., 2015).
Given the wide range of topics micro-phenomenological studies have investigated, the
exact procedures used in the micro-phenomenological interview method can vary. However, in
general, a typical micro-phenomenology interview study involves the isolation of a singular
experience such that it becomes possible to “practice an épochè: to ‘bracket’ or suspend our
preconceptions and theorizations about experience, and notably our implicit belief in the
existence of an objective world independent of experience” (Petitmengin et al., 2018, p. 691).
Identifying a singular experience is typically performed as a collaboration between the
participant and micro-phenomenology interviewers and can involve either re-evoking the
experience within the interview (e.g., intentionally re-engaging in behaviors to conjure the
experience) or identifying a past experience. Once an experience has been identified, the microphenomenology interviewer assists participants in avoiding participants’ verbalization of satellite
dimensions about the specific experience (e.g., the generalities, judgements, and theoretical
knowledge about the experience) and to instead talk about “the way this experience appears to us
(the ‘how’)” (Petitmengin et al., 2018, p. 691) by evoking or re-enacting the experience.
In particular, micro-phenomenology claims that evoking the experience involves
establishing two (diachronic and synchronic) dimensions of experience. First, interviewers help
the participant to establish the diachronic dimensions of the specific experience—a description of
the temporally-unfolding and “content-empty” nature of experience including how the participant
experienced things, breaking down the experience into successive sub-phases or a timeline of the
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experience. This typically involves questions such as “how did you start?” and “what happened
then?” (Petitmengin et al., 2018, p. 694). Once established, participants and interviewers
establish the synchronic dimensions of the experience—descriptions of the structural
characteristics of the experience at a given instant; if, for instance, the experience involved an
inner image, the interviewer may ask questions such as, “When you see this, how do you see it?”
(Petitmengin et al., 2018, p. 694) to help the participant describe how the inner image was
present (e.g., its color, size, location). Researchers that use the micro-phenomenology interview
method claim that the repeated evocation of the experience is an example of an iterative
structure, such that participants may be guided towards “a progressively finer synchronic and
diachronic mesh” (Petitmengin et al., 2018, p. 694). The final result of a micro-phenomenology
study typically results in discovering generic structures of experience that emerge from
considering each individual participants’ individual experience(s).
For example, Petitmengin et al. (2017) used micro-phenemenological interviews to study
the experience of shamatha-vipashyanā meditators. Twelve participants—each with 5 to 45
years of meditative experience—were interviewed two or three times. When participants first
arrived for the study, they engaged in a conversation with researchers to discuss the context and
objectives of the study. The researchers explained the theory and purpose of the microphenomenology method and collected information about the participant’s meditative practices
(e.g., type of practice, frequency of practice, years of practice). If participants were naïve to the
micro-phenomenology method, they engaged in a training micro-phenomenological interview.
Next, participants were asked to practice shamatha—a meditation aimed at focusing attention on
one’s breathing—for approximately 20 minutes.
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Following the meditation session, researchers conducted an elicitation interview, which
typically lasted approximately 60 to 90 min. The first step of the elicitation interview involved
discussing “a general description of the unfolding of the [meditation] session” from the
perspective of the participants’ experience. Next, participants were instructed to identify a
specific moment of experience to discuss; this sometimes involved an invoked experience that
occurred prior to participation in the study, but, more commonly, it involved having participants
elicit provoked experiences. Provoked experiences involved having participants purposefully
engage in meditation to better come into contact with their experience; within the procedures of
Petitmengin et al.’s (2017) study, this took the form of either (a) intentionally re-engaging in
meditation within the course of an interview to provide answers about experience, or (b)
interrupt meditation at a random point to begin the elicitation interview, typically with the sound
of a gong (such that participants were asked about their experiences that had occurred just before
the meditation was disturbed).
Once a single experience had been specified, participants were guided to re-enact the
experience in such a way that they were able to establish the basic spatio-temporal context of the
situation and various other components of experience (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic,
olfactory sensations). Next, participants were asked about finer levels of experience by the
investigator’s focus on the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of experience. At the end of
each interview, participants were asked to reflect on their experience of the interview process,
such as whether the elicitation interview aided their ability to notice previously unnoticed parts
of their experience. This pre-interview/meditation-session/elicitation interview/post-interview
protocol was repeated at least once for each participant; some participants were invited for an
additional (third) interview that followed the same procedure (Petitmengin et al., 2017).
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As a result, Petitmengin et al. described participants’ generation of a virtual scene (i.e., an
imagined space where some participants visualize their thoughts; Petitmengin et al., 2017, pp.
180-181), generation of a virtual scene while losing contact with their actual situation (i.e.,
getting “lost in a thought” and losing awareness of one’s actual body; pp. 181-182), instances of
regaining contact with bodily sensations (i.e., reconnecting with the physical sensations present
in their actual body; pp. 182-183), and various instances of the early emergence of thought (e.g.,
physical and mental characteristics that indicate the early parts of or changes in thought; pp. 183187).
Petitmengin et al.’s (2017) study failed to meet most of Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015,
2018) constraints:
1. The study did not cleave to a moment: of the three ways a moment of interest was
identified in the study, two failed to identify (let alone cleave to) any moment—
participants’ recollection of a self-selected past experience provided no means of
ensuring any moment was being identified, and the intentional re-engaging in meditation
to try and (re-)apprehend a particular phenomenon refers to a new, unique, and different
moment than the original moment. The third way a moment of interest was identified—
the random-interruption of meditation using a gong—approached cleaving to a moment,
but the use of a gong as a cue may have complicated the study’s task for participants (a
gong typically involves a slow-rise time, which ambiguates the exact moment a
participant should apprehend: is the moment when the first audible sound is heard, or
when the gong reaches its apex?; see Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004).
2. The study neared cleaving-to-inner-experience but failed to do so outrightly: investigators
sought describe directly apprehended experience while meditating (the authors
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specifically noted that a goal of their study was to “help the subject relax the focus of
attention on the content, the ‘what’ of the evoked experience, in order to let the ‘how’
appear” (Petitmengin et al., 2017, p. 175), and their results were about describing such
experience. However, there is reason to doubt that this study successfully cleaved to
experience: because the study failed to cleave to a moment, it is unlikely that any directly
apprehended phenomena could have been apprehended or described by participants
because inner experience (by definition) inheres in moments. A failure to cleave to a
moment diminishes (if not destroys) the likelihood of cleaving to experience. The study
failed to cleave to pristine experience: of the three ways in which the study identified
possible phenomena, only one involved an attempt at apprehending pristine experience
(the participants’ recollection of a self-selected past situation); but, because such a
practice failed to cleave to a moment, it is doubtful that pristine phenomena could have
been described. All other ways in which the study identified possible phenomena
involved demands to intentionally introspect on experience in a contrived, laboratory
environment.
3. The study failed to bracket presuppositions on at least three fronts: although the study
involved asking open-ended questions about whatever experience may have been present
to participants (in that the study did not restrict reportable phenomena to certain preselected categories per say), it still featured several presuppositions that were not at all
bracketed. First, there was/is a presupposition that the apprehension (and, subsequently,
the description) of past inner experience may be improved through repeatedly “reevoking” again and again the experience during the explication interview. Second, there
was/is a presupposition that experience-at-a-moment may be similar to, or at least could
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be adequately interchanged with, experience-at-(other-similar)-moments. For example,
the study involved having participants engage in purposeful periods of meditation to
better answer questions about their (past) experience-while-meditating that they could not
previously answer (likely because the participant failed to apprehend their experience). In
both instances, the known hazards that retrospection, heuristics, and other factors impose
on introspection suggest that these practices should be treated with great caution. Third,
there are presuppositions in assuming that whatever experience is reported on within
laboratory settings is similar to pristine inner experience.
4. The study did not provide iterative training as Hurlburt and Heavey (2015, 2018) defines
“iterative.” The micro-phenomenology version of iterative is primarily recurrent within a
single session (or perhaps across sessions aimed at re-evoking the same or similar
experience). The DES version of iterative is across sessions, aimed a preparation for
entirely new experiences.
Descriptive Experience Sampling
Descriptive experience sampling (DES) is a descriptive, naturalistic sampling and
interview-based method for describing pristine inner experience (e.g., naturally occurring
thoughts, feelings, physical sensations). Created by Russell Hurlburt, a precursor to DES was
first used in a master’s thesis under Hurlburt’s mentorship in the 1980’s (Saltman, 1983); that
method had built on earlier experience-sampling research that Hurlburt conducted in the 1970’s
that pioneered the use of random beepers in natural environment sampling (Hurlburt, 1976,
1979). DES was formally described and discussed in the 1990’s (Hurlburt, 1990, 1993, 1997).
Although DES’s protocol uses a random-beeper to cue participants in their everyday lives
(as do ESM and EMA), DES is substantially different from ESM and EMA in that DES does not
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use questionnaires or Likert scales, instead using expositional interviews to collect high-fidelity
descriptions of inner experience; and DES requires iterative skill training rather than one-shot
training. DES has been used to study inner experience across a number of diverse clinical
populations such as bulimia nervosa (Doucette & Hurlburt, 1993; Jones-Forrester, 2009), anxiety
(Hutchins, 2008), depression (Perlotto, 2001), and schizophrenia (Hurlburt, 1993). It has also
been used in diverse, non-clinical populations such as older adults (Seibert, 2009), left-handed
individuals (Mizrachi, 2013), and undergraduate college students (Lapping-Carr, 2019), and has
been used to study inner experience while engaging in various, on-going situations such as while
silently reading (Brouwers et al., 2018) and while golfing (Dickens, Van Raalte, & Hurlburt,
2018). DES has been validated by inviting skeptics into the sampling process (see Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2007) and has also been made publicly accessible (see Hurlburt & Krumm, 2020;
Krumm & Hurlburt, 2021); DES has also been validated by engaging in contemporaneous
sampling within an fMRI scan (Kühn et al., 2014).
The goal of DES is deceptively simple: to provide high-fidelity descriptions of directly
apprehended pristine inner experience through randomly sampled moments occurring in natural
environments. To achieve this, prospective DES participants are given a random beeper with
earphones and are instructed (via a 30- to 45-min pre-sampling instruction session) to wear the
beeper throughout their normal daily routines. The “beeper” (officially called the random interval
generator v.3.x; Hurlburt, 2000) used in DES studies is a pocket-sized (4.15 x 2.40 x .85 in)
device that produces a 700 Hz tone at random intervals (M = 30 min; minimum = a few seconds;
maximum = 60 min) delivered through an earphone worn by participants. At typically six
random beeps, participants are tasked with apprehending whatever inner experience happened to
be directly present at the “last undisturbed moment before the onset of the beep” (Hurlburt &
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Akhter, 2006, p. 277). Participants are instructed to stop the beep and then to take notes about
whatever experience that had been “caught in flight” by the beep. The note-taking procedure can
be by writing in a notebook, using the Notes feature of their mobile phone, or by recording audio
notes. All such notes are meant to help the participant recall their at-the-beep experience during
the upcoming expositional interview.
Within 24 hr of sampling, the participant meets with DES investigators to engage in an
expositional interview to (a) describe whatever experience was apprehended at each sampled
moment, (b) clarify and disambiguate the participant’s descriptions, and (c) through this
clarification and disambiguation practice, improve the apprehension-and-description process so
that they may be incrementally better equipped to provide higher fidelity descriptions of the
participant’s inner experience on subsequent sampling days.
Expositional interviews last approximately 1 h, during which time the participants are
asked to respond to the DES question, “what, if anything, was in your experience at the moment
of the beep?”. Such a question is open-beginninged in that “it leaves both the beginning and the
end of the response spontaneous and unguided” (Hurlburt, 2009, p. 169, emphasis in original)
and contributes to the bracketing of presuppositions by allowing participants to describe
whatever experience may have been directly apprehended. The expositional interview is/was an
inherently egalitarian endeavor—the participant is treated as a co-investigator (as they are the
only ones with access to the thing-of-interest—their inner experience), and DES investigators
themselves each individually practice the checking and bracketing of their own and all others’
presuppositions.
The expositional interview also involves confrontation. Both investigators and
participants must wrestle with the adequacy of participant’s utterances. All the while,
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investigators and participants are joined together in a group agreement to grasp inner experience
with as much fidelity as possible; thus, for example, if participant’s responses appeared to speak
of anything other than experience-at-a-moment (such as by reporting on their in-general
experience) or anything other than directly apprehended phenomena (such as by reporting on
explanations or self-theories of their experience), participants and investigators engaged in
conversations confronting the participant’s potential difficulties in apprehending and describing
their experience in the hopes of improving the apprehension and description of experience for the
next sampling opportunity. This sampling-and-interviewing process is repeated over a minimum
of 3-4 (often more) rounds of sampling-and-interviews, with each round aimed at grasping inner
experience with the highest fidelity possible and to successively improve for the next round of
sampling. The aim of DES studies are high-fidelity descriptions of participants’ inner experience.
Typically, the findings from DES studies involve the generation of idiographic descriptions of
individual participants’ salient inner experience characteristics—high-fidelity descriptions of a
few random samples of participant’s ongoing experience. Such profiles also thus allow for the
identification of phenomena that may be present in all or most participants of a particular
investigation.
For example, Jones-Forrester (2009) studied the inner experience of individuals with
bulimia nervosa. Recruiting participants from an undergraduate SONA population, JonesForrester invited 13 participants with bulimia to participate in six days (i.e., six sampling-andinterview sequences) of standard DES sampling following the procedures outlined above. JonesForrester’s findings involved the high-fidelity description of phenomena such as fragmented
multiplicity—instances where participants experienced several (e.g., 12) simultaneous
phenomena. Here is an example of a sample of experience from participant Jessica:
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She was watching the TV show Scrubs, a scene in which a skinny blonde female doctor
walked in to [sic] a room and all of the male doctors froze and stared at her. Jessica had a
partially worded thought process that if it were fully worded would be, “Why is it that
movies and TV shows always have blonde skinny girls for guys to stare at?” At the
moment of the beep, in this partially worded thought, the words “blonde,” “skinny,”
“guys,” and “stare” were apprehended in inner speech, in her own voice, as if she had
said these words aloud, and were apprehended as being in the front of her head. The
remainder of the words from this thought were apprehended as being also in inner
speech, in her own voice, but quieter and in the back of her head. These two voice
streams were not in a temporally organized stream; that is, it seemed that the front voices
were not synchronized to the back voices. Thus, if these inner speakings were
coordinated they would be saying one thing, “Why is it that movies and TV shows
always have blonde skinny girls for guys to stare at?” but at the moment of the beep they
are not coordinated but are instead two separate and simultaneous streams of partially
worded inner speakings. She also had separate, simultaneous multiple unsymbolized
thought/recollections of movies and TV shows in which blonde skinny girls were
featured. There were perhaps 8 or 10 of these simultaneous thoughts/recollections,
apprehended as a jumble of not fully articulated thoughts that somehow existed in a pile
or heap outside and behind her head (Jones-Forrester, 2009, pp. 286-287).
In addition to these types of descriptions of individual moments of directly apprehended
experience, Jones-Forrester found that the phenomena of fragmented multiplicity emerged as an
experience universal to all sampled participants (and is exceedingly rare in other populations that
do not have bulimia).
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Jones-Forrester’s (2009) study satisfied all of Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015, 2018)
constraints:
1. The study cleaved to moments: participants were tasked with apprehending whatever was
in their direct experience at moments identified by the random DES beeper—that is, the
last, undisturbed moment at the leading edge of the 700 hz tone.
2. The study cleaved to pristine inner experience: the entire study was focused on the
apprehension and description of directly apprehended inner experience. Moreover, the
experience under examination occurred in participant’s natural environments and the use
of the random beeper meant that participants could not anticipate when the beep would
occur (thus limiting intentional introspection).
3. The study made substantial, principled efforts to bracket presuppositions: for example,
the use of the random beeper meant that participants not chose to discuss their “favorite”
or theoretically desirable phenomenon or other forms of self-selection; the expositional
interviews always involved asking open-beginninged questions that allowed for the
description of any and all phenomena (that is, even though the investigators predetermined a population of interest, they intentionally did not set out to constrain
participants’ report to only bulimia-related phenomena).
4. The study provided iterative training: the entire construction of DES is intended to
facilitate participants’ improvement in their ability to apprehend and describe experience.
Summary
In contrast to all other introspective methodologies outlined in this review, DES has
several conspicuous characteristics. Similar to the other sampling methods, DES involves
random natural environment sampling (rather than laboratory settings or reenacting past
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experiences). However, unlike other sampling methods, the DES data collection involves
descriptive interviews (rather than self-report questionnaires) that are conducted using openbeginninged questions (rather than relying on close-beginninged and close-ended questions, such
as “Were you innerly speaking to yourself? Yes or no?”), involves bracketing presuppositions
(rather than relying on or leaning into a priori assumptions, theories, and other beliefs that may
obscure phenomena), and provides iterative training (rather than a one-shot attempt at collecting
data). Ultimately, idiographic characterizations of participants are descriptive (rather than relying
on summative statistics or numerical representations of non-numerical phenomena) and are
aimed at the individual (and are thus idiographic rather than nomothetic). Although the
challenges that are related to a scientific study of inner experience persist in all introspective
methodologies, DES has taken these considerations seriously (as evidenced by its fulfillment of
Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015, 2018) four constraints and the hundred others described in
Hurlburt, 2011) and has attempted to limit their influence by its methodological characteristics
(McKelvie, 2019). Thus, DES is a particularly promising methodology that merits further
exploration, particularly around its claims about the possibility of descriptive fidelity that give
rise to important questions: Is it possible to apprehend experience in high-fidelity? How does one
know a high-fidelity description from a report with low fidelity? Do participants improve in their
ability to apprehend and describe their experience?
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Chapter 3: DES Analytical Procedure
In the previous chapter, we saw that DES aspires to provide high-fidelity descriptions of
directly apprehended pristine inner experience while working within Hurlburt and Heavey’s
(2015, 2018) four constraints and discussed aspects of the method. Now, we provide a more
detailed discussion of the DES analytical procedure. We first review the target to be described,
and then discuss how DES deals with sampling data.
DES’ Target: High-Fidelity Descriptions of Directly Apprehended, Pristine Inner
Experience
Directly apprehended inner experience refers to any phenomenon “which directly
presents itself ‘before the footlights of consciousness’ (as William James would say) at some
particular moment” (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 2), that are undeniably present to an individual at a
particular point in time. By this definition, “a thought, a feeling, a tickle, a seeing, a hearing, and
so on count as [directly apprehended inner] experience” (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 2). In contrast,
processes that occur outside of conscious awareness (e.g., digestion, the regulation of one’s heart
rate, the activation of lumbar muscles while sitting) and explanations and/or interpretations of
phenomena (e.g, “I was talking to myself because I was getting ready to make a phone call”) are
not directly apprehended inner experience.
The adjectival phrase, ”directly apprehended inner” is designed to narrow the kind of
experience under consideration from other, usually broader, uses of “experience.” For example,
people may use “experience” to refer to life experience they’ve accumulated; people also may
use “experience” to describe an encounter or contact with an event or events, such as the
“experience of my trip to India,” (Caracciolo & Hurlburt, 2016) or the “experience of graduate
school”; and so forth. “Experience” as used in these examples and contexts are decidedly not part
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of directly apprehended inner experience. Thus—and arguing against the widely-held
assumption that inner experience is inherently “subjective” (see Czikszentmihalyi & Larson,
1987, p. 526)—directly apprehended inner experience can be said to be radically non-subjective.
It is not merely that directly apprehended inner experiences are “subjectively” or
“impressionistically” present, but rather that they are “actual phenomena that are directly
experienced at some moment; all subjective opinions, impressions, and characterizations are
radically avoided” (Hurlburt, 2011, pp. 330).
Pristine inner experience refers to “experiences in their natural state, not disturbed by the
act of observation, unplanned, unmapped, un-‘figured out’ already, uninterpreted, unheuristicized real experience” (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006, p. 273). Pristine by this definition is
used in the same way as it is used to describe a pristine forest: untouched, unsullied, unspoiled,
undeveloped. Notice that pristine in this context does not mean “’clean’ or ‘tranquil’; much of a
pristine forest is mucky, bloody, brutal, and so on” (Hurlburt, 2011, pp. 2).
High-fidelity descriptions of inner experience within the context of DES refer to “the
degree to which an apprehension or description of pristine inner experience faithfully reflects,
genuinely conveys, and non-misleadingly suggests important features of that pristine inner
experience” (Hurlburt et al., 2017). By this definition, high-fidelity does not aspire to perfection,
nor does it strive for concepts such as psychometric validity. Rather, high-fidelity is akin to the
process of painting a faithful, realistic, detailed representation of a particular, real-life scene; it
would be impossible to re-create the exact visual stimuli as it is apprehended through your eyes,
but one can commit oneself to ensuring that the salient characteristics of the scene are captured
with “a lack of distortion, misrepresentation, exaggeration, [or] avoidance” (Hurlburt et al., 2017,
pp. 5).
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DES’ Analytical Procedure
We now discuss the analytical procedures used by DES to describe directly apprehended
pristine inner experience.
Within a few hours following each expositional interview, one of the DES investigators
who had participated in the interview drafts the contemporaneous description of the participant’s
apprehended experience for each sampled moment. That contemporaneous description is
circulated to all other investigators who had been present in the interview so that each
investigator may, within 24 hours of the interview, provide comments, ask for clarification, and
express differences of opinion with the original contemporaneous description or comments
thereon (typically by using tracked changes on a Word document). The goal of these descriptions
is not necessarily to reach a consensus about ongoing experience at each beep, nor is it meant to
serve as a definitive description of ongoing experience. Instead, the goal is to document each
experience as individually apprehended by each interviewer, including acknowledging any
doubts, disagreements, ambiguities, and so on that may be present. Each investigator has the
responsibility of ensuring that his or her own apprehension of each sample of the participant’s
experience (including perhaps doubts about it) is contemporaneously documented. That is, the
contemporaneous description is messy; it may contain several competing versions of the same
sampled experience. As such, many commentary rounds as are necessary may occur, in which
the document is continually circulated to all interviewers. Sometimes during these rounds, an
investigator may be swayed by another investigator’s characterization (“Oh! That’s what she
said!”), in which case the messiness can be reduced. However, we emphasize that the goal of the
contemporaneous description is not consensus but individual responsibility.
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Contemporaneous descriptions are written and circulated after each sampling day.
Sometimes, a subsequent sampling day clarifies an ambiguity or messiness of a previous
contemporary description (“Oh! That’s what she meant!”), in which case the previous
contemporary description is edited.
When the sampling period with a participant is complete, the investigators meet to reawaken each individual investigator’s apprehension of each sample, now in the context of all the
samples. The contemporaneous descriptions are used as tools in this reawakening, but the aim is
not to reconsider the descriptions but to refresh the investigator’s recollection of the sampled
experiences. Sometimes those discussions involve watching the video of one or several samples.
Functionally, this involves reviewing and discussing each sample one-by-one and generating a
brief caption (usually less than about 10 words) that seeks to capture the heart of whatever
phenomena was present at each sample. Note that this process involves creating captions that
emerge from whatever phenomena is present at each sample; this process expressly does not
involve defining, fitting, or otherwise coding phenomena into a pre-determined set of codes or
categories. Thus, the process of captioning each sample is done in service of the phenomena,
where the intention is to honor and describe the phenomena with high fidelity; the intention is
not performed in service of getting phenomena to fit codes or categories.
Once the sample reconsideration has been completed, within 24 hours each investigator
independently prepares an independent informal characterization of the major idiographic salient
characteristics that emerged across the totality of sampled moments. These reports are similar to
the ethos behind the contemporaneous sample descriptions: each investigator has the
responsibility to provide his or her own take-aways regarding the participant’s sampled moments
(regardless of whether those take-aways agree with other investigators’). Through the discussion
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of the multiple informal characterizations (typically performed via email and tracked changes on
a Word document), a final summated document is created, called the idiographic salient
characteristics. This document characterize the main characteristics of that participant’s sampled
moments. Moreover, this document does reflect (for the first time) a desire for consensus, but
may also include differing or conflicting views of each investigator if such exist (Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2018). This document is referred to as the idiographic salient characteristics of a
participant’s collected samples, where idiographic emphasizes that the description characterizes
the particular individual, regardless of the characteristics of any other individuals (Hurlburt,
2011; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
The procedure up to now has created descriptions of several or many salient
characteristics; the task ahead involves applying that group of salient characteristics back to each
of the original samples. An Excel spreadsheet is created in which the description of each
idiographic salient characteristic appears as a column, and each sample description appears as a
row. Then, each investigator re-visits each sample (aided by the contemporaneous descriptions
and recollections of the samples, but returning to the videotape if necessary) and independently
codes which of the idiographic salient characteristics are present, in which a coding of 0 refers to
the salient characteristic being not at all or only very slightly present in that sample, 1 refers to
the salient characteristic as being present, and .5 refers to a salient characteristic as being
somewhat present or we weren’t sure. The goal of this process is to confront each sample with all
of the idiographic salient characteristics now identified.
Similar in many respects to the goal of the characteristic creation meeting, the intention
of coding the presence of salient characteristics in samples is not to see how well the phenomena
fits pre-determined categories, but instead is aimed at considering whether the idiographic
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characteristic itself should be refined. Once completed by each individual investigator,
investigators as a group meet for a rectification meeting. The goal of this meeting—like most
other processes within DES—is not to simply reach consensus, nor is it merely to implement
double-entry-bookkeeping data entry techniques (although doubtless this is a byproduct of the
practice). Instead, the process is one more step toward attempting to fulfill the goal of fidelity. In
other words, the goal of both the act of coding salient characteristics and the rectification of the
salient character codings is to consider whether the idiographic characteristics should be refined
so that they may rest with greater fidelity on the phenomena present within each sample, brought
into focus when the investigators do not unanimously agree on the coding of a particular
characteristic for a particular sample. Thus, discrepant codings between investigators may serve
as important indicator that the salient characteristics identified in previous sections may
misrepresent or distort fundamental aspects of the phenomena, and in turn may lead to the
adjustment of the “borders” or details of the characteristics themselves.
Once all characterizations are complete and rectified, an idiographic description is
created summarizing the salient characteristics of a participant’s sampled experience (here,
again, idiographic emphasizes the focus on a single individual). It should be noted that the goal
of the idiographic characterizations is not to interpret participant’s experience or to make
nomothetic generalizations across a group or population—rather, the primary goal of the
idiographic characterization is one of high-fidelity description of a person’s sampled experience.
For the sake of completeness in describing the DES method in its entirety, we have now
provided an outline of DES’ analytical procedure, which demonstrates the DES commitment to
apprehending and describing directly apprehended pristine inner experience in high-fidelity. This
commitment suffuses every aspect of the DES method—DES always aims to act in service of
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achieving high-fidelity experience, which means avoiding many of psychology’s conventional
practices and procedures such as the implementation of common qualitative data analysis (as
such analysis were not intentionally built in the services of apprehending and describing directly
apprehended pristine inner experience in high-fidelity).
Although the DES analytical procedure is central to the DES method, we did not
investigate this procedure in the current study. Instead, the current study analyzed a portion of
DES that comes before the analytic procedure: participant’s behavior and utterances within the
expositional interviews.
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Chapter 4: Current Study—Overview and Purpose
Of the many unique procedures that is part of the DES method, one of the core practices
at the heart of the method is the iterative training of participant’s skill. It has long been claimed
that most (nearly all) participants are initially unskilled at apprehending and describing their
inner experience (see Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001). However, through iterative training, it is
claimed that participants can and do sharpen the skills necessary to apprehend and describe their
inner experience. That is, it is claimed that a participant’s skill at the end of DES sampling (e.g.,
the last round of sampling-and-interviewing) is typically improved by comparison to their skill at
the beginning (e.g., the first round of sampling-and-interviewing).
There are several consequences both small and large that have stemmed from this
assumption. One specific example: first-day samples are always excluded (because they are
collected putatively with low skill) from consideration of participant’s salient characteristics are
aggregated:
•

First-day expositional interviews are considered “on-the-job” training for participants,
thus any information gathered during the first-day interviews are discarded (Heavey &
Hurlburt, 2008, p. 801; Hurlburt, 2007, pp. 23; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002, p. 139;
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015, pp. 9; Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002, p. 126).

•

Samples collected on first-day expositional interviews are considered unreliable and are
thus discarded from meaningful analysis (Hurlburt et al., 2015, p. 4).

•

Most people are unskilled observers and/or reporters about their inner experience; thus,
most people in their first-day expositional interview are unable to provide adequately
meaningful reports about their experience because they did not actually apprehend their
experience while sampling (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006, p. 281).
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•

Most people on their first day of sampling are either not highly skilled at apprehending
their experience and/or are not sufficiently bracketing their presuppositions about their
experience; and/or DES interviewers have not yet adjusted to a participant’s idiosyncratic
ways of reporting their inner experience. As a result, first-day expositional interviews are
only aimed at roughly approximating faithful apprehensions of experience (Heavey,
Hurlburt, & Lefforge, 2010, p. 349).

•

Most participants describe heuristics, speculations, and/or generalizations about their
inner experience during first-day interviews and thus do not report directly apprehended
pristine inner experience and so result in sullied data (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2018 p. 5;
Hurlburt, 2009, p. 165)
Although these claims may be based on observations by experienced DES investigators,

there has been no formal investigation of the characteristics of the experience-apprehension and
description skills of DES participants in first-day expositional interviews, and little formal
investigation of whether iterative training improves participants’ ability to apprehend and
describe their inner experience. It is unclear what the characteristics and skill are of naïve
participants during their first-day interview, and it is unclear what changes (if any) occur in their
characteristics and skill by the time of their last-day interview. The present study examines those
issues.
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Chapter 5: DES Skill
Defining DES Skill
In order to address the research aims of this study, it must first be clarified how DES
defines “skill” as it relates to apprehending and describing inner experience. To this end, we
return to parts of Hurlburt and Heavey’s (2015, 2018) four constraints. Although we have so far
discussed the four constraints as a means of assessing methodological adequacy, two of the
constraints relate directly to participants’ skill—cleaving to the moment of the beep and cleaving
to directly apprehended experience.
Cleaving to the Moment of the Beep
Because inner experience may change dramatically from moment to moment, it is
necessary for any exploration of inner experience to focus on temporal specificity. Therefore, in
order for any description of experience to be possible, the participant (and the method) must
work to cleave to (not stray from, focus only on) a specific moment. To this end, DES uses the
random beeper that delivers an unambiguous beep (700 hz tone with a fast-rise-time) and asks
participants about the experience that the beep “caught in flight.” By tying experience to a
specific moment in time, DES aims to constrain participants to apprehend only what had been
occurring at the “microsecond” right before the beep sounded (that is, what experience had been
ongoing at the leading edge of the beep). This process is meant to actively avoid participants’
reporting experiences that had occurred seconds, minutes, hours, or days prior to or after the
moment of the beep. The randomness of the beep is also intended to avoid the potentially
distortive effects of intentional introspection or self-selection bias on the part of the participant.
Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience
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By definition, directly apprehended phenomena are the only phenomena that can be
described (as it is the only thing that is directly and unambiguously apprehended by a
participant). Therefore, in order for any description of experience to be possible, the participant
(and the method) must work to cleave to (not stray from, focus only on) directly apprehended
inner experience. DES makes careful distinctions between phenomena that are directly
apprehendable to participants (i.e., phenomena that are present “in the footlights of
consciousness”) versus generalities, constructs, explanations, theories, speculations and so on
about inner experience that are themselves not directly apprehended at the moment of the beep.
This focus on directly apprehended experience makes possible a high-fidelity description: in the
same way a high-fidelity recording of a symphony translates the volume, timbre, location, echo,
and so on of a real performance (but can never fully recreate the live performance), a phenomena
that was directly apprehended by a participant at a specific moment implies that that experience
may described in a way that faithfully translates the phenomena into a worded description (but
can never fully recreate the ongoing, private experience).
In sum, by cleaving to the moment of the beep and cleaving to directly apprehended
experience, descriptions of directly apprehended phenomena that are actually present before the
footlights of consciousness at the moment of the beep are considered, while all other things are
avoided. Resultingly, a participant who shows evidence for implementing these abilities can be
considered a skillful participant.
(Lack of) Subjunctification
In addition to cleaving to the moment of the beep and cleaving to directly apprehended
experiences, Hurlburt and colleagues have cited subjunctification as a potential hallmark of a
participant’s skill. Hurlburt (2011) roughly defined a subjunctifier as “anything that gives a sign

70

that a subject’s utterance is not to be confidently understood as a straightforward description of
momentary experience” (pp. 116). Subjunctifiers can be understood as potential signaling on
behalf of participants that they (the participant) may not fully believe what they are saying
(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). Operationally, Hurlburt (2011) proposed an initial operational
definition of subjunctification that included a dozen behavioral and verbal cues such as: verbs in
the subjunctive mood (e.g., “I would think...,” “If I were to...”), generalities (e.g., “Whenever I
think, I’m always talking to myself), theoretical inferences (e.g., “I must have been
experiencing...”), undermining expressions (e.g., “Well,” “like,” “I think,” “probably,” “I’m not
sure, but...,” “um”), causal explanations (e.g., “I was talking to myself so I don’t forget”),
metaphors and similes, procedural comments or questions (e.g., “What should I have done when
the beep went off?” “I wasn’t wearing an earphone”), and distinctive behaviors (e.g., false starts,
long pauses, shrugs, sighs, grimacing, quizzical tones; Hurlburt, 2011, pp. 116-117).
Notably, Hurlburt (2011) emphasized that subjunctifiers in and of themselves are not the
only indicators of a participant’s skill. Subjunctifiers signal that the participant has some kind of
recognition (perhaps explicit, perhaps implicit) of a discrepancy between their directly
apprehended phenomena and what they are in the process of saying about it (Hurlburt, 2011;
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). A fundamental interviewer skill within the DES method is gaining
sensitivities towards recognizing and heeding subjunctification within the expositional interview.
Hurlburt (2011) has claimed that descriptions of experience that involve little
subjunctification are likely to be of higher fidelity than are descriptions with high
subjunctification, and that the density of subjunctification is likely more important than merely
counting the instances of subjunctification. Therefore, he recommended dividing a count of
subjunctifiers by the number of words in an utterance (or the amount of time elapsed) as a guide

71

to determining the likely quality of a description (Hurlburt, 2011, pp. 120). In short, Hurlburt
(2011) posited that “the lower the density of subjunctification, the better the description” (p.
120), although he noted that this is a general rule of thumb and is by no means definitive.
First-Day Expositional Interviews and (Low) Skill
Although no quantitative inquiries regarding the quality, characteristics, or descriptions
of first-day interviews have been conducted, Hurlburt (2009, 2011) provided qualitative
examples of typical first-day behaviors. For instance, participants may not initially follow
instructions for sampling, such as by not using the beeper and not using earphones while
sampling. Additionally, participants’ reports may frequently not strictly adhere to the moment
right before the beep sounds. Participants in first-day interviews often do not constrain their
reports to a specific moment in time, but rather report a string of moments that may span several
seconds, minutes, hours, or days prior to (or even in response to) the beep (Hurlburt, 2011, p.
167). That is, first-day participants often fail to cleave to the moment of the beep.
Participants moreover often struggle with constraining their reports to directly
apprehended inner experience. For example, participants may not initially know what directly
apprehended inner experience is. In Hurlburt (2009), a DES investigator (NM) has the following
exchange with a participant (JT) during his first expositional interview:
NM:13 OK. So, I know you gave me some background there, so if you can help me
clarify. Right when the beep went off, what was in your experience?
JT:14 Um. What do you mean, in my experience? [sounds puzzled] What was I thinking?
(p. 176)
Here, even though JT was provided with initial instructions before sampling about attending to
“anything that is occurring directly before the footlights of... consciousness at the moment of the
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beep” (Hurlburt, 2009, p. 176), he is perplexed by exactly what he should be apprehending and
subsequently describing. In particular, JT provides evidence of his presupposition that thinking
must be the primary feature of experience or encompasses the primary goal of the study. The fact
that JT does not immediately know what constitutes directly apprehended inner experience is not
merely one of ignorance. It is not simply the case that JT would have been more skilled in this
task if only he had been provided with a clearer, more exhaustive account of what directly
apprehended inner experience is. Instead, JT’s confusion illustrates a common misunderstanding
present across many neophyte DES participants, as was emphasized by Heavey et al. (2010) in
their fourth fundamental hazard of inner experience research: Participants in DES research
consistently show a failure to differentiate between directly apprehended phenomena and
constructs, processes, or concepts that are assumed to be directly apprehended phenomena (e.g.,
decision making, aggression, depression) but are difficult or impossible to apprehend directly.
Relatedly, participants may also struggle in cleaving to directly apprehended experience
by not clearly distinguishing between phenomena and presuppositions/heuristics. Hurlburt and
Schwitzgebel (2007) provided a transcript of a participant’s (“Melanie’s”) first-day, first sample
expositional interview. Melanie describes her “thinking” that was caught in-flight by the beep:
“It’s my inner thought voice, so it’s the one I recognize and hear all of the time whenever I’m
thinking” (p. 62). Here, Melanie makes two general claims about her inner voice: that she is
knowledgeable of her own distinctive inner voice (“it’s the one I recognize”) and that this inner
speaking is ubiquitous—one that she “hear[s] all of the time.” Notice, however, that these claims
are generalities about her inner experience, not descriptions of her inner experience at the precise
moment of this beep. In fact, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007) show that later sampling
undermined Melanie’s belief of her ubiquitous inner voice.
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Additionally, first-day participants often exhibit a high density of subjunctification. As
previously outlined, higher densities of subjunctification may be an indication that a participant’s
description of their inner experience may not be accurate. Hurlburt (2011; see p. 118) offered an
example of subjunctification in a participant’s initial description of her experience during her
first-day-first-sample interview in which she used approximately 35 subjunctifiers in 175 (a
density of about one subjunctifier for every 5 words).
Iterative Training and DES Skill
Central to the discussion of the (claimed) lack of skill typically demonstrated by
participants during first-day interviews—as well as an integral part of the DES method more
generally—is iterative training. At its fundamental core, the DES methodology is iterative, such
that the structure of the sampling-and-interview process is designed to incrementally improve
participant’s ability to apprehend and describe their inner experience over time through
successive refinement across multiple days of sampling (Hurlburt, 2009). Iteration within this
context is more than just simple repetition—it is an active process by which improving
approximations are made over multiple, always newly encountered instances in which the
description at each instance is likely of higher and higher fidelity (Hurlburt, 2011, pp. 152). The
importance of iterative training within DES cannot be overstated: Hurlburt and colleagues have
repeatedly emphasized the importance of iteration as it relates to high-fidelity reports of inner
experience, such that it “may, incrementally on successive occasions, increase the direct
contribution of pristine experience (and decrease the contribution of reconstruction)” (Hurlburt,
2011, p. 174, emphasis in original). Thus, DES investigators provide repeated rounds of
sampling and interviewing: at the onset of DES sampling (i.e., on day 1), it is anticipated that
participants will be relatively unskilled at apprehending and describing their inner experience
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due to the fact that as they have received no exposure and/or practice in apprehending and
describing their pristine inner experience. Through the skills (e.g., bracketing presuppositions,
asking open-beginninged questions, examining the language participants use to describe their
inner experience) used by investigators within the first expositional interview, however, it is
believed that participants will be more prepared and more skilled for their next round of
sampling and interviewing.
Hurlburt (2009) provided a theoretical overview of the strengths of the iterative process.
In his essay, Hurlburt outlined four main aspects of an iterative method that contribute to highfidelity apprehension of inner experience: the refreshment by new experience, improvement in
apprehension, multiple perspectives on experience, and the open-beginningedness of the process.
The first main aspect of the iterative method—the refreshment by new experience—is important
because it allows for the calibration of the skills necessary for the apprehension of inner
experience to be practiced on fresh samples at each step. Said in another way, using an iterative
method that relies on gathering new samples at every step is much like trying to ski having
access to an empty ski resort, such that every ski route is covered with fresh, undisturbed snow;
with each run, the skier is always given a fresh start on an “unblemished” surface that (thus,
predicated on the assumption that progress is being made on all other fronts of the constraints of
inner experience research, such as the bracketing of presuppositions, cleaving to the moment of
the beep, and cleaving to experience, the refreshment of experience allows for the apprehension
process to begin anew at each step, and thus the contribution of directly apprehended inner
experience should increase across interviews). In non-iterative methods (i.e., those that do not
involve the refreshment of experience), it is likely that the contribution of directly apprehended
inner experience decreases within each interview due to the greater and greater influence of

75

interviewer and/or interviewee’s presuppositions, retrospective and reconstructive errors, and so
forth on pristine experience: As a non-iterative investigation proceeds, the original (single)
experience becomes further and further distant, while the theories or presuppositions become
closer and closer in prominence. In other words—and continuing with the skiing analogy—a
non-iterative procedures is much like trying to ski at a busy ski resort in which the mountainside
face is riddled with moguls, deep ruts, and pockmarks. With each run, the skier is forced to
retread the same route, which inexorably contributes to the development of larger and larger
moguls, ruts, and so forth.
The second main aspect of an iterative method—the improvement in apprehension—
essentially involves improving the quality of apprehension and description of pristine inner
experience due to the function of practice. Hurlburt (2009) contends that practice involves (a)
trying to improve observational skills, (b) trying to improve interview skills, (c) using the
synergistic interplay between the practice of observation and interview skills to improve on
future observation/interviewing abilities, (d) increase his or her ability to become more
ready/prepared/poised to observe their pristine inner experience, (e) improve their ability to
create contemporaneous observations of their experience, and (f) improve his or her ability to
learn the skill of conforming their reconstructions more closely to their pristine experience.
However, just as in the refreshment of new experience and its effects on increasing skill,
improvement in apprehension is predicated on the assumption that both the interviewer and
interviewee are working to increase their skills at apprehending inner experience (i.e., bracketing
presuppositions, cleaving to the moment, cleaving to directly apprehended experience).
Hurlburt (2009) posits that the third aspect of an iterative method—multiple perspectives
on experience—helps to increase the contribution of pristine inner experience to interviewee’s
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reports by allowing genuinely salient phenomena to emerge over time. Because naturally
occurring pristine inner experience is intrinsically unknown to both the investigators and
(typically) to the participant themselves at the onset of sampling, the iterative sampling of new,
unique experiences allows genuinely frequent phenomena to arise while allowing nonrecurring
features to subside over time. Additionally, because each experience is unrepeatable, salient
phenomena are refined by exposure to a robust set of different circumstances, contexts, and
situations. Thus, Hurlburt (2009) argues that “iteration allows both for the emergence of salient
phenomena and for the elaboration of phenomena once they emerge” and that “both those
characteristics taken together can, across occasions, allow a greater clarity of apprehension of the
central features of pristine experience” (p. 168).
The fourth main aspect of an iterative method—open-beginninged probes—is what
Hurlburt (2009) highlights as perhaps the most important part of the iterative method. As
covered previously in this document, open-beginninged questioning within the DES method is
crucial for high-fidelity descriptions of inner experience, because such questions may reduce the
effects of presuppositions. As it relates to the iterative process, however, open-beginninged
probes communicate at each interview to the interviewee that “the interviewer really does want
to hear about the details of my [the interviewee’s] experience, whatever those details happen to
be or not be” (Hurlburt, 2009, p. 170). Because of the inherently ambiguous nature of openbeginninged questions, participants understandably require several iterations of such questions in
order to appreciate the sincerity that DES strives to embody in this questioning. There are
inherent structures and expectations that participants almost always have upon initially engaging
in DES investigations, such as the power differentials between investigators and participants,
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expectancies for deception or manipulation by, the investigators, and so forth, that can be
overcome (or at least, limited) only by repeated, iterative training.
Although the iterative process is indeed part of this current investigation, it should be
emphasized that the goal of the current study is explicitly not to look at the progression of the
iterative process. To do so would require a far more expansive investigation across each day of
DES sampling. Instead, the current study is specifically focused on the overall outcome of the
iterative process. Are DES participants relatively more skilled on their very-last-sample
interview regarding their ability to apprehend and describe their pristine inner experience in
contrast to their abilities on the very-first-sample interview?
Empirical Evidence Regarding the DES Iterative Process
Of the extant DES literature, there is only one previous investigation that has sought to
answer questions similar to those posed in this current study. In a dissertation completed by
Brouwers (2016), Brouwers and DES investigators completed two studies that aimed at
investigating the iterative process in DES. Specifically, Brouwers and colleagues were interested
in studying subjunctification density and participant’s access to experience within videotaped
DES expositional interviews as evidence for the DES iterative process. Broadly, given the claims
that the iterative process helps participants hone their ability to apprehend and describe their
experience, it was hypothesized that (a) participants would demonstrate a lower subjunctification
density during last-day interviews (in this particular study, this consisted of fourth-day
interviews) compared to first-day interviews, and (b) participants would demonstrate increased
ability to access their inner experience as a function of time (such that participants on their lastday (fourth-day) interviews would have higher access to their inner experience than did those
participants on their first-day interviews).
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In the first study, Brouwer (2016) and colleagues were interested in determining the
extent to which subjunctification density decreased across multiple days of DES interviews.
Eight undergraduate research assistants naïve to DES were trained to identify subjunctification
via a multimedia training platform that included an essay on subjunctification and an online
subjunctification training program. Once trained, the eight research assistants viewed video clips
of expositional interviews that were selected from 15 undergraduate DES participants (i.e.,
interviewee) from a previous study. For each interviewee, three utterances were obtained from
their first-day interview and their fourth-day interview, respectively, for a total of 90 video clips.
Utterances were defined as “any clear, verbal response, two words or longer, where the
interviewee [was] the sole speaker, aside from minor interviewer vocalizations such a “yeah” and
“hmm.” Utterances ranged from two-word responses (e.g., “Not really”) to responses several
sentences in length” (p. 24). In viewing these video clips, research assistants were tasked with
rating the interviewee’s level of subjunctification in each clip on a 5-point scale, where 0 =
unsubjunctified and 4 = highly subjunctified.
To analyze results, z-scores were calculated for each combination of rater and
interviewee for a total of six z-scores for each rater-interviewee pairing. An average first-day and
fourth-day z-score was calculated for Rater 1/Interviewee 1, which allowed for a direct
comparison of first-day ratings to fourth-day ratings within Rater 1/ Interviewee 1 (and so on and
so forth for each unique crossing of rater and interviewee). A dependent samples t-test was
performed and found no significant difference between levels of subjunctification when
comparing each interviewee’s average first-day z-score rating (M = .02, SD = .42) to their paired
fourth-day average z-score rating (M = -.02, SD = .42; t(119) = .60, p = .550). A Repeated
Measures ANOVA was also performed on the data due to violations of the t-test assumption. For
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this analysis, the level of subjunctification ratings were averaged within each rater, interviewee,
and day (i.e., first-day or fourth-day). The Repeated Measures ANOVA showed no main effect
for day (F(1, 14) = 0.32, p = .581), which indicated that there was no significant difference
between first-day average subjunctification level ratings (M = 1.80, SD = .84) and fourth-day
average subjunctification level ratings (M = 1.71, SD = .80). Brouwers proposed three possible
explanations for these findings: (1) the iterative method in DES is not effective at building the
skills necessary to apprehend inner experience (or that perhaps three days of sampling is
insufficient in training interviewees), (2) the study was not adequate and may have failed to
detect differences in subjunctification for a number of procedural reasons (e.g., insufficient
training for raters, lack of context of utterances), and (3) the iterative method in DES is effective
at developing skill in regards to apprehending experience, but subjunctification does not measure
DES skill.
In the second study, Brouwers (2016) and colleagues were interested in assessing
whether DES interviewee’s skill changed across sampling days. In this study, experienced DES
investigators watched and rated the same 90 video clips used in Brouwers’ first study on
subjunctifiers; however, rather than asking raters to rate levels of subjunctification, raters instead
were instructed to estimate interviewee’s access to experience on a 5-point scale where 0 = no
access and 4 = high access. Access to experience was defined as “the interviewee’s broad ability
to apprehend and describe inner experience phenomena in the DES interview” (p. 35). To
analyze results, z-scores were calculated using the same process as Brouwers’ subjunctification
study. A dependent samples t-test was performed and found a significant difference between
access to experience ratings when comparing each interviewee’s average first-day z-score rating
(M = -.19, SD = .41) to their paired fourth-day average z-score rating (M = .19, SD = .41), t(74) =
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3.98, p < .001. These results indicated that DES interviewees were rated as having greater
abilities to apprehend their experience on their fourth-day interviews compared to their first-day
interviews. A Repeated Measures ANOVA was also performed on the data due to violations of
the t-test assumption, and data was transformed using the same procedure as Brouwers’
subjunctification study. The Repeated Measures ANOVA showed a main effect for day: access
to experience ratings for fourth-day interviews (M = 2.49, SD = .82) were significantly higher
than access to experience ratings for first-day interviews (M = 2.07, SD = .65; F(1, 14) = 7.51, p
= .016). These results suggest that DES interviewees were rated as being more skillful at
apprehending their inner experience on their fourth-day interview compared to their first-day
interviews.
Although Brouwers’ (2016) dissertation is similar in many respects to the current study,
its methodology was perhaps inadequate in at least six fundamental ways. First, as explained in
summarizing Brouwers’ subjunctification study, Brouwers himself highlighted the potential
deficiencies in his methodology that may have affected his data. For example, Brouwers pointed
to the fact that:
The context of the utterance was not provided, and often the videos were brief,
sometimes including only two or three word [sic] utterances, and the shortest videos were
only two seconds in length. These factors may have been barriers to the raters’ detection
of differences in subjunctification between days. (p. 33)
Hurlburt (2011) described the complexities surrounding subjunctifiers, emphasizing that “there
are lots of reasons that a person might use a theoretical inference, might insert an undermining
expression, might show distress, or use some other subjunctifier even while faithfully describing
experience” (p. 117). Thus, by providing only (in some cases, very) short video clips of

81

interviews, such videos may indeed not adequately allow any rater to determine the function or
purpose of the subjunctification.
Second, Brouwers noted that he had used undergraduate research assistants naïve to DES
as raters for his subjunctification study. However, it “requires substantial skill to conduct an
interview that stays directly in touch with experience at the moment of the beep” (Hurlburt,
2011, p. 124), such that a DES investigator is sensitive to bracketing their presuppositions. Thus,
even in spite of subjunctification trainings, it is possible that naïve research assistants may still
have not adequately learned to attend the various factors important to achieving high-fidelity
descriptions of inner experience, such as bracketing presuppositions, cleaving to the moment of
the beep, cleaving to directly-apprehended experience, and so forth.
Third, Brouwers’ subjunctification study used a Likert-type scale to rate interviewee’s
subjunctification level. Given this rating system, it is unclear how to interpret differences
between ratings (i.e., what is the degree of difference between a rating of “3” and a rating of “4?”
Are the intervals between each rating uniform across the scale?).
Fourth, Brouwers’ procedure counted subjunctifier frequency, rather than follow
Hurlburt’s (2011) recommendation of focusing on subjunctification density as an indicator of
subjunctification level.
Fifth, Brouwers provides an insufficient operational definition of “access to experience,”
which thus exacerbates the lack of clarity around what exactly characterizes a person’s “access”
to their experience.
Sixth, Brouwers’ (2016) dissertation placed emphasis on rater’s assessments and
categorizations of various interview and experience characteristics and treated such assessments
as discrete data (in contrast to the interview behaviors or inner experience phenomena itself).
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This is seen as a fundamental error, as the ratings are not being used to reflect the phenomena but
are instead “top-down” assessments that (very likely) obscure the actual phenomena by having
raters determine the extent to which phenomena fit a pre-defined criteria. A consequence of this
process is that the ratings themselves become the primary data of interest as opposed to the
phenomena themselves (thus obscuring the phenomena).
Recapitulation of the Current Study
DES practitioners claim that there are three characteristics that provide evidence for high
fidelity descriptions: cleaving to the moment, cleaving to directly apprehended experience, and
low subjunctification density. If DES iterative training does in fact improve the participant’s
ability to provide high fidelity descriptions, then DES participants should demonstrate better
cleaving to the moment, better cleaving to experience, and lower subjunctification density on the
last day of their sampling participation than they do on the first day. However, that has not (until
now) been empirically tested.
The present study compared the very-last-sample interviews to the very-first-sample
interviews of six DES participant. We used both quantitative and descriptive methods to analyze
and describe three primary skills that contribute to the perceived quality of a participant’s
descriptions, asking: (1) Did participants’ cleaving to the moment improve from their very-firstsample to very-last-sample interview? (2) Did participants’ cleaving to experience improve from
their very-first-sample to very-last-sample interview? And (3) Did participants’ use of
subjunctifiers decrease from very-first-sample to very-last-sample interview?

83

Chapter 6: Method
Participants
Participants for this study consisted of six individuals who were randomly selected from
participants who had been videotaped while participating in one of two previous DES
investigations. In the first DES investigation (hereafter referred to as the “methodological study,”
described in Lapping-Carr, 2019), 12 undergraduate volunteers (9 female, 3 male) 18 years old
or older enrolled in introduction to psychology courses at a large urban university in the United
States had participated in five days of standard DES sampling; all expositional interviews had
been videotaped. Of these 12, three were randomly selected and, via their videotapes, became
participants in the present study. In the second DES investigation (hereafter referred to as the
“psychotherapy study,” described in Moynihan, 2020 and in Krumm, 2019), 20 participants (14
female, 5 male, 1 gender-fluid) had been individuals seeking psychotherapy services at a
community-based mental health clinic and had participated in eight days of standard DES
sampling; as in the methodological study, all expositional interviews had been videotaped. Of
these 20, three were randomly selected and, via their videotapes, became participants in the
present study.
Raters
Raters in the current study were two experienced DES investigators: the first rater was
the current study’s author (Cody Kaneshiro; CK), and the second was the developer of the DES
method (Russell T. Hurlburt; RTH). Their experience with DES at the time they provided their
ratings was 2.5 years and 40 years, respectively.
Materials
Videotapes
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In both the methodological study and the psychotherapy study, DES interviews had been
conducted following the procedure described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this document and in
Hurlburt (2011, 2017). At the time of each interview, each session was recorded in its entirety
(usually 1 hour) on a digital camera, and all files of the videotapes were stored on a secure,
password protected server.
Chess timer
An online chess timer (https://www.online-stopwatch.com/chess-timer/).
Experience-at-the-Moment-of-the-Beep (EMB) Ratings
The EMB rating procedure was developed for this study as a means of providing a single
numerical rating of the extent to which a participant is describing experience-at-the-moment-ofthe-beep during a conversational turn of an expositional interview. EMB ratings range from 0
(not at all cleaving to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep) to 10 (cleaving to experience-atthe-moment-of-the-beep). EMB ratings are intended to provide an in-general, quantitative
characterization of a multidimensional, non-numerical process.
Because inner experience is always experienced at (a) some particular moment, and (b)
directly apprehended phenomena, describing experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep involves
cleaving both to a moment and to directly apprehended experience. EMB ratings are designed to
reflect both aspects. Figure 1 illustrates the rater’s consideration of these two factors.
Conversational turns that are clearly consistent with describing both a particular moment and a
particular experience should be assigned a high EMB rating (10). Conversational turns that are
clearly inconsistent with describing either a specific moment or a specific experience (or both)
should be assigned a low EMB rating (0).
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Figure 1
EMB Rating Heuristic

Note. The numbers included in the figure are examples of hypothetical EMB ratings.

Procedure
All participants in this study had provided informed consent at the time of their
participation in their respective investigations (i.e., the methodological study or the
psychotherapy study) for their videotaped interviews to be used in future DES investigations.
Step 1: Video Selection
Participants in this study were randomly selected, three from the 12 participants of the
methodological study and three from the 20 participants of the psychotherapy study. Once
selected, videos of each participant’s first-day and last-day interviews were retrieved and each
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participant’s very-first-sample (i.e., the first sample on the first sampling day) expositional
interview and their very-last-sample (i.e., the last sample on their last sampling day) expositional
interview were isolated.
Step 2: Transcript Preparation
The main investigator (CK) prepared a verbatim transcript (including notable postural
features, facial expressions, vocal tone, volume, and so forth) for each participant’s very-firstsample and very-last-sample interviews. Once completed, the two raters (CK and RTH)
independently watched the videotapes of both interviews to verify the transcript’s accuracy; if
any corrections were necessary, they were incorporated into the transcript using tracked-changes
and circulated to the other rater. Transcripts were continually circulated until they were deemed
adequate by both raters.
Step 3: Subjunctification Identification
The two raters independently watched the video a second time, now highlighting (on the
transcript prepared in step 2) any and all subjunctifiers used by the participant. Once all
subjunctifiers were independently identified by each rater, the raters met and resolved any
discrepancies, returning to the video files as needed (for a third time). The purpose of this
meeting was to discuss and resolve any potential differences between raters for their
subjunctification identification. Once differences were resolved, the total number of
subjunctifications spoken by the participant were counted.
Step 4: Tracking Time Spoken
Each rater independently watched the video (for a fourth time) in three-minute blocks,
using the chess timer to measure the amount of time spoken by the participant and by the
interviewers in the block. That is, as the rater watched the video, he switched the chess timer
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back and forth between the participant and the interviewers as each spoke. This resulted in a
measure of how long the participant and the interviewers spoke in each 3-min block.
The three-minute blocks were used to calculate the reliability of the timings. Because the
very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews were excerpts of longer videotaped
expositional interviews, the first three-minute time block were rounded up to the closest wholeminute timestamp. For example: if a participant’s very-first-sample interview began at 3:23, we
rounded that up to 4:00 and then stopped the first three-minute block at the 7:00 timestamp. The
end of the last block coincided with the end of the interview, and therefore the last block was
often shorter than 3:00.
Once the timings in each block had been independently determined by each rater, the
raters met and resolve any discrepancies in the block timings, returning to the video (for a fifth
time) if necessary. The purpose of this meeting was to arrive at a consensus between raters
regarding the total amount of time spoken by the participant and interviewers. Once completed,
the timings were aggregated across the interview, resulting in the total time spoken by the
participant and the total time spoken by the interviewers.
Step 5: Calculating Subjunctification Densities
Subjunctification density was calculated by dividing the total number of subjunctifiers
(identified in step 3) by the total amount of time (in s) spoken by the participant for each
interview (determined in step 4). Thus, subjunctification density is thus defined as the number of
subjunctifiers per second of participant’s speech.
Step 6: Annotating the Transcript
Both raters met together to watch (and rewind and re-watch as necessary) the
participant’s interviews to discuss the extent to which the participant seemed to be describing

88

experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep in each interview turn. This discussion considered a
participant’s moment-cleaving, experience-cleaving, subjunctification usage, body
language/posture, the effect of the interviewer’s queries, and context that emerge from other
parts of the interview (e.g., noting that a participant describes multiple “drafts” of experience
descriptions might change across time within an interview), noting whether the participant
followed DES procedures, and so on. The main investigator (CK) then prepared an annotated
transcript that included a characterization of the extent to which each conversational turn of a
participant’s interview (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2) cleaved to experience in that
turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn.
Each turn was given a separate annotation unless a turn was understood to be part of a
single back-and-forth exchange (in which case these turns was combined into a single
annotation), or the turn involved statements, questions, or comments that were unrelated to the
descriptive process (e.g., a query by the participant to clarify the interviewer’s question), or when
the interview shifted away from trying to describe experience with fidelity to iterative training
for the next round of sampling-and-interviewing.
Step 7: EMB Ratings
Each rater independently returned to the videotapes and provided an EMB rating for all
conversational turns. There were two exceptions: turns that were understood to be part of a single
back-and-forth exchange were given a single EMB rating (consistent with their groupings
created in step 7), and turns that were unrelated to the descriptive process were skipped. Note
that raters relied on the videotapes and not the transcripts, thus allowing tone of voice,
inflections, sighs, body posture, length of pauses to influence the EMB rating. Then the raters
met and resolved any discrepancies in the block timings (returning to the video if necessary),
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thus ensuring that the EMB ratings corresponded to the turns determined in step 6. Then EMB
ratings were calculated for each turn by averaging the two rater’s EMB ratings for each turn.
Step 8: Within-Participant Analysis
We assessed the interrater reliability of subjunctification density by computing the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient of raters’ subjunctification density across all 3-min intervals.
We assessed the interrater reliability EMB ratings by computing the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient of rater’s EMB ratings across all rated turns in both sample interviews.
The last step in the within-participant consideration was to compare an individual
participant’s very-last-sample interview to their very-first-sample interview. Quantitatively, we
performed independent-samples t-tests to compare subjunctification density and EMB ratings
between participant’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews.
Qualitatively, we discussed the extent to which a participant apparently cleaved to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep during both their very-first-sample interview and their
very-last-sample interview, noting any changes between the interviews. We also discussed the
manner of each participant’s subjunctification during both their very-first-sample interview and
their very-last-sample interview, noting any changes between the interviews.
Step 9: Across-Participant Analysis
Once steps 1-8 had been completed for all participants, we compared changes in skill
between very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews across participants. Quantitatively,
we conducted a dependent samples t-test to compare the change in subjunctification density and
EMB ratings between all participants’ very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews.
Qualitatively, we described the characteristics of a typical participant’s talk in the very-first-
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sample interview so that we could contrast it with changes in participant talk in the very-lastsample interview.
Step 10: Counting Subjunctifiers by Type
At the completion of steps 1 through 9, we recognized that it would be desirable to
categorize subjunctifiers into three types: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA) subjunctifiers,
description-falling-short (DFS) subjunctifiers, and subjunctifiers that were difficult to categorize
as either PNA or DFS—hence, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers. We therefore returned to
all participant’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample videotapes and re-counted subjunctifiers
with the same procedure as in step 3, except that now we identified when any of three types
(PNA, DFS, or UTC) of subjunctifier was present. This allowed us to obtain a count and
subjunctification density of each of the three types of subjunctifiers as well as of the total
subjunctifiers (= PNA + DFS + UTC) within each sample interview. All the subjunctification
data presented here reflects this manner of subjunctification count and density calculation.
Design of Results and Discussions
Wundtian-Like Methodological Model
We chose to conduct our analysis (and present our results and discussion) using a
Wundtian-inspired methodological model (Danziger, 1990; Robinson, 2011). The Wundtian
model involves analyzing a collection of individual participants, each in an N = 1, case-study
fashion to provide the basis for establishing findings that are common to all in the sample 4. Thus,
in the following individual results and discussion section, we have treated each participant as

4

The Wundtian model draws conclusions if and only if those conclusions emerge for each of the individual N = 1
studies. That is, the Wundtian model is not primarily interested effects that occur on average (that would be the
Galtonian model) but rather in effects that occur for everyone (see Robinson, 2011).

91

independent case studies. Then, in Chapter 13, we discuss any findings that emerged as universal
across all participants.
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Chapter 7: Results and Discussion for Amelia
Amelia had been an undergraduate subject pool volunteer in the methodological study.
As part of her participation in that study—which had been approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas following standards issued in the Declaration of
Helsinki—Amelia had consented to have her videotapes used in studies such as the present one.
The present study therefore accessed her methodological-study videotapes and had no other
contact with her.
Amelia completed four days of natural environment DES sampling spread across a twoweek time span, with 14 days elapsing between her first-day interview and her last-day
interview. She collected a total of 22 samples: 4 samples in her first day, and 6 samples each
during her second, third, and fourth days.
Quantitative Results and Discussion
The data analysis procedure is described fully in Chapter 6, and Amelia’s quantitative
results are shown in Table 1. For Amelia, the very-first-sample interview was 657 s in total
length, of which Amelia spoke for 176 s across 37 conversational turns. The very-last-sample
interview was 262 s in total length, of which Amelia spoke for 121 s across 18 conversational
turns. We divided Amelia’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews into 3-min
intervals; there were four intervals in the very-first-sample interview and two intervals in the
very-last-sample interview.
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Table 1
Amelia: Quantitative Results

Length of interview (s)a

Descriptive Statistics
Very-firstVery-lastsample
sample
657
262

Rater Reliability
r
df
p

Comparing Last vs. First
t
df
p
d

Time spoken by
participant (s)a
Number of spoken turns

176

121

37

18

Number of 3-min
intervals
Total Subjunctification
Counta
Total Subjunctification
Densitya,b

4

2

65.5

19

0.37
(SD = 0.06)

0.16
(SD = 0.10)

.68

4

.134

−3.55

4

.016

3.12

PNA Subjunctification
Densitya,b
UTC Subjunctification
Densitya,b

0.37
(SD = 0.08)
0.01
(SD = 0.01)

0.02
(SD = 0.02)
0.04
(SD = 0.04)

.77

4

.076

−5.09

4

.004

5.32

.64

4

.172

−1.10

4

.323

1.65

DFS Subjunctification
Densitya,b

0.01
(SD = 0.01)

0.10
(SD = 0.04)

.53

4

.285

3.82

4

.010

4.45

Number of turns with
EMB ratings
Average EMB Ratingc

17

15

1.65d
(SD = 1.16)

8.97
(SD = 1.16)

.82

31

< .001

17.38

31

< .001

6.33

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-toclassify; DFS = Description-falling-short.
a

Averaged across the two raters.

b

Density is subjunctification count divided by time spoken by participant (subjunctifiers per s).

c

Average EMB ratings across the two raters for all rated turns of the interview.

d

Includes non-annotated turns given EMB ratings (A47a – A78a). If non-annotated turns are excluded, then there are

10 rated turns from the very-first-sample interview and 15 rated turns from the very-last-sample interview; the
results remain very similar: (t(23) = 16.98, p < .001, d = 6.93).

Rows 5 through 9 of Table 1 analyze Amelia’s subjunctifiers. Row 5 displays the total
count of Amelia’s subjunctifiers in her very-first- and very-last-sample interviews (averaged
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across both raters), and row 6 displays the total subjunctification density (row 5 divided by row
2) and changes to the overall subjunctification density across both interviews. Rows 7 through 9
display the density for the three subtypes of subjunctifiers: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA)
subjunctifiers, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers, and description-falling-short (DFS)
subjunctifiers.
Specifically, the four right-hand columns of rows 7 through 9 in Table 1 show that
Amelia’s subjunctification changed significantly and substantially between her very-first- and
very-last-sample interviews. We found that Amelia’s total subjunctification density significantly
decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.37 subjunctifiers per second) to the verylast-sample interview (M = 0.16 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d = 3.12) effect size; we
similarly found that Amelia’s PNA subjunctification density significantly decreased from the
very-first-sample interview (M = 0.37 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample
interview (M = 0.02 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d = 5.32) effect size. By contrast, her
DFS subjunctification density significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
0.01 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.10 subjunctifiers per
second) with a huge (d = 4.45) effect size. All these changes 5 are consistent with a consequential
improvement in Amelia’s skill in apprehending and describing experience: Whereas Amelia’s
very-first-sample interview involved a high density of subjunctifiers (mostly PNA), her verylast-sample interview involved a low density of subjunctifiers (mostly DFS), suggesting that she
learned to apprehend phenomena but struggled to find the words to describe them adequately.

5

Although UTC subjunctification density also decreased between the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.01
subjunctifiers per second) and the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.04 subjunctifiers per second) with a substantial
(d = 1.65) effect size, the change was not significant due to the small sample size. Moreover, changes in UTC
subjunctification density does not matter to the aims of the current study: UTC subjunctifiers, as their name implies,
merely represent subjunctifiers that could not easily be classified as a PNA or DFS-type subjunctifier; as such, they
do not provide insight into the possible fidelity of a participant’s report.
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Rows 10 and 11 of Table 1 analyze EMB ratings for Amelia’s sample interviews,
counting them in the row 10 and, in the row 11, showing the average EMB rating. We found that
Amelia’s average EMB rating significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
1.65) to the very last-sample interview (M = 8.97) with a huge (d = 6.33) effect size, suggesting
extremely great improvement in Amelia’s cleaving-to-a-moment and cleaving-to-experience
skill.
Qualitative Results and Discussion
A complete, turn-by-turn annotated transcript of Amelia’s very-first-sample and verylast-sample interviews are provided in Appendixes A and B, respectively. There, each annotation
includes analysis detailing the extent to which Amelia (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2)
cleaved to experience in that turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn. Here, we summarize
those results.
Experience at the Moment of the Beep
To reiterate: pristine, directly apprehended experience are phenomena that are present at
a specific moment. Thus, the high-fidelity apprehension of inner experience means that
participants must cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. Cleaving (successfully) to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep requires two, interrelated skills: the ability to cleave to
the last, undisturbed moment prior to beep onset and the ability to cleave to directly apprehended
experience. We now review the extent to which Amelia demonstrated moment- and experiencecleaving skill at the very start and very end of her DES sampling participation.
Very-First-Sample Interview
(Lack of) Cleaving to the Moment. Amelia did not cleave to any specific moment
during her very-first-sample interview.
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Here is one example from Amelia’s initial conversational turn from the very-first-sample
interview:
A1a: Actually, my first beep I was like, I dunno, I was thinking of why the beeper didn’t
go off [laughs]. So the whole time I was just wondering… when it would beep because it
took like, maybe about an hour before it beeped? So I thought, like, maybe I should call
you… text you… like, there was some kind of problem… and then it just beeped. And I
knew it worked. And that was it. [laughs] It was a simple one.
Here, Amelia provided many reports about time, but none were about a moment. For instance:
“so the whole time” and “because it took like, maybe an hour before it beeped?” explicitly
referred to a long period of time prior to the beep’s onset (not a specific moment). Moreover,
Amelia talked about periods of time that occurred after the moment of the beep: “and then it just
beeped. And I knew it worked. And that was it” all referred to her reaction to the beep after the
beep had sounded. Thus, not only did Amelia fail to cleave to the specific moment of interest
(i.e., the “microsecond” just before the beep onset), but she failed to constrain her description to
any moment at all (such that A1a described a mixture of many moments spread across an
indeterminate period of time).
Other evidence of Amelia’s failure to cleave to the moment of the beep came from her
radically different reports of (what should have been) her at-the-moment experience. The degree
of difference between these reports were so great that she could not possibly have been
describing the same, discrete moment. For example:
•

In A6a, Amelia said: “I was getting anxious because, I thought, like, maybe I handled
the beeper too roughly when I was in my car?” This report was about either a feeling
(“getting anxious”) or a thought about how she had handled the beeper too roughly.
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•

In A10a, Amelia stated: “I think right at that moment, I was thinking of whether I
should text... Leslie or you guys” and in A21a, she described that this thought was
present to her “in the form of words” and that it was being repeated “in [her] head.”
In A23a, she said the worded thought was: “Should I text Leslie?” Unlike Amelia’s
talk of her at-the-moment experience in A6a, her reports at turns A10a, A21a, and A23a
were aimed at describing a worded thought: “should I text Leslie?” Note that the
description of a worded thought was in no way in line with her A6a description of
apprehending an anxious feeling and/or thought about handling the beeper too
roughly. Instead, her A10a/A21a/ A23a descriptions appeared to refer to an entirely
different moment from A6a.

•

In A27a, Amelia again changed her description of her at-the-moment experience, when
she described, “‘Cause I was thinking… just like, how to text [the text message] on
my phone. Just like, how I should word it out.”

We see that Amelia’s description of her (purported) at-the-moment experience in A27a had
changed once again from her previous descriptions, such that Amelia described a thinking-abouthow-to word-out-a-text-message-to-DES-investigators experience. Note that this description
(thinking about wording a text message) was not merely an evolution, alteration, or continuation
of the “should I text Leslie?” worded thought described in A10a/A21a/ A23a, nor was the
description of an anxious feeling and/or a thought about breaking the beeper in A6a related to the
latter two descriptions. These descriptions were all quite distinct from each other; this fact, in
combination with her initial failure to cleave to a moment, are all illustrative of one simple
conclusion: Amelia failed to cleave to a moment during her very-first-sample interview. Thus,
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she could not have been cleaving to the specific moment of interest within DES—the last
undisturbed moment at the leading edge of the beep’s onset.
(Lack of) Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience. By definition, an inner
experience is a phenomenon that is present at a specific moment. Because, as we just reviewed,
Amelia’s very-first-sample interview never focused on any specific moment, her very-firstsample interview could not have described any genuine inner experience(s). Instead, Amelia
explicitly expressed her failure to cleave to directly apprehended experience and talked about
ersatz descriptions and faux generalizations of experience. We provide examples of each.
Amelia expressed her ignorance about her at-the-moment experience twice during her
very-first-sample interview. Here was the first exchange:
RTH15a: And how—and, and… how does that thought present itself to you?
A16a: Um… [looks quizzical] I’m not really sure.
The second instance came later in the interview:
RTH36a: And so, is that present to you at the moment of the beep?
A37a: Mhm.
RTH38a: In what way?
A39a: In what way? [pause] Mmm… I don’t know, it just comes.
In both instances, Amelia straightforwardly communicated her failure to cleave to directly
apprehended experience.
Amelia also provided ersatz descriptions of her experience—talk that (at first) may
appear to be descriptive of phenomena, but are in fact completely unacceptable and inferior
substitutions for any actual description of phenomena because ersatz descriptions are reports of
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non-phenomenal things such as situational context, talk of behavior, and so on. Here is one
example:
RTH5a: Okay. And, so, uh… so what’s that wondering like for you? What d…
A6a: I was getting anxious because, I thought, like, maybe I handled the beeper too
roughly when I was in my car? And that I broke it.
As A6a illustrates, Amelia failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience and did so in a
relatively substantial way—she spent time providing reports about the content of her ostensible
experience (e.g., how she had been worried that she broke the beeper; that she may have broken
the beeper while in her car), but was unable to describe how such phenomena had been directly
present to her (e.g., was it innerly spoken? Innerly seen? Inner heard? A physical sensation?).
DES is only interested in describing how phenomena is/was present, hence its demand for
cleaving to experience. Reports about what or why someone was thinking does not constitute
cleaving to experience, and hence indicates that what is being said is an ersatz description.
Amelia also provided faux generalization of experience—statements that appear to
describe experience, but instead are glib, in-general statements unconstrained to describing a
particular experience. Here is one such example:
A29a: I think I thought of [texting DES investigators and what message I would send] at
the same time. It usually just, like, pops up at the same time if I wanna like text someone.
I usually just think of what I’m gonna write.
Here, Amelia talked about a characterization of her in-general experience: how she “usually”
texts someone. Faux generalizations are so called because they seem to be aimed at saying
something about phenomena, but are not at all descriptive of a particular moment of experience.
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Even if Amelia’s generalization is genuine, it cannot describe Amelia’s specific experience at the
moment of any particular (including the very-first) beep.
The examples above are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Amelia did not cleave
to directly apprehended experience during her very-first-sample interview.
Very-First-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Amelia failed to
cleave to any moment and failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience during her veryfirst-sample interview. We conclude that Amelia’s utterances in her very-first-sample interview
had a near-zero possibility of any descriptive fidelity because she failed to grasp a particular
moment of experience and failed to differentiate phenomena from all else.
Very-Last-Sample Interview
Amelia’s very-last-sample interview was consistent with cleaving to directly
apprehended experience that occurred at a specific moment. Since the high-fidelity apprehension
and description of experience must involve the simultaneous presence of cleaving to a moment
and to directly apprehended experience, we are unable to separate our analysis of Amelia’s verylast-sample cleaving abilities as independent processes. Therefore, we will review examples
from Amelia’s very-last-sample interview and examine whether she did simultaneously cleave to
a moment and cleave to experience.
Here is Amelia’s initial first turn from her very-last-sample interview:
A1b: The next one… I was looking at the emails on my phone; I could feel the phone in
my left hand, but I could also feel, like, the dryness of my eyes. No thoughts or feelings.
But I could see the border around my phone, and the different emails I received, but no…
actual words. Just, like, colors.
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First, let us consider whether Amelia cleaved to a specific moment. She began the turn by
describing context (e.g., “I was looking at emails”), but soon zeroed-in on describing three
simultaneous experiences that were all consistent with at-a-moment experience (that is, she did
not refer to anything other than (what appeared to be) the single moment such as periods of time
or moments far before or after beep onset). Second, let us consider whether Amelia cleaved to
experience. After providing context, she described only phenomena: feeling her phone in her left
hand, eye dryness, and seeing colors. Thus, Amelia’s first turn of her very-last-sample, after a
brief statement of context, was a relatively straightforward description of experience at a
relatively specific time.
Throughout the remainder of her very-last-sample interview, Amelia appeared consistent
in describing the same moment of feeling-the-phone-and-eye-dryness-and-seeing-colors
experience that she described in A1b. For instance, Amelia provided further detail about how that
eye dryness had been present in turns A7b through A11b:
RTH6b: Well let’s start with the eyes: so I feel—my eyes feel dry? Both eyes?
A7b: Both, both.
RTH8b: Both dry? And in my eyeballs?
A9b: Yeah, my eyeballs [laughs].
RTH10b: My eyeballs feel dry [laughs]. All right. And… and is there more to be said
about that?
A11b: No, they’re just dry. Like they need eye drops.
Note that this description was entirely consistent with the at-the-moment experience Amelia first
described in A1b (“I could also feel, like, the dryness of my eyes”). Amelia additionally showed
her familiarity with her at-the-moment experience when she provided further details about how
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she felt her phone in her left hand, such as in A15b, where she described how she felt “the
pressure” of her fingertips on her phone. Notably, despite the outward diversity of Amelia’s three
simultaneous and ongoing experience at the moment of the beep, these descriptions were never
conflated with each other; Amelia unshakingly referred to the same three aspects of the same,
single moment throughout her very-last-sample interview.
Perhaps the most striking example of Amelia’s heightened sensitivity for the moment,
however, came in her detailed descriptions of seeing “colors” at the moment of the beep. For
instance, after she described seeing “rectangle strips” (A16b) of “orange, orange, and blue” (A20b)
colors, the following exchange occurred:
RTH25b: Okay. And, is that the way your phone actually works? So if we looked at your
actual phone would we see orange message followed by orange message followed by
blue message?
A26b: Mmm… [laughs] I don’t know. [A looks at her phone] Well, it looks different. My
phone is just like a little square of color, and then it’s just white. But I imagined it just
like the whole thing just being orange.
Notably, even when her descriptions of experience contradicted verifiable aspects of reality,
Amelia was not shaken in continuing to describe her “incorrect” experience. That is: Amelia
consistently described seeing her email inbox as rectangular blocks of color that ran horizontally
across her entire phone screen throughout her very-last-sample interview despite her actual email
inbox not resembling what Amelia had described seeing at the moment of the beep (her real
inbox displayed a small, colored square on the left-hand side of her phone screen and a white
rectangle with black text on the remaining right-hand side of her phone. See Figure 2 for a
comparison between Amelia’s described experience and her actual email inbox). Amelia
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explicitly expressed her surprise at the apparent difference between her at-the-moment
experience and her real email inbox twice in the interview; both turns have been copied below:
A28b: Like this? [A shows phone to interviewers] It’s very different [laughs] from how I
imagined it.
A30b: I thought it would be like, this one was just all orange, all orange [A gestures across
the width of her phone screen with her finger]—
Thus, despite the fact that Amelia (in reality) had been looking at her email on her phone at the
beep’s onset, Amelia’s experience was one that contradicted the logical/expected description of
reality. We note that this discrepancy did not appear a product of mere misremembering or
misreporting; her statements in A28b and A30b demonstrate Amelia’s obvious acknowledgement
of the contrast between her real phone and her directly apprehended experience that occurred at
the moment of the very-last beep. Taken together, Amelia’s steadfast commitment to describing
experience in spite of whether those descriptions were contradictory to reality (and her
straightforward description of only directly apprehended experience at the exclusion of all else)
throughout her very-last-sample interview strongly signal that she was describing a discrete
moment of experience.
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Figure 2
Comparing Amelia’s at-the-Moment Experience to Her Actual Email Inbox

Very-Last-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Amelia appeared to
cleave to a moment and to experience in her very-last-sample interview. We conclude that
Amelia’s descriptions had the probability (or at least the possibility) of describing with fidelity a
moment of experience (perhaps most likely the experience at the beep).
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Qualitative Characteristics vs. Very-Last-Sample Qualitative
Characteristics
We have seen that, in her very-first-sample interview, Amelia did not describe any
particular moment and did not describe experience. By contrast, Amelia’s very-last-sample
interview was constrained to a relatively specific time and was mostly limited to describing
experience. We conclude that Amelia’s very-last-sample interview was very different from her
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very-first-sample interview. Whereas in the very-first interview, she could not possibly have
been describing an experience that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep with any
level of fidelity, in the very-last sample she (at least) might have been describing an experience
that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctification
Previously in Amelia’s Quantitative Results and Discussion, we saw that Amelia’s
subjunctification density significantly decreased between her very-last-sample interview and her
very-first-sample interview, and as we have just detailed, there is reason to believe that Amelia’s
descriptions were of much higher fidelity during her very-last-sample interview than they had
been on her very-first-sample interview. These findings are all consistent with Hurlburt’s (2011)
proposal of using subjunctification density as an indicator of descriptive fidelity—that the higher
the density (that is, a greater number of subjunctifiers per second), the lower the fidelity.
However, we also found that subjunctification density was not the only difference
between interviews. The type and manner of subjunctifiers that Amelia used also dramatically
changed between interviews and may provide even greater insight into Amelia’s improvement:
Nearly all Amelia’s very-first-sample interview subjunctifiers signaled that she failed to
apprehend her experience at-the-moment-of-the-beep (and thus undermined any possibility of
describing experience). That is, most very-first-sample subjunctification was of the phenomenonnot-apprehended (PNA) type. By contrast, nearly all her very-last-sample interview
subjunctifiers signaled that, whereas Amelia apprehended the phenomenon adequately, her
description was not yet adequate. That is, most very-last-sample subjunctification was of the
description-falling-short (DFS) type.
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There were three types of PNA subjunctifiers that were common in Amelia’s very-firstsample interview: softening expressions, causal inferences, and hedges. We provide examples of
each.
Here is an example of softening expressions—an excerpt from the first conversational
turn in Amelia’s very-first-sample interview (all subjunctifiers are set in italics and with
superscripts):
A1a: ... So I thought, like1, maybe I should call you…2 text you…3 like4, there was some
kind of problem…5 and then it just beeped.
In this turn, all subjunctifiers undermined any commitment to describing a particular experience.
Each subjunctifier made whatever Amelia said generalized, non-specific, and approximated: for
instance, the four subjunctifiers present in “so I thought, like1, maybe I should call you…2 text
you…3 like4, there was some kind of problem” all denoted significant turns away from any
consistent description of possible experience. Each subjunctifier-utterance pairing took the report
in a completely different direction; the subjunctifiers signaled that what followed was
interchangeable to each other, and that all that was said should be understood within a manner of
speaking. This is in direct contrast to what is required to complete the DES task: to
straightforwardly describe a specific, unambiguous moment of experience. Thus, we see how
Amelia’s use of softening expressions signaled Amelia’s failure to have cleaved to experienceat-a-moment.
Another common PNA subjunctifier that Amelia used during her very-first-sample
interview were causal inferences—inferences explaining Amelia’s reports of experience. Here is
an example (all subjunctifiers are set in italics and with superscripts):
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A8a: Yes. ‘Cause1 this was taking really long. ‘Cause2 I thought it was just, like3, taking
half an hour, but that it would go all the way up to, like4, an hour. [RTH: Right]
Something like that5.
Even if true, the two causal inferences Amelia provided (i.e., both instances of “’cause”)
explaining why her (potential) experience occurred were not at all descriptive of directly
apprehended experience. Moreover, note that “something like that5” was a softening
expression—like the softening expressions discussed in the previous paragraph, “something like
that5” actively signaled that what was reported should not be understood as being descriptive of a
particular experience, hence undermining any possibility of a high-fidelity description.
Amelia’s very-first-sample interview also involved hedges— statements that signal what
is about to be said are speculations. Here is an example (all subjunctifiers are set in italics and
with superscripts):
A10a: I think1 right at that moment, I was thinking of whether I should text...2 Leslie or
you guys.
The opening “I think1” of the turn implied that all that followed was impressionistic or estimated,
thus undermining the possibility that what is being said is to be descriptive of a specific moment
of experience.
Thus, all the subjunctifiers in Amelia’s very-first-sample interview had the effect of
signaling Amelia had failed to cleave to experience-at-a-moment-of-the-beep. All of her
subjunctifiers lowered any possibility of describing specific experience, either by softening a
report, by reporting causal inferences, or by hedging, warning that what is about to be said
should not be taken as description. That is, all were PNA subjunctifiers.
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By contrast, Amelia’s subjunctifiers on her very-last-sample interview seemed to signal
that she was working to refine the fidelity of her descriptions of experience-at-the-moment-ofthe-beep (hence, DFS subjunctifiers, illustrating the description-falling-short label). The DFS
subjunctifiers never undermined a commitment to describing a particular phenomena; because
the subjunctifiers were nearly always immediately followed by descriptions of apprehendable
phenomena (or at least the possibility thereof), they signaled that Amelia was attempting to give
a careful description of experience. For example:
•

In A5b, Amelia provided a description of the relative prominence of her three
simultaneously apprehended phenomena: “No, I think maybe like dry, forty percent,
and then the rest were like thirty.” Although highly subjunctified, Amelia in this turn
is wholly constrained to describing her experience. Perhaps Amelia may not have
perfect certainty or descriptive fidelity in describing the relative prominence of her
experience, but her description is at least possibly descriptive of phenomena.

•

In A11b, Amelia used “like” to further clarify her description of eye-dryness: “No,
they’re just dry. Like they need eye drops.” Here, “like” did not qualify what
phenomena was present; it merely adjusted Amelia’s experience of how the dryness
was apprehended.

•

In A20b, Amelia described the order and arrangement of the rectangular blocks of
color she saw: “Orange orange and then blue and then I don’t remember the rest.”
Here, “I don’t remember the rest” was a subjunctifier (an explicit expression of
ignorance), but it was an expression of the limits of her memory; that is, it provided
evidence of Amelia’s improved ability to distinguish that which she apprehended
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from what she did not, and thus improved the believability of the phenomena she did
describe.
This is all not to suggest, however, that Amelia’s very-last-sample interview was entirely
consistent with high skill. In fact, Amelia used some PNA subjunctifiers in her very-last-sample
interviews that potentially signaled (through her use of hedges and causal inferences) that she
had failed to have apprehend her experience-at-a-moment. Here is an example (all subjunctifiers
are set in italics and with superscripts):
A15b: [Smiling] I think1 it must2 be the pressure. ‘Cause3 it didn’t feel like I was
massaging my phone or, like4, actually feeling the texture.
Here, “I think1” was a hedge indicating that what followed was speculative; “it must2” and
“‘Cause3” made up a causal inference in which she proposed a probable explanation for her
experience (but did not describe the experience); and “like4” was a softening expression. All of
these subjunctifiers mirrored the PNA subjunctifiers Amelia most frequently used in her veryfirst-sample interview; however, one notable difference in this turn is that, unlike her very-firstsample interview, Amelia’s description was consonant with describing possible, at-a-moment
experience. So, although it is possible that these subjunctifiers signaled Amelia’s failure to
cleave to a moment, they may have also been DFS subjunctifiers signaling that Amelia was
trying (with difficulty) to describe experience.
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Subjunctification vs. Very-Last-Sample Subjunctification
Amelia’s subjunctification improved across every manner between her very-lastinterview and her very-first-sample interview. Her subjunctification density on her very-last-
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sample was significantly and substantially lower than her subjunctification density on her veryfirst-sample interview, and (where subjunctifiers were used at all) involved mostly DFS
subjunctifiers that helped to refine the fidelity of her descriptions.
Amelia: Overall Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to examine a single participant (in this case: Amelia) at the
very start and the very end of her sampling process to assess any changes in her skillfulness to
engage in the sampling task (describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment
of the beep). By skillfullness, we specifically considered (using both quantitative and qualitative
means) the extent to which Amelia cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; we also
considered the nature of her subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Amelia (Possibly) Describe Experience?
No. She cleaved neither to the moment nor experience, her interview involved a high
density of PNA subjunctifiers that signaled her failure to have apprehended her experience-at-amoment, and the average EMB rating for the interview was low.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Amelia Improve?
Yes. She appeared to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, in which she
described (simultaneous) feeling-the-phone, eye dryness, and rectangles of color. The very-lastsample interview involved a low density of subjunctifiers that were most commonly of the DFS
type, signaling she successfully apprehended her experience but struggled to describe her
experience. Therefore, the EMB ratings for the interview were almost eight times higher than for
those of her very-first-sample interview.
Comparing the Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample Interviews
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Ultimately, we draw the following conclusion: whereas Amelia’s very-first-sample
interview could not possibly have been a high-fidelity description of experience (because she
failed to cleave to any moment and failed to cleave to any experience), it is possible that
Amelia’s very-last-sample interview involved high-fidelity descriptions of experience (because
she showed improvement in cleaving to a moment and in cleaving to experience). We cannot be
certain whether or not fidelity was actually achieved, but Amelia’s improvement in cleaving to
the moment and to experience, and the change in the manner of her subjunctification, suggests at
least the possibility that Amelia was apprehending at-the-moment experience in high-fidelity at
the end of her sampling participation
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Chapter 8: Results and Discussion for Shirley
Shirley had been an undergraduate subject pool volunteer in the methodological study.
As part of her participation in that study—which had been approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas following standards issued in the Declaration of
Helsinki—Shirley had consented to have her videotapes used in studies such as the present one.
The present study therefore accessed her methodological-study videotapes and had no other
contact with her.
Shirley had completed five days of natural environment DES sampling spread across a
roughly two-week time span, with 16 days elapsing between her first-day interview and her lastday interview. She had collected a total of 26 samples: 3 samples in her first day, 6 samples in
her second and third days, 5 samples in her fourth day, and 6 samples in her each during her fifth
day.
Quantitative Results and Discussion
The data analysis procedure is described fully in Chapter 6, and Shirley’s quantitative
results are shown in Table 2. For Shirley, the very-first-sample interview was 759 s in total
length, of which Shirley spoke for 328.5 s across 36 conversational turns. The very-last-sample
interview was 262 s in total length, of which Shirley spoke for 227.5 s across 23 conversational
turns. We divided Shirley’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews into 3-min
intervals; there were four intervals in the very-first-sample interview and three intervals in the
very-last-sample interview.
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Table 2
Shirley: Quantitative Results

Length of interview (s)a

Descriptive Statistics
Very-firstVery-lastsample
sample
759
262

Rater Reliability
r
df
p

Comparing Last vs. First
t
df
p
d

Time spoken by
participant (s)a
Number of spoken turns

328.5

227.5

36

23

Number of 3-min
intervals
Total Subjunctification
Counta
Total Subjunctification
Densitya,b
PNA Subjunctification
Densitya,b
UTC Subjunctification
Densitya,b
DFS Subjunctification
Densitya,b
Number of turns with
EMB ratings
Average EMB Ratingc

4

3

106.5

33

0.32
(SD = 0.02)
0.17
(SD = 0.07)
0.10
(SD = 0.03)
0.05
(SD = 0.04)
15

0.15
(SD = 0.04)
0.01
(SD = 0.01)
0.03
(SD = 0.01)
0.11
(SD = 0.04)
13

.73

5

.061

−7.52

5

< .001

6.13

.60

5

.157

−4.28

5

.008

3.01

.48

5

.279

−3.19

5

.024

2.80

.31

5

.498

2.48

5

.056

1.43

1.33d
(SD = 0.99)

9.10
(SD = 0.90)

.93

26

< .001

21.48

26

< .001

8.14

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-toclassify; DFS = Description-falling-short.
a

Averaged across the two raters.

b

Density is subjunctification count divided by time spoken by participant (subjunctifiers per s).

c

Average EMB ratings across the two raters for all rated turns of the interview.

d

Includes non-annotated turns given EMB ratings (S35a – S77a). If non-annotated turns are excluded, then there are

six rated turns from the very-first-sample interview and 13 rated turns from the very-last-sample interview. The
results are very similar and remain statistically significant (t(17) = 20.20, p < .001, d = 9.97).

Rows 5 through 9 of Table 2 analyze Shirley’s subjunctifiers. Row 5 displays the total
count of Shirley’s subjunctifiers in her very-first- and very-last-sample interviews (averaged
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across both raters), and row 6 displays the total subjunctification density (row 5 divided by row
2) and changes to the overall subjunctification density across both interviews. Rows 7 through 9
display the density for the three subtypes of subjunctifiers: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA)
subjunctifiers, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers, and description-falling-short (DFS)
subjunctifiers.
Specifically, the four right-hand columns of rows 7 through 9 in Table 2 show that
Shirley’s subjunctification changed significantly and substantially between her very-first- and
very-last-sample interviews. We found that Shirley’s total subjunctification density significantly
decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.32 subjunctifiers per second) to the verylast-sample interview (M = 0.15 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d = 6.13) effect size; we
similarly found that Shirley’s PNA (and UTC6) subjunctification density significantly decreased
from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.17 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample
interview (M = 0.01 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d = 3.01) effect size. By contrast, her
DFS subjunctification density increased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.05
subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.11 subjunctifiers per second)
with a substantial (d = 1.43) effect size, but this change was not significant due to the small
degrees of freedom. All these changes are consistent with a consequential improvement in
Shirley’s skill in apprehending and describing experience: Whereas Shirley’s very-first-sample
interview involved a high density of subjunctifiers (mostly PNA), her very-last-sample interview

6

Although UTC subjunctification density also significantly decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
0.10 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = .03 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d
= 2.80) effect size, UTC subjunctifiers, as their name implies, merely represent subjunctifiers that could not easily
be classified as a PNA or DFS-type subjunctifier; as such, they do not provide insight into the possible fidelity of a
participant’s report and are not germane to the overall argument.
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involved a low density of subjunctifiers (mostly DFS), suggesting that she learned to apprehend
phenomena but struggled to find the words to describe them adequately.
Rows 10 and 11 of Table 2 analyze EMB ratings for Shirley’s sample interviews,
counting them in row 10 and, in row 11, showing the average EMB rating. We found that
Shirley’s average EMB rating significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
1.33) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 9.10) with a huge (d = 8.14) effect size, suggesting
an extremely great improvement in Shirley’s cleaving-to-a-moment and cleaving-to-experience.
Qualitative Results and Discussion
A complete, turn-by-turn annotated transcript of Shirley’s very-first-sample and verylast-sample interviews are provided in Appendixes C and D, respectively. There, each annotation
includes analysis detailing the extent to which Shirley (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2)
cleaved to experience in that turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn. Here, we summarize
those results.
Experience at the Moment of the Beep
To reiterate: pristine, directly apprehended experience are phenomena that are present at
a specific moment. Thus, the high-fidelity apprehension of inner experience means that
participants must cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. (Successfully) cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep requires two, interrelated skills: the ability to cleave to
the last, undisturbed moment prior to beep onset and the ability to cleave to directly apprehended
experience. We now review the extent to which Shirley demonstrated moment- and experiencecleaving skill at the very start and very end of her DES sampling participation.
Very-First-Sample Interview
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(Lack of) Cleaving to the Moment. Shirley did not cleave to any specific moment
during her very-first-sample interview. Instead, Shirley talked about the wrong moment or long
(or ambiguous) time-periods that were not about any specific time. We provide examples of
each.
At the earliest conversational turns of the very-first-sample interview, Shirley
demonstrated her failure to cleave to experience:
LLC1a: All right, so… what, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of the
first beep?
S2a: Um, I was scared. [Laughs]
LLC3a: Okay.
S4a: I didn’t know what was—I forgot that, um, I put the beeper on, so I was really
startled. Um…
If Shirley’s S2a and S4a turns involved a moment at all, the moment occurred after the beep’s
onset. Specifically, “I forgot that, um, I put the beeper on, so I was really startled” was an
explicit statement about Shirley’s reaction to the beep. DES is only interested in the moment
before the beep’s onset.
Here is another turn from Shirley’s very-first-sample interview, where she talked about a
long time-period after being asked by a DES investigator what had been in her experience at the
moment of the beep:
S6a: Oh! Um… I was taking my psychology test online.
Although what she said in this turn was more specific than in her previous turns (S2a and S4a), it
referred to period that was several or many minutes in duration.
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Another example of Shirley’s references to a long time-period came at a later turn in the
very-first-sample interview:
S10a: Uh, the anxious—the anxious part [was most of my experience]. ‘Cause I really
need that good grade. [Laughs] Um… I remember right before I was, I was—we were
doing the independent and dependent variables, and I wasn’t, um… I wasn’t sure what
was the answer for what was the dependent variable [LLC: Mmm]. But like, it was
interesting cuz, like, right after, like, the beep and I wrote and then I looked back at the
question, I kinda, like, I don’t know, cleared my mind for a second and then got the
answer.
Here, Shirley indiscriminately talked about a long time-period, reporting on things that occurred
both before and after the beep’s onset. For instance, “I remember right before I was, I was—we
were doing the independent and dependent variables” was about something before the beep, and
“right after... the beep... I looked back at the question and I... cleared my mind for a second and
then got the answer” detailed a process that occurred after the beep. Although one could quibble
about the precise timing of the different components Shirley discussed in turn S10a (perhaps
Shirley referred to two seconds before and after the beep; perhaps shorter, perhaps longer), the
exact timing does not matter as the conclusion remains the same: Shirley failed to cleave to the
moment just before beep onset.
These excerpts are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Shirley did not cleave to any
moment during any part of her very-first-sample interview. Thus, she could not have been
cleaving to the specific moment of interest within DES—the last undisturbed moment at the
leading edge of the beep’s onset.
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(Lack of) Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience. By definition, an inner
experience is a phenomenon that is present at a specific moment. Because, as we just reviewed,
Shirley’s very-first-sample interview never focused on any specific moment, her very-firstsample interview could not have described any genuine inner experience(s). Instead, Shirley
provided ersatz descriptions (talk that appears to describe phenomena, but in actuality are talk of
non-phenomenal things), primarily of context and behavior. We provide examples of each.
We return to Shirley’s initial conversational turn of the very-first-sample interview, in
which Shirley provided an ersatz description of context:
S6a: Oh! Um… I was taking my psychology test online.
Here, Shirley did not differentiate between facts-of-reality and directly apprehended experience.
Even if this turn was an accurate statement about what Shirley had been doing at the moment of
the beep, it is in no way descriptive of directly apprehended phenomena.
Even in turns where Shirley may have described directly apprehended experience, she
failed to unambiguously make distinctions between experience and additional ersatz
descriptions:
S10a: Um, the anxious—the anxious part, most of me. ‘Cause I really need that good
grade. [Laughs] Um… I remember right before I was, I was—we were doing the
independent and dependent variables, and I wasn’t, um… I wasn’t sure what was the
answer for what was the dependent variable [LLC: Mmm]. But like, it was interesting
cuz, like, right after, like, the beep and I wrote and then I looked back at the question, I
kinda, like, I don’t know, cleared my mind for a second and then got the answer.
Except for talk about “the anxious part of me” (potentially a low fidelity description of possible
experience), everything else in this turn were ersatz descriptions of context and content: Shirley
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talked about what the nature of the quiz questions (independent and dependent variables), about
how she did not know the answer, and about what occurred after the beep’s onset. All of
Shirley’s talk—while descriptive of something—was not at all descriptive of directly
apprehended experience.
Although S6a and S10a represent only two specific turns of Shirley’s very-first-sample
interview, most (if not all) of her other very-first-sample turns are similar in nature, such that
they all include undifferentiated talk of context, the content and topics of thought, facts-ofreality, and (potential) kernels of experience.
The examples above are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Shirley did not cleave
to directly apprehended experience during her very-first-sample interview.
Very-First-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Shirley failed to
cleave to any moment and failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience during her veryfirst-sample interview. We conclude that Shirley’s utterances in her very-first-sample interview
had a near-zero possibility of any descriptive fidelity because she failed to grasp a particular
moment of experience and failed to differentiate phenomena from all else.
Very-Last-Sample Interview
Whereas Shirley’s very-first-sample interview did not describe at-a-moment experience,
Shirley’s very-last-sample interview very likely described at-a-moment experience. This was
evidenced by Shirley’s improved ability to cleave both to a specific moment and to directly
apprehended experience.
Shirley’s (improved) temporal and experiential specificity was evident from the initial
turn of the very-las-sample interview:
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S2b: Number six… um… So, right before the beep, I was think—I was mentally doing
math. Of… a hundred times... [laughs] a hundred times one, in my head. Which is one
hundred. But [laughs], at that beep, um, it was… a mental thing of... multiplying that
hundred times one. And… that feeling of, like, I know the answer is a hundred. Is there.
First, let us consider whether Shirley cleaved to a specific moment. Although she began the turn
with describing context (“I was mentally doing math... a hundred times one, in my head”), she
did not appear to conflate that context with her experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, nor did
she appear to conflate the moment of the beep with temporally nearby moments. Rather, she
explicitly acknowledged and differentiated context from experience caught in flight by beep; “so,
right before the beep” and “but at that beep” illustrated her understanding that (a) the moment of
interest in DES is very specific, and (b) that she had seemingly apprehended and could recall a
discrete and known moment (while setting all other moments aside). Second, let us consider
whether Shirley cleaved to directly apprehended experience in S2b. Setting aside the parts of the
turn where she explicitly talked about context, she appeared to constrain her description to two
directly apprehended, preset-at-the-moment-of-the-beep phenomena: a mental multiplication and
a feeling of knowing7.
Throughout the remainder of her very-last-sample interview, Shirley appeared consistent
in describing the same moment of mental multiplication and a feeling of knowing that she
described in S2b. For example:
•

In S4b, she essentially provided the same description of a directly apprehended
mental-multiplication and feeling-of-knowing: “At that beep, it was… a hundred

We note that—despite Shirley’s apparent ability to cleave to experience-at-a-moment, S2b had a high
subjunctification density; we will further discuss Shirley’s subjunctification in the next section.
7
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times one, but, the feeling of knowing the answer is a hundred.” This consistency
suggests that she was describing a discrete, known moment of experience.
•

In S15b and S17b, Shirley provided more details on how the mental math had been
present to her as an apparent inner seeing: “The… so, in my head, the, the problem
was a hundred times one... And then the equal sign.” This again appeared to describe
the mental-multiplication and feeling-of-knowing that Shirley first described in S2b,
but now included a seemingly higher-fidelity description of the apprehended
phenomena.

•

In S21b, Shirley described the details of her inner seeing, stating, “Yeah, it was, it
was… like, literally a hundred and then x one equals [draws out the equation in front
of her with her right index finger]. And it was… it was white in bold. And the
background was… [quizzically grimaces] it wasn’t black, but it was… black.” Of
particular note were the notable differences in descriptive fidelity across this turn.
Certain aspects of her inner seeing (such as which numbers and symbols were
present, their color, and their orientation) were described clearly, straightforwardly,
and with little subjunctification. However, other aspects of her inner seeing (such as
the color of the background) caused Shirley significant difficulty as demonstrated by
her increased subjunctification and behavioral changes captured on videotape (e.g.,
quizzical grimacing, strained facial expressions). This strain appeared to be centered
more on her communicative difficulty (i.e., Shirley’s inability to find the words to
describe her experience faithfully) rather than an apprehension problem (i.e., a failure
to have apprehended the phenomenon. Nothing that Shirley said in S21b decreased the
believability that a particular phenomenon had been present; Shirley’s talk merely
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appeared to signal that describing the background as “black” failed to describe her
experience with fidelity).
•

In S23b, Shirley appeared to describe the same inner seeing as in S21b and likewise
continued to struggle to describe the background of her inner seeing. Shirley was
entirely aimed at describing the black8 background in spite of her struggle in doing
so, “Yes, it was [a different kind of black]… there was… it wasn’t a very strong or
intense black. But the white was… the white of the numbers were intense and it was
clear. But the background was… like, yeah, a different type of black.”

Again, we note that Shirley appeared to describe the same mental multiplication and a feeling of
knowing in a manner that was consistent, temporally specific, and entirely descriptive of
phenomena to the exclusion of all else across multiple turns of her very-last-sample interview.
Taken together, Shirley’s steadfast commitment to describing experience (despite her obvious
struggle in doing so) throughout her very-last-sample interview strongly signal that she was
describing a discrete moment of experience.

8

A significant limitation of any transcript is that it does not capture body language, facial expressions, and other
nonverbal aspects. In the interview, particularly in S21b and S23b, Shirley appeared strained and sometimes anguished
in her responses; it was not merely that Shirley used subjunctifiers in her descriptions, but that she used
subjunctifiers while also exhibiting grimaces, starts and stops, a furrowed brow, and looks of frustration. Our
perspective is that Shirley’s worded and unworded struggle in S21b and S23b was indicative of Shirley’s endeavor to
communicate something important (specifically, that being the characteristics of the black background). That Shirley
stumbled, made numerous attempts at describing the black background, and appeared to strive forward yet remain
thwarted in her descriptions was an indication that Shirley was steadfast in describing her experience despite the
serious challenges that make describing inner experience difficult (e.g., the lack of differentiated vocabulary
available to describe difficult-to-word experiences). Moreover, what makes Shirley’s faithfulness compelling is that
it represents a challenge of Shirley on Shirley’s terms: It was Shirley (and Shirley alone; not the DES investigators)
who first mentioned the background of her inner seeing, and it was Shirley (and Shirley alone) who attempted to
describe what she saw of the background. In other words, the fact that Shirley went ahead to describe the
background despite the fact that doing so would invoke “trouble” (because the background was difficult, or
impossible, to put into words) signals to us that Shirley was completely devoted to the DES task: to describe her atthe-moment experience in the face of the many “troubles” that imperil that task.
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Very-Last-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Shirley appeared to
cleave to a moment and to experience in her very-last-sample interview. We conclude that
Shirley’s descriptions had the probability (or at least the possibility) of describing with fidelity a
moment of experience (perhaps most likely the experience at the beep).
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Qualitative Characteristics vs. Very-Last-Sample Qualitative
Characteristics
We have seen that, in her very-first-sample interview, Shirley did not describe any
particular moment and did not describe experience. By contrast, Shirley’s very-last-sample
interview was constrained to a relatively specific time and was mostly limited to describing
experience. We conclude that Shirley’s very-last-sample interview was very different from her
very-first-sample interview. Whereas in the very-first interview, she could not possibly have
been describing an experience that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep with any
level of fidelity, in the very-last sample she (at least) might have been describing an experience
that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctification
Previously in Shirley’s Quantitative Results and Discussion, we saw that Shirley’s
subjunctification density significantly decreased between her very-last-sample interview and her
very-first-sample interview, and as we have just detailed, there is reason to believe that Shirley’s
descriptions were of much higher fidelity during her very-last-sample interview than they had
been on her very-first-sample interview.
However, we also found that subjunctification density was not the only difference
between interviews. The type and manner of subjunctifiers that Shirley used substantially
changed between interviews and may provide even greater insight into Shirley’s improvement:
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Nearly all Shirley’s very-first-sample interview subjunctifiers signaled that she failed to
apprehend her experience at-the-moment-of-the-beep (and thus undermined any possibility of
describing experience). That is, most very-first-sample subjunctification was of the
phenomenon-not-apprehended (PNA) type. By contrast, nearly all her very-last-sample interview
subjunctifiers signaled that, whereas Shirley apprehended the phenomenon adequately, her
description was not yet adequate. That is, most very-last-sample subjunctification was of the
description-falling-short (DFS) type.
There were three types of PNA subjunctifiers that were common in Shirley’s very-firstsample interview: causal inferences, intentional expressions, and softening expressions. We
provide examples of each.
One of most common PNA subjunctifier that Shirley used in her very-first-sample
interview were causal inferences. Here are two examples, with the causal inference subjunctifiers
italicized for emphasis:
•

In S10a, “Um, the anxious—the anxious part, most of me. ‘Cause I really need that good
grade.”

•

In S19a, “I was trying to remember from lecture classes. Um, what was the dependentindependent variable because we did an activity on, um, on what it was and how, like, to
differentiate between the two.”

The italicized portions of Shirley’s turns are explanations of why something occurred rather than
descriptions of what had occurred. Moreover, causal inferences not only thwart the description
apprehended experience, but they are also are known to be particularly difficult for people to
perform readily and accurately (that was the main thesis of Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) well
known paper).
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Another common PNA subjunctifier in Shirley’s very-first-sample interview were
intentional expressions. An intentional expression is a specific type of contextual statement: an
utterance that communicates a person’s intent for their behavior or experience. Here is an
example (all subjunctifiers are set in italics and with superscripts):
S19a: I was trying to1 remember from lecture classes. Um2, what was the dependentindependent variable because3 we did an activity on, um4, on what it was and how, like5,
to differentiate between the two. And I was trying to6 take that example and apply it to
this problem.
Here, the two instances of “trying to” communicates the intent behind Shirley’s behavior but
does not describe anything that was directly apprehended. As noted by Hurlburt (2011), “’I was
trying to see an image’ means, or at least may mean, ‘I was not seeing an image’” (p. 117).
One other common PNA subjunctifier in Shirley’s very-first-sample interview were
softening expressions (i.e., statements, utterances, and expressions that led away from describing
experience-at-a-moment). Here is an example (all subjunctifiers are set in italics and with
superscripts):
S23a: Um1…2 I was still kinda3 thinking about the, well4, writing in, like5, jotting it down.
Tryna to6 like7, clear my thoughts on, like8, this, like9—10 a dependent variable is this and
independent variable was this. Yeah. [Laughs11]
Each subjunctifier in this turn (except for “tryna to,” which is an intentional expression)
approximated all that Shirley talked about in a way that significantly limited any possibility that
Shirley was describing a specific experience with fidelity. Shirley provided at least three possible
descriptions of experience: I was thinking about something, I was writing something, I was
clearing my thoughts. However, these descriptions referred to three very different experiences—
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they were not descriptive of a specific experience-at-a-moment. Moreover, the softening
subjunctifiers amplified the lack of fidelity about what Shirley reported on: “kinda3” implied that
the possible description of “thinking” should not be understood straightforwardly. In short:
every subjunctifier in S23a (and other instances of softening expressions throughout Shirley’s
very-first-sample interview) undermined a commitment to a particularized experience.
Thus, all the subjunctifiers in Shirley’s very-first-sample interview had the effect of
signaling Shirley had failed to cleave to experience-at-a-moment-of-the-beep. All of her
subjunctifiers lowered any possibility of describing specific experience, either because they
involved explanations of intention, by reporting causal inferences, or by softening a report. That
is, all were PNA subjunctifiers.
By contrast, Shirley’s subjunctifiers on her very-last-sample interview seemed to signal
that she was working to refine the fidelity of her descriptions of experience-at-the-moment-ofthe-beep (hence the DFS label). The DFS subjunctifiers never undermined a commitment to
describing a particular phenomena; because the subjunctifiers were nearly always immediately
followed by descriptions of apprehendable phenomena (or at least the possibility thereof), they
signal that Shirley was attempting to give a careful description of experience. A striking example
of Shirley’s use of DFS subjunctifiers came in S21b and S23b, where Shirley appeared to know
what her at-the-moment experience was but had difficulty putting her experience into words; set
in italics and with superscripts:
S21b: And the background was…1 [quizzically grimaces2] it wasn’t black, but it was…3
black. [Laughs4]
RTH22b: A different kind of black.
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S23b: Yes, it was…5 there was…6 it wasn’t a very strong or intense black. But the white
was…7 the white of the numbers were intense and it was clear. But the background
was…8 like9, yeah, a different type of black.
In S21b, Shirley used subjunctifiers to signal her difficulty in describing blackness, not her failure
to have apprehended the blackness in the first place. That is, her subjunctifiers reflected a
genuine characteristic of Shirley’s inner seeing (that the background was something like, but not
entirely black). This is corroborated by her continued description in S23b; notably, Shirley was
able to straightforwardly describe those aspects of her inner experience that were (apparently)
clearly apprehended and easily describable (e.g., “the white of the numbers were intense and it
was clear”), but struggled to adequately describe the background that had been “a different kind
of black.” That Shirley used subjunctifiers did not diminish the fact that she was tightly
constraining her descriptions to (known, but difficult to describe) directly apprehended
experience. In other words, Shirley’s steadfast commitment to phenomenal-talk that was
consistent of the same phenomena indicates her use of DFS subjunctifiers.
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Subjunctification vs. Very-Last-Sample Subjunctification
Shirley’s subjunctification improved across every manner between her very-lastinterview and her very-first-sample interview. Her subjunctification density on her very-lastsample was significantly lower than her very-first-sample interview, and involved mostly DFS
subjunctifiers that helped to refine the fidelity of her descriptions.
Shirley: Overall Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to examine a single participant (in this case: Shirley) at the
very start and the very end of her sampling process to assess any changes in her skillfulness to
engage in the sampling task (describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment
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of the beep). By skillfulness, we specifically considered (using both quantitative and qualitative
means) the extent to which Shirley cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; we also
considered the nature of her subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Shirley (Possibly) Describe Experience?
No. She cleaved neither to the moment nor experience, her interview involved a high
density of PNA subjunctifiers that signaled her failure to have apprehended her experience-at-amoment, and the average EMB rating for the interview was low.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Shirley Improve?
Yes. She appeared to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, in which she
described a (simultaneous) inner-seeing-of-a-math-problem-and-recognition-of-the-answer. The
very-last-sample interview involved a significantly lower density of PNA subjunctifiers in
comparison to her very-first-sample interview. The subjunctifiers she did use were mostly of the
DFS type, signaling she successfully apprehended her experience but struggled to describe her
experience. Shirley’s subjunctification differed both quantitively and qualitatively between
interviews, suggesting that her very-last-sample interview was more consistent than her veryfirst-sample-interview in describing directly apprehended phenomena present at-a-moment.
Shirley’s substantial improvement in her ability to cleave to experience at-a-moment was
similarly reflected in the average very-last-sample EMB ratings—they were almost seven times
higher than for those of her very-first-sample interview.
Comparing the Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample
Ultimately, we draw the following conclusion: whereas Shirley’s very-first-sample
interview could not possibly have been a high-fidelity description of experience (because she
failed to cleave to any moment and failed to cleave to any experience), it is possible that
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Shirley’s very-last-sample interview involved high-fidelity descriptions of experience (because
she showed improvement in cleaving to a moment and in cleaving to experience). We cannot be
certain whether or not fidelity was actually achieved, but Shirley’s improvement in cleaving to
the moment and to experience, and the change in the manner of her subjunctification, suggests at
least the possibility that Shirley was apprehending at-the-moment experience in high-fidelity at
the end of her sampling participation.
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Chapter 9: Results and Discussion for Kayla
Kayla had been an undergraduate subject pool volunteer in the methodological study. As
part of her participation in that study—which had been approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas following standards issued in the Declaration of
Helsinki—Kayla had consented to have her videotapes used in studies such as the present one.
The present study therefore accessed her methodological-study videotapes and had no other
contact with her.
Kayla completed five days of natural environment DES sampling, with 14 days elapsing
between her first-day interview and her last-day interview. She had collected a total of 23
samples: 4 samples in her first day, 5 samples in her second day, 4 samples in her third day, 6
samples in her fourth day, and 4 samples in her fifth day.
Quantitative Results and Discussion
The data analysis procedure is described fully in Chapter 6, and Kayla’s quantitative
results are shown in Table 3. Kayla’s very-first-sample interview was 470 s in total length, of
which she spoke for 165 s across 16 conversational turns. Her very-last-sample interview was
711 s in total length, of which she spoke for 346 s across 40 conversational turns. We divided her
very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews into 3-min intervals; there were three intervals
in the very-first-sample interview and four intervals in the very-last-sample interview.
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Table 3
Kayla: Quantitative Results

Length of interview (s)a

Descriptive Statistics
Very-firstVery-lastsample
sample
470
711

Rater Reliability
r
df
p

Comparing Last vs. First
t
df
p
d

Time spoken by
participant (s)a
Number of spoken turns

165

346

16

40

Number of 3-min
intervals
Total Subjunctification
Counta
Total Subjunctification
Densitya,b
PNA Subjunctification
Densitya,b

3

4

97

185

0.59
(SD = 0.11)
0.53
(SD = 0.11)

0.52
(SD = 0.06)
0.13
(SD = 0.09)

.44

5

.074

−0.56

5

.616

0.88

.71

5

.631

−4.76

5

.005

4.18

UTC Subjunctification
Densitya,b
DFS Subjunctification
Densitya,b
Number of turns with
EMB ratings
Average EMB Ratingc

0.06
(SD = 0.02)
0.00
(SD = 0.00)
12

0.16
(SD = 0.03)
0.23
(SD = 0.13)
21

.22

5

.003

−5.69

5

.002

4.13

.92

5

.328

2.69

5

.043

2.24

0.52
(SD = .42)

6.31
(SD = 1.82)

.88

31

< .001

10.80

31

< .001

3.91

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-toclassify; DFS = Description-falling-short.
a

Averaged across the two raters.

b

Density is subjunctification count divided by time spoken by participant (subjunctifiers per s).

c

Average EMB ratings across the two raters for all rated turns of the interview.

Rows 5 through 9 of Table 3 analyze Kayla’s subjunctifiers. Row 5 displays the total
count of Kayla’s subjunctifiers in her very-first- and very-last-sample interviews (averaged
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across both raters) and row 6 displays the total subjunctification density (row 5 divided by row 2)
and changes to the overall subjunctification density across both interviews. Rows 7 through 9
display the density for the three subtypes of subjunctifiers: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA)
subjunctifiers, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers, and description-falling-short (DFS)
subjunctifiers
Specifically, the four right-hand columns of rows 7 through 9 in Table 3 show that
Kayla’s subjunctification changed significantly and substantially between her very-first- and
very-last-sample interviews. We found that Kayla’s total subjunctification density decreased
from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.59 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample
interview (M = 0.52 subjunctifiers per second) with a somewhat large (d = 0.88) effect size, but
this change was not significant due to the small degrees of freedom. PNA (and UTC9)
subjunctification density significantly decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.53
subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.13 subjunctifiers per second)
with a huge (d = 4.18) effect size. By contrast, DFS subjunctifiers significantly increased from
the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.00 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample
interview (M = 0.23 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d = 2.24) effect size. All these
changes are consistent with a consequential improvement in Kayla’s skill in apprehending and
describing experience. Although Kayla’s total subjunctification density changed in moderate (but
not statistically significant) ways between the very-first-sample and very-last-sample interview,
the type of subjunctifiers present in each interview changed dramatically: Whereas Kayla’s veryfirst-sample interview involved a high density of mostly PNA subjunctifiers (and a very low
9

Although UTC subjunctification density also significantly decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
0.06) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.16) with a huge (d = 4.18) effect size, UTC subjunctifiers, as their
name implies, merely represent subjunctifiers that could not easily be classified as a PNA or DFS-type subjunctifier;
as such, they do not provide insight into the possible fidelity of a participant’s report.
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density of DFS subjunctifiers), her very-last-sample interview involved a high density of mostly
DFS subjunctifiers (and a low density of PNA subjunctifiers), suggesting that she learned to
apprehend phenomena but struggled to find the words to describe them adequately.
Rows 10 and 11 of Table 3 analyze EMB ratings for Kayla’s sample interviews, counting
them in the row 10 and, in the row 11, showing the average EMB rating. We found that Kayla’s
average EMB rating significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.52) to
the very-last-sample interview (M = 6.31) with a huge (d = 3.91) effect size, suggesting an
extremely great improvement in Kayla’s cleaving-to-a-moment and cleaving-to-experience skill.
Qualitative Results and Discussion
A complete, turn-by-turn annotated transcript of Kayla’s very-first-sample and very-lastsample interviews are provided in Appendixes E and F, respectively. There, each annotation
includes analysis detailing the extent to which Kayla (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2)
cleaved to experience in that turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn. Here, we summarize
those results.
Experience at the Moment of the Beep
To reiterate: pristine, directly apprehended experience are phenomena that are present at
a specific moment. Thus, the high-fidelity apprehension of inner experience means that
participants must cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. (Successfully) cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep requires two, interrelated skills: the ability to cleave to
the last, undisturbed moment prior to beep onset and the ability to cleave to directly apprehended
experience. We now review the extent to which Kayla demonstrated moment- and experiencecleaving skill at the very start and very end of her DES sampling participation.
Very-First-Sample Interview
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(Lack of) Cleaving to the Moment. Kayla did not cleave to any specific moment during
her very-first-sample interview. Instead, she spoke entirely of relatively long time-periods or
made statements that were not about any specific time. We provide examples of each.
K2a: All right. Uh, so... I was, like, I wasn’t really feeling anything too much… like, you
know. Um... like… when it went off, uh, my mom and I were making, like, uh, tuna
sandwiches, so I really just put the toast—the bread to toast and then she did everything
else. [Laughs] But um… yeah… uh... I was, I was, like, I guess I felt—like, physically I
felt tired. Like, uh… I’ve been up since like 5:30 in the morning, um... and I did some
exercises in the, in the gym that morning as well... and I had a long day. [Laughs] So I
have three classes… um, and… my... I had a midterm in one of the classes, so that didn’t
help. [LLC: Yeah] So yeah.
Here, Kayla reported that the beep had occurred while she and her mother had been making tuna
sandwiches—this was talk about a long time-period, not a moment. When Kayla appeared to
refer to a more specific moment (that the beep sounded when Kayla “just put... the bread to
toast”), putting the “bread to toast” still refers to a relatively long time-period (e.g., placing the
bread into the toaster? Adjusting the toaster’s settings? Initiating the toaster to begin toasting?).
Furthermore, when Kayla reviewed what she had done that day (“I’ve been up since like 5:30 in
the morning... I did some exercises... I have three classes”), these statements provided context or
interpretation, not about any specific time.
Here is an example from a later turn of the very-first interview:
K4a: Um… the main thing was just, like, we were, like, we were, like, actually in the
middle of making [tuna sandwiches] when [the beeper] went off. So then, um, that was
just like, uh… that was the thing that, that, that, uh, we were doing at that moment, so—
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Kayla’s statement that she was “actually in the middle of making [tuna sandwiches] when [the
beeper] went off” referred to a long time-period—a several- or many-minutes long process of
making sandwiches. This was not a description of a moment.
Another later-turn example:
K18a: And, oh! Actually, I just remembered, I think I had also gotten a plate for that, for
that toast so that, like, whenever, whenever it was ready I could just put it on the plate.
This turn involved talk about a general statement of facts (i.e., that she had gotten a plate) and
inferred intentional expressions (i.e., her expressed intent explaining why she had gotten a plate);
nothing that Kayla said was about any specific time.
These excerpts are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Kayla did not cleave to any
moment during any part of her very-first-sample interview. Thus, she could not have been
cleaving to the specific moment of interest within DES—the last undisturbed moment at the
leading edge of the beep’s onset.
(Lack of) Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience. By definition, an inner
experience is a phenomenon that is present at a specific moment. Because, as we just reviewed,
Kayla’s very-first-sample interview never focused on any specific moment, her very-first-sample
interview could not have described any genuine inner experience(s). Instead, Kayla spoke of
context and behavior. We provide examples of each.
K2a: All right. Uh, so... I was, like, I wasn’t really feeling anything too much… like, you
know. Um... like… when it went off, uh, my mom and I were making, like, uh, tuna
sandwiches, so I really just put the toast—the bread to toast and then she did everything
else. [Laughs] But um… yeah… uh... I was, I was, like, I guess I felt—like, physically I
felt tired. Like, uh… I’ve been up since like 5:30 in the morning, um... and I did some
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exercises in the, in the gym that morning as well... and I had a long day. [Laughs] So I
have three classes… um, and… my... I had a midterm in one of the classes, so that didn’t
help. [LLC: Yeah] So yeah.
“I’ve been up since like 5:30 in the morning…and I had a long day” was about context, not
experience. “Physically, I felt tired” may have been a description of experience, but it may have
also been a statement of context rather than experience—an introduction to the day’s events.
Everything else Kayla said was about behavior—things she had done. “When [the beep] went
off... my mom and I were making... tuna sandwiches, so I really just put... the bread to toast” was
a report of actions Kayla had performed around the moment of the beep, and “I’ve been up since
like 5:30 in the morning... I [had] three classes... I had a midterm in one of the classes” was a
long list of actions Kayla had performed throughout the day. Reports about behavior are not
descriptive of directly apprehended phenomena.
Here is another example:
K6a: ... I think I had put in the second, uh, set of, like, uh, bread, ‘cause like, you know,
two tuna sandwiches. I think I put the second one in like uh right before the beep went
off. [Quizzically casts eyes upwards; pauses] Yeah, I did. And then, um… yeah. Yeah,
that’s what I did.
“I had put in the second” was a characterization of context rather than a description of directly
apprehended experience.
Notably, even when Kayla was pressed by DES investigators to describe what had been
present to her, she continued to talk only about her behavior. For example:
RTH25a: ... so the question is what is in your experience right at the moment when the
beep goes off?
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K26a: [Pauses] I wanna say I was turning away from the thing? I’m not sure on that.
Consistent with Kayla’s reports in all other turns, “I wanna say I was turning away from the
thing” was a statement about behavior, and not a description of experience.
The examples above are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Kayla did not cleave to
directly apprehended experience during her very-first-sample interview, instead talking primarily
about context and behavior.
Very-First-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Kayla failed to cleave
to any moment and failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience during her very-firstsample interview. We conclude that Kayla’s utterances in her very-first-sample interview had a
near-zero possibility of any descriptive fidelity because she failed to grasp a particular moment
of experience.
Very-Last-Sample Interview
Kayla’s very-last-sample interview was consistent with cleaving to directly apprehended
experience that occurred at a specific moment. Since the high-fidelity apprehension and
description of experience must involve the simultaneous presence of cleaving to a moment and to
directly apprehended experience, we are unable to separate our analysis of Kayla’s very-lastsample cleaving abilities as independent processes. Therefore, we will review examples from
Kayla’s very-last-sample interview and examine whether she did simultaneously cleave to a
moment and cleave to experience.
Here is Kayla’s very first turn from her very-last-sample interview:
K2b: So six, um… I, I decided to do neither of those things and, um, uh—I decided to,
like, uh, um… ‘cause I, I play piano, like, sometimes. So, I, I have a keyboard in my
room and, um… so, I was reading the sheet music on that. Uh, I, I think I printed it out,
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like, a few days ago, and I was reading, uh… um… I think it was the third or fourth
measure. Um… and I was specifically focused on, like, the left hand, like, trying to figure
out, like, how it should sound and like, how to play, how to exactly play it. ‘Cause, like,
in that specific measure the right hand and the left hand kind of… kind of are jumbled
together. [Laughs] So I was trying to figure out how I would exactly play that.
First, let us consider whether Kayla cleaved to a specific moment. She began the turn describing
context (e.g., “I have a keyboard in my room”)—neither cleaving to a moment nor to experience.
However, she soon specified a brief, temporally-specific moment: “the third or fourth measure.”
Thereafter her description was constrained to those same few seconds. Second, let us consider
whether Kayla cleaved to experience. She described experiencing something about her left hand:
“I was specifically focused on, like, the left hand, like, trying to figure out, like, how it should
sound and like, how to play, how to exactly play it.” Although heavily subjunctified (we will
discuss Kayla’s subjunctification in the next section), included in Kayla’s description is the
possibility of directly apprehended phenomena. Thus, Kayla’s first turn of the very-last-sample,
after a brief statement of context, was a relatively straightforward description of experience at a
relatively specific time.
Throughout the remainder of her very-last-sample interview, Kayla appeared consistent
in describing the same moment of figuring-out-how-the-piano-should-sound experience that she
described in K2b. For example, in K4b, Kayla said:
K4b: “Um… it’s… so, I’m seeing…, so I see the notes, like, on the, on the thing, and I’m
trying to… um, visualize how it, how it should sound. So, I guess, in a way, I’m hearing
the, um… I’m hearing—I’m trying to like hear it in my mind and at the same time also
trying to like, uh, uh… like, play it out on the piano itself.”
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In this turn, Kayla appeared to be describing the same third-or-fourth-measure moment as before,
and her descriptions were of apprehendable phenomena: seeing, visualizing, and hearing. She
expressed difficulty about apprehending those phenomena, but then settled into describing an
imaginary hearing. That is, her talk was consistent with experience-at-a-moment.
In later turns, Kayla continued:
K14b: “I’d say that, um… the main thing was, uh… like, playing it was, like, not as
present as, um, as like, hearing it in, like—hearing it and then, read, like, reading it as
well.”
Here, Kayla described the relative strengths between the various phenomena that she had directly
apprehended. These fine-grained distinctions suggest Kayla was attempting to cleave her
description to a specific moment of apprehended experience.
Turns later, in K22b, Kayla continued in a similar vein:
K22b: “I have a process about, like, uh, about like, uh, going about, like, learning notes,
like, uh, um… uh… I’m not sure how, how exactly to describe it like I know like what
notes should, like, with what a note should sound like. Um, so… in my mind I’m trying
to, like, hear it, like, and then put it together based on, like, what I’ve heard before. And,
what, um… um… what I’ve—what I know that these notes, like, sound like and how
long I should hold them for. Which isn’t that long [laughs] ‘cause they’re like sixteenth
and eighth notes.”
Although highly subjunctified, Kayla’s description was still consistent with the same (third or
fourth measure) time and the same (hearing) experience.
Very-Last-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Kayla appeared to
cleave to a moment and to experience in her very-last-sample interview. We conclude that
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Kayla’s descriptions had the probability (or at least the possibility) of describing with fidelity a
moment of experience (perhaps most likely the experience at the beep).
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Qualitative Characteristics vs. Very-Last-Sample Qualitative
Characteristics
We have seen that, in her very-first-sample interview, Kayla did not describe any
particular moment and did not describe experience. By contrast, Kayla’s very-last-sample
interview was constrained to a relatively specific time and was mostly limited to describing
experience. We conclude that Kayla’s very-last-sample interview was very different from her
very-first-sample interview. Whereas in the very-first interview, she could not possibly have
been describing an experience that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep with any
level of fidelity, in the very-last sample she (at least) might have been describing an experience
that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctification
As we have just detailed, there is reason to believe that Kayla’s descriptions were of
much higher fidelity during her very-last-sample interview than they had been on her very-firstsample interview. However, we have also seen in the Quantitative Results and Discussion
section that her total subjunctification density did not significantly change from the very-first to
very-last sample. Hurlburt (2011) proposed that subjunctification density can generally been
thought of as an indicator of descriptive fidelity—that the higher the density (that is, the greater
number of subjunctifiers per second), the lower the fidelity. Kayla’s sampling suggests that
Hurlburt’s proposal does not apply for Kayla; despite the lack of significant total
subjunctification density change between interviews, it is clear that Kayla changed between her
very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews.
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However, the type and manner of subjunctifiers that Kayla used did change dramatically
between interviews and may provide greater insight into Kayla’s improvement: nearly all of
Kayla’s very-first-sample interview subjunctifiers signaled that she failed to apprehend her
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep (and thus undermined any possibility of describing
experience). In other words, all of Kayla’s very-first-sample subjunctification was of the
phenomenon-not-apprehended (PNA) type. By contrast, the majority of her very-last-sample
interview subjunctifiers signaled that, whereas Kayla apprehended the phenomenon adequately,
her description was not yet adequate. That is, most very-last-sample subjunctification was of the
description-falling-short (DFS) type.
There were three types of PNA subjunctifiers that were common in Kayla’s very-firstsample interview: softening expressions, intentional expression, and hedges. We provide
examples of each.
Here is an example of softening expressions from the first two sentences of Kayla’s
initial turn from her very-first-sample interview (all subjunctifiers are set in italics and with
superscripts):
K2a: All right. Uh1, so...2 I was, like3, I wasn’t really4 feeling anything too much…5 like6,
you know7. Um8...9 like10…11 when it went off, uh12, my mom and I were making, like13,
uh14, tuna sandwiches, so I really just15 put the toast—the bread to toast and then she did
everything else.
Here, Kayla’s subjunctifiers signaled that her reports were not to be taken as descriptions of
experience-at-a-moment because they undermined a commitment to describing any specific
experience. For example, “Uh1, so...2 I was, like3, I wasn’t really4 feeling anything too much…5”

142

involved five subjunctifiers that de-particularized any commitment to describing a specific
experience; the result is a report with very low fidelity.
Another common PNA subjunctifier that Kayla used during her very-first-sample
interview were intentional expressions. Here is the last part of turn K30a:
K30a: ... I was trying to1 be careful to like not bump into my mom, because she was
behind me, so, I had to be careful about that2.
“I was trying to1” and “so, I had to be careful about that2” communicated intent and provided a
(possible) explanation of Kayla’s behavior, but neither intention nor explanation are in any way
descriptive of directly apprehended experiences.
Kayla’s very-first-sample interview also included hedges—statements that qualify what
follows. Here are examples:
K26a: [Pauses] I wanna say1 I was turning away from the thing?
K30a: I feel like2 if I remember3 about what when I turned away from the toaster...
“I wanna say1,” “I feel like2,” and “if I remember3” are all warnings: they give notice that what is
about to be said is impressionistic or speculative. They alert the interviewer/reader not to believe
what is about to be said.
Thus, all the subjunctifiers in Kayla’s very-first-sample interview had the effect of
signaling Kayla failed to cleave to experience-at-a-moment-of-the-beep. All subjunctifiers
lowered the possibility of describing experience, either by softening a report, by expressing
intent, or by hedging, warning that what is about to be said should not be taken as description.
That is, all were PNA subjunctifiers.
By contrast, Kayla’s subjunctifiers on her very-last-sample interview generally seemed to
signal that she was working to refine the fidelity of her descriptions of experience-at-the-
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moment-of-the-beep—we refer to these as DFS subjunctifiers. The DFS subjunctifiers never
undermined Kayla’s commitment to describing a particular phenomena; because the
subjunctifiers were nearly always immediately followed by descriptions of apprehendable
phenomena (or at least the possibility thereof), they signaled that Kayla was attempting to give a
careful description of experience. Here is one example from Kayla’s initial conversational turn
from the very-last-sample itnerview:
K2b: I was reading, uh1…2 um3…4 I think5 it was the third or fourth measure. Um6…7 and
I was specifically focused on, like8, the left hand, like9, trying to10 figure out, like11, how
it should sound and like12, how to play, how to exactly play it.
•

“uh1…2 um3…4 I think5 was followed by a description of a temporally specific time:
somewhere around the third or fourth measure of a song. The subjunctifiers signaled that
Kayla was actively limiting the range of possible events—that she was cleaving to a
moment that occurred while reading either this or that particular bar of music.

•

“Um6…7” and “like8” was followed by specific talk about a possible experience:
“specifically focused on, like8, the left hand.” Perhaps her focus was not exactly on the
left hand, but at least there was the possibility that the subjunctifiers signaled that she
was heading in the direction of describing directly apprehended phenomena.

•

“trying to10 figure out, like11, how it should sound and like12” was followed by, “how to
play, how to exactly play it.” The difference between the present “trying to10” and that of
turn K30a in the very-first-sample is that, in K30a, the trying is the whole supposed
experience, whereas in K2b the trying is part of an experiential phenomenon (how it
should sound). That is, Kayla’s description was subjunctified not because experience
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was not apprehended, but (potentially) because Kayla was trying but not able to describe
what she apprehended with sufficient fidelity.
There are numerous other examples of DFS subjunctifiers present throughout Kayla’s
very-last-sample interview. For example, in K30b, Kayla said in response to whether she was
hearing two simultaneous external and internal sounds:
K30b: “Mmm1…2 a little bit less from what I’m hearing from, like3, the actual, like4, piano,
but yeah.”
Here, her subjunctifiers were always followed by a description of possible phenomena (the
hearing of the piano). Whereas the PNA subjunctifiers in Kayla’s very-first-sample interview
softened any possibility of describing experience, involved inferences of intention, or involved
hedging, Kayla’s subjunctification in this turn did not otherwise detract from Kayla’s description
of her directly apprehended experience of hearing-the-piano—they merely qualified the degree
to which the real-life piano hearing was present to her.
This is not to suggest, however, that Kayla’s cleaving to a moment and to experience
during her very-last-sample interview was perfect. In fact, Kayla subjunctified in a way that (like
her very-first-sample PNA interview subjunctifiers) undermined her descriptions through her use
of hedges and faux generalizations. For example, when Kayla was asked how hearing the piano
was present in her experience, she stated:
K22b: Um1, like2…3 uh4…5 it’d be6 how, um7, how I’ve heard it, like8, played—um9, and
how, um10…11 like12, trying to13…14 hmm15. I have a process16 about, like17, uh18, about
like19, uh20, going about, like21, learning notes, like22, uh23, um24…25 uh26…27 I’m not sure
how28, how exactly to describe it like29 I know like30 what notes should, like31, with what
a note should sound like. Um32, so…33 in my mind I’m trying to34, like35, hear it, like36,
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and then put it together based on, like37, what I’ve heard before. And, what, um38…39
um40…41 what I’ve—42 what I know that these notes, like43, sound like and how long I
should hold them for. Which isn’t that long [laughs] ‘cause44 they’re like45 sixteenth and
eighth notes, so46…47
Initially, Kayla hedged about her in-general process about learning notes: “it’d be6 how, um7,
how I’ve heard it, like8, played” was a hedge—a speculation about a hypothetical experience and
is not descriptive of any particular experience. Kayla also talked used talked about how she
typically learns music (“I have a process16 ... going about, like21, learning notes”)—this was a
faux generalization that—correct or not—is not descriptive of her experience-at-the-moment-ofthe-beep. However, Kayla eventually appeared to return to describing her specific experience
when she began describing her apparent figuring-out-how-the-piano-should-sound experience
(starting from “so…33 in my mind I’m trying to34” and ending at the end of the turn), suggesting
that the subjunctifiers around her phenomenal-talk of figuring-out-how-the-piano-should-sound
experience may be DFS subjunctifiers. This turn was one of several such turns throughout
Kayla’s very-last-sample interview that featured a highly dense, nonspecific mix of potentially
PNA and DFS subjunctifiers (see K26b, K42b, K52b).
There were also some turns during her very-last-sample interview that were (essentially)
one big PNA subjunctifier:
K65b: Uh… that’s, that’s a tricky thing about this particular piece ‘cause, like, it was
written in, like, uh, a period where like, um… uh… like, there’s just—there’s not really
like a specific way that the composer had, like, had in mind for it? So, I’ve, I’ve heard a
lot of different recordings, like, uh, just like, with like different tempos and all that, so…
there’s no right way specifically to play it? But, um… I, I have, like, I have a personal,
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like, thing that like, that it shouldn’t be played, like, too fast—like it sounds it sounds
weird playing it kinda fast. [Laughs]
This whole paragraph was not at all descriptive of experience, involving explanations about the
piece, generalities about previous times she had heard the piece, and her reasoning about how
she should play the music—all are unrelated to directly apprehended experience, and thus signal
the presence of PNA subjunctification10.
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Subjunctification vs. Very-Last-Sample Subjunctification
Overall, the quantification of subjunctification density was not effective as a measure of
the fidelity of Kayla’s descriptions: both of Kayla’s interviews featured a high density of
subjunctifiers (broadly defined). However, we did observe notable differences in the types of
subjunctifiers present within each interview (that is: the relative proportion of PNA, UTC, and
DFS subjunctifiers that contributed to the total subjunctification in each interview changed in
composition between the very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews). Subjunctifiers in
Kayla’s very-first-sample interview were mostly of the PNA type—utterances that signaled that
phenomenon may not have been adequately grasped, and so lowered any possibility of
describing a specific moment of experience. In contrast, subjunctifiers in Kayla’s very-lastsample interview were mostly of the DFS type—utterances that signaled an attempt to refine the
fidelity of describing a specific moment of experience
Kayla: Overall Conclusion

However, we note that the relatively “low quality” response in K 65b was provided in response to (perhaps poor)
questions in RTH62b and RTH64b about whether she was playing the “right” notes based upon what the composer had
in mind.
10

147

The goal of this chapter was to examine a single participant (in this case: Kayla) at the
very start and the very end of her sampling process to assess any changes in her skillfulness to
engage in the sampling task (describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment
of the beep). By skillfulness, we specifically considered (using both quantitative and qualitative
means) the extent to which Kayla cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; we also
considered the nature of her subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Kayla (Possibly) Describe Experience?
No. She cleaved neither to the moment nor experience, her interview involved a high
density of (mostly PNA) subjunctifiers, and the average EMB rating for the interview was low.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Kayla Improve?
Yes. She appeared to cleave to the moment (the third or fourth measure) and to
experience (consistently referring to the experience of learning music). The very-last-sample
interview still involved a moderate density of subjunctifiers that was not significantly different
from the very-first-sample interview, but, unlike the very-first-sample interview, most
subjunctifiers were of the DFS type, signaling she successfully apprehended her experience but
struggled to describe her experience. Therefore, the EMB ratings for the interview were over
twelve times higher than for those of her very-first-sample interview.
Comparing the Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample Interviews
Ultimately, we draw the following conclusion: whereas Kayla’s very-first-sample
interview could not possibly have been a high-fidelity description of experience (because she
failed to cleave to any moment and failed to cleave to any experience), it is possible that Kayla’s
very-last-sample interview involved high-fidelity descriptions of experience (because she
showed improvement in cleaving to a moment and in cleaving to experience). We cannot be
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certain whether or not fidelity was actually achieved, but Kayla’s improvement in cleaving to the
moment and to experience, and the change in the manner of her subjunctification, suggests at
least the possibility that Kayla was apprehending at-the-moment experience in high-fidelity at the
end of her DES sampling participation.
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Chapter 10: Results and Discussion for Jake
Jake had been a participant in the psychotherapy study. As part of his participation in that
study—which had been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas following standards issued in the Declaration of Helsinki—Jake had consented to his
videotapes used in studies such as the present one. The present study therefore accessed his
psychotherapy-study videotapes and had no other contact with him.
Jake had completed eight days of natural environment DES sampling spread across a
roughly four-month time span, with 108 days elapsing between his first-day interview and lastday interview. He had collected a total of 37 samples: 4 samples in his first day, 5 samples in his
second day, 6 samples in his third day, 5 samples in his fourth day, 4 samples in his fifth day, 4
samples in his sixth day, 4 samples on his seventh day, and 5 samples on his eighth day.
Quantitative Results and Discussion
The data analysis procedure is described fully in Chapter 6, and Jake’s quantitative
results are shown in Table 4. For Jake, the very-first-sample interview was 642 s in total length,
of which Jake spoke for 305.5 s across 35 conversational turns. The very-last-sample interview
was 379 s in total length, of which Jake spoke for 258 s across 24 conversational turns. We
divided Jake’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews into 3-min intervals; there were
four intervals in the very-first-sample interview and three intervals in the very-last-sample
interview.
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Table 4
Jake: Quantitative Results

Length of interview (s)a

Descriptive Statistics
Very-firstVery-lastsample
sample
642
379

Rater Reliability
r
df
p

Comparing Last vs. First
t
df
p
d

Time spoken by participant
(s)a
Number of spoken turns

305.5

258

35

24

Number of 3-min intervals

4

3

Total Subjunctification
Counta
Total Subjunctification
Densitya,b
PNA Subjunctification
Densitya,b
UTC Subjunctification
Densitya,b
DFS Subjunctification
Densitya,b
Number of turns with EMB
ratings
Average EMB Ratingc

127.5

71

0.42
(SD = 0.14)
0.27
(SD = 0.13)
0.11
(SD = 0.06)
0.04
(SD = 0.04)
14

0.28
(SD = 0.16)
0.04
(SD = 0.03)
0.08
(SD = 0.05)
0.16
(SD = 0.10)
10

.90

5

.006

−1.88

5

.119

0.97

.50

5

.255

−2.97

5

.031

2.25

.11

5

.809

−0.85

5

.433

0.67

.62

5

.136

1.03

5

.349

1.75

2.71d
(SD = 1.99)

7.68
(SD = 1.20)

.90

22

< .001

7.01

22

< .001

2.90

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep.
a

Averaged across the two raters.

b

Subjunctifiers per second: Subjunctification count divided by total time spoken by participant (sec).

c

Average EMB ratings for all rated turns of the interview.

Including non-annotated turns (J61a – J75a). If non-annotated turns are excluded, then there are 11 very-first-sample
and 10 very-last-sample turns, but the results are very similar and remain statistically significant (t(19) = 6.20, p <
.001, d = 2.71).
d
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Rows 5 through 9 of Table 4 analyze Jake’s subjunctifiers. Row 5 displays the total count
of Jake’s subjunctifiers in his very-first- and very-last-sample interviews (averaged across both
raters), and row 6 displays the total subjunctification density (row 5 divided by row 2) and
changes to the overall subjunctification density across both interviews. Rows 7 through 9 display
the density for the three subtypes of subjunctifiers: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA)
subjunctifiers, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers, and description-falling-short (DFS)
subjunctifiers.
Specifically, the four right-hand columns of rows 7 through 9 in Table 4 show that Jake’s
subjunctification changed significantly and substantially between his very-first- and very-lastsample interviews. We found that Jake’s total subjunctification density decreased from the veryfirst-sample interview (M = 0.42 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M
= 0.28 subjunctifiers per second) with a somewhat large (d = 0.97) effect size, but this change
was not significant due to the small degrees of freedom. PNA subjunctification density
significantly decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.27 subjunctifiers per second)
to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.04 subjunctifiers per second) with a huge (d = 2.25)
effect size. By contrast, DFS subjunctifiers increased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
0.04 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.16 subjunctifiers per
second) with a substantial (d = 1.75) effect size, but this change was not significant due to the
small degrees of freedom. All these changes 11 are consistent with a consequential improvement
in Jake’s skill in apprehending and describing experience. Although Jake’s total subjunctification

11

Although UTC subjunctification density also decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.11
subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.08 subjunctifiers per second) with a moderate (d
= 0.67) effect size, the change was not significant. However, changes in UTC subjunctification density does not
matter: UTC subjunctifiers, as their name implies, merely represent subjunctifiers that could not easily be classified
as a PNA or DFS-type subjunctifier; as such, they do not provide insight into the possible fidelity of a participant’s
report.
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density changed in moderate (but not statistically significant) ways between the very-first-sample
and very-last-sample interview, the type of subjunctifiers present in each interview changed
dramatically: Whereas Jake’s very-first-sample interview involved a high density of mostly PNA
subjunctifiers (and a very low density of DFS subjunctifiers), his very-last-sample interview
involved a high density of mostly DFS subjunctifiers (and a very low density of PNA
subjunctifiers), suggesting that he learned to apprehend phenomena but struggled to find the
words to describe them adequately.
Rows 10 and 11 of Table 4 analyze EMB ratings for Jake’s sample interviews, counting
them in the row 10 and, in the row 11, showing the average EMB rating. We found that Jake’s
average EMB rating significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 2.71) to
the very-last-sample interview (M = 7.68) with a huge (d = 2.90) effect size, suggesting an
extremely great improvement in Jake’s cleaving-to-a-moment and cleaving-to-experience skill.
Qualitative Results and Discussion
A complete, turn-by-turn annotated transcript of Jake’s very-first-sample and very-lastsample interviews are provided in Appendixes G and H, respectively. There, each annotation
includes analysis detailing the extent to which Jake (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2)
cleaved to experience in that turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn. Here, we summarize
those results.
Experience at the Moment of the Beep
To reiterate: pristine, directly apprehended experience are phenomena that are present at
a specific moment. Thus, the high-fidelity apprehension of inner experience means that
participants must cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. Cleaving (successfully) to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep requires two, interrelated skills: the ability to cleave to
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the last, undisturbed moment prior to beep onset and the ability to cleave to directly apprehended
experience. We now review the extent to which Jake demonstrated moment- and experiencecleaving skill at the very start and very end of his DES sampling participation.
Very-First-Sample Interview
(Lack of) Cleaving to the Moment. Jake did not cleave to any specific moment during
his very-first-sample interview.
Here is one example from Jake’s very-first-sample interview; the first half of his initial
conversational turn:
J2a: So, I had it [looks at his notes]—uh, 12:57, I don’t know if the time matters too
much. Um… so the the first time, uh, it beeped, I was actually driving—the person, a
friend of mine, said, “okay, I need to... I need to park the car to get my experiences.”
Um… I was actually thinking, like, immediately, “what is it that I am—that I just
experienced?” Um, I was listening to... a song… um, just before. And, in my head, um...
the chorus was playing. Um, I was thinking about, uh… I was trying to, like, process the
fact that, um… what was that beep for again? It was for the study.
Here, Jake detailed a long time-period that included an undifferentiated mix of pre- and postbeep context. For instance: “I was listening to... a song... um, just before” referred to what had
occurred before the beep’s onset, and (a) “’okay, I need to... I need to park the car to get my
experiences’”; (b) “I was actually thinking... ‘what is it that I am—that I just experienced?’”; and
(c) “I was trying to, like, process the fact that... what was that beep for again?” all referred to
things that occurred after the beep’s onset. Thus, Jake was not cleaving to any specific moment.
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Not only did Jake fail to cleave to the moment in the early parts of J 2a, but he also went
on to acknowledge his ignorance about what constituted the moment of interest. Below is the
remaining, second-half portion of Jake’s J2a turn, with italics added for emphasis:
J2a: (continued) So, I was thinking about—so um, when I, when I describe my inner
experiences, am I supposed to describe like, what happens during the beep, or occurring
right before or is there like a certain time frame that I should focus on? Because that, that
was the thing that actually was coming to mind like, it’s like wait, I actually didn’t clarify
that this beep occurred, was, was I supposed to like—okay, that’s what I just, like, was
my inner experience, or, is it what I’m doing, like, right now or should I start, like,
monitoring that? So, actually, that’s kind of an actual question, too, so...
The text set in italics was Jake’s explicit admission that he did not understand the moment of
interest within DES—that is, the last, undisturbed moment just before the beep’s onset. Thus,
that Jake asked for clarification about what moment DES investigators were interested in raises
doubt about the fidelity of his entire very-first-sample description. The skilled DES participant
should display minimal confusion about the moment of interest versus all other moments. A
failure to cleave to the moment is a failure at the DES task: an inability to cleave to the moment
of the beep means that describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment of the
beep is very likely to be impossible, if not significantly hampered.
Jake continued to demonstrate temporal imprecision across later turns from the very-firstsample interview. Here are a few examples:
•

In J6a, Jake noted the beep had gone off while he was listening to “the chorus of a song.”
Although what he said in J6a was more specific than J2a, the chorus of a song refers to an
interval of several or many seconds.
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•

In J13a—and in contrast to J6a—Jake amended the timing of the beep’s onset and stated
that the beep occurred after he had finished listening to a song (“There was nothing—I
was not listening to anything, but [the song] was just playing, kinda, in my head.”).
Although Jake appeared to make greater differentiations between what happened far
before the moment of the beep (i.e., playing the song through his speakers) and what may
have been closer to beep onset (i.e., sitting in silence, playing the chorus in his
imagination), he still talked about an ambiguous time-periods and failed to cleave to the
single, discrete moment just before the beep’s onset.

•

In J22a, Jake remained consistent in talking about the same sitting-in-silence-and-playingthe-chorus-in-imagination interval that he referred to in J13a. However, J22a continued to
refer to an ambiguously long period of time; Jake failed to describe the moment just
before beep onset.

•

In J37a, Jake provided further details about the song he was innerly hearing (Beyonce
singing the chorus of Walk on Water) and noted that the beep occurred somewhere within
“that chorus section of, like, Beyonce and stuff.” Although J37a was more specific than
any previous turn, J37a still did not straightforwardly describe any specific moment (let
alone the moment just before beep onset).

Thus, even though Jake’s account of what occurred around the moment of the beep ostensibly
became more and more detailed over the course of his very-first-sample interview, his talk never
cleaved to a specific moment; at best, he talked about a time-period of hearing the chorus of
Walk on Water.
Taken together, these excerpts are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Jake did not
cleave to any moment during any part of her very-first-sample interview. Thus, he could not
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have been cleaving to the specific moment of interest within DES—the last undisturbed moment
at the leading edge of the beep’s onset.
(Lack of) Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience. By definition, an inner
experience is a phenomenon that is present at a specific moment. Because, as we just reviewed,
Jake’s very-first-sample interview never focused on any specific moment, his very-first-sample
interview could not have described any genuine inner experience(s). Instead, the most defining
characteristic of Jake’s cleaving-to-experience skill during his very-first-sample interview was
the elusiveness of a high-fidelity description of directly apprehended experience. Below is an
outline of Jake’s report about his experience throughout his very-first-sample interview:
•

In the opening turn of the interview (J2a), the only aspect of the turn that potentially
referred to experience-at-a-moment was “and, in my head, um... the chorus was
playing.” All else in the turn involved ersatz descriptions—talk about context,
procedural questions, and reports of Jake’s reaction to the beep’s onset.

•

In J6a, Jake continued to talk about the same listening-to-the-chorus report he stated in
J2a: “Then, that—what was going on was just like the, the chorus of a song that I was
listening to on the, um, on the, uh… um, Bluetooth speakers I was using.” However, it
was unclear whether that statement was descriptive of experience or was simply a report
of situational context.

•

In J13a, Jake amended his purported at-the-moment experience from J6a, in which he
clarified that he “had just listened to [the song], actually. There was nothing—I was not
listening to anything, but it was just playing, kinda, in my head.” Note that this turn was
similar to what Jake stated in J2a about the chorus playing in his head; however, it is also
worth noting that neither of Jake’s talk in J2a nor J13a described with much fidelity as to
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how the chorus had been directly present to (i.e., had been directly
apprehended/experienced by) Jake.
•

In J19a, Jake noted that the inner hearing of the chorus had been “auditorily clear.” This
provided the first description of how the directly apprehended inner hearing phenomena
had been present, but emerged from a highly subjunctified turn (Jake’s subjunctifiers
will be discussed in far greater detail in the next section).

•

In J22a, Jake said, “I’m just listening to the song—well yeah, I’m just… the song is still
fresh in my mind I guess, and so—.” This utterance ambiguated Jake’s purported inner
hearing description, as “still fresh in my mind” was an explanation about experience as
opposed to a description of experience (in other words, J22a introduced uncertainty as to
whether Jake was describing phenomena or was talking about something else).

•

J37a provided more details about Jake’s inner hearing: “Uh… it was, uh… Beyonce.
Um… singing the chorus of a song called Walk on Water. So, it was—it was just like,
the, um… I forget how the chorus goes, but, um… it was that, it was that chorus section
of, like, Beyonce and stuff.” This turn provided greater information regarding what Jake
was potentially experiencing: an inner hearing of Beyonce singing the chorus of Walk on
Water. However, this turn was not descriptive of how the inner hearing had been directly
present to Jake; moreover, it referred to a several-or-many-seconds-long experience,
which inherently was not and could in no way be descriptive of experience-at-a-moment.

•

When asked to describe what he had heard, Jake in J44a said, “It was only, uh, it’s a piano
background, so it was just piano and her.” Similar to J37a, this turn provided greater
information about the content of Jake’s (possible) experience, but it did not describe (a)
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how those phenomena had been directly present and (b) failed to straightforwardly
describe a specific experience-at-a-moment.
•

When pressed by DES investigators to state how the inner hearing had been directly
apprehended (see RTH45a, RTH47a, and RTH49a), Jake failed to provide such descriptions.
This was most evidence in J50a, where Jake turned to talking about a hypothetical
scenario to describe his inner hearing experience: “I don’t know if I, like, in my head at
the time it captured every detail? But, I, I know that it’s like, if, if I were to, like, like
hear the song again, it’s like, okay, I heard—definitely heard most of it.” This talk about
a hypothetical scenario moved Jake’s talk away from describing experience-at-amoment.
To reiterate: Although Jake’s talk (at best) throughout his very-first-sample interview

appeared to consistently reference a possible directly apprehended experience (innerly hearing
the chorus of Walk on Water), we have seen that Jake’s failure to cleave to a moment makes it
ambiguous as to whether any of Jake’s talk of experience described a particular experience-at-amoment or was an inferred report about a long time-period. In addition, Jake’s talk was of
relatively low-fidelity, such that even if Jake were to be describing experience, he demonstrated
only low-to-moderate ability.
Very-First-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Jake very-first-sample
interview involved a failure to cleave to any moment and thus likely involved a failure to cleave
to directly apprehended experience. We conclude that Jake’s utterances in his very-first-sample
interview had little possibility of any descriptive fidelity because he failed to grasp a particular
moment of experience and failed to differentiate phenomena from all else.
Very-Last-Sample Interview
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Jake’s very-last-sample interview was consistent with cleaving to directly apprehended
experience that occurred at a specific moment. Since the high-fidelity apprehension and
description of experience must involve the simultaneous presence of cleaving to a moment and to
directly apprehended experience, we are unable to separate our analysis of Jake’s very-lastsample cleaving abilities as independent processes. Therefore, we will review examples from
Jake’s very-last-sample interview and examine whether he did simultaneously cleave to a
moment and cleave to experience.
Jake’s improved cleaving to experience-at-a-moment was evidenced by his consistency
across conversational turns. In fact, the opening turn of his very-last-sample interview (when
considered alone) was of relatively low fidelity, in that it was not explicitly descriptive of
experience at the moment of the beep:
J2b: [Looks downward at notes] Okay, number five. Okay, so, we had the food to go and
we were walking out of the restaurant. And, um… and—[laughs] this one is, uh, kinda
funny, but, uh, I was trying to think of a different topic to distract slash avoid thinking
about, um, the idea of, uh… trypophobia, um, which is the, the fear of, of pores. Um, and
in the restaurant I was talking about—with my little brother—like, I just have kinda this
aversion to, like, like, pores in the skin, right? And we had, um… like, been talking about
it and I was just getting kinda like, like iffy about the whole concept and we had looked
up a picture and I had the picture etched into my mind and, um… and I was like, “okay,
we, we—you know—let’s just think about something else.” And, um… and… I
remember trying to think of, like, “what’s, what’s a different topic other than, you know,
this one that seems to be, like, forcing itself into my mind?” um, when, when it had
beeped. So…
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First, let us consider whether Jake cleaved to a specific moment: his talk consisted of both
context (looking at a picture, talking to his brother, walking out of a restaurant) and of describing
a (apparent) thinking-type event consonant with experience-at-a-moment: distract-slash-avoidthoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia. However, both the talk of context and talk of the potential
moment ambiguate whether what Jake said in J2b referenced a specific moment. Second, let us
consider whether Jake cleaved to experience: his talk consisted mostly of either context (which
was not at all descriptive of experience) or was about the content of the (potential) distract-slashavoid-thoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia; it was not straightforwardly descriptive of how the
distract-slash-avoid thinking had been directly present in his experience.
The fidelity of this moment of experience, however, became clearer in an exchange that
occurred between Jake and the DES investigators in the turns immediately preceding J2b:
AK3b: So… before the beep, you guys had been talking about this fear of pores [J: Mhm],
with you and your brother [J: Mhm]. And you looked up a picture [J: Mhm], and then at
this moment you’re walking out—are you guys still talking... about it?
J4b: Yeah? Yeah. Not about that [AK: Okay], but, more about… um… I don’t even
remember what we were talking about, but I remember thinking that I… still have this in
my mind—
Note that the question posed by the DES investigator in AK3b was a question about timing—
AK3b asked about the behaviors and events leading up to the moment of the beep (and not about
what experience was present at the moment). And, in spite of the invitation presented by AK 3b to
move in a direction away from describing his experience, Jake ultimately ended his turn with
returning to (what appeared to be a known and familiar) description of directly apprehended
experience consistent with his thinking-type, distract-slash-avoid-thoughts-of-lingering-
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trypophobia experience described in J2b (“I remember thinking that I… still have this in my
mind—“).
Later in the interview, Jake continued to display consistency (in describing the same
moment of experience as previous turns) and stronger moment- and experience-cleaving skills.
For instance, when asked if he was still looking at a picture that had originally triggered his
thought of trypophobia, Jake said:
J13b: Um… I… think the picture… was not there. I, I think it was, um… it was more, I
had this kind of disgust that, uh… I don’t even know if that’s the right word, but just this
sense of disgust? Um, from that conversation. And, um… I remember—you know, just
thinking about what is it that I can… change the topic to, to kind of, get rid of this disgust
or avoid or, you know, like, refocus.
This turn is notable for several reasons. First (from the perspective of cleaving to a moment): J 13b
was consistent with (a) describing experience-at-a-moment (that is, Jake’s talk appeared
consonant with possible phenomena present at-a-moment; it did not outwardly appear to refer to
a long time-period or anything else that was not a moment) and (b) describing the same apparent
moment-of-experience as in previous turns (that is, the distract-slash-avoid-thoughts-oflingering-trypophobia experience). Second (from the perspective of cleaving to experience): Jake
made distinctions between what was (“I had this... sense of disgust”) and was not (“I... think the
picture... was not there”) directly present to him at the moment of the beep. Although this
distinction was situated amongst many subjunctifiers (and we will provide further analysis of
Jake’s subjunctification in the next section), the subjunctifiers did not diminish the fact that Jake,
of his own accord, made some differentiation about what was and was not part of his at-the-
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moment experience. That is: that subjunctifiers were present did not diminish the fact that Jake
constrained his talk (with difficult) to describe experience with fidelity.
Jake continued to make fine-grained discriminations about the same distract-slash-avoidtrypophobia experience across multiple later turns of the very-last-sample interview, and these
discriminations occurred in spite of “leading” questions posed to Jake by DES investigators.
Below is one such example:
AK17b: So is this a, a thought process? The, the thinking-type experience?
J18b: Um, yeah.
AK19b: And are there words? Specific words present?
J20b: Um… I don’t think so. I—I think it’s… yeah, [shakes head] I don’t think so. I think
it’s more of just um… just… the idea of it.
Here, Jake was not led on by suggestions made by the DES investigators: for instance, he denied
AK19b’s suggestion of words when talking in J20b (“Um… I don’t think so. I—I think it’s… yeah,
[shakes head] I don’t think so”), and in fact strengthened that denial by offering his own
description of directly apprehended experience that emerged independently of any suggestion
made by DES investigators—that the wanting-to-change-the-subject experience was “more of
just um… just… the idea of it.” That Jake was not led on by leading questions and instead
provided his own description of an (unworded) avoiding-thoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia can
be taken as evidence of Jake’s improved ability to cleave to a moment and to directly
apprehended experience.
A final example of Jake’s improved cleaving skills came in a turn near the conclusion of
the interview. In the turns presented below, RTH29b inquired about whether Jake had an
alternative conversation topic that had been part of his at the moment experience:
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RTH29b: And new possibilities? Are they—
J30b: No, I didn’t get that far.
RTH31b: Haven’t gotten there yet. Okay.
Note that Jake was not led on by the question posed in RTH29b. Rather, Jake (in a completely
straightforward, non-subjunctified manner) denied RTH29b’s suggestion. Distinguishing what
was and was not part of experience is indicative of a participant who successfully cleaved to a
moment and to experience, as one can only reasonably make such distinctions if one has
knowledge and familiarity with a discrete moment of experience.
Very-Last-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Jake appeared to
cleave to a moment and to experience in his very-last-sample interview. We conclude that Jake’s
descriptions had the probability (or at least the possibility) of describing with fidelity a moment
of experience (perhaps most likely the experience at the beep).
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Qualitative Characteristics vs. Very-Last-Sample Qualitative
Characteristics
We have seen that, in his very-first-sample interview, Jake’s did not describe any
particular moment and so did not describe experience. By contrast, Jake’s very-last-sample
interview was constrained to a relatively specific time and was mostly limited to describing
experience. We conclude that Jake’s very-last-sample interview was very different from his veryfirst-sample interview. Whereas in the very-first interview, there was an extremely low
possibility that he was able to describe experiences that had been directly apprehended at the
moment of the beep with fidelity, in the very-last sample he (at least) might have been describing
an experience that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctification
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As we have just detailed, there is reason to believe that Jake’s descriptions were of much
higher fidelity during his very-last-sample interview than they had been on his very-first-sample
interview. However, we have also seen in the Quantitative Results and Discussion section that
Jake’s total subjunctification density did not significantly change from the very-first to very-last
sample. Hurlburt (2011) proposed that subjunctification density can generally been thought of as
an indicator of descriptive fidelity—that the higher the density (that is, the greater number of
subjunctifiers per second), the lower the fidelity. Jake’s sampling suggests that Hurlburt’s
proposal does not apply for Jake; despite the lack of significant subjunctification density change
between interviews, it is clear that Jake changed between his very-first-sample and very-lastsample interviews.
Rather than focusing simply on Jake’s total subjunctification density on his two sample
interviews, we can instead focus on analyzing the type and manner of subjunctifiers that Jake
used; in doing so, we find that the type of subjunctifiers Jake used within each sample interview
did change dramatically, and may provide greater insight into Jake’s improvement. Nearly all of
Jake’s very-first-sample interview subjunctifiers signaled that he failed to apprehend his
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep (and thus undermined any possibility of describing
experience). In other words, all of Jake’s very-first-sample subjunctification was of the
phenomenon-not-apprehended (PNA) type. By contrast, the majority of his very-last-sample
interview subjunctifiers signaled that, whereas Jake apprehended the phenomenon adequately,
his description was not yet adequate. That is, most very-last-sample subjunctification was of the
description-falling-short (DFS) type.
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There were three types of PNA subjunctifiers that were either common or notable in
Jake’s very-first-sample interview: utterances that signaled Jake was not following the sampling
procedure, verb forms in the subjunctive mood, and softening expressions.
We begin by discussing the most notable PNA subjunctifier present in Jake’s very-firstsample interview: his utterances that signaled he was had not followed the sampling procedures.
Here is an example, with the subjunctifier set in italics for emphasis:
J2a: ... so um, when I, when I describe my inner experiences, am I supposed to describe
like, what happens during the beep, or occurring right before or is there like a certain
time frame that I should focus on? Because that, that was the thing that actually was
coming to mind like, it’s like wait, I actually didn’t clarify that this beep occurred, was,
was I supposed to like—okay, that’s what I just, like, was my inner experience, or, is it
what I’m doing, like, right now or should I start, like, monitoring that? So, actually, that’s
kind of an actual question, too, so...
These types of procedural questions are considered PNA subjunctifiers because “a comment or
question about the procedure indicates that the subject is not (yet) doing the procedure, that is, is
not describing experience” (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 117); they literally illustrate the phenomenon-notapprehended label. This observation is true of Jake’s comment in J2a. That Jake expressed an
ignorance about the moment of the beep is a clue that Jake did not cleave to a moment (and,
subsequently, did not cleave to directly apprehended experience-at-a-moment).
Additionally, one common PNA subjunctifier that Jake used in his very-first-sample
interview was his use of verb forms in the subjunctive mood. Subjunctive is defined in the
Oxford English Dictionary as “designating or relating to a verbal mood that refers to an action or
state as conceived (rather than as a fact) and is therefore used chiefly to express a wish,
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command, exhortation, or a contingent, hypothetical, or prospective event.” Here is one
conversational turn with multiple verb-forms-in-the-subjunctive-mood, all of which are set in
italics and with superscripts:
J59a: ... Um, I mean in the same way it’s like—if I were to repeat you asking that question
in my head1, um… I, I would say2 it’s, yeah, in my head... Uh… it’s kind of—like, if you
were talkin’ to me3, um, the same way that it’s like I’m kind of processing it as you’re
speaking to me is the same way that I’m hearing it in my head as… if I were to replay it4.
All four instances of italicized text in J59a grammatically signal that Jake was talking about a
hypothetical event instead of describing experience-at-a-moment.
Another common PNA subjunctifier that occurred throughout Jake’s very-first-sample
interview was softening expressions (i.e., statements, utterances, and expressions that led away
from describing at-the-moment experience). Here is one example, with all subjunctifiers set in
italics and with superscripts:
J37a: Uh1…2 it was, uh3…4 Beyonce. Um5…6 singing the chorus of a song called Walk on
Water. So, it was—7 it was just like8, the, um9…10 I forget how the chorus goes11, but,
um12…13 it was that, it was that chorus section of, like14, Beyonce and stuff 15.
Each subjunctifier in this turn in some way signaled that Jake was not describing directly
apprehended experience. For instance, “it was that chorus section of, like14, Beyonce and stuff 15”
involved subjunctifiers that approximated any possible description of a particular experience. “
Thus, all the subjunctifiers in Jake’s very-first-sample interview had the effect of
signaling Jake had failed to cleave to experience-at-a-moment-of-the-beep. All of his
subjunctifiers lowered the possibility of describing specific experience, either by signaling he
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was not yet adequately performing the sampling task, by reporting hypothetical situations, or by
softening a report. That is, all were PNA subjunctifiers.
By contrast, Jake’s subjunctifiers on his very-last-sample interview generally seemed to
signal that he was working to refine the fidelity of her descriptions of experience-at-the-momentof-the-beep—we refer to these as DFS subjunctifiers. The DFS subjunctifiers never undermined
Jake’s commitment to describing a particular phenomena; because the subjunctifiers were nearly
always immediately followed by descriptions of apprehendable phenomena (or at least the
possibility thereof), they signaled that Jake was attempting to give a careful description of
experience.
Of note: Jake did not begin his very-last-sample interview clearly describing experience.
His initial conversational turn was highly subjunctified, though Jake provided a “first-draft”
description of his at-the-moment experience:
J2b: I was trying to think of a different topic to distract slash avoid thinking about, um, the
idea of, uh… trypophobia
The subjunctifiers in this turn were of an indeterminate type, as it was unclear whether Jake was
cleaving to experience-at-a-moment or was speaking of approximated experience. However, it
became clear over the course of Jake’s subsequent conversational turns that he was, indeed,
striving for fidelity by cleaving to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. Here are some
examples, with the subjunctifiers set in italics and with superscripts:
•

In J8b, Jake appeared to describe the same, distract-slash-avoid-thoughts-of-lingeringtrypophobia experience as he described in J2b: “So I’m just thinking, like1…2 I wanna—I
want to talk about something that will get my mind off of it.” Note that there were only
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two subjunctifiers (“like1…2”) which reflected Jake’s previously subjunctified talk of
potential experience stated in J2b.
•

In J13b, Jake again described the same apparent moment of experience that he provided in
J2b and J8b: “I, I think1 it was, um2… it was more, I had this kind of3 disgust that, uh4…5 I
don’t even know6 if that’s the right word, but just this sense of disgust?7 Um8, from that
conversation. And, um9… I remember—10 you know11, just thinking about what is it that I
can… change the topic to, to kind of 12, get rid of this disgust or avoid or, you know13,
like14, refocus.” Despite the many subjunctifiers present in this turn, the subjunctifiers did
not detract from the fact that Jake was describing (with difficulty) directly apprehended
experience. That is: the subjunctifiers did not ambiguate nor detract from the fact that
Jake’s was talking (with great difficulty) about his apparent distract-slash-avoidthoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia experience.

•

J16b provided another instance of Jake talking about the same moment of experience as in
J2b, J8b, and J13b: “Like1, there was no topic that, like2, my mind had settled on. It was
more of a3, I was considering possibilities of…4 considering the notion of, of 5, maybe,
maybe6 I should change the subject. Or7, let’s change the subject.” Here, Jake appears to
make phenomenal-references about an experience he has consistently described across
multiple conversational turns, but does so with great difficulty.

•

In J20b, Jake said, “Um1…2 I don’t think3 [there were words present]. I—I think4 it’s…5
yeah, [shakes head] I don’t think so6. I think7 it’s more8 of just um9…10 just…11 the idea
of it.” This turn featured high subjunctification density amidst a fully constrained
description of experience. Everything Jake said in J20b was consistent with describing a
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moment of experience; the fact that he used (DFS) subjunctifiers did not negate his
attempt to be descriptive.
•

Lastly, in J34b, Jake responded to a question posed by DES investigators about whether a
feeling of disgust was present to Jake at the moment of the beep: “Yeah. Um1, that’s a
good question. I, I think2, um3…4 I, I know earlier, I was, like5, kinda6 feeling like7 itchy
or8 uncomfortable. Um9, like10, even kind of11, like12, skin crawling sensation, but13...14
when I was walking out the restaurant, I don’t think so15 [shakes head]. I think it
was16…17 almost exclusively, if not exclusively, like18, a thinking process.” The first part
of J34b (up until “, but13...14”) involved Jake talking about context leading up to the beep,
and such talk appeared to include PNA subjunctifiers (for example: “I was, like5, kinda6
feeling like7 itchy or8 uncomfortable” approximated the potential experience and departicularized (or at least lessened the descriptive fidelity of) an apparent description of
itchy/discomfort); however, that context is not the aim of the turn, as the second half of
J34b was entirely talk aimed at describing the same, consistent distract-slash-avoidthoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia experience that Jake described across the entire verylast-sample interview.
Thus, Jake’s very-last-sample interview subjunctifiers signaled changes in Jake’s ability

to cleave to a moment and to experience. Although he subjunctified, he did so around
phenomenal references; his DFS subjunctifiers signaled wavering around the words used to
describe experience, whereas his commitment to consistently describing the same distract-slashavoid-thoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia experience remained unwavering throughout the verylast-sample interview. Thus, most subjunctifiers used were DFS subjunctifiers.
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Subjunctification vs. Very-Last-Sample Subjunctification
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Overall, the quantification of total subjunctification density was not effective as a
measure of the fidelity of Jake’s descriptions: both of Jake’s interviews featured a high density of
subjunctifiers (broadly defined). However, we did observe notable differences in the types of
subjunctifiers present within each interview (that is: the relative proportion of PNA, UTC, and
DFS subjunctifiers that contributed to the total subjunctification in each interview changed in
composition between the very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews). Subjunctifiers in
Jake’s very-first-sample interview were mostly of the PNA type— utterances that signaled that
phenomenon may not have been adequately grasped, and so lowered any possibility of
describing a specific moment of experience. In contrast, subjunctifiers in Jake’s very-last-sample
interview were mostly of the DFS type—utterances that signaled an attempt to refine the fidelity
of describing a specific moment of experience
Jake: Overall Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to examine a single participant (in this case: Jake) at the very
start and the very end of his sampling process to assess any changes in his skillfulness to engage
in the sampling task (describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment of the
beep). By skillfulness, we specifically considered (using both quantitative and qualitative means)
the extent to which Jake cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; we also considered
the nature of his subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Jake (Possibly) Describe Experience?
Not likely. He failed to cleave to the moment and so likely failed to cleave to experience;
his interview involved a high density of PNA subjunctifiers that signaled his failure to have
apprehended his experience-at-a-moment, and the average EMB rating for the interview was
low.
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The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Jake Improve?
Yes. He appeared to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, in which he
described an (unworded) avoiding-thoughts-of-lingering-trypophobia, thinking-type experience.
The very-last-sample interview still involved a moderate density of subjunctifiers that was not
significantly different from the very-first-sample interview, but, unlike the very-first-sample
interview, most subjunctifiers were of the DFS type, signaling she successfully apprehended her
experience but struggled to describe her experience. Moreover, there was (in comparison to the
very-first-sample interview) a significant and substantial decrease in the density of PNA
subjunctifiers on the very-last-sample interview. Therefore, the EMB ratings for the interview
was over three times higher than for those of his very-first-sample interview.
Comparing the Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample
Ultimately, we draw the following conclusion: whereas Jake’s very-first-sample
interview had a near-zero possibility of being a high-fidelity description of experience (because
he failed to cleave to any moment and failed to adequately cleave to experience), it is possible
that Jake’s very-last-sample interview involved high-fidelity descriptions of experience (because
he showed improvement in cleaving to a moment and in cleaving to experience). We cannot be
certain whether or not fidelity was actually achieved, but Jake’s improvement in cleaving to the
moment and to experience, and the change in the manner of his subjunctification, suggests at
least the possibility that Jake was apprehending at-the-moment experience in high-fidelity at the
end of his sampling participation.
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Chapter 11: Results and Discussion for Macy
Macy had been a participant in the psychotherapy study. As part of her participation in
that study—which had been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas following standards issued in the Declaration of Helsinki —Macy had
consented to her videotapes used in studies such as the present one. The present study therefore
accessed her psychotherapy-study videotapes and had no other contact with her.
Macy completed eight days of natural-environment DES sampling spread across a
roughly three-month time span, with 90 days elapsing between her first-day interview and her
last-day interview. She had collected a total of 34 samples: 6 samples in her first day, 5 samples
in her second day, 3 samples in her third day, 4 samples in her fourth day, 5 samples in her fifth
day, 6 samples in her seventh day, and 5 samples in her eighth day.
Quantitative Results and Discussion
The data analysis procedure is described fully in Chapter 6, and Macy’s quantitative
results are shown in Table 5. For Macy, the very-first-sample interview was 323 s in total length,
of which Macy spoke for 135 s across 28 conversational turns. The very-last-sample interview
was 476 s in total length, of which Macy spoke for 258.5 s across 28 conversational turns. We
divided Macy’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews into 3-min intervals; there
were two intervals in the very-first-sample interview and three intervals in the very-last-sample
interview.
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Table 5
Macy: Quantitative Results

Length of interview (s)a

Descriptive Statistics
Very-firstVery-lastsample
sample
323
476

Rater Reliability
r
df
p

Comparing Last vs. First
t
df
p
d

Time spoken by
participant (s)a
Number of spoken turns

135

258.5

28

28

Number of 3-min
intervals
Total Subjunctification
Counta
Total Subjunctification
Densitya,b

2

3

55.5

71

0.41
(SD = 0.07)

0.28
(SD = 0.06)

.95

3

.013

−2.36

3

.065

2.20

PNA Subjunctification
Densitya,b

0.08
(SD = 0.04)

0.02
(SD = 0.01)

.37

3

.545

−2.49

3

.055

2.30

UTC Subjunctification
Densitya,b
DFS Subjunctification
Densitya,b
Number of turns with
EMB ratings
Average EMB Ratingc

0.13
(SD = 0.14)
0.20
(SD = 0.11)
17

0.01
(SD = 0.01)
0.25
(SD = 0.06)
20

.99

3

.011

−2.03

3

.098

1.59

.62

3

.263

1.00

3

.364

0.13

5.18
(SD = 2.14)

8.00
(SD = 1.31)

.73

35

< .001

4.92

35

< .001

1.62

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-toclassify; DFS = Description-falling-short.
a

Averaged across the two raters.

b

Density is subjunctification count divided by time spoken by participant (subjunctifiers per s).

c

Average EMB ratings across the two raters for all rated turns of the interview.

Rows 5 through 9 of Table 5 analyze Macy’s subjunctifiers. Row 5 displays the total
count of Macy’s subjunctifiers in her very-first- and very-last-sample interviews (averaged
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across both raters), and row 6 displays the total subjunctification density (row 5 divided by row
2) and changes to the overall subjunctification density across both interviews. Rows 7 through 9
display the density for the three subtypes of subjunctifiers: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA)
subjunctifiers, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers, and description-falling-short (DFS)
subjunctifiers.
Specifically, the three right-hand columns of rows 6 through 8 in Table 5 show that
Macy’s total, PNA, and UTC subjunctification densities decreased substantially (as evidenced by
the huge effect sizes in the right-most column of rows 6 through 8) but not significantly between
her very-first- and very-last-sample interviews. By contrast, the three right-hand columns of row
9 show that Macy’s DFS subjunctification density showed neither substantial nor significant
change between the very-first- and very-last-sample interview. However, Macy usedmore DFS
subjunctifiers on her very-first-sample interview (M = 0.20, 49% of her total subjunctifiers) than
any of our other participants (the average DFS subjunctification density on the very-first-sample
interview for all other participants is 0.03, or 6.5% of their total subjunctifiers), suggesting that
Macy demonstrated a relatively high level of skill in cleaving to experience at-a-moment at the
outset of sampling. Thus, taking Macy’s subjunctification data together, the substantial reduction
in total and PNA subjunctification density in Macy’s very-last-sample interview (in comparison
to her very-first-sample interview subjunctification densities) suggest that Macy’s skill improved
even though she was comparatively skilled to begin with.
Rows 10 and 11 of Table 5 analyze EMB ratings for Macy’s sample interviews, counting
them in row 10 and, in row 11, showing the average EMB rating. We found that Macy’s average
EMB rating significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 5.18) to the very-
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last-sample interview (M = 8.00) with a substantial (d = 1.62) effect size, suggesting extremely
great improvement in Macy’s cleaving-to-a-moment and cleaving-to-experience skill.
Qualitative Results and Discussion
A complete, turn-by-turn annotated transcript of Macy’s very-first-sample and very-lastsample interviews are provided in Appendix I and J, respectively. There, each annotation
includes analysis detailing the extent to which Macy (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2)
cleaved to experience in that turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn. Here, we summarize
those results.
Very-First-Sample Interview
To reiterate: pristine, directly apprehended experience are phenomena that are present at
a specific moment. Thus, the high-fidelity apprehension of inner experience means that
participants must cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. Cleaving (successfully) to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep requires two, interrelated skills: the ability to cleave to
the last, undisturbed moment prior to beep onset and the ability to cleave to directly apprehended
experience. We now review the extent to which Macy demonstrated moment- and experiencecleaving skill at the very start and very end of her DES sampling participation.
Macy’s very-first-sample interview involved some possibility of describing experienceat-the-moment-of-the-beep. During some conversational turns, her descriptions appeared to be
consistent with describing a moment of experience; this would imply she was able to cleave to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. However, in other conversational turns, Macy’s talk
appeared more consistent with generalized reports of her experience across a long time-period.
The type and nature of her subjunctifiers were also inconsistent: although there were some
instances where the subjunctifiers appeared to signal that Macy did not adequately apprehend
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any phenomenon (and so failed to describe any particular experience), there were other instances
where the type of subjunctifier used was less clear.
Because Macy appeared to display some degree of moment- and experience-cleaving
skill during her very-first-sample interview, the following section provides examples selected
from Macy’s very-first-sample interview that are illustrative of both her moment- and
experience-cleaving skills, and of the type of subjunctifiers she used: we will begin by reviewing
instances where it appeared Macy failed to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep and
used (mostly phenomenon-not-apprehended; PNA) subjunctifiers. Then we will review instances
where it appeared Macy cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep and used (a mostly
indeterminate type of) subjunctifiers.
We begin by reviewing Macy’s first turn from her very-first-sample interview, with all
subjunctifiers set in italics and with superscripts:
M2a: Um1, I was really worried that I did it wrong, [laughs] [SAM: Okay] um2, just
because3 I hadn’t—I had turned it on, and hadn’t received a beep yet. Um4…5 so, that’s
actually when I had texted you, saying, “I haven’t gotten it,” something like that6. Um7…8
and I was just—I was worried, um9…10 that I was doing it wrong.
Macy failed to cleave to a specific moment: she talked about time in two different ways, neither
of which successfully described a moment. Macy began the turn by saying: “I had turned it on,
and hadn’t received a beep yet.” This was talk about a long time-period (since she turned it on),
not a moment. Even when Macy appeared to refer to a more specific moment (that the beep
sounded when Macy had “actually” just texted DES investigators), that referred to a temporally
ambiguous period—did “that’s actually when I had texted you” refer to the millisecond just after
pressing the “send” button, or a few seconds later, or a few minutes later?
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Importantly, Macy had forgotten her sampling notes when she appeared for first-day
expositional interview. This may have been partially or entirely responsible for Macy’s inability
to speak about the moment of the beep. In an important sense, it doesn’t matter: on her first
sampling day, Macy was, for whatever reason, unable or unwilling to cleave to the moment-ofthe-beep.
Because inner experience inheres in moments, the lack of temporal specificity made it
impossible for Macy to cleave to directly apprehended experience. Instead of describing
experience, Macy talked about context, provided causal inferences, and used PNA subjunctifiers
that further solidified our conclusion that she was not describing a particular experience. For
example, “that’s actually when I had texted you, saying, ‘I haven’t gotten it,’” was talk of
context (which was followed by an explicitly undermining expression “something like that6” that
signaled that her talk was not describing a specific experience). Moreover, Macy began the turn
by using a causal inference: “just because3... I had turned it on, and hadn’t received a beep yet.”
This subjunctifier, in combination with the presence of other PNA subjunctifiers and the lack-ofsampling notes, suggests that Macy was inferring causation rather than describing experience.
In later turns of the interview, however, Macy appeared to describe a known and specific
moment involving worry/chest pressure. However, for all the reasons outlined above, it is also
possible that Macy’s descriptions were more consistent with talk about inferred reports from
context that occurred during a long time-period. For example, Macy said the following in M6a:
M6a: Yeah, yeah. It was just the… “oh no, I did this wrong!” kind of thing1.
Although Macy’s description was consistent with the same “worry” noted in M2a, we have seen
that Macy’s failure to cleave to a moment makes it ambiguous as to whether this turn described a
particular moment of experience or was an inferred report about a long time-period. Moreover,
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the subjunctifier present in M6a also was indeterminate from the perspective of its type and
function: “kind of thing1” could be understood as making a report non-specific (thus signaling
that Macy may have failed to apprehend her experience at-the-moment-of-the-beep, and so was a
PNA subjunctifier), or it could also be understood as an effort to improve the fidelity of
describing the “’oh no, I did this wrong!’” (ostensibly difficult-to-put-into-words, and so was a
description-falls-short or DFS subjunctifier) experience.
Turn M16a provides another example of Macy’s typical very-first-sample interview
characteristics:
M16a: Um1…2 it was just very, um3…4 like5, it just made me6 worry that I wasn’t doing it
correctly, I guess7. It was the… like8—I don’t know9—pressure on my chest kind of10…
Although consistent with the worry/chest pressure of previous turns, it again was unclear
whether this turn described a specific moment or was an inferred report about a long time-period.
Moreover, M16a was another heavily subjunctified turn that involved a mix of PNA subjunctifiers
and indeterminate subjunctifiers. For example, “it just made me6 worry that I wasn’t doing it
correctly” was a causal inference—a speculation about the cause of the worry. However, “like8—
I don’t know9—pressure on my chest kind of10…” involved indeterminate subjunctifiers. They
could be understood as signaling she did not adequately apprehend the phenomenon at the
moment-of-the-beep, and so she ambiguated her report here to de-particularize any potential
description of experience (because "like8—I don’t know9” implied that what follows should not
be understood straightforwardly, and “kind of10…” signaled that what came before was an
approximation—a PNA subjunctifier), or the subjunctifiers could be understood as Macy trying
to find the words to refine the fidelity of her description of chest pressure (and so was a DFS
subjunctifier).
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Very-First-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Macy’s very-firstsample interview involved some possibility of describing experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep,
although the extent of that possibility remains indeterminate. She appeared to cleave to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep in low-to-moderate ways throughout the interview: in
some turns, it appeared that she failed to cleave to-experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep (e.g.,
the first conversational turn), but in other turns, her reports were consistent with cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. Her subjunctifiers also varied across the interview: most
of her subjunctifiers were DFS, but some subjunctifiers were indeterminate as it was unclear
whether they were approximating characterizations of in-general experience (which would imply
they were PNA subjunctifiers) or whether they were refining the fidelity of descriptions of
directly apprehended experience (which would imply they were DFS subjunctifiers ).
Very-Last-Sample Interview
Macy’s very-last-sample interview was consistent with cleaving to directly apprehended
experience that occurred at a specific moment. Therefore, we will review examples selected from
Macy’s very-last-sample interview and examine whether she did simultaneously cleave to a
moment and cleave to experience; we will also discuss the type and nature of her (mostly DFS)
subjunctifiers used.
Here is the first turn from her very-last-sample interview:
M2b: Um1, the last one—I was, um2, laying down and, uh3…4 cat had come and laid down
with me, and my thought at the moment of the beep was, um5, there was: “My cat is so
cute!” [M laughs] And, um6…7 seeing her mental image of, like8, her…9 smiling?10
Like11, closed eyes, smiling. Um12, in my head. At the same time.
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Although Macy began describing context, she soon explicitly acknowledged the moment of the
beep and described two simultaneous experiences that were consistent with at-a-moment
experience: “My cat is so cute!” and a mental image of her cat smiling. Regarding subjunctifiers,
none diminished the fidelity of her descriptions; all were followed by further descriptions of
phenomena. For example, the three subjunctifiers in “seeing her mental image of, like8, her…9
smiling?10” were immediately followed by additional descriptions of experience: that the image
was of Macy’s cat “closed eyes, smiling” and that the phenomena were present “at the same
time.” Hence, they were all DFS subjunctifiers.
Throughout the remainder of her very-last-sample interview, Macy appeared consistent in
describing the same moment of experience that she described in M2b. Here is an example
exchange between Macy and the investigator:
SAM13b: Kay. And this is—this is something you’re actually seeing?
M14b: Yeah. It was something I had seen just a second ago.
SAM15b: So— [pause]
M16b: It was something I had seen just a second ago, and then I had thought about it at the
beep. Yes.
Note that Macy spoke about the timing of the moment of apprehended experience with zero
subjunctification: she was constrained to describing an innerly seen image of a scene that, just
prior to the moment of the beep, she had externally seen.
Here is another example:
M25b: So. [She adjusts her left arm, then her right, then twists her body. She laughs at
herself and her movements.] Sorry, I’m like, I’m trying to recreate it. Um1…2 I was
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looking at her like this [M is pretending to look directly at her cat, which was positioned
to M’s right side] and she was looking towards that [straight ahead] way.
Macy described the same moment as in all previous turns and provided very specific details of
her inner seeing. That is, she described the particular scene she had seen at the moment of the
beep, even to go as far as to recreate the scene within the interview; in contrast, she did not talk
in generalities or in a manner inconsistent with a particularized moment.
Here is a final example of Macy’s typical skill during her very-last-sample interview:
M30b: Um1, it was, um2, it wasn’t talking. It wasn’t really3 hearing, it was just like4
thinking. The words were present. They’re, um5…6 it was, uh7…8 I don’t think9 there was
much emotion attached to it. Um10, it was just a recognition of “my cat’s so cute.”
Macy appeared to describe the same moment of experience as in all previous turns. Although
heavily subjunctified, her turn was entirely aimed at describing phenomena, ending with a
description of experience: “it was just a recognition of ‘my cat’s so cute.’” Notably, Macy did
not subjunctify about what she experienced—her subjunctifications acknowledged a difficult-todescribe apprehended experience. That is, her subjunctifiers were of the DFS type.
Very-Last-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, Macy appeared to cleave to a
moment of directly apprehended experience in her very-last-sample interview: the majority of
what she said was consistent with grasping a particular moment of experience. Her subjunctifiers
were (mostly) refinements aimed at improving the details of her description.
Macy: Overall Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to examine a single participant (in this case: Macy) at the
very start and the very end of her sampling process to assess any changes in her skillfulness to
engage in the sampling task (describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment
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of the beep). By skillfulness, we specifically considered (using both quantitative and qualitative
means) the extent to which Macy cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; we also
considered the nature of her subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Macy (Possibly) Describe Experience?
Maybe, but it is unclear. Macy did not outrightly fail to cleave to experience-at-themoment-of-the-beep: her utterances at times were possibly consistent with describing
worry/chest tightness apprehended at the moment of the beep. At other times, however, Macy’s
utterances were consonant with failures to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep: the
initial conversational turn of the interview was not clearly constrained a specific moment, thus
imperiling the possibility that she could have described phenomena. Her interview also involved
a high density of subjunctifiers (broadly defined), and the average EMB rating for the interview
was moderate.
Additionally, Macy did not have her first-day sampling notes to refer to during the
interview.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Macy Improve?
Yes. She appeared to cleave to the moment and to experience (consistently describing the
details of an inner seeing and the characteristics of the innerly spoken statement). The very-lastsample interview involved a substantially lower density of both total subjunctifiers and PNA
subjunctifiers, specifically—both of these findings demonstrate that Macy described her
experience in a more straightforward manner across her entire very-last-sample interview (in
comparison to her very-first-sample interview), likely due to improvements in apprehending her

183

experience12. Moreover, the EMB ratings for the interview was more than 1.5 times higher than
for those of her very-first-sample interview.
Comparing the Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample Interviews
Ultimately, we draw the following conclusion: whereas Macy’s very-first-sample
interview may have been a possible (perhaps low-fidelity) description of experience, it is likely
that Macy’s very-last-sample interview did involve a relatively high-fidelity descriptions of
experience (because she showed improvement in cleaving to a moment and in cleaving to
experience). We cannot be certain whether or not fidelity was actually achieved, but Macy’s
improvement in cleaving to the moment and to experience, and the change in the manner of her
subjunctification, suggests at least the possibility that Macy was apprehending at-the-moment
experience in high-fidelity at the end of her sampling participation.

12

Although we do not know with certainty whether Macy actually got better at apprehending her experience, the
substantially lower PNA subjunctification density of the very-last-sample interview meant that she talked in ways
that were consistent with describing specific phenomena more frequently on her very-last-sample interview
compared to her talk on her very-first-sample interview.
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Chapter 12: Results and Discussion for Emma
Emma had been a participant in the psychotherapy study. As part of her participation in
that study—which had been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas following standards issued in the Declaration of Helsinki—Emma had
consented to have her videotapes used in studies such as the present one. The present study
therefore accessed her psychotherapy-study videotapes and had no other contact with her.
Emma completed eight days of natural environment DES sampling spread across an 11week time span, with 77 days elapsing between her very-first interview and her very-last
interview. She collected a total of 29 samples: 4 samples in her first day, 3 samples in her second
day, 6 samples in her third and fourth days, 3 samples in her fifth and sixth days, and 4 samples
each in her seventh and eighth days.
Quantitative Results and Discussion
The data analysis procedure is described fully in Chapter 6, and Emma’s quantitative
results are shown in Table 6. For Emma, the very-first-sample interview was 421 s in total
length, of which Emma spoke for 149.5 s across 16 conversational turns. The very-last-sample
interview was 111 s in total length, of which Emma spoke for 43.5 s across 11 conversational
turns. We divided Emma’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews into 3-min
intervals; there were three intervals in the very-first-sample interview and one intervals in the
very-last-sample interview.

185

Table 6
Emma: Quantitative Results

Length of interview (s)a

Descriptive Statistics
Very-firstVery-lastsample
sample
421
111

Rater Reliability
r
df
p

Comparing Last vs. First
Statistic
df
p
d

Time spoken by
participant (s)a
Number of spoken turns

149.5

43.5

16

11

Number of 3-min
intervals
Total Subjunctification
Counta
Total Subjunctification
Densitya,b,c

3

1

45.5

16

0.31
(SD = 0.14)

0.37d

.85

2

.146

χ2 = 0.01

1

.950

0.42e

PNA Subjunctification
Densitya,b,c

0.17
(SD = 0.06)

0.00d

.13

2

.870

χ2 = 0.07

1

.787

3.01e

UTC Subjunctification
Densitya,b,c

0.08
(SD = 0.05)

0.07d

.25

2

.747

χ2 = 0.00

1

.990

0.10e

DFS Subjunctification
Densitya,b,c
Number of turns with
EMB ratings
Average EMB Ratingf

0.07
(SD = 0.05)
5

0.30d

.99

2

.010

χ2 = 0.15

1

.695

4.64e

2.81
(SD = 1.02)

8.46
(SD = .68)

.97

10

< .001

t = 11.60

10

< .001

10.17

7

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-toclassify; DFS = Description-falling-short.
a

Averaged across the two raters.

b

Density is subjunctification count divided by time spoken by participant (subjunctifiers per s).

c

Because there was only one 3-minute interval on the very-last-sample interview, it was not possible to compute a t-

test.
d

Because there was only one 3-minute interval on the very-last-sample interview, it was not possible to compute its

SD.
e

Emma’s effect sizes were calculated using very-first-sample standard deviations because there was only one very-

last-sample interval.
f

Average EMB ratings across the two raters and across all rated turns of the interview.
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Rows 5 through 9 of Table 6 analyze Emma’s subjunctifiers. Row 5 displays the total
count of Emma’s subjunctifiers in her very-first- and very-last-sample interviews (averaged
across both raters), and row 6 displays the total subjunctification density (row 5 divided by row
2) and changes to the overall subjunctification density across both interviews. Rows 7 through 9
display the density for the three subtypes of subjunctifiers: phenomena-not-apprehended (PNA)
subjunctifiers, unable-to-classify (UTC) subjunctifiers, and description-falling-short (DFS)
subjunctifiers.
We used an N-1 Chi-squared test13 to examine the change in subjunctification density
between Emma’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews. The four right-hand
columns of rows 6 through 9 in Table 5 show our findings: there was no significant nor
substantial changes in total, PNA, UTC, and DFS subjunctification densities between Emma’s
interviews. We conclude that, for Emma, subjunctification density alone does not provide much
insight into her skill.
Rows 10 and 11 of Table 6 analyze EMB ratings for Emma’s sample interviews,
counting them in row 10 and, in row 11, showing the average EMB rating. We found that
Emma’s average EMB rating significantly increased from the very-first-sample interview (M =
2.81) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 8.46) with a huge (d = 10.17) effect size, suggesting
extremely great improvement in Emma’s cleaving-to-a-moment and cleaving-to-experience skill.

13

We note that our data violates some assumptions needed to properly perform an N-1 Chi-squared test as outlined
in Campbell (2007) and Richardson (2011). Notably, we performed this test by treating subjunctification density as
a proportion (i.e., the proportion of seconds with subjunctifiers in them) and evaluated the difference in proportions
between the two interview subjunctification densities. Given the non-significant difference between Emma’s veryfirst-sample and very-last-sample subjunctification densities, we contend that the violation of these assumptions are
negligible, as the ultimate conclusion would remain the same.
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It is worth highlighting a major limitation regarding Emma’s sample interviews.
Compared to other participants, Emma’s very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews were
both short in length: 149.5 and 43.5 seconds, respectively. The relative terseness of her
interviews means that there were a limited number of turns to analyze. Thus, added caution
should be exercised when attempting to generalize findings from either of her very-first-sample
or very-last-sample interviews. Additionally, we provided EMB ratings for only five of the 16
very-first-sample turns. We stopped providing EMB ratings at the conversational turn where
Emma disclosed she had not followed DES sampling instructions while wearing the beeper. As
such, this context should be considered in understanding Emma’s EMB analysis. A further
discussion of the limitations of Emma’s analysis is provided in Chapter 16.
Qualitative Results and Discussion
A complete, turn-by-turn annotated transcript of Emma’s very-first-sample and very-lastsample interviews are provided in Appendix K and L, respectively. There, each annotation
includes analysis detailing the extent to which Emma (1) cleaved to a moment in that turn, (2)
cleaved to experience in that turn, and (3) used subjunctifiers in that turn. Here, we summarize
those results.
Experience at the Moment of the Beep
To reiterate: pristine, directly apprehended experience are phenomena that are present at
a specific moment. Thus, the high-fidelity apprehension of inner experience means that
participants must cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. (Successfully) cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep requires two, interrelated skills: the ability to cleave to
the last, undisturbed moment prior to beep onset and the ability to cleave to directly apprehended
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experience. We now review the extent to which Emma demonstrated moment- and experiencecleaving skill at the very start and very end of her DES sampling participation.
Very-First-Sample Interview
(Lack of) Cleaving to the Moment. Emma did not cleave to any specific moment during
her very-first-sample interview. Notably, Emma stated she had not worn earphones while using
the random beeper and explicitly stated she failed to apprehend the moment of the beep. So, in
place of cleaving to a moment, Emma made statements about long time-periods. We provide
examples below.
We begin by reviewing Emma’s acknowledgement that she did not wear earphones while
sampling with the beeper. Upon receiving clarification from DES investigators about what
constituted the specific moment of interest (i.e., one microsecond before beep onset), Emma said
the following:
E16a: ... right when the beep went off… I, like, had it in my pocket without the
headphones in, and I heard something, like, “wait what is that?” And… then I’m like,
“wait, is it the beeper?”, and then I pulled the beeper out of my pocket and I heard it
beeping and then I turned off the button so, like, the beeping, like, stopped—like it made
me pulled me out of, like, the conversation and maybe—or “what am I—what am I
hearing?” [RTH: Okay] And then… I’m like, “oh, it must be the beeper.”
The fact that Emma could not easily identify the leading edge of the beep complicated her
possible apprehension of the last, undisturbed moment before the beep: “’wait what is that?’”
and “’what am I hearing?’” explicitly signaled Emma’s confusion about identifying the moment
of the beep. Additionally, Emma’s comment that she had been “pulled... out of, like, the
conversation” was an acknowledgement that attending to the (ambiguous) beep lowered the
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possibility that she cleaved to the moment of the beep. Moreover, “I heard something, like, ‘wait
what is that?’ And… then I’m like, ‘wait, is it the beeper?’” and “I pulled the beeper out of my
pocket... I turned off the button” showed Emma reacting to the beep rather than to moment of
interest (i.e., the moment just before beep onset). That Emma spoke about any moment other
than the moment of the beep decreased the likelihood that she cleaved to the moment of the beep.
The sum effect of Emma’s inability to attend to the beep was that she could not have cleaved to a
moment, and thus means that all of Emma’s very-first-sample utterances suffered from low (if
any) temporal specificity.
Emma’s failure to cleave to a moment becomes clearer when reviewing other
conversational turns from the very-first-sample interview. Here is one such example:
E4a: ... and I was, like, thinking of what it would be like to talk to the person, like,
explaining well, like, why I wear the big brace while I’m here on campus and why I wear
a little brace at home. And thinking about that ’cause I’m scared of falling here on
campus [RTH: Okay] when I walk.
This report referred to a long time-period: Emma’s talk of multiple potential conversation topics
(“explaining... why I wear the big brace while I’m here on campus... [that] I’m scared of falling
here on campus”) signaled this was a reference to a period of indeterminate length, likely
spanning several seconds to several minutes. A conversation is descriptive of a process, and a
process cannot be apprehended at a moment.
Similarly, Emma was not constrained to a discrete moment in later turns of the very-firstsample interview. At E12a, Emma described an ongoing conversation with multiple topics:
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E12a: Um... I’m in like an x-ray room, or, talking to them explaining why, like, explaining
about why... what’s going on, like, that I fell, I rolled my ankle, and I—they think it
might be fractured, and...
Although “I’m in like an x-ray room” may have described an experiential moment, “explaining
about why... what’s going on, like, I fell, I rolled my ankle, and... it might be fractured” was a list
of several, separate topics that could not possibly have been discussed or apprehended in a single
moment.
These excerpts are all illustrative of one simple conclusion: Emma did not cleave to any
moment during any part of her very-first-sample interview. Thus, she could not have been
cleaving to the specific moment of interest within DES—the last undisturbed moment at the
leading edge of the beep’s onset.
(Lack of) Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience
By definition, an inner experience is a phenomenon that is present at a specific moment.
Because, as we just reviewed, Emma’s very-first-sample interview never focused on any specific
moment, her very-first-sample interview could not have described any genuine inner
experience(s). Instead, Emma provided ersatz descriptions and faux generalizations. We provide
examples of each.
Some of Emma’s very-first-sample interview turns involved ersatz descriptions—
statements that appeared to be of experience, but instead referred to context and other, nonphenomenal things. Here is one example:
E4a: Yesterday, I turned it on at about five-ish and it went off at about 5:28. [RTH: Okay]
so it hadn’t been on that long. Um, I was cooking dinner, um…
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In this turn, nothing that Emma said was descriptive of phenomena. The time of day the beep
occurred and behaviors she had been doing around the moment of the beep—even if true—have
nothing to do with Emma’s directly apprehended experience.
Emma also used faux generalizations in her very-first-sample interview. Here is one such
example:
E4a: ... I also notice I have inner conversations with myself. [Chuckles and smiles] Um...
sometimes, like, just talking to myself sometimes I’m envision I’m talking to somebody
else.
“I notice I have” and “sometimes” are characterizations about her (supposed) in-general
experience, and statements about in-general experience (whether accurate or not) cannot be
descriptive of a specific experience.
Emma’s talk about ersatz descriptions and faux generalizations are illustrative of one
simple conclusion: Emma did not cleave to directly apprehended experience during her veryfirst-sample interview.
Very-First-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Emma failed to cleave
to any moment and failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience during her very-firstsample interview. We conclude that Emma’s utterances in her very-first-sample interview had a
near-zero possibility of any descriptive fidelity because she failed to grasp a particular moment
of experience.
Very-Last-Sample Interview
Emma’s very-last-sample interview was consistent with cleaving to directly apprehended
experience that occurred at a specific moment. Since the high-fidelity apprehension and
description of experience must involve the simultaneous presence of cleaving to a moment and to
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directly apprehended experience, we are unable to separate our analysis of Emma’s very-lastsample cleaving abilities as independent processes. Therefore, we will review examples from
Emma’s very-last-sample interview and examine whether she did simultaneously cleave to a
moment and cleave to experience.
Here is Emma’s very first turn from her very-last-sample interview:
E2b: [looking at notes] I was, uh, feeling chest... chest pain.
That was a straightforward description of that was consonant with directly apprehended
phenomena present at a single, specific moment.
Throughout the remainder of her very-last-sample interview, Emma consistently
described possible phenomena present at a specific moment, and most turns appeared to describe
the same moment of feeling-of-chest-pain experience that she described in E2b. For example:
•

In E6b, she said, “I’m, like, aware that, there’s... the pain in my chest.” Although being
“aware” of chest pain may be contrasted with “feeling chest pain” described in E2b, it still
featured chest pain as a primary characteristic and was still consistent with describing
directly apprehended phenomena present at a moment.

•

In E10b, Emma said, “I’m, like, feeling it but I’m not... like, really, that engaged on
thinking about it.” This again appeared to describe the feeling-chest-pain experience
described in previous turns. Emma additionally was able to make clear that her at-themoment of experience was a sensory experience (“I’m, like, feeling it”) and not a
cognitive experience (“I’m not... that engaged on thinking about it”).

•

In E12b, Emma described the characteristics of her chest pain, stating that it had been “a
dull, achey” pain.

•

In E14b, Emma described the location of her chest pain: “Just the center [of my chest].”
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The main takeaway: Emma appeared to describe the same feeling-chest-pain experience in a
manner that was consistent, temporally specific, and entirely descriptive of phenomena to the
exclusion of all else across multiple turns of her very-last-sample interview.
Very-Last-Sample Interview: Conclusions. Overall, we see that Emma appeared to
cleave to a moment and to experience in her very-last-sample interview. We conclude that
Emma’s descriptions had the probability (or at least the possibility) of describing with fidelity a
moment of experience (perhaps most likely the experience at the beep).
Comparison: Very-First-Sample Qualitative Characteristics vs. Very-Last-Sample Qualitative
Characteristics
We have seen that, in her very-first-sample interview, Emma did not describe any
particular moment and did not describe experience. By contrast, Emma’s very-last-sample
interview was constrained to a relatively specific time and was mostly limited to describing
experience. We conclude that Emma’s very-last-sample interview was very different from her
very-first-sample interview. Whereas in the very-first interview, she could not possibly have
been describing an experience that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep with any
level of fidelity, in the very-last sample she (at least) might have been describing an experience
that was directly apprehended at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctification
As we have just detailed, there is reason to believe that Emma’s descriptions were of
much higher fidelity during her very-last-sample interview than they had been on her very-firstsample interview. However, we have also seen in the Quantitative Results and Discussion
section that her subjunctification density did not significantly change from the very-first to verylast sample. Hurlburt (2011) proposed that subjunctification density can generally been thought
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of as an indicator of descriptive fidelity—that the higher the density (that is, a greater number of
subjunctifiers per second), the lower the fidelity. Emma’s sampling suggests that Hurlburt’s
proposal does not apply for Emma; despite the lack of significant change between interviews, it
is undeniable that Emma changed between her very-first-sample and very-last-sample
interviews.
Therefore, it is desirable and necessary to consider qualitatively the way in which
Emma’s type and manner of subjunctification changed between interviews; doing so may
provide greater insight into Emma’s improvement. We observe that nearly all of Emma’s veryfirst-sample interview subjunctifiers signaled that she failed to apprehend her experience-at-themoment-of-the-beep (and thus undermined any possibility of describing experience). In other
words, all of Emma’s very-first-sample subjunctification was of the phenomenon-notapprehended (PNA) type. By contrast, nearly all her very-last-sample interview subjunctifiers
signaled that, whereas Emma apprehended the phenomenon adequately, her description was not
yet adequate. That is, most very-last-sample subjunctification was of the description-fallingshort (DFS) type.
There were three types of PNA subjunctifiers that were common in Emma’s very-firstsample interview: causal inferences, hedges, and softening expressions. We provide examples of
each.
Here is an example of causal inferences from one of Emma’s first conversational turns in
her very-first-sample interview (both causal inferences are set in italics and with superscripts):
E4a: ... And, I envision—'cause1 I’m probably gonna go get my x-ray done today for my
ankle, and I was, like, thinking of what it would be like to talk to the person, like,
explaining well, like, why I wear the big brace while I’m here on campus and why I wear
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a little brace at home. And thinking about that ‘cause I’m scared of falling here on
campus2.
Both instances of “’cause” are inferred explanations as to why something (potentially) occurred,
but in no way provided any description of directly apprehended experience.
Another common PNA subjunctifier that Emma used during her very-first-sample
interview were hedges, or statements that signal what is about to be said are speculations. Here is
an example, with all subjunctifiers set in italics and with superscripts:
E8a: I, I imagine myself talking to a doctor. I imagine male1 since most of the sports
medicine people I’ve talked to have been male doctors2.
“I imagine male1” literally means that what is being provided is guessed—it is not to be taken as
a description of an experience that had been apprehended. Moreover, note that all that follows
the hedge is a (possibly incorrect) causal inference—that Emma has mostly interacted with male
sports medicine doctors says nothing descriptive about her experience-at-a-moment.
Emma’s very-first-sample interview also involved softening expressions. Here is an
example:
E12a: Um1...2 I’m in like3 an x-ray room, or4, talking to them explaining why, like5,
explaining about why...6 what’s going on, like7, that I fell, I rolled my ankle, and I—8 they
think it might be fractured, and...
All of these subjunctifiers undermined any commitment to describing a particular experience.
“I’m in like3 an x-ray room,” implied that what was being described may or may not have been
true; the “or4” in “I’m in like3 an x-ray room, or4, talking to them explaining why, like5”
proposes two reports of experience, which lessens the fidelity of a single experience-at-amoment; and the long list of possible topics of discussion (“what’s going on, like7, that I fell, I
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rolled my ankle”) approximated the conversation and was not descriptive of any particular
experience-at-a-moment.
Thus, all the subjunctifiers in Emma’s very-first-sample interview had the effect of
undermining any communication about directly apprehended experience, either by reporting on
causal inferences, by hedging, or by softening a report. Thus, all were PNA subjunctifiers.
By contrast, Emma’s subjunctifiers on her very-last-sample interview seemed to signal
that she was working to refine the fidelity of her descriptions of experience-at-the-moment-ofthe-beep—hence, DFS subjunctifiers. The DFS subjunctifiers never undermined Emma’s
commitment to describing a particular phenomena; because the subjunctifiers were nearly always
immediately followed by descriptions of apprehendable phenomena (or at least the possibility
thereof), they signaled that Emma was attempting to give a careful description of experience.
Here is an example from E10b (all subjunctifiers are set in italics with superscripts):
E10b: I’m, like1, feeling it but I’m not...2 like3, really, that engaged on thinking about it.
Here, both “likes” qualified a distinction between feeling and thinking; that is, Emma was wholly
constrained to describing experience, and the subjunctifiers did not undermine the specificity of
her report. In fact, the most straightforward interpretation of her utterances was that she was
trying to refine what she meant by the distinction between feeling and thinking—a distinction
that was entirely aimed at a providing a high-fidelity description of experience.
Here is another example of DFS subjunctifiers from the first sentence of E4b (all
subjunctifiers are set in italics with superscripts):
E4b: Um1, I was kinda2 like3...4 feeling that [the chest pain] was there.
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All of these subjunctifiers are immediately situated by a description of phenomena (the feeling of
chest pain). The most likely interpretation of these subjunctifiers is that they were used as a
means of refining the description of chest pain.
This is not to suggest, however, that Emma’s very-last-sample interview was entirely
consistent with high skill. In the last turns of the very-last-sample interview, Emma subjunctified
in a way that signaled that she may have failed to grasp her experience-at-a-moment undermined
her descriptions through her use of softening expressions (all subjunctifiers are set in italics with
superscripts):
RTH18b: And, is the—so the previous beep, we talked about the hearing of the
construction. But not really attending to it.
E19b: Yeah.
RTH20b: Is that the same—more or less the same kind of a deal; a different sensory deal
here?
E21b: I think so1.
RTH22b: So I’m... I’m hearing construction, or I guess I’m hearing the construction, or
I’m feeling my chest... sort of the same deal?
E23b: I think so2.
The two instances of “I think so” in E21b and E23b are examples of UTC subjunctifiers: Although
they may be aimed at describing experience (which would make them DFS subjunctifiers) they
may also be hedges (which would make them PNA subjunctifiers) or somewhere in between
(which would make them UTC subjunctifiers)14.
We note that these subjunctifiers may have been caused by RTH’s abstract line of questioning and Emma’s
difficulty in understanding RTH’s questions. In other words, Emma’s subjunctification in E21b and E23b may have
been more a reflection of Emma’s confusion regarding RTH’s questions rather than her ignorance or unfamiliarity
about her experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep.
14
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Comparison: Very-First-Sample Subjunctification vs. Very-Last-Sample Subjunctification
Overall, the quantification of subjunctification density was not effective as a measure of
the fidelity of Emma’s descriptions: both of Emma’s interviews featured a high density of
subjunctifiers that did not change between interviews. However, we did observe notable
differences in the types of subjunctifiers present within each interview (that is: the relative
proportion of PNA, UTC, and DFS subjunctifiers that contributed to the total subjunctification in
each interview changed in composition between the very-first-sample and very-last-sample
interviews). Subjunctifiers in Emma’s very-first-sample interview were mostly PNA
subjunctifiers—utterances that signaled that phenomenon may not have been adequately grasped,
and so lowered any possibility of describing a specific moment of experience. In contrast,
subjunctifiers in Emma’s very-last-sample interview were mostly DFS subjunctifiers—utterances
that signaled an attempt to refine the fidelity of describing a specific moment of experience.
Emma: Overall Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to examine a single participant (in this case: Emma) at the
very start and the very end of her sampling process to assess any changes in her skillfulness to
engage in the sampling task (describing directly apprehended experience present at the moment
of the beep). By skillfulness, we specifically considered (using both quantitative and qualitative
means) the extent to which Emma cleaved to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; we also
considered the nature of her subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Emma (Possibly) Describe Experience?
No. She cleaved neither to the moment nor experience, her interview involved a
moderately high density of subjunctifiers (mostly PNA), and the average EMB rating for the
interview was low. Most notably, Emma did not follow the instructions for sampling and did not
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wear earphones while using the beeper. This meant that she had (explicitly stated) difficulties
cleaving to the moment of the beep.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Emma Improve?
Yes. She appeared to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, in which she
described an awareness of chest tightness. The very-last-sample interview still involved a
moderate density of subjunctifiers that was not significantly different from the very-first-sample
interview, but, unlike the very-first-sample interview, most subjunctifiers were of the DFS type,
signaling she successfully apprehended her experience but struggled to describe her experience.
Therefore, the EMB ratings for the interview were over three times higher than for those of her
very-first-sample interview.
Comparing the Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample Interviews
Ultimately, we draw the following conclusion: whereas Emma’s very-first-sample
interview could not possibly have been a high-fidelity description of experience (because she
failed to cleave to any moment and failed to cleave to any experience), it is possible that Emma’s
very-last-sample interview involved high-fidelity descriptions of experience (because she
showed improvement in cleaving to a moment and in cleaving to experience). We cannot be
certain whether or not fidelity was actually achieved, but Emma’s improvement in cleaving to
the moment and to experience, and the change in the manner of her subjunctification, suggests at
least the possibility that Emma was apprehending at-the-moment experience in high-fidelity at
the end of her sampling participation.
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Chapter 13: Overall Results
The present study examined whether DES participants demonstrated changes in their skill
to engage in the DES task—to apprehend and describe directly apprehended experience present
at the moment of the beep. To give the iterative process the greatest possible latitude to work, we
compared the very-first-sample interview to the very-last-sample interview of six DES
participants from two previous DES investigations. We quantitatively and qualitatively assessed
participant’s skill in engaging in the DES task by considering the extent to which each
participant (a) cleaved to a moment and (b) cleaved to experience; we also considered (c)
participant’s subjunctifier use (density and type). In the previous chapters, we treated each
participant as an individual N = 1 case study; we now consider overarching findings that were
common across our six case studies.
We will first review and discuss the overall quantitative results across all participants.
Then, we will discuss the qualitative results of the very-first-sample interview across all
participants. Lastly, we will discuss the notable changes observed in the very-last-sample
interview by contrasting qualitative results of the very-last-sample interview with what was
observed on the very-first-sample interview and the implications of these changes.
Quantitative Results
Comparing Quantitative Results of Very-First-Sample Interviews vs. Very-Last-Sample
Interviews for Each Participant
Table 7 provides a summary of the direction and magnitude of change in
subjunctification density and EMB ratings for each of the six individual participants in this
study, reprinting results from each individual participant’s chapter. We see that the direction of
change was universal for each participant from the very-first-sample interview to the very-last-
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sample interview (with the exception of Emma’s change in total subjunctification density): every
individual participant’s total, PNA, and UTC subjunctification density decreased while their DFS
subjunctification density and EMB rating increased. Moreover, as displayed in the bottom panel
of Table 7, the median effect sizes of these changes were all substantial. Taken together, these
trends signals each and every participants’ improvement in cleaving to experience-at-a-moment
between interviews.
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Table 7
Subjunctification Density and EMB Rating Change from the Very-First-Sample Interview to the
Very-Last-Sample Interview for Each Participant
Subjunctification Density
Total

PNA

UTC
Change

DFS

Partic.

Change

d

Change

d

d

Ameliaa

Decrease*

3.12

Decrease*

5.32

Decrease

1.65

Shirleyb

Decrease*

6.13

Decrease*

3.01

Decrease*

Kaylac

Decrease

0.88

Decrease*

4.18

Jaked

Decrease

0.97

Decrease*

Macye

Decrease

2.20

Emmaf

Increase

0.43

Change

EMB Rating
d

Change

d

Decrease

4.45

Increase*

6.33

2.80

Decrease*

1.43

Increase*

8.14

Decrease*

4.13

Decrease*

2.24

Increase*

3.91

2.25

Decrease

0.67

Decrease

1.75

Increase*

2.90

Decrease

2.30

Decrease

1.59

Decrease

0.13

Increase*

1.62

Decrease

3.01

Decrease

0.10

Decrease

4.64

Increase*

10.17

2.00

Increase

5.12

Across Participants
Median

Decrease

1.59

Decrease

3.01

Decrease

1.62

Increase

Note. Partic. = Participant; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-to-classify; DFS = Descriptionfalling-short.
* Within participant, p < .05
a

Reprinted from Table 1 for participant Amelia

b

Reprinted from Table 2 for participant Shirley

c

Reprinted from Table 3 for participant Kayla

d

Reprinted from Table 4 for participant Jake

e

Reprinted from Table 5 for participant Macy

f

Reprinted from Table 6 for participant Emma
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Comparing Quantitative Results of Very-First-Sample Interviews vs. Very-Last-Sample
Interviews
Subjunctification Density. Table 8 summarizes the average subjunctification density
(both by type and in total) across both interviews for all participants, reprinting results from each
individual participant’s chapter.
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Table 8
Comparing Subjunctification Density Across All Participants
Total
M
(SD)

PNA
M
(SD)

UTC
M
(SD)

DFS
M
(SD)

Participant
(Study)
Amelia
(Methodological)a
Shirley
(Methodological)b
Kayla
(Methodological)c
Jake
(Psychotherapy)d
Macy
(Psychotherapy)e
Emma
(Psychotherapy)f

First

Last

First

Last

First

Last

First

Last

0.37
(0.06)
0.32
(0.02)
0.59
(0.11)
0.42
(0.14)
0.41
(0.07)
0.31
(0.14)

0.16
(0.10)
0.15
(0.04)
0.52
(0.06)
0.28
(0.16)
0.28
(0.06)
0.37

0.37
(0.08)
0.17
(0.07)
0.53
(0.11)
0.27
(0.13)
0.08
(0.04)
0.17
(0.06)

0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
0.13
(0.09)
0.04
(0.03)
0.02
(0.01)
0.00

0.01
(0.01)
0.10
(0.03)
0.06
(0.02)
0.11
(0.06)
0.13
(0.14)
0.08
(0.05)

0.04
(0.04)
0.03
(0.01)
0.16
(0.03)
0.08
(0.05)
0.01
(0.01)
0.07

0.01
(0.01)
0.05
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
0.04
(0.04)
0.20
(0.11)
0.07
(0.05)

0.10
(0.04)
0.11
(0.04)
0.23
(0.13)
0.16
(0.10)
0.25
(0.06)
0.30

Across Participants
M
(SD)

0.40
(0.10)

0.29
(0.14)

0.27
(0.16)

0.04
(0.05)

0.08
(0.04)

0.07
(0.05)

0.06
(0.07)

0.19
(0.08)

t(5)g

−2.83

−4.40

−0.53

3.92

p

.037

.007

.618

.011

d

0.90

1.90

0.35

1.69

Note. PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; UTC = Unable-to-classify; DFS = Description-falling-short; First =
Very-first-sample interview; Last = Very-last-sample interview.
a

Reprinted from Table 1 for participant Amelia

b

Reprinted from Table 2 for participant Shirley

c

Reprinted from Table 3 for participant Kayla

d

Reprinted from Table 4 for participant Jake

e

Reprinted from Table 5 for participant Macy

f

Reprinted from Table 6 for participant Emma

g

Dependent samples
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As shown at the bottom of Table 8, we performed dependent-samples t-tests to compare
the average change in the subjunctification density by subjunctifier type. We found that total
subjunctification density significantly decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.40
subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.29 subjunctifiers per second)
with a large (d = 0.90) effect size; we similarly found that the average PNA subjunctification
density significantly decreased from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.27 subjunctifiers per
second) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 0.04 subjunctifiers per second) with a substantial
(d = 1.90) effect size. By contrast, average DFS subjunctification density significantly increased
from the very-first-sample interview (M = 0.06 subjunctifiers per second) to the very-last-sample
interview (M = 0.19 subjunctifiers per second) with a substantial (d = 1.69) effect size. These
findings suggest that, on average15, participants’ talk reflected participants’ significant
improvement in cleaving to experience-at-a-moment between their two interviews.
We found no significant or substantial difference in UTC subjunctification density
between the two interviews. Because UTC subjunctifiers merely represent subjunctifiers that
could not easily be classified as a PNA or DFS-type subjunctifier, they do not provide insight
into the possible fidelity of a participant’s report, and thus this finding is irrelevant to the main
aims of the current study.
EMB Ratings. Table 9 summarizes the average EMB ratings across both interviews for
all participants, reprinting results from each individual participant’s chapter.

15

The analyses in Tables 7 and 8 are Galtonian, the kind most frequently used in psychological research. See
footnote 4.
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Table 9
Comparing EMB Ratings Across All Participants
EMB Rating
M (SD)
Participant (Study)

First

Last

Amelia (Methodological)a

1.65 (1.16)

8.97 (1.16)

Shirley (Methodological)b

1.33 (0.99)

9.10 (0.90)

Kayla (Methodological)c

0.52 (0.42)

6.31 (1.82)

Jake (Psychotherapy)d

2.71 (1.99)

7.68 (1.20)

Macy (Psychotherapy)e

5.18 (2.14)

8.00 (1.31)

Emma (Psychotherapy)f

2.81 (1.02)

8.46 (0.68)

2.37 (1.63)

8.09 (1.03)

Across Participants
M (SD)
g

7.90

p

< .001

d

4.21

t(5)

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep; First = Very-first-sample interview; Last = Very-last-sample
interview.
a

Reprinted from Table 1 for participant Amelia.

b

Reprinted from Table 2 for participant Shirley.

c

Reprinted from Table 3 for participant Kayla.

d

Reprinted from Table 4 for participant Jake.

e

Reprinted from Table 5 for participant Macy.

f

Reprinted from Table 6 for participant Emma.

g

Dependent samples.

207

As shown at the bottom of Table 9, we performed a dependent-samples t-test to compare
the average change in EMB rating. We found that average EMB ratings significantly increased
from the very-first-sample interview (M = 2.28) to the very-last-sample interview (M = 8.09)
with a huge (d = 4.21) effect size. This finding suggests (similar to the implications of
subjunctification density described above) an extremely large improvement in participants’
cleaving to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep between their two interviews.
Reliability. Table 10 shows subjunctification densities ratings for each rater by interview
and participant. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 10, we assessed interrater reliability in
three ways. First, we computed the Pearson correlation between raters’ subjunctification
densities across the very-first-sample interviews. This assesses whether raters agreed on
subjunctification ratings for naïve participants, when (presumably) individual differences in
participants’ natural level of subjunctification would be greatest. Then we computed the Pearson
correlation between raters’ subjunctification densities across the very-last-sample interviews.
This assesses whether raters agreed on subjunctification ratings for participants who had been
trained in DES reporting, when (presumably) their individual differences had been reduced by
training (and reliability might be expected to be lessened by reduction of range). Then we
computed the Pearson correlation between raters’ subjunctification densities across all
interviews. This confounds individual differences and training effects, but reliability might be
expected to be higher because of that confound. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 10, it
doesn’t much matter how those reliabilities are computed: they are acceptably high (following
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the recommendations of Multon, 2010) for the subjunctification measurements that are of most
interest16 (i.e., total, PNA, and DFS subjunctifiers).

16

UTC subjunctifiers had low to moderate interrater reliability across the individual sample interviews (r = .64; r =
.74) and across both interviews (r = .65), respectively. However, because UTC subjunctifiers referred only to
subjunctifiers that could not be straightforwardly categorized as being either PNA or DFS subjunctifiers, and
because UTC subjunctifiers were not interpreted throughout this study, the interrater reliability of UTC
subjunctifiers are inconsequential.
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Table 10
Subjunctification Densities by Rater

Sample
interview

First

Last

Totala

PNAa

UTCa

DFSa

Rater

Rater

Rater

Rater

Participant

CK

RTH

CK

RTH

CK

RTH

CK

RTH

Amelia

.41

.32

.40

.30

.01

.01

.00

.01

Shirley

.34

.31

.17

.20

.13

.06

.05

.05

Kayla

.55

.55

.43

.55

.12

.00

.00

.00

Jake

.43

.37

.22

.30

.12

.05

.10

.02

Macy

.47

.40

.14

.04

.16

.19

.16

.16

Emma

.28

.17

.21

.08

.06

.03

.02

.06

Amelia
Shirley
Kayla
Jake
Macy

.17
.17
.51
.20
.27

.08
.15
.51
.17
.27

.02
.01
.14
.01
.03

.00
.00
.14
.04
.01

.03
.06
.20
.06
.01

.02
.01
.13
.04
.00

.11
.10
.17
.13
.23

.06
.14
.25
.10
.26

Emma

.40

.34

.00

.00

.14

.00

.26

.34

Pearson’s r Across Participants
Very-first-sampleb
Very-last-samplec

.97
.99

.83
.96

.64
.74

.81
.92

Both interviewsd

.97

.91

.65

.91

Note. First = Very-first-sample interview; Last = Very-last-sample interview; Both interviews = Both very-firstsample and very-last-sample interviews.
a

Subjunctification density averaged within individual raters for each respective sample interview.

b

Pearson’s r of all of CK’s very-first-sample interview subjunctification densities compared with all of RTH’s very-

first-sample subjunctification densities.
c

Pearson’s r of all of CK’s very-last-sample interview subjunctification densities compared with all of RTH’s very-

last-sample subjunctification densities.
d

Pearson’s r of all of CK’ subjunctification densities for both interviews compared with all of RTH’s

subjunctification densities for both interviews.
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Table 11 shows EMB ratings for each rater by interview and participant. As shown in the
bottom panel of Table 11, and parallel to the analysis described for Table 10, we assessed
interrater reliability in three ways. As in Table 10, it doesn’t much matter how the EMB
reliability is computed: they are all acceptably high (following the recommendations of Multon,
2010).
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Table 11
EMB Ratings by Rater
EMB Ratinga
Sample
interview

First

Last

Rater
Participant

CK

RTH

Amelia

1.18

2.12

Shirley

0.73

1.93

Kayla

0.25

0.33

Jake

2.43

3.00

Macy

4.94

7.24

Emma

1.62

4.00

Amelia

8.07

9.87

Shirley

9.04

9.15

Kayla

6.07

6.86

Jake

7.65

7.70

Macy

8.10

7.90

Emma

5.72

6.50

Pearson’s r Across Participants
Very-first-sampleb
Very-last-samplec
Both interviewsd

0.95
0.84
0.96

Note. EMB= Experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep; First = Very-first-sample interview; Last = Very-last-sample
interview; Both interviews = Both very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews.
a

EMB rating averaged within individual raters for each respective sample interview.

b

Pearson’s r of all of CK’s very-first-sample interview EMB ratings compared with all of RTH’s very-first-sample

interview EMB ratings.
c

Pearson’s r of all of CK’s very-last-sample interview EMB ratings compared with all of RTH’s very-last-sample

interview EMB ratings.
d

Pearson’s r of all of CK’ EMB ratings for both interviews compared with all of RTH’s EMB ratings for both

interviews.
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Quantitative Results: Conclusions
As assessed using subjunctification density and EMB ratings, participants’ ability to
cleave to experience-at-a-moment improved substantially from the very-first-sample interview to
the very-last-sample interview. Very-first-sample interviews involved high total and PNA
subjunctification densities and low EMB ratings, which suggests that naïve participants failed to
cleave to a specific moment or to directly apprehended experience. By contrast, very-last-sample
interviews involved substantially lower total and PNA subjunctification densities and higher
EMB ratings, which suggests that with practice, participants improved in their ability to engage
in the DES task: they spoke in a manner more consistent with successfully cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. In instances where participants used subjunctifiers at all
in their very-last-sample interview, approximately two-thirds of those subjunctifiers were DFS,
suggesting that very-last-sample subjunctification was the result of the difficulty in describing
phenomena.
Qualitative Results
We qualitatively assessed three characteristics of participant’s skill within very-firstsample and very-last-sample interviews: cleaving to a moment, cleaving to experience, and the
type and manner of subjunctifiers used. We begin by first discussing the two types of
subjunctifiers that were identified as part of this study. We then presenting the common
characteristics of very-first-sample interviews. Once we have established how participants naïve
to the DES process performed on the very-first-sample interview, we present changes in
participant’s skill by contrasting participant’s skill during the very-last-sample interviews with
what was observed during the very-first-sample interviews.
Types of Subjunctifiers

213

Following Hurlburt (2011), it has been customary to use subjunctification density as an
indicator of descriptive fidelity—the higher the density (of subjunctifiers per second spoken), the
lower the fidelity. This recommendation has remained unquestioned within the DES literature
due in large part to way subjunctifiers have long been defined as “anything that gives a sign that
a subject’s utterance is not to be confidently understood as a straightforward description of
momentary experience” (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 116).
Hurlburt’s definition of a subjunctifier implies (correctly) that all subjunctifiers are
undermining in nature. Subjunctifiers signal that anything within its vicinity (either preceding or
subsequent) should not be straightforwardly understood. However, although all subjunctifiers
communicate an undermining of sorts, the manner in which subjunctifiers undermine does
vary—that is, not all subjunctifiers undermine in the same way. The results from this study led us
to identify two different types of subjunctifiers: those that signal that the phenomenon was not
apprehended adequately (we have called them phenomenon-not-apprehended or PNA
subjunctifiers), and those that signal that the description was not adequate even though the
phenomenon seemed to have been apprehended adequately (we have called them descriptionfalling-short or DFS subjunctifiers). We present operational definitions and examples of PNA
and DFS subjunctifiers below.
We recognize a subjunctifier as being a PNA subjunctifier when it occurs in the vicinity
of talk that does not make a single (or otherwise consistent) phenomenal reference(s). In other
words, PNA subjunctifiers signal that there is no possibility that the talk is describing a specific
phenomenon, either because what is being said does not describe any phenomenon (e.g.,
generalities, statements of causation) or because the talk characterizes something that might be a
phenomenon but is inconsistent (for example: describing one putative phenomenon but then
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morphing into describing a different putative phenomenon with no recognition of transition or
simultaneity).
Here is an example of the use of PNA subjunctifiers (from Amelia’s very-first-sample
interview). All subjunctifiers are set in italics and with superscripts:
A1a: “Actually, my first beep I was like1, I dunno2, I was thinking of why the beeper
didn’t go off [laughs]. So the whole time I was just wondering…3 when it would beep
because4 it took like5, maybe about an hour before it beeped? So I thought, like6, maybe7 I
should call you…8 text you…9 like10, there was some kind of problem…11 and then it just
beeped. And I knew it worked. And that was it. [laughs] It was a simple one.”
In this turn, there are at least four possible phenomena being invoked: I was thinking of why…; I
was wondering when…; maybe I should call you; maybe I should text you. Note that if these
reports are of phenomena, the phenomena are very different from each other; that is, they refer to
four different experiences (not simply variations of the same experience). Additionally, note the
way in which the subjunctifiers contribute to the approximation of experience: “like1, I dunno2”
explicitly signals that what follows should not be understood straightforwardly, and “so I
thought, like6, maybe7” de-particularizes Amelia’s report and diminishes the likelihood Amelia is
cleaving to a specific experience-at-a-moment. Thus, the subjunctifiers in A1a signal that the talk
could not possibly be aimed at a particular phenomenon; therefore, these are PNA subjunctifiers,
and therefore it is likely that no particular phenomenon had been apprehended.
We note that these conclusions emerge from the nature of Amelia’s talk itself—we are
not mind-reading, not hypothesizing about why Amelia subjunctified, not comparing Amelia’s
talk to some epistemologically questionable assumption about the “accuracy” of Amelia’s
descriptions. Instead, we consider only the literal, grammatical effects of the words
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(subjunctifiers) Amelia used and from that direct observation conclude that what Amelia said
had no possibility of describing phenomena. In short, as illustrated in A1a, PNA subjunctifiers
indicate that a description has low (or no) fidelity.
In contrast to PNA subjunctifiers, we recognize a subjunctifier as being a DFS
subjunctifier when it occurs in the vicinity of talk that does make a single (or otherwise
consistent) phenomenal reference(s), but the words used in those references are delivered in a
halting, inconsistent, or otherwise unconfident way. Here is an example of the use of DFS
subjunctifiers (from Shirley’s very-last-sample interview). All subjunctifiers are set in italics and
with superscripts:
S21b: Yeah, it was, it was…1 like2, literally a hundred and then x one equals [draws out the
equation in front of her with her right index finger]. And it was…3 it was white in bold.
And the background was…4 [quizzically grimaces5] it wasn’t black, but it was…6 black.
[Laughs7]
In this turn, everything that Shirley talked about was descriptive of a single, directly apprehended
phenomenon (an inner seeing of a math problem). That is, Shirley did not equivocate about her
experience, did not conflate her experience with statements of in-general experience, did not
conflate her experience with non-experiential things, and so on; her consistency suggests that
Shirley was talking about experience apprehended at-a-moment. Because all the subjunctifiers in
this turn occur within talk that was aimed at a single phenomena, they signal that Shirley herself
judges that her description of the phenomenon is not yet of adequate fidelity.
We observe that every subjunctifier in S21b lead Shirley’s description towards a
particularized experience; that is, these DFS subjunctifiers signal Shirley’s struggle to describe
phenomena with fidelity. Whereas PNA subjunctifiers sow doubt that any particular experience
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is being described (because they generalize and/or approximate any talk of experience), DFS
subjunctifiers do the opposite: there is little doubt that a particular experience is being described,
and the subjunctifiers merely refine the description of the particular experience.
Like our consideration of recognizing PNA subjunctifiers, we are not mind-reading, not
hypothesizing about why Shirley subjunctified, not comparing Shirley ‘stalk to some
epistemologically questionable assumption about the “accuracy” of her descriptions. Instead, we
considered only the literal, grammatical effects of the words (subjunctifiers) she used.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Did Participants Describe Experience?
We found that no participant during their very-first-sample interviews straightforwardly
described their experience at any moment (much less at the last, undisturbed moment before the
onset of the beep), and (therefore) failed to cleave to any experience (much less the experience
present at the moment of the beep). On average, subjunctifiers were also dense across very-firstsample interviews and were comprised primarily of PNA subjunctifiers.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Failures of Cleaving to the Moment. Participants
failed to cleave a moment as evidenced by one of three shortcomings: their reports suffered
either from temporal indeterminacy, temporal imprecision, or temporal incorrectness. Table 12
provides an overview of each type of temporal shortcoming.
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Table 12
Cleaving to the Moment of the Beep and Failures to do so
Aimed at some
temporal interval

Aimed at one
particular
moment

Aimed at the
moment of
the beep

Brief description

Temporal indeterminacy







No particular moment

Temporal imprecision

✓





Some unspecified set of
moments

Temporal incorrectness

✓

✓



The wrong moment

Cleaving to the moment

✓

✓

✓

The moment of the beep

Temporal indeterminacy. Temporal indeterminacy refers to instances where a participant
talked about things that had no relevancy towards time. Here is a typical example from Emma’s
very-first-sample interview:
E4a: ...I also notice I have inner conversations with myself. [Chuckles and smiles] Um...
sometimes, like, just talking to myself sometimes I’m envision I’m talking to somebody
else.
This entire turn is a timeless generalization—a statement that is unrelated to any specific
moment. Note that whether the generalization is true or false does not matter from the standpoint
of temporal specificity: even if the generalization is true, it is not a description of any particular
moment. A report that does not specify any particular moment cannot possibly cleave to any
specific moment, let alone to the moment of the beep. Thus, the first row of Table 12 has all
X’s—temporally indeterminate reports fail to meet any of the stated criteria of cleaving to a
moment.
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Temporal imprecision. Temporal imprecision refers to instances where a participant talks
about a specific time-period (or several moments) but fails to limit itself to a single moment.
Unlike temporal indeterminacy, the time is of some relevance to the participant—that is, the
participant was discussing an event that occurred at some particular time, but the timing is not
constrained to any particular moment. Here is a typical example from Amelia’s very-first-sample
interview:
A1a: “Actually, my first beep I was like, I dunno, I was thinking of why the beeper didn’t
go off [laughs]. So the whole time I was just wondering… when it would beep because it
took like, maybe about an hour before it beeped? So I thought, like, maybe I should call
you… text you… like, there was some kind of problem… and then it just beeped. And I
knew it worked. And that was it. [laughs] It was a simple one.
Here, Amelia talked about a long time-period: “so the whole time…maybe an hour.”
Furthermore, “and I knew it worked” was aimed at a time after the beep. Thus, A1a is temporally
imprecise in two ways: it refers to both a long period (an hour) and to several moments (both
before and after the beep).
Here is another example of temporal indeterminacy from Kayla’s very-first-sample
interview:
K2a: Um... like… when it went off, uh, my mom and I were making, like, uh, tuna
sandwiches, so I really just put the toast—the bread to toast and then she did everything
else.
This specified a temporally particular event (the making-of-tuna-sandwiches took place on a
particular day at a particular time), but the event has a long duration—perhaps hundreds of
individual moments could occur during the five-or-so minutes of making of sandwiches.
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Temporal imprecision is an improvement over temporal indeterminacy—we are at least talking
about some discrete time (hence the checkmark in the second row of Table 12; temporal
imprecision does involve some temporal interval). But that time is still far too long for DES
(hence the X’s for all other cleaving-to-a-moment criteria).
Temporal incorrectness. Temporal incorrectness refers to instances where a participant
appears to talk about experience at a specific moment, but the moment involved could not have
been the moment of the beep. Here is an example from Shirley’s very-first-sample interview:
LLC1a: All right, so… what, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of the
first beep?
S2a: Um, I was scared. [Laughs]
LLC3a: Okay.
S4a: I didn’t know what was—I forgot that, um, I put the beeper on, so I was really
startled. Um…
Shirley is describing a fairly specific moment—the time of being scared/startled by the beep.
Although this description was aimed at a specific moment (hence the two checkmarks in the
third row of Table 12; temporal incorrectness involves some temporal interview and one specific
moment), it is the wrong moment—the moment of interest to DES is before the beep, but the
moment of the startle must be after the beep (hence the X for the criteria of aiming at the
moment of the beep).
Failures of Cleaving to the Moment: Conclusions. DES is interested in only one
temporal moment, usually called “the moment of the beep,” and sometimes metaphorically
called “the millisecond right before the beep,” the “moment caught in flight by the beep,” the
“last undisturbed moment before the beep,” or the moment “interrupted by the onset of the
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beep.” Inner experience is (by definition) private, so we cannot observe directly whether a
moment being described actually occurred at this target moment. However, if a description is
temporally indeterminate (not about any particular time at all), it cannot possibly be about the
moment of the beep. If a description of temporally imprecise (about a long period of time or
about any of several moments), it cannot possibly be about the moment of the beep. If a
description of temporally incorrect (about a particular moment but that moment is not possibly
the moment of the beep—for example, is after the beep), it, too, cannot possibly be about the
moment of the beep. The takeaway: reports that are temporally indeterminate, imprecise, or
incorrect have no possibility of describing DES’s moment of interest. However, if a description
appears to be temporally precise (i.e., describes a moment) and appears to be about the moment
of the beep, then it could possibly be about the moment of the beep. We could speculate that it is
likely that the described moment is indeed the moment of the beep, but we cannot be certain of
that conclusion. Perhaps the person is referring to a precise moment, but that moment is (say)
exactly 10 s before the beep.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: Failures of Cleaving to Directly Apprehended
Experience. We have discussed temporal specificity; we turn now to experiential specificity.
When asked the “one legitimate” DES question (“What, if anything, was in your experience at
the moment of the beep?”), we observed that participants in their very-first-sample interview
often provided reports that may appear to be descriptions of phenomena but in reality are not
such descriptions, instead being either ersatz descriptions or faux generalizations. Table 13
provides an overview of these descriptive shortcomings.
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Table 13
Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience and Failures to do so
Item

Brief Description

Example

Ersatz descriptions

Talk that (a) does not appear to be about
experience and (b) is not descriptive of
directly-apprehended-at-a-moment experience.

“I was taking a psychology test
online.”

Faux generalizations

Talk that (a) does appear to be about
experience but (b) is not actually descriptive of
directly-apprehended-at-a-moment experience.

“I always talk to myself when I
think.”

Descriptions

Talk that (a) does appear to be about
experience and (b) actually is descriptive of
directly-apprehended-at-a-moment experience.

“I was seeing three rectangles of
color; orange, orange, and then
blue.”

Ersatz Descriptions. “Ersatz” is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “being a
usually artificial and inferior substitute or imitation.” Within the context of DES, an ersatz
description is something that a participant says that in no way describes directly apprehended
experience. Ersatz descriptions are substitutes for describing experience; they are references
about things such as context, past behavior, and other non-experiential things (instead of
describing directly apprehended phenomena).
Here is an example of an ersatz description from Emma’s very-first-sample interview:
E4a: Yesterday, I turned it on at about five-ish and it went off at about 5:28, [RTH: Okay]
so it hadn’t been on that long.
This entire excerpt is an ersatz description—Emma is talking about context rather than
describing inner experience.
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Here is another example of an ersatz description from Kayla’s very-first-sample
interview:
K2a: Um... like… when it went off, uh, my mom and I were making, like, uh, tuna
sandwiches, so I really just put the toast—the bread to toast and then she did everything
else.
Kayla’s talk here is either about context or behavior. Nothing was descriptive of inner
experience.
Faux Generalizations. Faux generalizations have previously been described as
statements that appear to sound like statements of one’s in-general experience but are “faux,
rather than true, generalities, [because they are] based on heuristics such as recency or salience
rather than on inductive process” (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006, pp. 277-278). Thus, faux
generalizations are, by definition, examples of failure to cleave to experience because a faux
generalization is an utterance that sounds like a characterization of experience but in actuality is
a general statement unconstrained to describing a particular experience. Here is example from
Emma’s very-first-sample interview:
E4a: ... I was thinking—I also notice I have inner conversations with myself. [Chuckles
and smiles] Um... sometimes, like, just talking to myself sometimes [I] envision I’m
talking to somebody else.
“I have inner conversations with myself” is a generalization about experience. It is a faux
generalization because it is not based on an actually observed series of observations (that is, it is
not of the form “I have randomly sampled myself before and discovered that 39% of my inner
experiences involve inner conversations”).
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Failures of Cleaving to Directly Apprehended Experience: Conclusions. The
phenomena of interest in DES are deceptively simple: phenomena that presents itself directly,
unambiguously, and “before the footlights of consciousness” (James, 1890) to a particular
individual at a particular moment in time. However, we emphasize the use of the word
“deceptively,” as it can often be challenging (but necessary) to distinguish between description
of phenomena and ersatz descriptions and faux generalizations. Ersatz descriptions and faux
generalizations are challenging because they—in a manner of speaking—are descriptive of
something, but they do not describe directly apprehended experience.
The Very-First-Sample Interview: PNA Subjunctifiers. Given the frequent difficulties
participants encountered in cleaving to a moment and cleaving to experience, PNA subjunctifiers
comprised nearly all subjunctifiers in very-first-sample interviews. Few (if any) conversational
turns across all participants were consistent with describing experience-at-a-moment, and so,
both by definition and by analyzing the subjunctifiers’ function, few DFS subjunctifiers were
present in very-first-sample interviews because no phenomena were described.
The Very-First-Sample Interview Conclusions: A Summary of First-Day Interview
Qualitative Characteristics. Figure 3 provides a summary of the qualitative characteristics
observed in the very-first-sample interviews; it also provides an interpretation of each
characteristic’s significance from the perspective of the DES task. We note that these findings
are an averaged set of characteristics that emerged across considering all participants within this
study. As such, Figure 3 merely represents an in-general characterization of a typical participant
on a typical very-first-sample DES interview.
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Figure 3
Very-First-Sample Expositional Interview Qualitative Characteristics
Characteristics

Implications

Failure To Cleave to the Moment of
the Beep
• Temporal Indeterminacy
• Temporal Imprecision
• Temporal Incorrectness

Failure to grasp the specific
moment of interest.

Failure to Cleave to Directly
Apprehended Experience
• Ersatz Descriptions
• Faux Generalizations

Failure to make clear
distinction between directly
apprehended phenomena from
all else.

PNA Subjunctifiers
• Not following sampling procedures
• Hedges
• Verbs in the subjunctive mood
• Explicit expressions of ignorance
• Undermining expressions
• Casual inferences
• Intentional expressions
• Softening expressions

Signals a failure to describe
directly apprehended
experience present at the
moment of the beep.

Note. PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended.

There were two consequential characteristics that were present across all participants.
First, all very-first-sample interviews displayed some failure(s) to cleave to a specific moment.
At best, participants constrained their report to a relatively specific period of time near the beep
sounding (see participant Macy) but did not unambiguously describe the moment of the beep. At
worst, participants did not follow the procedure for DES sampling and, in so doing, destroyed
any possibility of apprehending a moment or experience (see participant Emma). Second, all
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participants used a large number of PNA subjunctifiers throughout their very-first-sample
interviews. This resulted in low fidelity descriptions (or general characterizations that had no
descriptive fidelity whatsoever) across all very-first-sample interviews.
In summary, participants during their very-first-sample interviews did not cleave to any
particular moment, and therefore could not be understood to be cleaving to the moment of the
beep. Because inner experience inheres in moments, it was therefore not possible for participants
to be describing experience at the moment of the beep.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Did Participants Improve?
We found that all participants’ very-last-sample interviews were consistent with
describing phenomena apprehended at-a-moment. This was due in large part to simultaneous and
interconnected improvements observed in participants’ cleaving to a moment and cleaving to
experience, leading to participants’ overall improvement in cleaving to experience-at-themoment-of-the-beep; moreover, subjunctifiers were also significantly less dense across very-lastsample interviews in comparison to the very-first-sample interviews. Those subjunctifiers that
remained signaled that the phenomenon had been adequately apprehended but the descriptions
were not adequate—that is, descriptions now used DFS subjunctifiers rather than PNA
subjunctifiers.
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: Improvements in Cleaving to Experience-At-TheMoment-of-the-Beep. Table 14 compares the initial conversational turn spoken by participants
during their very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews; it also includes the top-line
annotation relevant to each aspect of DES skill in bold text face, reprinted from each
participant’s annotated transcript. There is a clear and compelling trend across sampling days.

226

All initial very-first-sample interview turns failed to cleave to the moment of the beep.
Although some participants may have described some aspect of possible experience (such as
Shirley, Jake, and Macy), the universal lack of precision about cleaving to the moment of the
beep drastically lowered the likelihood that participants were describing experience with fidelity
(they, instead, likely reported on heuristics, inferences, or presuppositions). Moreover, all veryfirst-sample interviews involved PNA subjunctifiers. The bottom line: participants were
undeniably bad at the DES task during their very-first-sample interview; all participants failed to
unambiguously cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep.
By contrast, all initial very-last-sample interview turns were not undeniably bad at the
DES task during their very-last-sample interview; their reports were generally consistent with
describing experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. No initial very-last-sample interview turn
unambiguously failed to cleave to a moment; in reality, most participants appeared to describe
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep. No initial very-last-sample interview turn
unambiguously failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience; in reality, most participants
appeared to constrain their description to phenomena. No initial very-last-sample interview
included (exclusively or primarily) PNA subjunctifiers; in reality, where subjunctifiers were
used, they were DFS subjunctifiers that were aimed at modifying descriptions of directly
apprehended experience.
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Table 14
Comparing the Initial Conversational Turns Spoken by Participants During Their Very-FirstSample and Very-Last-Sample Interviews
Participant
(Study)

Amelia
(Methodological)

Very-First-Sample Interview

Very-Last-Sample Interview

A1a: Actually, my first beep I was like, I
dunno, I was thinking of why the beeper
didn’t go off [laughs]. So the whole time I
was just wondering… when it would beep
because it took like, maybe about an hour
before it beeped? So I thought, like,
maybe I should call you… text you…
like, there was some kind of problem…
and then it just beeped. And I knew it
worked. And that was it. [laughs] It was a
simple one.

A1b: The next one… I was looking at the
emails on my phone; I could feel the
phone in my left hand, but I could also
feel, like, the dryness of my eyes. No
thoughts or feelings. But I could see the
border around my phone, and the different
emails I received, but no… actual words.
Just, like, colors.

Moment? No.
Experience? No.
Subjunctifiers? High density of PNA
subjunctifiers.

Moment? Likely.
Experience? Likely.
Subjunctifiers? Low density of
indeterminate and DFS
subjunctifiers

S4a: I didn’t know what was—I forgot
that, um, I put the beeper on, so I was
really startled. Um…

S2b: Number six… um… So, right before
the beep, I was think—I was mentally
doing math. Of… a hundred times...
[laughs] a hundred times one, in my head.
Which is one hundred. But [laughs], at
that beep, um, it was… a mental thing of...
multiplying that hundred times one.
And… that feeling of, like, I know the
answer is a hundred. Is there..

Moment? No.
Experience? Not likely.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate
subjunctification density, all of
which were PNA
subjunctifiers.

Moment? Likely.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate
subjunctification density; all
were DFS subjunctifiers

Shirley
(Methodological)
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Kayla
(Methodological)

Jake
(Psychotherapy)

K2a: All right. Uh, so... I was, like, I
wasn’t really feeling anything too much…
like, you know. Um... like… when it went
off, uh, my mom and I were making, like,
uh, tuna sandwiches, so I really just put
the toast—the bread to toast and then she
did everything else. [Laughs] But um…
yeah… uh... I was, I was, like, I guess I
felt—like, physically I felt tired. Like,
uh… I’ve been up since like 5:30 in the
morning, um... and I did some exercises in
the, in the gym that morning as well... and
I had a long day. [Laughs] So I have three
classes… um, and… my... I had a
midterm in one of the classes, so that
didn’t help. [LLC: Yeah] So yeah.

K2b: So six, um… I, I decided to do
neither of those things and, um, uh—I
decided to, like, uh, um… ‘cause I, I play
piano, like, sometimes. So, I, I have a
keyboard in my room and, um… so, I was
reading the sheet music on that. Uh, I, I
think I printed it out, like, a few days ago,
and I was reading, uh… um… I think it
was the third or fourth measure. Um…
and I was specifically focused on, like, the
left hand, like, trying to figure out, like,
how it should sound and like, how to play,
how to exactly play it. ‘Cause, like, in that
specific measure the right hand and the
left hand kind of… kind of are jumbled
together. [Laughs] So I was trying to
figure out how I would exactly play that.

Moment? No.
Experience? No.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were
PNA subjunctifiers.

Moment? Maybe.
Experience? Maybe.
Subjunctifiers? High density, both PNA
and DFS subjunctifiers
present.

J2a: So, I had it [looks at his notes]—uh,
12:57, I don’t know if the time matters too
much. Um… so the the first time, uh, it
beeped, I was actually driving—the
person, a friend of mine, said, “okay, I
need to... I need to park the car to get my
experiences.” Um… I was actually
thinking, like, immediately, “what is it
that I am—that I just experienced?” Um, I
was listening to... a song… um, just
before. And, in my head, um... the chorus
was playing. Um, I was thinking about,
uh… I was trying to, like, process the fact
that, um… what was that beep for again?
It was for the study. So, I was thinking
about—so um, when I, when I describe
my inner experiences, am I supposed to
describe like, what happens during the
beep, or occurring right before or is there
like a certain time frame that I should
focus on? Because that, that was the thing
that actually was coming to mind like, it’s
like wait, I actually didn’t clarify that this
beep occurred, was, was I supposed to
like—okay, that’s what I just, like, was
my inner experience, or, is it what I’m
doing, like, right now or should I start,
like, monitoring that? So, actually, that’s
kind of an actual question, too, so...

J2b: [Looks downward at notes] Okay,
number five. Okay, so, we had the food to
go and we were walking out of the
restaurant. And, um… and—[laughs] this
one is, uh, kinda funny, but, uh, I was
trying to think of a different topic to
distract slash avoid thinking about, um,
the idea of, uh… trypophobia, um, which
is the, the fear of, of pores. Um, and in the
restaurant I was talking about—with my
little brother—like, I just have kinda this
aversion to, like, like, pores in the skin,
right? And we had, um… like, been
talking about it and I was just getting
kinda like, like iffy about the whole
concept and we had looked up a picture
and I had the picture etched into my mind
and, um… and I was like, “okay, we,
we—you know—let’s just think about
something else.” And, um… and… I
remember trying to think of, like, “what’s,
what’s a different topic other than, you
know, this one that seems to be, like,
forcing itself into my mind?” um, when,
when it had beeped. So…
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Macy
(Psychotherapy)

Emma
(Psychotherapy)

Moment? No.
Experience? Ambiguous.
Subjunctifiers? High density, nearly all
were PNA subjunctifiers.

Moment? Nonspecific.
Experience? Nonspecific.
Subjunctifiers? Both PNA and DFS
subjunctifiers were present.

M2a: Um, I was really worried that I did it
wrong, [laughs] [SAM: Okay] um, just
because I hadn’t—I had turned it on, and
hadn’t received a beep yet. Um… so,
that’s actually when I had texted you,
saying, “I haven’t gotten it,” something
like that. Um… and I was just—I was
worried, um… that I was doing it wrong.

M2b: Um, the last one—I was, um, laying
down and, uh… cat had come and laid
down with me, and my thought at the
moment of the beep was, um, there was:
“My cat is so cute!” [M laughs] And,
um… seeing her mental image of, like,
her… smiling? Like, closed eyes, smiling.
Um, in my head. At the same time.

Moment? No.
Experience? Possibly.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate
subjunctification density; most
were PNA subjunctifiers.

Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were
DFS subjunctifiers.

E4a: Yesterday, I turned it on at about fiveish and it went off at about 5:28. [RTH:
Okay] so it hadn’t been on that long. Um,
I was cooking dinner, um… and then I
was thinking—I also notice I have inner
conversations with myself. [Chuckles and
smiles] Um... sometimes, like, just talking
to myself sometimes I’m envision I’m
talking to somebody else. And, I
envision—'cause I’m probably gonna go
get my x-ray done today for my ankle, and
I was, like, thinking of what it would be
like to talk to the person, like, explaining
well, like, why I wear the big brace while
I’m here on campus and why I wear a
little brace at home. And thinking about
that ‘cause I’m scared of falling here on
campus. [RTH: Okay] When I walk.

E2b: [looking at notes] I was, uh, feeling
chest... chest pain.

Moment? Mostly no.
Experience? Mostly no.
Subjunctifiers? High density, nearly all
were PNA subjunctifiers.

Moment? Probably.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? All were DFS
subjunctifiers.

Note. PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; DFS = Description-falling-short.
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Improvements in Cleaving to Experience-At-The-Moment-of-the-Beep: Conclusions.
Table 14 focuses on only two brief excerpts from much longer interviews for each participant—a
few seconds at the beginning of each interview. We note that one conversational turn is not
wholly illustrative of an entire interview (and thus encourage the reader to refer to each
participant’s annotated transcripts and their individual results and discussion section for an indepth analysis). However, the fact that such stark differences emerge despite considering just a
single turn is evidence of the degree of difference observed between the very-first and very-last
interview days. Even if participants did not display “perfection” in their ability to cleave to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, we see that all participants improved when comparing
their very-last-sample interview to their very-first-sample interview.
The bottom line: there are significant and evident differences between the very-firstsample and very-last-sample interviews. Whereas participants’ very-first-sample interviews had
a low possibly of describing experience with fidelity (because of failures cleaving to any moment
and failures cleaving to experience), it is possible that participants’ very-last-sample interviews
involved high-fidelity descriptions of experience (because of improvement in cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep).
The Very-Last-Sample Interview: DFS Subjunctifiers. Given the observed
improvements in participants’ ability to provide descriptions that were consistent with cleaving
to experience-at-a-moment, DFS subjunctifiers comprised nearly all subjunctifiers in very-lastsample interviews. Most conversational turns across all participants were consistent with
describing experience-at-a-moment, and so, both by definition and by analyzing the
subjunctifers’ function, where subjunctifiers occurred on the very-last-sample interviews, they
were all of the DFS type.
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The Very-Last-Sample Interview Conclusions: A Summary of Very-Last-Sample
Interview Characteristics. Figure 4 provides a summary of the notable characteristics observed
in this study’s very-last-sample interviews and an interpretation of each characteristic’s
significance from the perspective of the DES task.

Figure 4
Very-Last-Sample Expositional Interview Qualitative Characteristics
Characteristics

(Improved) Cleaving to the Moment
of the Beep

Implications

(Improvement in) the
apprehension and
description of directly
apprehended experience
present at the moment of the
beep

(Improved) Cleaving to Directly
Apprehended Experience

DFS Subjunctifiers

Signal the participant is refining
descriptions that describe
directly apprehended experience
present at the moment of the
beep.

Note. DFS = Description-falling-short.
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There were three consequential characteristics that were present across all participants’
very-last-sample interviews. First, participants in all very-last-sample interviews were able to
talk in ways that were consistent with describing a moment (that is, their reports were
constrained to describing a specific moment and avoided talk about periods of time or talk that
referred to no particular moment). Second, participants in all very-last-sample interviews were
able to talk in ways that were consistent with describing experiential phenomena (that is, their
reports were constrained to describing things that could be directly apprehended and avoided talk
about presuppositions, general characterizations, statements-of-reality, reports about behavior,
and so on). Third, to the extent that participants used subjunctifiers during their very-last-sample
interviews, those subjunctifiers were mostly of the DFS type, signaling the participant’s active
engagement with the DES task—to describe directly apprehended experience with fidelity (that
is, the DFS subjunctifiers were aimed at finding the words to describe the experience; the
experience always remained clear and was never itself undermined).
In sum, the talk of participants during their very-last-sample interviews was consonant
with the task of describing experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep with fidelity.
Overall Results: Comparing Quantitative and Qualitative Changes Between the Very-FirstSample and Very-Last-Sample Interviews
Figure 5 presents an overall comparison of the qualitative and quantitative changes
observed between the very-first-sample and very-last-sample interviews.
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Figure 5
Comparing Very-First-Sample and Very-Last-Sample Expositional Interview Characteristics

Note. Subjunt. = Subjunctification; PNA = Phenomena-not-apprehended; DFS = Description-falling-short; EMB =
Experience at the moment of the beep.

At the start of their participation in sampling, naïve participants universally failed to
cleave to any moment, and because experience inheres in moments, it was not possible that they
cleaved to directly apprehended experience. These failures were also reflected in the quantitative
measures: participants’ talk during very-first-sample interviews generally involved high total
subjunctification and PNA subjunctification densities, low DFS subjunctification density, and
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low EMB ratings. Taken together, all these characteristics signaled that naïve participants have
difficulty apprehending and describing a specific moment and specific experience.
By the end of their participation in sampling, participants universally showed substantial
improvement in cleaving to experience-at-a-moment: each participant’s talk became more
consistent with successfully cleaving to a specific moment and cleaving to directly apprehended
experience. These improvements were also reflected in the quantitative measures of participant’s
abilities: participants’ talk during the very-last-sample interviews generally involved low total
and PNA subjunctification densities, high DFS subjunctification density, and high EMB ratings.
Taken together, all these characteristics signaled that participants had acquired substantial skill in
apprehending and describing a specific moment and specific experience. While this study does
not itself provide evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the described experience-at-amoment faithfully reflected experience that was actually present at the moment of the beep.

235

Chapter 14: Overall Discussion
DES is built on the recognition that pristine inner experience inheres in moments, and
therefore describing inner experience with fidelity requires participants to cleave to a specific
moment (the target is the moment of the beep) and to cleave to experience (the target is whatever
phenomena had been directly apprehended as present at the moment of the beep). Anything short
of grasping experience-apprehended-as-ongoing-at-the-moment-of-the-beep would fall well
short of DES’ goal.
DES claims that most people, at the start of sampling, are unskilled at cleaving to
experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep, so DES uses first-day interviews as training for future
sampling days and discards first-day samples from data analysis (because of the low possibility
that they describe experience with fidelity). Moreover, DES claims that most participants
improve over time: that participants after each round of sampling-and-interviewing are better
able to cleave to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep than they were on the previous round. In
particular, DES claims that this iterative training (the successive rounds of collecting new
samples, engaging in the joint attempt at describing experience with investigators) causes
participants’ improvement. However, none of those claims have been studied adequately.
The present study investigated changes in participants’ ability to cleave to experience-ata-moment from the beginning to the end of their DES sampling. We examined the first-day and
last-day interviews of six participants. By comparing their very-first-sample interview to their
very-last-sample interview, we found that across all quantitative and qualitative measures,
participants showed improvement in their ability to provide descriptions of experience-at-amoment.
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These findings support DES’ long-held-but-not-formally-investigated claim that naïve
participants struggle with engaging in DES during the early rounds of their DES participation.
Our participants’ very-first-sample interviews often involved temporal indeterminacy and
imprecision, as predicted by the unsystematic observations of Hurlburt (2011), who claimed
participants often failed to constrain their reports to a specific moment. Our participants’ veryfirst-sample interviews also often failed to cleave to directly apprehended experience (and
instead involved talk about things such as context or faux generalizations), as predicted by the
unsystematic observations of Hurlburt (2009) and Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007). Taken
together, these findings support the typical DES practice of discarding first-day interview
samples from DES data analysis.
Our results also provide evidence supporting the notion that participants’ skill improves
across sampling, conceptually replicating Brouwers (2016), who found that ratings of
participants’ “access to experience” were significantly higher for video clips drawn from
participants’ last-day sample interview compared to clips drawn from first-day interviews. The
current study expanded on Brouwers (2016) by considering change both within- and acrossparticipants. Brouwers had shown that, in general, last-day utterances were less subjunctified
than first-day utterances. We showed that, on average, a participant’s own very-last-sample talk
was less subjunctified than that same participant’s very-first-sample talk. We found that whereas
participants’ talk in their very-first-sample interview displayed varying levels of temporal and
phenomenological specificity, participants’ talk in their very-last-sample-interview was much
more constrained to describing a specific moment and directly apprehended experience.
Brouwers (2016) found no significant changes in ratings of subjunctification between
first-day and last-day interviews. In contrast, we found that total subjunctification density
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significantly decreased from first-day to last-day interviews. Brouwers’ subjunctification rating
method used relatively unskilled raters, whereas the present study used skilled raters.
Furthermore, Brouwers’ study was aimed at brief video clips, where the context of each had been
removed. The present study, by keeping the entire very-first-sample and very-last-sample
interviews, kept the context of each utterance intact.
Furthermore, the present study suggests that total subjunctification density itself may be
of less importance in signaling fidelity than is attending to the type of subjunctifier used (e.g.,
PNA vs. DFS subjunctifiers). Even in those participants who’s total subjunctification density did
not significantly change between interviews, the type of subjunctifiers used in each respective
interview changed in substantial and usually significant ways. As a result, our results suggest that
DES investigators, instead of following the principle that lower subjunctification density
suggests higher fidelity (Hurlburt, 2011), should follow the principle that lower PNA
subjunctification density suggests higher fidelity.
In sum, we found that participants improve in cleaving to experience-at-a-moment.
Because inner experience is private, there is no guarantee that the moment to which participants
cleave is the moment “a microsecond before” beep onset. It is likely, for example, that
“mentally reacting” to the beep requires X milliseconds, so the moment being described is
actually X milliseconds after the beep’s physical onset. There is reason to believe from other
observations that for most participants, this is a very small offset. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that the experience to which participants cleave is the experience that was actually
ongoing at the moment of beep onset. It is likely, for example, that responding to the beep
distorts ongoing inner experience to some degree, or perhaps even creates inner experience
where there was none originally. At the present state of the art, these possibilities cannot be ruled
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out, although it is possible that with future substantial advances in techniques such as fMRI,
science might be able to investigate the time course of experiential characteristics. At present, it
seems likely that participants’ improvement in cleaving to experience-at-a-moment was actually
an improvement of the fidelity of their description of experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep—
they had acquired, across sampling, a better grasp of what constituted a moment and what
constituted experience and had practiced responding to the beep, and therefore it seems likely
that they did indeed describe whatever had been in their experience at the last, undisturbed
moment prior to beep onset.
This study found improvement when comparing the very-first-sample to the very-lastsample, but it did not investigate when that improvement occurred. Perhaps one sampling day of
training accounted for most of the effect; perhaps the improvement was acquired gradually
across the sampling days. Further research would be required to quantify that.
Furthermore, this study did not examine whether it was the iterative training itself that
was responsible for participants’ change in skill. Iterative training certainly did not hurt
participants’ ability, because all participants were substantially better by the end of their
participation in DES sampling than at the beginning, so at the very least, iterative training had no
harmful effects. Iterative training is designed to facilitate participants’ improvement, but it is
possible that some other, unknown variable actually better explains the changes that were
observed in participants.
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Chapter 15: Broader Implications
Although the focus of this study was narrow in scope, the implications of this study have
broader ramifications. If science is to create a robust science of inner experience, investigators
must think carefully about the methods used to apprehend and describe inner experience and how
such methods may help participants improve their cleaving to experience-at-particular-moments.
What is clear from this study is that, despite the ostensibly straightforward task of apprehending
and describing one’s inner experience, doing so is far from easy for most people to do without
some form of (probably iterative) training.
First, our findings demonstrate that anything short of cleaving to a specific moment
implies that there is very little (arguably zero) possibility of grasping experience with fidelity.
This high degree of temporal specificity is a function of the constraints imposed by the nature of
inner experience. Because inner experience is ever-changing moment-to-moment, an adequate
method must be clear about what moment is of interest and under consideration while avoiding
all else. Moreover, because pre-selected moments of inner experience (whether that moment
is/was pre-selected by the participant or the investigator) may not match everyday inner
experience, the moment of interest should be a random moment to allow for the study of pristine
inner experience (as opposed to artificial, contrived, or personally alluring inner experience).
DES attempts to mitigate this hazard by using the random beeper to have participants cleave to
the last, undisturbed moment just before beep onset, but this is simply one possibility. Other
methods that seek to study inner experience must consider how to identify a random-but-specific
moment.
Second, our findings demonstrate that anything short of cleaving to directly apprehended
experience implies there is very little (arguably zero) possibility of grasping experience with

240

fidelity. This high degree of phenomenological specificity is a function of the constraints
imposed by the nature of inner experience. Because directly apprehended experience is the only
phenomena that can be reasonably introspected-and-reported-on, an adequate method must be
clear about cleaving-to-phenomena while avoiding all else. DES attempts to mitigate this hazard
by doing just that: DES focuses solely on describing directly apprehended phenomena and doing
whatever can reasonably be done to achieve that goal (as evidenced by its use of, for example,
interviews with multiple investigators to disentangle non-phenomenal talk from descriptions of
experience; its constant practice of the bracketing of presuppositions to confront the unconscious
assumptions that my distort the high-fidelity apprehension of experience, and so on). However,
the ways by which DES attempts to cleave to experience is simply one possibility. Other
methods that seek to study inner experience must consider how to cleave to directly apprehended
experience.
Third, our findings demonstrate the essential importance of training (likely iterative in
nature) to make possible high-fidelity descriptions of experience. Most first-person and
introspection studies recognize the importance of participant training and include instructions
and tutorials prior to collecting data. For instance, nearly all introspective methods described in
Chapter 2 (the experience sampling method (ESM), ecological momentary assessment (EMA),
the think-aloud method (TA), articulated thoughts during simulated situations (ATSS), and the
micro-phenomenological interview method) include some pre-study training. One specific
example is Janssens et al.’ (2021) ESM study, in which the authors provided all participants with
didactic instructions, a guided demo of the full ESM task, and the ability to ask questions of
investigators prior to engaging in ESM sampling. Although this type of training may provide
participants important context to the task ahead of them, the observed difficulties across all very-
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first-sample DES interviews despite similar pre-sampling training in DES (in addition to
numerous other instances of re-stating DES’ instructions and aims within the very-first-sample
interview and despite numerous, open-beginninged invitations for participants to describe their
experience) clearly demonstrate the insufficiencies of prior-to-sampling training. We suspect that
no amount of prior-to-sampling information, definitions, or clarifications from investigators are
able to improve the fidelity of participant’s cleaving alone.
Moreover, we contend that repeated data collection (without intercalated iterative
training) may not improve apprehension or description skill—in fact, it may make such skills
worse because participants (and their reports of experience) are never challenged. Iterative
training involves successive improvement in apprehending and describing experience, and as we
have seen, this only comes from the continuous practice of having a participant collect new
samples of experience, attempt to describe those experiences, have constructive conversations
with investigators that collaborate with the participant to guide the discussion back to
experience-at-a-moment, have the participant recognize their shortcomings, and so on, so that
they may ultimately be better equipped to apprehend and describe their experience upon their
next sampling. Procedures that simply repeat data collection—whether through the
administration of self-report questionnaires or interviews—do not allow for the dynamic
processes described in DES’ iterative training. Although other forms of iterative training may be
possible, the takeaway is that some form of iterative training is necessary to describe experience
with fidelity. Other methods that seek to study inner experience must consider how to implement
some form of iterative training for their participants.
Future Directions
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Our findings showed that people are able to improve their ability to provide descriptions
with iterative training, which optimistically suggests the possibility of developing a science of
inner experience. Our studies suggest that one-shot or otherwise ineffectively trained methods of
inquiring about inner experience are inadequate, but can be improved.
We have seen that even though inner experience is transient and evanescent, training can
allow it to be investigated as long as the training is temporally specific. We have seen that even
though talk that is supposed to be about inner experience typically (at first) involves many things
(e.g., presuppositions, self-theories, behavior, context, etc.) other than experience, training might
allow experience to be investigated as long as the training restricts our consideration to directly
apprehendable phenomena while avoiding all other talk. Adhering to both cleave-to-the-moment
and cleave-to-experience constraints 17 does not guarantee success, nor does it address certain
insurmountable pitfalls 18. However, both constraints—if achieved—represent substantial
improvements to the possibility of studying inner experience with fidelity. This study provided
many examples of descriptions that work within these constraints—participant’s very-lastsample interviews were largely consonant with descriptions of experience-at-the-moment-of-thebeep.

17

There are over 100 more constraints that could be discussed (see Hulrburt, 2011), but we have restricted our
discussion here to the most relevant components of DES that formed the main thrust of the current study.
18
Such as the fact that we cannot—at the current state-of-the-art—make claims about the accuracy of self-report due
to the private nature of inner experience.
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Chapter 16: Limitations
This chapter discusses some methodological considerations regarding our study design,
the materials used in this study, and the components of the procedure that are necessary to better
understand this study’s results.
Small Sample Size
Our sample size was very small. Thus, any group-level conclusions must be interpreted
with caution. However, we note that the six participants considered in this study is consistent
with recommendations for the sample sizes of idiographic qualitative research studies (Robinson,
2014). Moreover, our use of the Wundtian method of generating nomothetic conclusions if and
only if such conclusions were true across all participants provides a very promising initial (but
tentative) bedrock for future investigation.
Imperfection of EMB Ratings
EMB ratings are inherently limited and should not be interpreted as being the determinant
indicator of a participant’s skill. Because EMB ratings are our attempts at generating a
unidimensional numerical value for a multidimensional, non-numerical process (the extent to
which a particular conversational turn describes experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep), EMB
ratings are inherently “squishy.” For example, EMB ratings can be affected by the context in
which a rater provides their ratings: Rating an interview when one is blind to its ending versus
rating an interview after one has viewed it many times over can affect a rater’s understanding of
the degree to which a participant may be cleaving to experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep (see
participant Kayla and Macy for examples). In other instances, EMB ratings can be affected by
the context of the interview itself: Participants’ utterances are often nuanced and resist black-
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and-white categorization (e.g., that what they are saying demonstrates cleaving vs. failure to
cleave); an interviewer’s question may be misleading; and so on.
While acknowledging the squishy nature of the EMB ratings, we see them as no worse
than coding systems in other studies that provide quantification of some complex and perhaps illdefined constructs. Moreover, we believe there are two counterarguments that are important
safeguards to mitigate the limitations of the EMB rating system and how it was applied in this
study.
First, there were multiple procedural steps we implemented to control for the flaws of the
EMB ratings: we (a) used multiple raters to provide (b) independent ratings for each interview;
once both raters completed this task, we (c) met to collaboratively review each rated turn of the
interview, with (d) the goal of arriving at ratings that captured best a participant’s skill and not
for the sake of consensus (this is similar to the process of how DES arrives at generating
categorical codes for a participant’s salient characteristics; see Krumm, 2019 for an example).
Second, we fully recognize the limits of EMB ratings and do not advocate for its widespread use
as the primary means of interpreting the quality and/or skillfulness of DES participants. We fully
acknowledge that EMB ratings alone do not and cannot possibly capture the complexity inherent
in assessing skill within a DES context. However, we do think that EMB ratings when used as
one small data point amidst an array of other data points (as we have done in this study) may be
helpful in assessing a participant’s general ability to engage in the DES task.
EMB Ratings are Arbitrary
The EMB ratings of Emma’s very-first-sample (Chapter 12) provide an illustrative
example of the arbitrary nature of EMB ratings; in doing so, it also highlights the benefit of using
both quantitative and qualitative analysis in assessing participant’s cleaving. As was discussed in
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Chapter 12, only five of the 16 conversational turns in Emma’s very-first-sample interview were
given EMB ratings since she failed to wear earphones while sampling, thus implying Emma
could not have performed the DES task (or at the very least, the task became very difficult). To
strike a balance between being too conservative (rating none of her turns) or too liberal (rating all
of her turns despite her not fully following the DES procedure), we rated only those turns of the
interview where the aim of the interview was to describe Emma’s experience at the moment of
her very-first-beep. Both raters mutually determined that the shift of the interview changed at the
conversational turn Emma disclosed that she did not wear earphones, after which the goal of the
interview shifted to provide iterative training to improve Emma’s ability to grasp and describe
her experience on her next sampling day.
Had we continued to provide EMB ratings, it is possible that Emma’s very-first-sample
average EMB ratings would have been, on average, higher or lower than what was reported.
Ultimately, however, we believe determining Emma’s very-first-sample EMB rating simply does
not much matter: although the numerical EMB rating may be debatable, it is not debatable that
Emma’s very-first-sample interview did not possibly describe a moment of experience. By
contrast, her very-last-sample interview did (at least possibly) describe a moment of experience.
Imperfection of Counting Subjunctifiers
Any count of subjunctifiers should be treated with some degree of skepticism, as the
counting of subjunctifiers is very rarely straightforward. Recall that subjunctifiers are defined as
“anything that gives a sign that a subject’s utterance is not to be confidently understood as a
straightforward description of momentary experience” (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 116). Given this
definition, it is often unclear as to how one should go about quantifying one subjunctifier from
another. For instance: does body language (e.g., shrugging and grimacing) count as separate
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subjunctifiers in addition to what a participant says? How does one count long pauses in a
participant’s speech (is it a single subjunctifier, or is it only a subjunctifier when it is preceded by
a spoken-aloud subjunctifier (e.g., “um”), or does it not count as a subjunctifier at all)? Does a
hedge such as “I feel like if I were to talk to myself” count as a single subjunctifier or two
subjunctifiers (“I feel like” and “if I were to talk to myself”)? There are no correct answers to
these questions, but it ultimately does not matter much. No matter how you count subjunctifiers,
what is apparent is that subjunctifiers exist and attending to them offers important insight into
whether or not we are meeting the DES task (describing a moment of experience with fidelity).
We explicitly acknowledge the imperfect nature of counting subjunctifiers. However, we
contend there are four counterarguments and important safeguards applied to this study’s
procedures to mitigate the limitations of subjunctifiers.
First, as this study demonstrated, the count of subjunctifiers is not necessarily the most
important characteristic of subjunctification—the nature of the subjunctification is at least as (or
more) important than the count. Second—similar to the strategies used to mitigate the limitations
of EMB ratings—we (a) used multiple raters to provide (b) independent ratings for each
interview in which both raters (c) met to collaboratively review all subjunctification counts of the
interview, with (d) the goal of arriving at a count that best captured a participant’s
subjunctification within the interview (and not for the sake of consensus). Third, the problematic
nature of counting subjunctifiers can be mitigated by attending to subjunctification density; this
is consonant with Hurlburt’s (2011) recommendations, and we did so in this study. Fourth, we
fully recognize the limits of subjunctifiers do not advocate for its widespread use as the primary
means of interpreting the quality and/or skillfulness of DES participants. We fully acknowledge
that attending to subjunctifiers and/or subjunctification density alone do not and cannot possibly
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capture the complexity inherent in assessing skill within a DES context. However, we do think
that attending to subjunctifiers when used as one small data point amidst an array of other data
points (as we have done so in this study) may be helpful in assessing a participant’s general
ability to engage in the DES task.
Raters Were Not Blind
Raters knew whether a videotape they were about to rate was of a very-first-sample or a
very-last-sample interview for a particular participant. Because expositional interviews involve
the discussion of multiple beeped samples of experience, it is impossible to mask the context
clues that make the sample interview status obvious. For example, very-first-sample interviews
often involved re-explaining the instruction and aims of the DES sampling procedure (thus
signaling the participant’s naivety), and very-last-sample interviews typically included some
reference to or discussion of a previous sample.
Conversational Turns are Arbitrary
Defining conversational turns informed many parts of this study’s procedure. For
example, a period where a participant spoke for 10 s, was interrupted by an interviewer followup question for 1.5 s, and where the participant continued speaking for another 8 s could be
considered a single conversational turn or could be broken up into three turns (participant,
interviewer, participant). The difference between these two organizations lead to different data:
the former results in one annotation and one EMB rating, while the latter results in two
annotations and two EMB ratings. To mitigate this limitation, we used similar strategies used to
control for the limitations of subjunctifiers and EMB ratings: once a transcript draft was created,
we (a) used multiple reviewers that (b) independent viewed the videotaped interviewers that (c)

248

met to collaboratively review interview transcript, with (d) the goal of arriving at a transcript that
best honored the flow of the interview.
Raters Evolve
As was discussed previously, there are significant difficulties and limitations regarding
EMB ratings. One of these is that the multiple-immersion nature of the research process
sometimes resulted in a rater arriving at the opinion that his earlier ratings were incorrect. For
example, in the process of writing Kayla’s results and discussion, rater CK returned to Kayla’s
videotaped interviews and re-rated four of the 16 conversational turns of the very-first-sample
interview and three of the 40 conversational turns of the very-last-sample interview. All of CK’s
re-rated turns for the very-first-sample day were lower than his original set of EMB ratings and
all of CK’s re-rated turns for the very-last-sample day were higher than his original set of EMB
ratings. That is, he now saw Kayla as making more improvement than he originally did.
Faced with such discrepant ratings, we presented results and analyses based on the raters’
original ratings. None of the re-ratings changed the main findings of this study. For example,
Table 15 reprints row 8 from Chapter 9’s Table 3 and then presents the results using CK’s reratings. The conclusions based on the two sets of ratings are identical.
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Table 15
Comparing Original and Re-Rated EMB Ratings for Kayla
Descriptive Statistics

Rater Reliability

Comparing Last vs. First

r

df

t

df

Very-firstsample

Very-lastsample

p

p

d

Average EMB
Original Ratinga

.52
(SD = .42)

6.31
(SD = 1.82)

.88

31

< .001

10.80

31

< .001

3.91

Average EMB ReRatedb

.29
(SD = .41)

6.46
(SD = 1.98)

.91

31

< .001

10.58

31

< .001

3.83

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep.
a

Average EMB ratings for all turns of the interview using CK and RTH’s original ratings.

b

Average EMB ratings for all turns of the interview using CK’s re-ratings and RTH’s original ratings.

Similarly, rater RTH returned to Macy’s videotaped interviews and re-rated nine of the
29 conversational turns of the very-first-sample interview. All of his re-rated turns were higher
than his original set of EMB ratings. That is, his new ratings showed less improvement for Macy.
As before, the results we have presented were from his original ratings. Table 16 reprints
row 8 from Chapter 11’s Table 5 and then presents the results using RTH’s re-ratings. The
conclusions based on the two sets of ratings are identical.

Table 16
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Comparing Original and Re-Rated EMB Ratings for Macy
Descriptive Statistics

Rater Reliability

Comparing Last vs. First

r

df

t

df

Very-firstsample

Very-lastsample

p

p

d

Average EMB
Rating Originala

5.18
(SD = 2.14)

8.00
(SD = 1.31)

.73

35

< .001

4.92

35

< .001

1.62

Average EMB
Rating Re-Ratedb

6.09
(SD = 1.66)

8.00
(SD = 1.31)

.65

35

< .001

3.92

35

< .001

1.29

Note. EMB = Experience at the moment of the beep.
a

Average EMB ratings for all turns of the interview using CK and RTH’s original ratings.

b

Average EMB ratings for all turns of the interview using CK’s original ratings and RTH’s re-ratings.

The Limitations of Total Subjunctification Density as a Metric of Fidelity
The lower total subjunctification density on very-last-sample interviews may be one sign
of improved descriptive fidelity on those interviews—this is consistent with Hurlburt’s (2011)
claim that subjunctification density may serve as a reasonable indicator of a description’s fidelity
(in that the lower the subjunctification density, the better the description). However, there are
three important limitations on the straightforward analysis of subjunctification density alone as a
measure of fidelity.
First, whether a description is of lower or higher fidelity is in and of itself a conjecture; in
reality, we do not and cannot know the accuracy of participant’s descriptions. Although a lower
total subjunctification density implies a more straightforward description of experience (because
it means the ratio of seconds spoken to subjunctifier is large: participants speak for longer
periods of time with minimal subjunctification), there may be other possible explanations. For
example, a participant’s utterances may feature lower total subjunctification density simply
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because they are lying to investigators, or because they did not apprehend anything in their
experience at the moment of the beep. The most we can definitively conclude is that the total
subjunctification density was lower at the end of DES sampling than at the beginning; explaining
why this change occurred involves speculation.
Second, considering only group-level analyses obscures (potentially important) trends of
individual participant’s subjunctification density. For example, some participants (such as
Emma) actually showed a non-significant increase in subjunctification density between
interviews. Thus, not all participants demonstrated significant decreases in total subjunctification
density. A more accurate conceptualization—and one that is, in fact, more consistent with the
idiographic nature of DES—is that individual participants on individual sample interviews will
differ in idiosyncratic ways in their subjunctification.
Third, total subjunctification density does not take into account the type of subjunctifier
that a participant uses. Because, as this study has demonstrated, the type of subjunctifier
dramatically impacts how a particular conversation turn and/or sample interview is understood,
this is a significant limitation of the use of subjunctification density alone in assessing the
fidelity of description.
Limits of Generalizing from the Very-First-Sample Interview to the First-Day Expositional
Interview
We acknowledged that we only considered the very-first-sample interview of
participant’s first-day interviews as part of this study. This limitation implies that any
overarching conclusions about first-day interviews should be interpreted with caution, as we did
not assess all first-day sample interviews. However, the very-first-sample interview may be
particularly well-suited to define “typical” first-day interview characteristics because the very-
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first-sample interview occurs without any prior intervention, training, or other mediation from
the investigators. In other words, it captures how a typical, naïve participant responds to the
prompt of, “what, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of the beep?” It is possible
that participants may improve the fidelity of their descriptions as the first-day sample interview
continues; however, we believe that that likelihood is small because the first interview revealed
that all participants failed in some fundamental way to apprehend any specific moment of
experience during their first-day of natural environment sampling. That is: participant’s veryfirst-sample interviews were of low fidelity not simply due to low interview skill but because
they failed to take notice of experience-at-the-moment-of-the-beep at the time the beep occurred.
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Appendix A
Very-First-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Amelia
A1a: Actually, my first beep I was like, I dunno, I was thinking of why the beeper didn’t go off
[laughs]. So the whole time I was just wondering… when it would beep because it took like,
maybe about an hour before it beeped? So I thought, like, maybe I should call you… text
you… like, there was some kind of problem… and then it just beeped. And I knew it worked.
And that was it. [laughs] It was a simple one.
Moment? No. “So the whole time” referred to an interval, rather than a specific
moment. Moreover, Amelia described events after the onset of the beep: “I knew it
worked” must occur after (i.e., in response to) the beep.
Experience? No. “I was thinking of why the beeper didn’t go off” and “So I thought...
maybe I should call you...” were two completely different reports—they could not have
been describing one experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density of PNA subjunctifiers. Because everything Amelia said
was not consistent with cleaving to experience-at-a-moment, the subjunctifiers were
not tied to any descriptions of phenomena, and thus were understood as an additional
sign that Amelia failed to apprehend experience-at-a-moment; for example, “I was like,
I dunno” was an explicit acknowledgement that proceeding talk should not be
understood straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 0
RTH2a: So shall I—shall I deal with the questions [incomprehensible, RTH and LLC talk over
each other to establish who will ask questions first]
RTH3a: So, so at the moment of the beep, and by this moment, it’s like—sometimes we
use…[uses clipboard visual aid] this is the deal: so, so this is time going this way and there’s
no beep, there’s no beep—you’re doing whatever it is that you’re gonna to do—and then the
beep happens right here, so it beeps here, and then you push the button, and the time keeps
marching on here. The time that we’re interested in is is right here, just very much just before
the beep occurs. And so, is it the case—is what you said that, “I was wondering about the
beep, should I call Leiszle,” whatever; I’m still wondering about the beep [A: Yeah], I’m still
wondering about the beep [A: Yeah, and then it stopped me.], and the beep catches me in
flight [A: Yeah], catches my wondering [A: Mhm] in flight.
A4a: Yeah.
RTH5a: Okay. And, so, uh… so what’s that wondering like for you? What d…
A6a: I was getting anxious because, I thought, like, maybe I handled the beeper too roughly
when I was in my car? And that I broke it.
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Moment? Indeterminate; it was possible that Amelia was referring to a discrete
moment, but she may have also been reporting on a general period of time or provided
a report that was unrelated to any moment.
Experience? Maybe. “I was getting anxious” may have been an initial attempt at
describing experience, but it may have been a general comment of context. “I thought...
I handled the beeper too roughly” may also have been an initial description of
experience, but it could have also been a generality.
Subjunctifiers? All were PNA subjunctifiers. “Because...” was a causal inference, and
“I thought, like, maybe...” de-particularized the report away from a specific experience.
All of these subjunctifiers led the report away from describing a particular experience.
EMB CK = 3
EMB RTH = 1
RTH7a: Okay. And, is that going on right, right at this particular moment right here? That I’m
won—I’m worried that I [A: Mhm], that I broke the beeper?
A8a: Yes. ‘Cause this was taking really long. ‘Cause I thought it was just, like, taking half an
hour, but that it would go all the way up to, like, an hour. [RTH: Right] Something like that.
Moment? Indeterminate.
Experience? Maybe, but not likely. Only “I thought...” may have possibly described
directly apprehended experience; everything else described an indeterminate mix of
possible context, content, and causal inferences.
Subjunctifiers? High density, nearly all were PNA subjunctifiers. “’Cause this was
taking really long” and “’Cause I thought...” were both causal inferences that were not
at all descriptive of experience. “Something like that” also implied that all of A8a may
have been an approximation of experience (that is: not to be taken as a straightforward
description).
EMB CK = 2
EMB RTH = 0
RTH9a: And that can happen. That’s—that’s what—that’s what random means. Sometimes
it’s long, sometimes it’s short. But what I’m—what I’m trying to get at is: were you interested,
worried about—whatever—anxious about… that I handled the beeper too roughly back here?
Sort of a 5 minutes before the beep? Or, were you wondering about, “did I handle the beeper
too roughly” right here, and the beeper caught that in flight; caught that in the act, so to speak.
A10a: I think right at that moment, I was thinking of whether I should text... Leslie or you guys.
Moment? Possibly; Amelia described experience that was consistent with experience
apprehended at-a-moment.

255

Experience? Possibly. “I was thinking of whether I should text... Leslie or you guys”
may have described directly apprehended phenomena (although “thinking” does not
describe how “whether I should text... Leslie or you guys” was present).
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. “I think” may have implied that what follows was an
approximation; however, it may also have merely implied a recollection.
EMB CK = 5
EMB RTH = 2
RTH11a: So the—so the deal is, it seems like “this is taking a long time, I’m wondering
whether I handled the beeper too roughly, should I text Leiszle” boom, beep [A: Mmm]. Right
then.
A12a: Yeah.
Moment? Maybe; however, note that RTH11a proposed a timeline to which Amelia
agreed to—Amelia herself did not generate a description.
Experience? Maybe, but again note that possible experience was proposed by RTH11a;
Amelia herself did not explicitly provide this description.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
RTH13a: So the moment that we’re interested in is the, “should I text Leiszle”… beep [A nods
affirmatively]. That that happens right here [A nods affirmatively]. And, so is that… so how
does that—so now we’re narrowing down into time, and I would say that this, this
conversation that we’re having right now, that narrow down the time? That’s always the
conversation that we have on the first sampling day. That’s… that’s—most people think that
we’re interested in sort of a long period of time, but we’re actually interested in just what was
going on here. So it’s: “should I text Leslie…” right here?
A14a: Yeah.
RTH15a: And how—and, and… how does that thought present itself to you?
A16a: Um… [looks quizzical] I’m not really sure.
Moment? Possibly. A14a appeared to refer to the same moment as in A10a.
Experience? No. Amelia explicitly stated she was unsure about what was directly
present to her at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctifiers? PNA subjunctification; Amelia explicitly expressed her failure to have
apprehended the phenomenon at the moment of the beep.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 0
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RTH17a: So, lemme give you some possibilities, and I’ve never met you, so I don’t actually
know what’s—what your experience is actually like. But it could be that you were saying to
yourself, quote “should I text Leslie,” unquote.
A18a: Yeah.
RTH19a: Or, it could be I see a picture of Leslie’s face and that somehow conveys, “should I
text her?” Or I see a picture of my phone, in my head; or I’m seeing my actual phone. There’s,
there’s lots of different things that could be construed as saying, well… this is… should I text
Leslie, which is really Leiszle, by the way.
LLC20a: [Laughs] Yeah. My name’s pronounced Leiszle, but it sounds like you thought I was
Leslie at the moment, so that’s why he keeps repeating it.
A21a: Hmm… I think it was more like the first one where it was just, like, repeating it in my
head, it’s like in the form of words.
Moment? Maybe. Amelia appeared to refer to the same moment as in previous turns.
Experience? Maybe, but not likely. “It was just, like, repeating it in my head, it’s like
in the form of words” may have described directly apprehended experience; however,
this description was proposed by RTH in RTH17a, not by Amelia.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were PNA subjunctifiers. The opening “hmm... I think
it was more like” qualified all that followed and led the report away from a highfidelity description of experience (in that “it was more like” implies a comparison, not
a description). Similarly, “it’s like in the form of” also implied a comparison; it was
not in and of itself a description of experience.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 1
RTH22a: And what exactly were those words?
A23a: “Should I text Leslie?” “Leiszle”? “Leizle”? [laughs]
Moment? Maybe. Amelia appearred to refer to the same moment as in previous turns.
Experience? Maybe, but not likely. Although it was possible that “Should I text
Leslie?” was descriptive of experience, this turn was very likely (if not entirely)
influenced by RTH’s suggestion of words present in RTH17a (and Amelia’s subsequent
agreement in A21a).
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
RTH24a: Except the words at the moment of the beep would’ve been “Leslie,” right?
A25a: [laughs] Yeah, yeah.
RTH26a: So, so… and, and—this illustrates that we’re, we’re not so much interested in whether
something was correct or whatever. We’re interested in what your experience was, and if your
experience was, “should I text Leslie” even though she happens to be Leiszle, then that’s what
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we’re… that, that, that’s the way experience is. And so you think it was actually in words? [A:
Mhm] In those exact words, “Should I text Leslie?”
A27a: ‘Cause I was thinking… just like, how to text it on my phone. Just like, how I should
word it out.
Moment? Indeterminate. It was possible that Amelia was describing the same moment
as in previous turns; however, note that the experience-at-a-moment described in this
turn (“I was thinking... how to text it on my phone”) differed from her previous
descriptions of the moment (e.g., “Should I text Leslie?” in A23a). This may have
implied that Amelia was not cleaving to the same moment.
Experience? Maybe. “I was thinking... how to text it on my phone” described the
possible content of a first-draft description of possible experience, but it did not
describe how the phenomenon was present. Moreover, Amelia’s conflicting description
of her experience-at-a-moment may have implied that she was not describing directly
apprehended phenomena.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density, all were PNA subjunctifiers. “’Cause I was thinking”
was an inference, which may or may not be related to what was directly apprehended.
“Just like...”, which Amelia uses twice, also implied what was stated in this turn should
not be understood straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 1
RTH28a: So that seems like sort of two different things… when I’m interested in which, or
maybe both, so—should I text Leslie would be one thing, and the other thing is what I would
say [LLC: What words should I use…]…
A29a: I think I thought of it at the same time. It usually just, like, pops up at the same time if I
wanna like text someone. I usually just think of what I’m gonna write.
Moment? No. The turn began with a description of a possible moment, but then
included a temporally indeterminate description (“It usually”) unbound to any
consideration of time.
Experience? No. The start of the turn (“I think I thought of it at the same time”) may
have been referring to two simultaneous phenomena that had been directly
apprehended; however, the rest of the turn was a generalization (likely faux) of
Amelia’s experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were PNA subjunctifiers. Amelia’s faux
generalization of her “typical” texting behavior destroys any possibility of describing
experience-at-a-moment.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 0
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RTH30a: Okay. And so… is it the case that what gets caught in flight then by the beep—the
beep catches, the beep interrupts this, “what should I write,” “how should I text,” “how should
I word this,” “what should…” ?
A31a: No, I think it was, like, already formed, by that time.
Moment? Maybe, but not likely. It was possible that Amelia was referring to the same
moment she described in previous turns throughout the interview, but her imprecision
about the moment in A29a and her changing description of her experience-at-a-moment
in A27a may imply that she was not consistently cleaving her report to a discrete,
known moment.
Experience? Maybe, but not likely. It was possible that Amelia was describing her
directly apprehended experience, but her inconsistency about describing the same
experience-at-a-moment across later conversational turns of the interview and her
agreement with RTH’s proposals of plausible experiences suggest she was not
describing directly apprehended phenomena.
Subjunctifiers? “I think it was, like” was an entirely subjunctified statement that
undermined all that followed.
EMB CK = 3
EMB RTH = 1
RTH32a: And what was it? What...?
A33a: I’m sorry, [Laughs] I don’t think the beep works.
RTH34a: Okay. And, so, so—so the, the message that you might text to Leslie slash Leiszle
is… “I’m sorry, I don’t think the beeper works.” Something like that.
A35a: Mhm.
RTH36a: And so, is that present to you at the moment of the beep?
A37a: Mhm.
RTH38a: In what way?
A39a: In what way? [pause] Mmm… I don’t know, it just comes.
Moment? Indeterminate.
Experience? No. Amelia explicitly stated she was unsure about how her thinking had
been directly present to her.
Subjunctifiers? All were PNA subjunctifiers. Amelia’s behavioral (e.g., her pause,
“mmm...”) and verbal (e.g., “I don’t know”) responses implied that her report should
not be understood straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 1
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EMB RTH = 0
RTH40a: Okay. So, so… lemme back up a sec. Now I’m, I’m guessing that these questions are
more specific than you thought they were going to be.
A41a: Yeah. Way more. [Laughs]
RTH42a: And that’s the way [LLC: That’s fair] it is for everybody. And it, and it’s not your
fault, and it’s not my fault, and it’s not Leiszle’s fault, and it’s not Cody’s fault. This is just the
way the first, the first sampling day always is. But we’re interested in those details, and so we
ask specific kinds of questions. So—and, I’m guessing that Leis`le said to you that we don’t
expect you to be very good at it on the first day, that we expected you to say, “well, if I had
known that that’s what you were going to ask, then I would’ve paid attention to that.” That’s…
A43a: Yup. [nods and smiles] Exactly.
RTH44a: … that’s, that’s what happens on the first day, that is just the way this process works.
And there’s no… there’s no shortcut to it. We just have to—we have to go through this,
basically. But let me give you some possibilities. So the, so there is… this notion of, “Hey
Leslie, the beeper doesn’t work,” or, I forget exactly what those words were; what that phrase
was. “I don’t think the beeper works,” or something like that.
LLC45a: I'm sorry, [A: Yeah, I’m sorry, I don’t think the beeper works] I don’t think the beeper
works.
RTH46a: “I’m sorry, I don’t think the beeper works.” So it could be that I was saying to myself,
quote “I’m sorry, I don’t think the beeper works,” unquote. Or it could be: I see on my
imaginary phone the words, “I’m sorry, I don’t think the beeper works.” Or I somehow feel it
in my thumbs as if I might have been about to text that. Or I just have that notion that that’s
the concept and there aren’t really any words there, but if I have to tell these guys about what’s
going on with me then that’s how I would put it into words.
A47a: I think it was more like the second one, where I feel like, I can kinda see my phone, but
I’m not actually holding it.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 3
RTH48a: Okay. And, and what do you see?
A49a: My keyboard [laughs].
RTH50a: The keyboard and the—the whole, the whole… does the phone have a keyboard? Do
you see the keyboard of the phone?
A51a: Um, yeah? Like, when you… text someone usually the keyboard comes up.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 3
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RTH52a: Okay. So, so, so at the moment of the beep, I’m seeing in my imagination, not in my
real phone? Or, am I seeing the real phone?
A53a: My real phone.
RTH54a: So at the moment of the beep, I’m seeing the real phone and I’m about to make this
text… about to send this text?
A55a: Well like, I could see, like, the keyboard? But like, the words are in my head; there’s
nothing, like, actually on the phone.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 5
RTH56a: Okay. And, and—in what way are the words in your head?
A57a: Mmm… you mean like…?
RTH58a: Well, I see them in my imagination? [A: Yeah! I see my—] Or I hear myself say
them? Or I’m saying them? Or…
A59a: --in my imagination.
RTH60a: You see them in your imagination? What do they look like?
A61a: Letters [laughs]. Like the alphabet.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 3
RTH62a: But like, you know, black on white or…
A63a: Yeah, black on white.
RTH64a: And, and… script or, um… Times New Roman? Or…
A65a: Um—
LLC66a: The font that your phone uses?
A67a: Yeah, just the basic—
RTH68a:--phone font?
A69a: Mhm [Laughs] I didn’t know you can change it.
RTH70a: I’m guessing you can. I don’t know—[LLC: I don’t either]
LLC71a: But, you know, I think the point is, like, if you’re seeing it in your imagination, it
could have been any of those things. And so, we’re interested in which of those it was.
A72a: No, I just saw, like, whatever usual happens on my keyboard. Just like the basic… cuz
that’s the only thing I’m texting.
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EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 5
LLC73a: And are you seeing the—the words, like, all written out? Like, already, like, as if you
had texted—you had already typed out the entire sentence? Or…
A74a: No, just like the portion. The first, the most important portion of it. “I'm sorry I broke the
beeper.” But then I usually, like, add on after… [LLC: Oh, okay.] Like I think I need to make
it polite or something [laughs].
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 8
CK75a: And you were saying earlier—'cause your first description of it you were saying you
kind of… you heard in your mind, “should I text Leslie?” And sort of—how, how should I text
it? Like it was—like you were describing it as all coming at once, and now you’re saying
it’s… you, you were seeing it. Were you both seeing and hearing? Like, would you say that
was like a one…?
A76a: Not hearing, just, like, imagining in the… seeing I guess.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 3
CK77a: So it was mostly a visual sort of…
A78a: Yeah.
RTH79a: So I think we’ve probably probed enough about this particular sample. And, and, and
what I’m guessing that you’ve gotten now is a… sort of a view of the kind of [A: Yeah]
specificity that we’ve got, which is different from what you have before. [A: Mhm.] And that’s
fine. That’s—that’s perfect. That’s exactly what we’re here for. We are…we came in—all of
us came in—expecting that you would be doing whatever it is that you’re doing right now,
which is wondering what… [A laughs] didn’t get that, didn’t get that. But, but that’s why we
have to do it more than once, because that’s… and, and I would say, it looks like you’re taking
this seriously, you’re trying to get this—you’re trying to get the right answer, you didn’t get
the task laid out right, but you’re trying to get the right answer. And that’s—that is 100 percent
of what we’re looking for today. This is perfect. We’re doing exactly what it is that we want to
do.
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Appendix B
Very-Last-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Amelia
A1b: The next one… I was looking at the emails on my phone; I could feel the phone in my left
hand, but I could also feel, like, the dryness of my eyes. No thoughts or feelings. But I could
see the border around my phone, and the different emails I received, but no… actual words.
Just, like, colors.
Moment? Likely. “I was looking at emails on my phone” may have described context,
but the rest of the turn from “I could feel the phone” onward were all descriptions
consistent with experience apprehended at a specific moment.
Experience? Likely. Amelia led every description of directly apprehended experience
(“I... feel the phone in my left hand”, “I... feel... the dryness of my eyes”, “I... see the
border around my phone”) with the subjunctifier “could.” “Could” implied only that
what followed was possible; it may or may not mean that experience had been directly
present.
Subjunctifiers? Low density of indeterminate and DFS subjunctifiers. The three uses of
“could” suggested whatever followed was merely possible, but not necessarily
apprehended (however, Amelia always followed “could” with descriptions of
experience, which suggested she may have been adjusting her description of
apprehended phenomena). Amelia also clearly followed other subjunctifiers with
descriptions of possible phenomena: “But no...” was immediately followed by
phenomenon (words) that were explicitly not present, and “just, like...” was followed
by a description of “colors.”
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 10
RTH2b: So that seems like there’s sort of three things in your experience: I feel the phone [A
nods affirmatively], I feel my eyes [A nods affirmatively], and I see the messages.
A3b: Well, I could see colors, but not actually any words formed on… the messages.
Moment? Increasingly likely. Amelia appeared consistent in describing the same
phenomena that was directly present to her at the same moment as in A 1.
Experience? Yes. Although Amelia continued to use the word “could” before
describing her experience, it was now clear that Amelia’s use of “could” did imply that
she had apprehended the phenomena: that she “could see colors” was directly
contrasted with the fact that she was not seeing “any words formed on... the messages.”
As such, the entire turn appeared to be aimed at a description of directly apprehended
experience (notably, she directly altered RTH2’s description that she was seeing the
messages).
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Subjunctifiers? Very low density, and all were DFS subjunctifiers. “Formed on...” was
followed by “the messages”: the vocal pause may have mirrored Amelia’s report in A1b
that she was seeing the different colors (of her emails), but not the actual content/words
of the emails themselves (as one might expect).
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 10
RTH4b: Okay. And of those—of those three things, is one of them more prominent than the
other?
A5b: No, I think maybe like dry, forty percent, and then the rest were like thirty.
Moment? Very likely. Amelia appeared to consistently constrain her report to the same
experience-at-a-moment as A1 and A3.
Experience? Yes. She continued to describe the same three experiential phenomena,
and Amelia endorsed the relative saliency of the apprehended phenomena.
Subjunctifiers? Low density, all were DFS subjunctifiers. “I think maybe like dry, forty
percent” involved three subjunctifiers (“I think,” “maybe”, “like”) that modified a
description of the estimated saliency of directly apprehended phenomena.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 10
RTH6b: Forty, thirty, thirty? Well let’s start with the eyes: so I feel—my eyes feel dry? Both
eyes?
A7b: Both, both.
RTH8b: Both dry? And in my eyeballs?
A9b: Yeah, my eyeballs [laughs].
RTH10b: My eyeballs feel dry [laughs]. All right. And… and is there more to be said about
that? Does it feel, like, my eyeballs are moving in there? Or is there—
A11b: No, they’re just dry. Like they need eye drops.
Moment? Yes. Amelia consistently appeared to constrain her report to the same known
moment.
Experience? Yes. “No, they’re just dry” was consonant with Amelia’s previous report
of the dryness of her eyes. Although “like they need eye drops” was not a description
of experience, it may be understood as Amelia’s attempt of trying to answer the
question posed in RTH10 (“is there more to be said about that?”).
Subjunctifiers? DFS subjunctifiers. “Like they need eye drops” was a simile, but it was
used as a modification of a description of phenomena (dryness of eyes).
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EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH= 10
RTH12b: Okay. All right. And then, “I feel the phone in my left hand.” And that’s the weight of
the phone or the texture of the phone, or the…?
A13b: Just the feeling of—I guess it is the texture on my fingertips.
Moment? Yes. She continued to consistently describe at-a-moment experience that
occurred in the same known moment as in previous turns.
Experience? Maybe. “I guess it is...” was a subjunctifier that was immediately
followed by a description of sensory awareness, but it weakened the description of
possible experience, especially because it endorsed (that is: was potentially influenced
by) a suggestion made by RTH12.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. “I guess it is...” may have been an attempt at refining
what was directly apprehended, or it may have been signaling that the phenomena had
not been adequately apprehended at the moment of the beep.
EMB CK = 5
EMB = 10
RTH14b: And, and—I’m not sure if this is a possible… so does it feel like you’re feeling the
phone or does it feel like something on your fingertips? Obviously it’s your fingertips that are
doing this, but does it feel like I’m feeling my phone? Or does it feel like I’m feeling pressure
or something on my fingertips.
A15b: [Smiling] I think it must be the pressure. ‘Cause it didn’t feel like I was massaging my
phone or, like, actually feeling the texture.
Moment? Yes. She continued to be focused on the same fingertip/phone moment.
Experience? Difficult to determine. Amelia’s report of “the pressure”, “massaging
[her] phone”, and “feeling the texture” closely matched suggestions made by RTH 14: as
such, it is impossible to determine whether A15 was an attempt at describing
experience-at-a-moment with high fidelity, or was created from RTH14, or was a
mixture of phenomena and RTH14.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density of indeterminate subjunctifiers. “I think it must be”
were two subjunctifiers followed by a possible description of experience; “’Cause it
didn’t feel like” was a causal inference and comparison that undermined Amelia’s
description of phone-massaging. It was possible these subjunctifiers signaled Amelia’s
surprise at her experience, or it may have signaled her failure to have adequately
apprehended the phenomena at the moment of the beep.
EMB CK = 4
EMB RTH = 8
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RTH15b: Mkay. And then, “I’m seeing colors.” Patches of colors.
A16b: Yeah, like [gestures with her hand in front of her face, indicating rectangles stacked on
top of each other] rectangle strips of colors.
Moment? Yes. She continued to be focused on the same moment from all pervious
turns.
Experience? Yes. Amelia described phenomena, and did so in a way that provided
greater fidelity than what was proposed by RTH15.
Subjunctifiers? “Like” refined the description that followed (“rectangle strips of
colors”).
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 10
RTH17b: And are they all the same color?
A18b: [Shakes head] No. I only remember seeing orange and blue and that’s it.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. The entire turn was focused on describing experience.
Subjunctifiers? “I only remember” was Amelia’s explicit acknowledgement of the
limits of her memory—that she “only remembered” seeing orange and blue and no
other colors suggest that she was describing a known, specific experience-at-amoment.
EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 10
RTH19b: And does that seem like one message is orange and another message is blue?
A20b: [Gestures with her hands as she had done previously, in which one message is first and
other messages are arranged below each other] Orange orange and then blue and then I don’t
remember the rest.
Moment? Yes. Amelia constrained her report to the same known moment.
Experience? Yes. Amelia provided a detailed description of directly apprehended
experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification. The fact that Amelia explicitly stated what she
could not remember implied she was describing only what was remembered and
directly apprehended (and not relying on heuristics, inferences, or hedges).
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 10
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RTH21b: So one message is orange, another message is orange, another message is blue but I
don’t really see the messages, I just know that this is a—this is—
A22b: Yeah, color and then the border. [A draws a rectangular border in the air]
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes; note that Amelia described her experience with unique details (“the
border”) that emerged from Amelia herself—that is, A22 described phenomena that was
in no way suggested or recommended by RTH21.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 10
RTH23b: Like a rectangle around the orange?
A24b: Yeah, like, a little black border around each message.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes; Amelia provided further elaboration about her experience (“a little
black border around each message”) that appeared to reflect phenomena that genuinely
occurred at some moment (rather than reflect a leading question or suggestion made by
RTH in RTH23).
Subjunctifiers? “Like” was followed by a description of experience and can be
understood as modifying that description.
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 10
RTH25b: Okay. And, is that the way your phone actually works? So if we looked at your actual
phone would we see orange message followed by orange message followed by blue message?
A26b: Mmm… [laughs] I don’t know. [A looks at her phone] Well, it looks different. My
phone is just like a little square of color, and then it’s just white. But I imagined it just like the
whole thing just being orange.
Moment? Yes. “But I imagined it just like the whole thing being orange” was a
description of Amelia’s experience-at-a-moment—in other words, it demonstrated
Amelia’s constraint to a discrete moment. The fact that Amelia noticed (with surprise)
how her email inbox looked at this very turn does not change the fact that Amelia
appeared to consistently separate what occurred at the moment of the beep and all other
moments: she used how her email inbox looked within the interview as a means to
contrast it with the experience that was caught in flight at the moment of the beep.
Experience? Yes. “But I imagined... the whole thing being orange” was a description
of experience that Amelia reliably stated even though, only a few seconds before, she
observed how her inbox actually appeared in reality. The fact that she chose a
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description that intentionally contradicted how her inbox appeared suggests she was
describing directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Only one subjunctifier was relevant to Amelia’s description of her
experience at-a-moment: the “like” in the final sentence of the turn. However, this
subjunctifier was followed by and refined her description of experience.
EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 10
RTH27b: And, and is this sort of the same color as the rectangles that are off to the side there?
So, so you were seeing the same color as your phone would have—
A28b: Like this? [A shows phone to interviewers] It’s very different [laughs] from how I
imagined it.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Amelia continued to describe her experience (by calling into contrast
her experience with the actual inbox) that she explicitly acknowledges wass “very
different” from what she experienced.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 10
RTH29b: Okay.
A30b: I thought it would be like, this one was just all orange, all orange [A gestures across the
width of her phone screen with her finger]—
Moment? Yes; she was constraining her report to the same discrete eye-dryness/phonefeeling/seeing-color moment as previous urns.
Experience? Likely. “I thought it would be like” set up a comparison between her real
phone inbox (a square of color on the left side of her phone) with her directly
apprehended experience (rectangles of “all orange”).
EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 10
RTH31b: Same color, same color orange?
A32b: Mhm. [nods] But then, I imagined blue. I didn’t remember seeing a red. Like a pinkish
color.
Moment? Yes; Amelia continued to constrain to the same moment as before.
Experience? Yes. Although “imagined” did not straightforwardly communicate how
experience was directly present, it appeared that Amelia’s use of “imagine” implied
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that phenomena was directly present: she “imagined blue”, which is by distinct contrast
to the fact that she was not “seeing a red”. As such, the entire turn was a description of
what Amelia was seeing. Notably, the colors Amelia described seeing contradicted
how her actual inbox appeared in real life, which further suggests she was describing
directly apprehended experience that genuinely occurred.
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 10
RTH33b: And… and, I understand that you were looking at your actual phone. This is—so this
is another one of those sort of creative seeings [A laughs]; what I’m seeing is not exactly
what’s there [A: Mhm]. I’m, I’m seeing a, an orange rectangle that goes all the way across my
phone, even though what’s actually on my phone is an orange square off to the left-hand side
[A laughs]. Is that right?
A34b: Yeah.
RTH35b: Okay, I think I’m good.
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Appendix C
Very-First-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Shirley
LLC1a: All right, so… what, if anything, was in your experience at the moment of the first beep?
S2a: Um, I was scared. [Laughs]
LLC3a: Okay.
S4a: I didn’t know what was—I forgot that, um, I put the beeper on, so I was really startled.
Um…
Moment? No. A startle must occur after the moment of the beep.
Experience? Not likely. “Startled” may describe experience, but it may also describe
behavior or context (that may or may not be directly apprehended). All else in the turn
did not describe directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate subjunctification density, all of which were PNA
subjunctifiers. Of particular note, “so I was really startled” was an inference of
causation, which inherently was not a description of directly apprehended experience.
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 0
LLC5a: Okay, so… before we go too far down that—so what we’re interested in—so, I
understand you’re, you know… [LLC uses visual timeline example] so this is a little timeline
kind of visual aid type thing. So you’re going along, you’re doing whatever it is you’re doing,
you’re hanging out. The beep goes off, and at some point you turn the beep off. So, your reaction
to the beep—being startled and being scared—that’s happening after the beep goes off. So what
we’re interested in is the moment right before the beep goes off? What was in your experience
when the beep actually interrupted you—like, what the beep interrupted in the middle of?
S6a: Oh! Um… I was taking my psychology test online.
Moment? Nonspecific. Taking a test may have a duration of several or many minutes.
Experience? No. Shirley was describing only what she was doing.
CK EMB = .5
RTH EMB = 0
LLC7a: Okay.
S8a: So I was really, like, um… focused into that [LLC: Ok]. And… trying to find the answers.
[Laughs]. In the book.
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Moment? Nonspecific. “Trying to find answers” may have a duration of several or
many minutes.
Experience? Nonspecific. “Focused into” may be descriptive of experience or of
behavior, but “trying to find the answers” described only what she was doing and was
not descriptive of directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density, and all subjunctifiers were PNA.
Given the lack of constraint to a particular moment and to experience, subjunctifiers
such as “like,” “um,” and “...” communicate that the description was not
straightforwardly descriptive of at-a-moment experience.
CK EMB = 2
RTH EMB = 2
LLC9a: Okay. So, you’re taking your psychology test online [S: Mhm]. Um, so, you know,
there’s a whole bunch of different ways that that might be, kinda, present to you in your
experience. So, you know, maybe you’re looking at the computer screen? Maybe you’re
focused on a certain question and wondering what the answer is? Maybe you’re feeling
anxious about getting the right answers? You know, a whole bunch of different things. Do you
have any sense about what might’ve been present to you at that moment?
S10a: Uh, the anxious—the anxious part, most of me. ‘Cause I really need that good grade.
[Laughs] Um… I remember right before I was, I was—we were doing the independent and
dependent variables, and I wasn’t, um… I wasn’t sure what was the answer for what was the
dependent variable [LLC: Mmm]. But like, it was interesting cuz, like, right after, like, the
beep and I wrote and then I looked back at the question, I kinda, like, I don’t know, cleared my
mind for a second and then got the answer.
Moment? No. Shirley described things that occurred before the moment of the beep (“I
remember right before I was…”), things that (perhaps occurred) at the moment of the
beep, and things that occurred after the moment of the beep (“right after,… I looked
back…”).
Experience? Nonspecific. Except for Shirley’s description of “the anxious part of me”
(which may have described possible experience), everything else described was about
historical facts-of-reality (“we were doing the independent and dependent variable and
I wasn’t... sure what was the answer for what was the dependent variable”) and
presuppositions (the anxious part, most of me. ‘Cause I really need that good grade”).
Subjunctifiers? High density; all subjunctifiers were PNA. Every subjunctifier signaled
a departure from describing specific, directly apprehended experience; specifically,
these subjunctifiers signaled Shirley’s unfamiliarity with whatever experience had been
interrupted by the moment of the first beep.
CK EMB = 0.5
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RTH EMB = 0
LLC11a: Oh, that’s cool! Have a little break and—
S12a: [Laughs] Yeah.
LLC13a:—was able to get back to it.
RTH14a: So at the moment—at the moment... that the—just one microsecond before the beep
occurred, you were trying to figure out the answer to this independent, dependent variable
problem. Is that right?
S15a: Mhm.
RTH16a: And how is that trying to figure out… work? Or, what do you mean? What’s in your
experience about that?
S17a: I’m sorry, um, how does figuring… the…
Notes: This was a clarification question; as such, no annotation nor EMB ratings were
provided.
RTH18a: So I can imagine I was—I was googling “independent variables,” or I was… trying to
think what I remember about independent variables [S: Oh!], or I have a picture of my
textbook in my head, or… [S: Oh! Um—] there’s lots of different ways that that can happen.
S19a: I was trying to remember from lecture classes. Um, what was the dependent-independent
variable because we did an activity on, um, on what it was and how, like, to differentiate
between the two. And I was trying to take that example and apply it to this problem.
Moment? Nonspecific. “Trying to remember from lecture classes” described an
apparent process that likely took several seconds or minutes (and was further
corroborated by Shirley’s multi-part description of the lecture’s topic, the activity they
had performed in class, and that she was trying to apply that memory to her current
homework problem; this implies a several-moments-long operation).
Experience? Not likely. Although this turn may have described some inchoate aspect
of directly apprehended experience, there was no straightforward description of how
any phenomena had been directly present.
Subjunctifiers? All were PNA subjunctifiers. Shirley described two intentional
expressions that signaled she was not aimed at apprehending or describing at-amoment experience. “Trying to remember” and “trying to take that example and apply
it to this problem” described what Shirley was attempting to do, and what one was
trying to do is not a description of what was directly apprehended.
CK EMB = 1
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RTH EMB = 0
RTH20a: Okay. And so is that example present to you right at the moment of the beep?
S21a: Yes.
RTH22a: In what way?
S23a: Um… I was still kinda thinking about the, well, writing in, like, jotting it down. Tryna to
like, clear my thoughts on, like, this, like—a dependent variable is this and independent
variable was this. Yeah. [Laughs]
Moment? Nonspecific. What was described in S23a might describe a discrete moment,
or it may describe a process that occurred over several seconds or minutes.
Experience? Nonspecific. The gist of this turn was that Shirley described a (possible)
thinking/analytical-type experience; however, this description is dubious for two
reasons. First, Shirley did not describe how any phenomenon/phenomena had been
present to her. Second, it is possible (and, given Shirley’s lack of apparent constraint to
a known moment of experience, likely) that what Shirley described was her
presuppositions about experience rather than about directly known and apprehended
experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. Every one of Shirley’s
subjunctifiers undermine any commitment to a particularized moment of directly
apprehended experience.
CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 0
LLC24a: Okay.
RTH25a: So I’m not—I’m not sure that I quite understand what the—what was going on at the
moment of the beep. So are you… at the moment of the beep, remembering what took place in
class?
S26a: Yes.
RTH27a: And is that remembering—the, sort of, the memory of that present to you right at the
moment of the beep?
S28a: Yeah, I was… yeah.
RTH29a: In… and so, do you remember that by… by seeing it again? Or hearing it? Or, by just
knowing that the… this is what the instructor said? Or…
S30a: Um… this is hard to explain. Um… [Laughs]
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Moment? Unknown.
Experience? No. Shirley explicitly stated she was unsure about how to describe what
she had directly experienced.
Subjunctifiers? Very likely PNA subjunctifiction. Shirley had demonstrated a lack of
constraint to both a specific moment and to directly apprehended experience
throughout all turns of her very-first-sample-interview; as such, it is likely that the
subjunctifiers in this turn signal her unfamiliarity with what her ongoing experience
had been at the moment of the beep.
RTH31a: And, it—so you’re doing great, this is... [LLC: Yes, you’re doing great.] So
everything that you’ve done so far is perfect. So when you came into it and the first thing you
said was, “I wasn’t sure what I was supposed to do”? That’s great as far as we’re concerned
because we want you to—we want you to get a feeling for what to do as a result of this
conversation. The first conversation is always about… trying to [S Laughs] get you a notion
of, of the kind of questions we’re asking. And it’s not a failure of yours that you didn’t know
that in the first place—this is what this conversation, this day, is designed to do.
S32a: Yeah, a new experience. [Laughs]
Notes: Shirley agreed with RTH31a’s characterization that she was not yet engaging in
the DES task (i.e., that she did not cleave to experience-at-a-moment while she was
wearing the beeper). As such, the intention of the interview shifted from trying to
describe Sharleen’s experience at the moment of the first beep with fidelity to iterative
training for Shirley’s next round of sampling-and-interviewing.
LLC33a: Yes.
RTH34a: So, about this particular beep—so we got this timeline going on here… time is
marching on and the beep happens, and right here, I understand you to be saying, “I’m trying
to figure out whether this is an independent variable or a dependent variable.” [S nods; S:
Yes.] And, so, at this moment right here, are you more focused on the problem that’s being
presented to you today, or on the recollection of the... what took place in class? Or both?
S35a: The—I was… I was at the moment I was more focused on trying to... yeah, the
recollection—the memory—on, um… what, what she said [RTH: Okay]. What my instructor
said.
CK EMB = 1.5
RTH EMB = 3
RTH36a: Okay. And, and—so, is your instructor… what your instructor said somehow present
to you, at this particular moment?
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S37a: Yes.
RTH38a: In what way? So I can imagine that I hear my instructor’s voice, or I see my
instructor, or—in my imagination, or…
S39a: Um… like, a little short memory clip, I guess you could say? Um, I remember her, um…
the, the examples were on the slide and she was just going through them on what’s an
independent variable and what’s a dependent variable, and she had, um, the class, um… like,
she asked the class what, like, what they thought on what it was. And if it was right, we would
move onto the next on, and if not then she would, like, elaborate on it more.
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 2
RTH40a: And so that—that’s what happened in the class a couple of days ago [S: Yeah]. And
it’s somehow present to you at this moment.
S41a: Yeah. [Laughs]
RTH42a: And is that present to you in a visual kind of way? Or a hearing kind of way? Or just a
remembering that’s not visual or not…
S43a: Um, it was definitely visual. Cause I remember, like, I know that memory, like, seeing
her there.
CK EMB = 0.5
RTH EMB = 3
RTH44a: And what do you see?
S45a: I see… her, um, standing in front of the board. Um, the slide that she had with all the
examples. And then, I remember, um, people saying… at this particular one, she got it wrong
[Laughs] so that’s how I remember, like, oh so it’s, like, the dependent variable is on this side
and the independent variable is this side.
CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 3
RTH46a: And, and so you’re remembering an incorrect—a student in the class [S: Being
incorrect] being incorrect [S: Yeah.]. And so do you see the student? Or hear the student? Or
are you just seeing the teacher?
S47a: Um, I don’t remember the student, but I do s—see the teacher, um… explaining, like,
why it wasn’t this.
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CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 4
RTH48a: Okay. And do you see the teacher explaining it? Or do you see and hear the teacher
saying this?
S49a: That’s a good question. [Pause] I don’t really see her, like, talking? But it was—it’s kinda
like she, like, um… like, it was kinda like a picture of her, I guess? Like—
CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 4
RTH50a: Like a still picture?
S51a: Kinda. But, like, but like—one moment it would just be, like, a picture of her, and then it
would move to, like, her walking. But… I don’t… remember what her directly—like—her
mouth moving. So I guess it’s, like, her voice. And then like what she’s saying about
independent and dependent variable.
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 4
RTH52a: So visually it’s a seeing and then another seeing rather than a video that—
S53a: That plays, no.
RTH54a: So, so I see her standing here and then I see her over there, or something like that.
S55a: Yeah, it’s like, um… like, first I remembered her, like, standing in front of the board
[RTH: mhm], and then I remember, um, what she was saying. And then so I remember her just
walking to the board. And then I was focused on the, the screen with the examples. And I
would… uh, and that’s when I remember, like, the incorrect things.
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 3
RTH56a: Okay. And, so—and, in this process, do you hear your teacher’s voice? Or do you just
know what she’s saying?
S57a: It was, like, I, I know what she was trying to say, so I took it into my own interpretation
of what she was saying?
RTH58a: And so do you hear your own voice?
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S59a: Yes. Of me trying to work it out.
RTH60a: So this—this is the kinda thing that we’re interested in, which is a difficult thing for
your—for the… for the TA to have explained to you, which is why you didn’t know what was
gonna happen. So we have to go through this—this exercise of, of—so… I understand you to
be saying that you have somehow taken this explanation in, somehow.
S61a: Yeah, like, um… like, she taught it and then I know what she was saying. And then, I
guess you could say, like, I heard her voice? But it was more, like, it was more predominantly,
like, me, trying to, like… like think it out. And, like, “oh, I remember her saying… this.” But
it was in my own voice saying that?
CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 4
LLC62a: Mhm.
RTH63a: So your voice or her voice?
S64a: My voice.
RTH65a: And so—at the moment… what we’re calling the moment of the beep, which is
actually one microsecond just before the beep occurs—
S66a: [Nods] That would be my voice.
RTH67a: It’s in your voice. And so are you saying something at that particular moment?
S68a: Um… like, I can’t quite remember.
RTH69a: Okay.
LLC70a: And that’s perfect. If there’s something that you’re not sure about or don’t quite
remember, like, an, “I don’t know” or an, “I don’t remember” is exactly what we want, rather
than trying to guess about it.
RTH71a: So what I’ve got out of this experience is that there are two… or maybe three sort of
parallel strands of experience going on. One is I see… my teacher in front of a blackboard and
I see her walking towards the blackboard [S: Yes], or a whiteboard or whatever. And then I
also experience myself sort of somehow reframing or restating or… something—
S72a: What she said.
RTH73a:—what she has said. And then, maybe the, the current problem is somehow present to
me as well.

277

S74a: Uh, uh like the problem that I was, like trying to get at. [Laughs]
LLC75a: Yeah.
RTH76a: So th—these are the details that we find interesting, that we’re trying to sort out. So
for example, it’s quite possible for your real eyes to be aimed at the problem that you’re trying
to solve today—the one that’s on the quiz you’re trying to take, or whatever. But I’m not
really paying attention to that, because I’m thinking back to what happened in class and so…
my experience is entirely back to yesterday's class period, or something.
S77a: Yeah… oh! Oh, this, this—oh, I get it now! The—okay. I see.
RTH78a: So that’s the—that is what we find interesting, is what happens to your experience.
So, is the, is the quiz—is what you’re really eyeballs are looking at—present to you at this
particular moment, or not?
S79a: No. I think I was more, like… in my brain.
RTH80a: In your memory [S: Yeah.]—in the memory. Okay. I think that’s great.
LLC81a: Yeah.
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Appendix D
Very-Last-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Shirley
RTH1b: Number six.
S2b: Number six… um… So, right before the beep, I was think—I was mentally doing math.
Of… a hundred times... [laughs] a hundred times one, in my head. Which is one hundred. But
[laughs], at that beep, um, it was… a mental thing of... multiplying that hundred times one.
And… that feeling of, like, I know the answer is a hundred. Is there.
Moment? Likely. Shirley explicitly differentiated between context that occurred prior
to the beep (“So, right before the beep...” to “Which is one hundred”) and what had
occurred at the moment of the beep (“But, at that beep, um it was...” to “I know the
answer is a hundred is there”).
Experience? Yes; Shirley described directly apprehendable phenomena: mental
multiplication and the feeling of knowing.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate subjunctification density; all were DFS subjunctifiers. When
describing experience (i.e., the final two sentences of the turn), all subjunctifications
were followed by descriptions of at-the-moment experience. Even when describing
context (i.e., the first two sentences of the turn), the context aided in understanding the
experience.
CK EMB = 8
RTH EMB = 7
RTH3b:

So does that mean that I’m multiplying a hundred times one? And, sort of separately, I
know the answer is a hundred? Or that I’m sort of at the end of the multiplication and the
answer is gonna be a hundred?
S4b: At that beep, it was… a hundred times one, but, the feeling of knowing the answer is a
hundred.
Moment? Likely. Shirley appeared to describe the same moment as in S2 (that is: she
does not talk about doing mental math in general; rather, she constrained her report to
the mental math ongoing at the moment of beep 6).
Experience? Yes. This turn was almost (if not entirely) about experience: the mental
math and the feeling of knowing the answer.
Subjunctification? Almost no subjunctification. She gave a straightforward, nonambiguated description of her experience.
CK EMB = 8.5
RTH EMB = 8
RTH5b: Okay. And, and… does this feeling of knowing have to do with the fact that the—
when I multiply one hundred times one, I’m gonna get a hundred? Or does the feeling of
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knowing a more general thing that’s… whenever I multiply anything times one I get, I get that
same thing.
S6b: It was, if I multiply anything by one I’m gonna get the same thing.
RTH7b: So I’ve got sort of two separate things going on. I have a multiplication in process—
one hundred times one, which is gonna be a hundred. And I have a general recognition that
anything times one is equal to anything.
S8b: Yes.
RTH9: Is that right?
S10b: Yes.
RTH11b: Both of those things are sort of going on simultaneously?
S12b: Yes, and they’re both present.
S6, S8, S10, and S12:
Moment? Yes; Shirley appeared to consistently constrain her reports to the same
known moment.
Experience? Yes; all descriptions were entirely of directly apprehended experience and
nothing else.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
CK EMB = 8
RTH EMB = 8
RTH13b: Mhm.
LLC14b: Is… is the, the multiplying a hundred times one… is it just that? Or is it also that it is
a hundred. Is it just that you’re multiplying a hundred times one at the moment, and you’re
recognizing that anything times it--anything times one is that anything? Or is the answer
present to you also.
S15b: The… so, in my head, the, the problem was a hundred times one.
LLC16b: Okay.
S17b: And then the equal sign.
LLC18b: Okay.
S19b: But it was the feeling of… the feeling and knowing that… the answer is a hundred.
S15, S17, and S19:
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density but pauses only; subjunctifications were followed by
descriptions of experience at the moment of the beep.
CK EMB = 9
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RTH EMB = 9
LLC20b: Okay. And… when you say that… in your head, it’s a hundred times one and the
equal sign, do you mean that, like, literally? Like you’re seeing that?
S21b: Yeah, it was, it was… like, literally a hundred and then x one equals [draws out the
equation in front of her with her right index finger]. And it was… it was white in bold. And
the background was… [quizzically grimaces] it wasn’t black, but it was… black. [Laughs]
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Note that Shirley independently provided a description of a highly
detailed and nuanced inner seeing.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density; all subjunctifiers were DFS. Shirley notably
qualified her descriptions to indicate that her words should not be understood
straightforwardly—for instance, that the background of her inner seeing was something
like a black, but not actually black (“And the background was… it wasn’t black, but it
was… black.”). Her subjunctifiers all apparently acted in the service of better honing
the fidelity of her descriptions of experience.
CK EMB = 10
RTH EMB = 10
RTH22b: A different kind of black.
S23b: Yes, it was… there was… it wasn’t a very strong or intense black. But the white was…
the white of the numbers were intense and it was clear. But the background was… like, yeah, a
different type of black.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density; all subjunctifiers were DFS subjunctifiers. “... like,
yeah, a different type of black” involved three subjunctifiers (“...”, “like”, “yeah”) that
qualify a distinction about the type of black that Shirley had seen; that subjunctifiers
were used did not undermine the fact that Shirley was describing seeing some type of
black.
CK EMB = 10
RTH EMB = 10
LLC24b: Yeah, like, before you talked about sort of like an off-white, like, a not intense white.
Is this the same kind of thing, like, an off-black, like, a not intense black, kind of?
S25b: [Laughs] Yeah.
LLC26b: Okay.
RTH27b: So tell me exactly again what you see.
S28b: Um… a hundred. And then x for times and then one and then equal sign. And it’s white
and… it was, it was clear.

281

Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifier? All subjunctifiers were DFS subjunctifiers. Shirley used subjunctifiers
while providing nuanced descriptions of directly apprehended experience (but the
subjunctifiers did not in any way undermine the fact that she was making distinctions
about phenomena). Thus, her subjunctifiers were in the spirit of improving the fidelity
of her descriptions.
CK EMB = 10
RTH = 9
RTH29b: Handwritten? Typewritten?
S30b: Um… like, typed.
Moment? Yes; Shirley appeared to describe the same moment as in all previous turns.
Experience? Yes. She described a part of her inner seeing.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. Because RTH24 presented Shirley with two options, it is
possible her subjunctification was intended to imply that her description should not be
believed at face value (thus making it a PNA subjunctifier). However, it is also
possible that her subjunctification was an attempt to adjust her description of her inner
experience (thus making it a DFS subjunctifier).
EMB = 8.5
RTH EMB = 10
RTH31b: Okay. And so the problem that you’re working… are you writing this problem down?
S32b: Um, the problem was on a piece of paper. Like, in front of me. But… I was at that beep I
was not…
Moment? Yes; Shirley appeared consistent in describing the same moment.
Experience? Yes. Shirley clearly contrasted the context of the situation (that the
problem was on paper she was reading) from what had been directly present to her
(“But... at that beep I was not...” implies that the description of context that came
before was not directly present to her).
Subjunctifiers? All subjunctifiers were DFS subjunctifiers. Shirley did not conflate
facts and context about the situation with what was in her direct experience.
CK EMB = 9.5
RTH EMB = 10
RTH33b:

So you’re real eyeballs are aimed at the paper, but your visual experience is in your
mental seeing of a hundred times one equals.
S34b: Yes.
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RTH35b: And the… and at the same time as that seeing, you know that the answer is gonna be
one hundred. And this—and I wanna make sure that I understand—do you also know in your
experience the general principle—that whatever times one is equal to that same whatever?
S36b: Yes. In my—in my… yeah, it’s like…
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Possibly. RTH31 provided Shirley with a possible description of her
experience based upon her reports in previous turns; however, Shirley did not quite get
to describing how that phenomena had been present to her.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. It was possible that she was simply assenting to RTH 31’s
suggestion (i.e., PNA subjunctification). However, it was also possible that her
subjunctification was in the service of faithfully describing her experience (i.e., DFS
subjunctification).
CK EMB = 7
RTH EMB = 10
RTH37b: And that’s, that’s as much in your experience as the other stuff?
S38b: Yes.
RTH39b: Okay. So it’s not just that a hundred times one equals one hundred, it’s that a hundred
times one equals, and, whatever times one is whatever, and that’s gonna make this come out to
be a hundred.
S40b: Yes.
RTH41b: Okay.
S42b: And, like, it was happening, like, at the same time.
Moment? Yes; Shirley appeared to be describing the same known moment.
Experience? Yes. This turn was entirely descriptive of directly apprehended
experience.
Subjunctifiers? DFS subjunctification. Although heavily subjunctified, S38 was
consistent with RTH11 and S12 where Shirley described two simultaneous phenomena
occurring at the moment of the beep.
CK EMB = 10
RTH EMB = 10
RTH43b: Okay. I’m good.
LLC44b: I guess… and this might not make sense with this experience—is the… is what you’re
seeing and kind of this… more, like, recognition kind of feeling / knowing kind of a process…
are, is one of those more present to you than the other?
S45b: [inhales] The… the recognition and, like, understanding part was more present than…
[gestures with her hand and cringes]
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Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Although heavily subjunctified, Shirley’s description is exclusively
descriptive of directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? DFS subjunctification; Shirley subjunctified a statement contrasting the
relative saliency of different aspects of her at-the-moment experience. The fact that she
used subjunctifiers did not change the fact that she is aimed at describing experience.
CK EMB = 10
RTH EMB = 10
LLC46b: The inner—what you were seeing? What you were imagining? Sorry, finish your
sentence.
S47b: No, I’m trying to think. Um… [looks down at notes] No, I take that back. The
recognition and, like, seeing this problem in my head was together.
Moment? Yes; Shirley appeared to cleave to the same moment as previous turns.
Experience? Yes; Shirley actively resisted both her own description (S45) and was not
led by LLC44’s question.
Subjunctification? DFS subjunctifiers. “Um...” was followed by a description of her atthe-moment experience (“No, I take that back. The recognition and... seeing this
problem [were] in my head together”), and thus acted in service of Shirley refining her
description.
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 9
LLC48b: Okay. So it’s not like—it doesn’t make sense to say one was more present than the
other?
S49b: No.
LLC50b: Okay.
RTH51b: I think I’m good.
LLC52b: Yup.
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Appendix E
Very-First-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Kayla
LLC1a: Just kinda tell me what if anything was in your experience when the beep went off?
K2a: All right. Uh, so... I was, like, I wasn’t really feeling anything too much… like, you
know. Um... like… when it went off, uh, my mom and I were making, like, uh, tuna
sandwiches, so I really just put the toast—the bread to toast and then she did everything else.
[Laughs] But um… yeah… uh... I was, I was, like, I guess I felt—like, physically I felt tired.
Like, uh… I’ve been up since like 5:30 in the morning, um... and I did some exercises in the,
in the gym that morning as well... and I had a long day. [Laughs] So I have three classes…
um, and… my... I had a midterm in one of the classes, so that didn’t help. [LLC: Yeah] So
yeah.
Moment? No. “Making… tuna sandwiches” described a period (not a moment) of
several minutes. Moreover, Kayla’s “long day” described events (not a moment) that
were completely irrelevant to the moment of interest.
Experience? No. “Physically I felt tired” may have described at-the-moment
experience or general context, but the remainder of the turn only described context or
speculation of causation: “Making… tuna sandwiches” described only actions being
performed, and “I’ve been up since like 5:30… I did some exercises… I had a
midterm…” merely described a timeline of events.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were PNA subjunctifiers. For example: “uh, so... I was,
like, I wasn’t really feeling anything too much” involved five subjunctifiers (“uh”,
“...”, “like”, “wasn’t really”, “too much”) that all qualified Kayla’s report of “making
tuna sandwiches” (which itself was about actions, not experience). An additional
example occurred when Andrea subjunctified her talk about her day’s activities. “But
um… yeah… uh... I was, I was like, I guess I felt—like, physically I felt tired” was an
entirely subjunctified sentence that included both multiple starts and stops, groans, and
an explicit acknowledgement of ignorance (“I guess” literally implied that what
followed may or may not have been true). Although “physically I felt tired” may seem
like a description of experience, Kayla’s listing of her day highlights her
misunderstanding of the DES task: she was talking—with great subjunctification—
about her day’s schedule, and not about experience.
EMB CK = 2
EMB RTH = 0
LLC3a: So, okay, so… you know, you’ve talked about a few different things: you’re making
sand—tuna sandwiches with your mom [K nods; K: Mhm], and you’re—you’ve had a really
long day, you’re tired from working out and getting up early and all this stuff [K nods]. And
so… I’m going to use a little visual aid demonstration here. So… you know, all of that is
something that’s kind of going on around you, maybe in your experience or not, and then at
some point [uses the visual aid] the beep goes off and then you shut it off. And so what we’re
interested in is what was directly present to you the moment before the beep interrupted you.
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K4a: Um… the main thing was just, like, we were, like, we were, like, actually in the middle of
making them when they went off. So then, um, that was just like, uh… that was the thing that,
that, that, uh, we were doing at that moment, so—
Moment? No. “We were, like, actually in the middle of making them when [the beep]
went off” is a reference to a timeless fact of an ongoing activity. Being “in the middle
of” making sandwiches is not specific to any moment, let alone the moment of the
beep.
Experience? No. “We were, like, actually in the middle of making [sandwiches] when
they went off” described actions performed; it did not describe directly apprehended
experience. This continued throughout the second half of her turn: “that was the thing
we were doing at that moment” was an explicit report of only the activity that Kayla
had been engaged in at the moment. It did not provide any description of what was
directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers? Many PNA subjunctifiers, none of which improved the fidelity of
describing experience-at-a-moment.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 0
LLC5a: Okay. And so… is some… is some particular aspect of making the tuna sandwiches
present? Like, you said you were, like, making the bread to toast or something like that?
K6a: Yeah. I think I had put in—I think I had put in the second, uh, set of, like, uh, bread,
‘cause like, you know, two tuna sandwiches. I think I put the second one in like uh right before
the beep went off. [Quizzically casts eyes upwards; pauses] Yeah, I did. And then, um… yeah.
Yeah, that’s what I did. [Laughs] I had to think about that.
Moment? No. Although “I think I had put in the second… set of… bread” may have
been somewhat more temporally precise than what was stated in previous turns, it did
not describe a moment. “Putting in” bread to toast refers to a period with an
indeterminate start and end point and has an unclear duration, lasting possibly several
seconds or minutes.
Experience? No. Kayla merely talked about the actions she had been performing: “I
had put in the second… set of… bread” was a statement of behavior and did not
describe directly apprehended experience. Kayla’s utterance where she reassured
herself that “that’s what I did” further demonstrated that this turn was about what she
had done and not about what she had directly apprehended. [We achkowledge that that
the interviewer’s turn (LLC5a) may have may have been understood as a question about
actions rather than about experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. No subjunctifiers improved the
fidelity of describing at-the-moment experience.
EMB CK = 1.5
EMB RTH = 0
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LLC7a: And is that directly in your experience? So… you know, it’s kind of a fact of the world
that you had just put the bread in the toaster [K nods and smiles; K: Yes!] or something like
that. Um… and, another—so, so a way that we like to, um, describe this would be, like, so…
right now, your arms are resting on the table [K: Mhm], but until I kinda called your attention
to it, you might not have been feeling your arms [K laughs] resting on the table. Uh… and so,
you know, it’s very possible for lots of things to be going on in the world around us with our
body… without it being directly in our experience. So, I guess the thing that we’re most
interested in is what’s directly—like, what’s really present to you, what’s in your experience
right when the beep interrupts you.
K8a: Hm… I have to think. Ooh... hm…
Moment? No.
Experience? No.
Subjunctifiers? This turn was comprised entirely of PNA subjunctifiers.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 0
RTH9a: So let me observe that your inability to answer this question is great from our point of
view. [K laughs and smiles with relief; K: OK!] This is exactly what we want to see on the in
our first interview. [K laughs with relief; K: OK!] Because what that means is that you’re
trying but you’re not sure that you know. And what we’re trying to build on—what we’re
trying to build on in the first interview or two is the skill of being able to do something that
you haven’t, you didn’t have before, and the best way we can do that is to get you in a position
where you can say, “Well, jeez, if I knew you were going to ask that question, I would’ve paid
more attention to it.” [K laughs; K: Yeah] And, and, and that’s perfect. That’s exactly what
we’re trying to do. So what this, this spiel is trying to do is to try to say… it’s not a failing of
yours not to be able to answer this question; this is… nobody can answer these questions on
the first day. We need, we need—you need to hear the specificity of our questions before you
can believe it, basically. [K nods affirmatively] So can I ask about the, the timing… let’s start
with the, the timing. So, when exactly did the beep occur?
K10a: Um… like, is it, like, the exact time? Or…?
Moment? No. RTH’s question was ambiguous between an “exact time” of day and the
moment of interest in DES (the moment at the leading edge of the beep).
Experience? No.
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. Kayla’s confusion about what
constituted the moment of interest [exacerbated by RTH’s ambiguity] illustrated that
Kayla was not yet understanding the DES procedure, and therefore was not describing
at-the-moment experience.
EMB RTH = 0
EMB CK = 0
RTH11a: I don’t want to know time of day, I want to know, as far as your activity was
concerned. So, I’m understanding that it has to do with the second toasting [K: Mhm]. But is
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this—have I put it in? Am I in the process of putting it in? Have I finished putting it in and
now I’ve turned my attention to the buttering of the first toasting, or…?
K12a: Um… I think it was just, we, like, I put—I had just put it in the toaster.
Moment? Ambiguous. “I had just put it in the toaster” referred to a relatively short
interval of time that lacked a discrete beginning and end, but the subjunctification
undermines confidence in it.
Experience? No. Kayla talked only about what she had been doing. She in no way
described any aspect of her directly apprehended experience. [Note that RTH was
asking just about time, not experience. His strategy was apparently to focus on the
temporal aspect, believing that the experiential aspect was not possible on this sample.]
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. It began with three
subjunctifiers (“Um”, “...”, “I think”), all of which undermined commitment to
describing any particularized moment.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 1
RTH13a: And, pushed down on the toaster?
K14a: Yes [nods].
RTH15a: And, and are still in contact with the toaster? Or have turned away from the toaster,
or…?
K16a: I would say that I had turned away from the toaster by that point.
Moment? No. “I had turned away from the toaster by that point” was a vague comparison
about a series of events: that she, at some point in the past, turned away from the toaster when
the beep sounded (and is notably not descriptive of a discrete moment). Any specificity was
undermined by the subjunctification.
Experience? No. This turn only described things Kayla had been doing.
Subjunctifiers? “I would say” implied that what followed was not a description of facts.
EMB CK = 1.5
EMB RTH = 0
RTH17a: Okay.
K18a: And, oh! Actually, I just remembered, I think I had also gotten a plate for that, for that
toast so that, like, whenever, whenever it was ready I could just put it on the plate.
Moment? No. “I had also gotten a plate” was a timeless statement-of-fact that was not
specific to any moment.
Experience? No. This turn only involved a report of the actions Kayla had performed
and her best inferences behind her actions. Nothing about this turn described directly
apprehended experience.

288

Subjunctifiers High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. None improved the fidelity of
describing at-the-moment experience.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 1
RTH19a: So on our timeline here, basically, I’ve put in the first toast out here [uses the visual
aid] and now I’m putting the second toast and now I’m getting the plate for the second toast
and I’m turning away to wherever and it beeps somewhere in there. Is that right?
K20a: Yes.
RTH21a: Okay. So, one of the things that you’re in the process of learning from us is that we
want to be very precise about when the time concern. Because we think that experience can be
quite a bit different—your experience when you put the first toast... the first toast in might be
very different from when you put the second toast in, might be different from when you go to
get the plate, which might be very different from what happens when you, when you turn
away from getting the plate [K: Mhm]. So we want to be precise about when—about when the
beep occurs.
K22a: Um, well, fff… so if we want to be precise, the toaster was warm from like the first, like,
uh, toasting, so that was different.
Moment? No. This turn involved a temporally indeterminate report that has nothing to
do with time; that the toaster was warm is a general statement that does not refer to any
specific moment.
Experience? Ambiguous. This turn may have described a fact about reality (the toaster
was warm) or a fact about experience (I felt the warmth of the toaster).
Subjunctifiers? The (PNA) subjunctifiers did not improve the fidelity of describing
experience-at-a-moment.

EMB CK = 1.5
EMB RTH = 0
RTH23a: And is that warmth in your experience at the moment of the beep?
K24a: Yes. Or, not at the moment of the beep, but, uh, it was like when I was putting the toast
in before the beep.
Moment? No. Although Kayla differentiated what had occurred before the moment of
the beep, simply ruling-out events that occurred before the beep does not imply Kayla
was describing a specific moment.
Experience? No. This turn only described facts about reality.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctifiers improved the fidelity of describing experience-at-amoment.

EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 0
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RTH25a: Okay. So, as far as your experience is concerned, I experience some warmth from the
toaster, but then I—that’s gone, and now I’ve turned my attention to get a plate and the
warmth is gone [K: mhm], so the question is what is in your experience right at the moment
when the beep goes off?
K26a: [Pauses] I wanna say I was turning away from the thing? I’m not sure on that.
Moment? No.
Experience? No. “I was turning away” was talk about actions. There was nothing in
this turn that described directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. “I wanna say” implied that all
that followed was hedge about a hypothetical situation, and “I’m not sure on that” was
Kayla’s explicit acknowledgement that her turn should not be understood
straightforwardly.
EMB RTH = 0
EMB CK = 0
RTH27a: Okay. And do you know what was in your experience as you were turning away?
K28a: Hm…
RTH29a: So, what if, so, in this training mode here, there’s what you’re doing, which is turning
away, and, and what you’re doing may or may not be related to what you’re experiencing.
When you’re turning, you could feel yourself turning, or you could be thinking about a castle
in Spain, you know? [K laughs] Your experience doesn’t have to be at all tied to what you’re
doing—might be, it might not be. What we want to know about is your experience at the
moment of whenever, whenever the random beep happens to sound, we want to know what
your experience is.
K30a: All right. Um… [looks up and to the left and right, thinking] I feel like if I remember
about what when I turned away from the toaster was, um, I was trying to be careful to like not
bump into my mom, because she was behind me, so, I had to be careful about that.
Moment? No. Kayla described an ambiguously-long period of time (i.e., while turning
away from the toaster, which could take several or many seconds).
Experience? Probably not. This entire turn involved Kayla talking about the actions she
had been performing (“when I turned away from the toaster”), inferences of her
intention (“I was trying to be careful to like not bump into my mom”) and facts of
reality (“because [my mom] was behind me”). None of these utterances describe
directly apprehended experience. However, being careful about her mother might have
been related to experience at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. “Um... I feel like if I
remember” was an explicit statement in the subjunctive mood. Kayla’s use of this
conditional phrasing signaled that all that followed is contrary to fact and should not be
understood straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 0
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EMB RTH = 2
RTH31a: Okay.
K32a: Uh, other than that I’m not sure. [smiles and laughs]
RTH33a: Okay. Well, I would say we should go on to beep number two here. I think you’re
getting—you’re getting a flavor of the kinds of... the kinds of specific questions that we’re...
that we’re trying to ask. Let’s go to beep number two and see what we get there. And I’d say
you’re doing a great job, again. I think I said that before but if I didn’t say that before, I’m
saying that now. You're doing… This is exactly what we want to be doing. [K: OK] Number
two.
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Appendix F
Very-Last-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Kayla
LLC1b: Um, number six?
K2b: So six, um… I, I decided to do neither of those things and, um, uh—I decided to, like, uh,
um… ‘cause I, I play piano, like, sometimes. So, I, I have a keyboard in my room and, um…
so, I was reading the sheet music on that. Uh, I, I think I printed it out, like, a few days ago,
and I was reading, uh… um… I think it was the third or fourth measure. Um… and I was
specifically focused on, like, the left hand, like, trying to figure out, like, how it should sound
and like, how to play, how to exactly play it. ‘Cause, like, in that specific measure the right
hand and the left hand kind of… kind of are jumbled together. [Laughs] So I was trying to
figure out how I would exactly play that.
Moment? Maybe. Although beginning with context, Kayla eventually trended closer to
describing a discrete moment: “I was reading... the third or fourth measure.”
Experience? Maybe. Although beginning with context, Kayla eventually described
directly apprehended experience by the end of the turn: “I was specifically focused
on... the left hand... trying to figure out... how it should sound and... how to exactly
play it”.
Subjunctifiers? High density, both PNA and DFS subjunctifiers present. The beginning
was highly subjunctified and many subjunctifiers were of the PNA-type (for example,
Kayla describes her experience in general: “’cause I play piano, like, sometimes”).
What eventually emerged, however, involved DFS subjunctifiers and approached
describing experience-at-a-moment: “I was specifically focused on, like, the left hand,
like, trying to figure out, like, how it should sound and like, how to play, how to
exactly play it.”
EMB CK = 6.5
EMB RTH = 6
LLC3b: And… um, how, how was that present to you?
K4b: Um… it’s… so, I’m seeing…, so I see the notes, like, on the, on the thing, and I’m trying
to… um, visualize how it, how it should sound. So, I guess, in a way, I’m hearing the, um…
I’m hearing—I’m trying to like hear it in my mind and at the same time also trying to like, uh,
uh… like, play it out on the piano itself.
Moment? Maybe. Kayla did not talk about her music learning experience in general or
about processes that are not related to a specific moment—she appeared to constrain
her report to the same “third or fourth measure” as in K2b.
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Experience? Likely but ambiguous. “I see the notes” is ambiguous, either descriptive
of directly apprehended phenomena or is context. Furthermore, she may or may not
have been “hearing” (her description of hearing is highly subjunctified, and “I’m trying
to hear” does not necessarily imply “I’m hearing,” and instead of experience might be
conveying something about her theory of sightreading.)
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density of indeterminate subjunctifiers. The subjunctifiers are
followed by a range of possibilities (trying to hear vs. hearing, for example). But that
range is fairly small—it’s all in the ballpark of trying to imagine the right sound.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 6
LLC5b: Okay. So, let me see if I—so it sounds like you’re, you’re looking at the sheet music...
K6b: Mhm!
LLC7b: ... and the notes in this measure for your left hand.
K8b: Yes. [nods affirmatively]
LLC9b: And, somehow, hearing what the notes should sound like in your mind?
K10b: Mhm. [nods affirmatively]
LLC11b: And… and you’re also playing it on the piano [K: Yes!]. Like, with your left hand—
all of that is going on at the same time?
K12b: Yes.
K6b, K8b, K10b, and K12b:
Moment? Likely. Kayla appeared confidently definitive.
Experience? Yes. Kayla constrained her report only to directly apprehended
experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 6
LLC13b: Is all of that in your experience at the moment?
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K14b: [Nods affirmatively] Yes. I’d say that, um… the main thing was, uh… like, playing it
was, like, not as present as, um, as like, hearing it in, like—hearing it and then, read, like,
reading it as well.
Moment? Yes. Kayla appeared to constrain her report to the same known moment as in
previous turns.
Experience? Yes. Not only did Kayla agree that two processes were occurring
simultaneously, but she clarified the relative present-ness of each part of her experience
(that hearing and reading the music were more present than playing the piano).
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. All of Kayla’s
subjunctifiers are followed by descriptions of experience-at-a-moment: “the main thing
was, uh... like” involves three subjunctifiers (“uh”, “...”, “like”) that modify “playing
[the music]”, which is a description of phenomena.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 8
LLC15b: Okay. Um… so it’s mostly about reading it and hearing it...
K16b: Yes.
LLC17b: ... but you’re also playing it and kinda, doing that with some attention.
K18b: Mhm.
K16 and K18:
Moment? Yes. Appears to be constrained to the same moment throughout.
Experience? Yes. All of Kayla’s responses were related to experience. [Note that
LLC17b gives more experiential presence to the playing than Kayla might have meant in
K14b “playing it was, like, not as present as, um, as like, hearing it.” Kayla assents, but
that is weak evidence.]
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 8
RTH19b: So I’m—I’d like to give you some space to… you, you sort of hedged your bets a
little bit on the hearing. Said it was sorta like hearing, maybe it’s like hearing… something like
that. Do you mean to say, in my imagination, I hear it? Or do you mean to say… there’s
something that’s sort of hearing-y about it?
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K20b: Um, in my imagination I hear it.
RTH21b: Okay. And what do you hear?
K22b: Um, like… uh… it’d be how, um, how I’ve heard it, like, played—um, and how, um…
like, trying to… hmm. I have a process about, like, uh, about like, uh, going about, like,
learning notes, like, uh, um… uh… I’m not sure how, how exactly to describe it like I know
like what notes should, like, with what a note should sound like. Um, so… in my mind I’m
trying to, like, hear it, like, and then put it together based on, like, what I’ve heard before. And,
what, um… um… what I’ve—what I know that these notes, like, sound like and how long I
should hold them for. Which isn’t that long [laughs] ‘cause they’re like sixteenth and eighth
notes, so…
K20b and K22b:
Moment? Probably. K20b was a very straightforward description of experience at a
moment. K22b (“I have a process about... learning notes”) was a contextual statement of
temporal indeterminacy: it was an in-general characterization that has no relevancy
towards time. However, Kayla then appeared to constrain her report back to the
moment of the beep: “in my mind I’m trying to... hear it,” and noting that the notes she
was attempting to hear were sixteenth and eight notes may have been a description of
at-the-moment experience.
Experience? Probably. K20b was a very straightforward description of experience at a
moment. However, like Kayla’s nonspecific constraint to the moment, she
simultaneously discussed both her general experience (her process of learning notes)
and potential at-the-moment experience (hearing music) in this turn. The inclusion of
“trying to” adds some ambiguity to the experiential descriptiveness: trying to hear and
hearing are two different things. But with that exception, she seemed to be struggling
to describe a difficult-to-describe experience.
Subjunctifiers? With the exception of the introductory “Um,” K20b has no subjunctifiers
at all. However, K22b was inconsistent; both PNA and DFS subjunctifiers appeared
present. “I have a process about, like, uh, about... learning notes” was an example of
Kayla’s subjunctifying a description of her general experience, whereas “um, so... in
my mind I’m trying to... hear it” may have been an example of Kayla subjunctifying a
description of directly apprehended inner hearing. Notably, Kayla’s observed difficulty
in K22b was correlated with her describing her “trying to figure out how the music
should sound” experience that she also subjunctified in K2b, K4b, and K14b. That is: she
consistently appeared to have difficulty describing her “trying to figure out how the
music should sound” experience.
EMB CK = 4
EMB RTH = 8
RTH23b: And so do you hear the notes that you see?
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K24b: Mhm. [nods affirmatively]
Moment? Yes. Kayla is asked a question about a specific moment, and she appears to
respond based on what was present in her at-the-moment experience.
Experience? Yes. Kayla provides a straightforward answer about experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 8
RTH25b: And… as opposed to: do you hear the notes that you have heard when somebody else
has played this?
K26b: I’d say it’s both, in a way. ‘Cause, um… in terms of like how I’ve heard it, like, I was
trying to figure out how, how um… uh… how I should play it? I guess? [makes a confused
grimace] Um… and then, um… I hear the notes, like, actually there [makes a gesture with her
fingers, as if holding a note between her index finger and thumb]. I’m [makes a confused
face]—I’m trying to figure out the best way I can describe this because, I, I, I don’t know… I
don’t know, like, the—how to put it into words, like, how I usually learn music.
Moment? Likely; then ambiguous. “I was trying to figure out how... I should play it”
and “I hear the notes, like, actually there” both suggested that Kayla was constraining
her report to a specific moment. However, “I don’t know... how to put into words, like,
how I usually learn music” was a temporally indeterminate statement about a
nonspecific process.
Experience? Yes; then ambiguous. Similar to her moment ambiguity, Kayla began with
describing directly apprehended experience (figuring out how to play the music;
hearing the notes), but ended the turn with describing her general experience (how she
usually learns music).
Subjunctifiers? Inconsistent; included PNA and DFS subjunctifiers. Kayla’s
subjunctification again appeared in conjunction with her “trying to figure out how the
music should sound” descriptions as in previous turns. “I was trying to figure out how,
how um... uh... how I should play it?” and “Um... and then, um... I hear the notes” are
both examples of DFS subjunctification that adjust descriptions of experience.
However, “I don’t know, like, the—how to put it into words, like, how I usually learn
music” involved PNA subjunctifiers that led towards generalities and away from
experience.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 8
RTH27b: So… first off, it would be interesting enough to know how you usually learn music,
but that’s—that’s beyond what we’re going to do here. So we’re, we’re only interested in what
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happens in this experience [K: Mhm]. And it seems to me that there’s sort of three things that
are going on here that are maybe hard to inter—hard to separate. There’s the hearing of the
notes that you’re seeing [K: Mhm], there’s the hearing of the notes that you’re actually playing
on the piano [K nods], and there’s the hearing of the… notes that somebody else has played
and recorded or whatever and you’re [K nods], you’re hearing that played back. Is that true,
that there are three hearings going on?
K28b: Yes. [nods affirmatively]
Moment? Yes. Kayla was responding to and successfully constraining her answer to a
specific moment.
Experience? Yes. Her answer was aimed purely at describing directly apprehended
experience
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification. Note that Kayla was markedly unsubjunctified in
this turn; there was no confusion, conflation, or generalization within Kayla’s response.
EMB CK = 6.5
EMB RTH = 8
RTH29b: Simultaneously?
K30b: Mmm… a little bit less from what I’m hearing from, like, the actual, like, piano, but
yeah.
Moment? Yes. Kayla appeared to be constraining her report to the same moment.
Experience? Yes. This entire turn described experience: the directly present hearing-ofthe-notes.
Subjunctifiers? All DFS subjunctifiers. Kayla merely subjunctified around the degree
to which the real-life piano hearing was present to her.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 10
RTH31b: And… and by a little less so you mean that’s there, the piano—the real piano, or the
real keyboard is making noise, but I’m just not much paying attention to it? Is that right?
K32b: Yeah.
RTH33b: So it’s not like you’ve turned the volume off of that.
K34b: [Nods slightly] Yeah.
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K32 and K34:
Moment? Yes. She appeared to constrain her report to the same specific moment as in
previous turns
Experience? Yes. Kayla responded to questions that pertain only to directly
apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 8
RTH35b: Okay.
LLC36b: Do you hear just the notes for the left hand? Or do you hear the entire—like, both the
left and the right hand together?
K37b: Both the left and right hand, um, for… for when, like, just to—just to kind of get a sense
of like how it should sound like together.
Moment? Yes. Kayla appeared to constrain her report to the specific moment that she
had been describing throughout the interview.
Experience? Yes, with difficulty. The turn began with a response to what Kayla was
hearing: the notes from the “left and right hand.” However, the turn ended with Kayla
providing speculation of causation (specifically, an explanation of why she had heard
the notes from her left and right hands: that is, to “get a sense of how it should sound
like together”), which did not contribute to any higher-fidelity description of
experience.
Subjunctifiers? Ambiguous. Kayla’s heavily subjunctified turn again appeared in
tandem with her “trying to figure out how the music should sound” description. It was
difficult to determine whether Kayla was subjunctifying to signal her descriptionfalling-short, or whether her subjunctification signaled that the phenomenon-was-notapprehended.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 6
LLC38b: Okay.
RTH39b: You’re not playing with your right hand; or are you?
K40b: No. [shakes head]
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Moment? Yes. Kayla was able to unambiguously differentiate between what she had
and had not been doing at a discrete and specific moment. That is, she was able to
straightforwardly report that her right hand was not playing the piano at the moment of
the beep.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
RTH41b: So when you look… so we gotta, we gotta know what we’re talking about here. The,
the—what you hear that comes from what you see: does that involve a left hand and a right
hand both?
K42b: Mhm [nods]. ‘Cause, the reason why is ‘cause, like, there’re, there’s like—the way it’s
written on the sheet music, um, the left hand kinda jumps up into the, into the, um… into the
right hand’s part. So, that’s why, that’s why I need to, like, hear, like, how it should sound
together.
Moment? Yes. Kayla appeared to refer to a very specific musical passage—she was not
talking about her general music learning process, or about any other moment.
Experience? Likely. Kayla’s “mhm” at the start of the turn was her assent to RTH’s
question about directly apprehended experience (that is: that she heard musical notes
that involved both her left and right hands). However, all that followed “mhm” were
speculations about her motivation/causations of behavior, which are not descriptive of
directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Ambiguous. Kayla appeared motivated to provide a high-fidelity
description of her experience, and she did so in a way that appeared constrained to a
discrete moment; however, she provided explanation (“’Cause, the reason why...”) and
speculations of causation (“So, that’s why... I need to, like, hear...”) about her
experience, which do not contribute to the fidelity of her description.
EMB CK = 4
EMB RTH = 8
RTH43b: Okay. And so… I hear the left hand and the right hand both from what I see and from
what I remember from what somebody else has played.
K44b: Mhm.
RTH45b: And so do those things sound the same?
K46: Um… that I’m not sure. [Laughs and smiles] Uh…
Subjunctifiers? This turn was made up entirely of subjunctifiers; however, her
subjunctified reply came only after being asked a very specific question about the
characteristics of her hearing (whether the hearing-of-the-keys-being-played sounded
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the same as hearing another musician playing the song). That is: she was not
subjunctifying about “basic” aspects of her experience at the moment of the beep, such
as whether or not she was hearing something at the moment of the beep; instead, the
possible content that Kayla qualified her report about was very small, such as the way
Kayla apprehended any differences between two types of hearing.
RTH47b: Well let me ask an easier question, then. Are you sure that there are two different
hearings going on here? [pause] One that comes from what you see and one that comes from
what you hear?
K48b: [Grimaces; pause] I’d say yes.
Subjunctifiers? “I’d say” characterizes the verb “say” in the subjunctive mood; “I’d say
yes” may likely mean “I have no memory of directly apprehending two distinct
hearings.”
RTH49b: Okay. And… can you, do you know the difference that… in what I’m hearing? I’m
hearing this coming from my, my eyeball-mediated stuff [K chuckles] and this from my
recollection-mediated stuff?
K50b: Hm…
RTH51b: And I’m, I’m asking because we’re interested in this kind of stuff; I don’t—we don’t
have any rules that say you should be able to do that or you shouldn’t [K laughs]… just trying
to figure it out.
K52b: Yeah, I’m trying to figure out cause, um… hmm. This is—this is a usually, this usually is
an easier thing to describe, like, if like I’m learning, like, the music without, like, having
heard, like, uh, um… like a previous recording. ‘Cause then, then I know, like, then I know the
difference. If I’m basing it, like, uh, off of a recording that I’ve heard, it’s a little harder to tell
the difference?
Moment? Ambiguous. “This usually is an easier thing to describe” was an explicit comparison
to other instances, not to the moment of interest. Additionally, “If I’m basing it...” set up a
hypothetical scenario and does not constrain the report to a specific moment.
Experience? No. There was no description of inner experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density, and many were PNA subjunctifiers. Most if not all of Kayla’s
turn involved talk of generalities and hypothetical situations.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 4
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RTH53b: And so, at this particular moment…
K54b: Yes.
RTH55b: ...was it harder to tell?
K56b: It’s a bit harder to tell. [nods]
K54b and K56b:
Moment? Yes. RTH53b corralled Kayla’s report back to the moment of the beep in K54b,
and she appeared to remain constrained to the moment of the beep in K 56b.
Experience? Yes. Kayla only described directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 4
EMB RTH = 5
RTH57b: So there’s two of them.
K58b: Mhm. [nods]
RTH59b: But it’s hard to tell which is which.
K60b: Mhm. [nods]
K58 and K60:
Moment? Yes. Kayla appeared to continually constrain her description to the same
known moment as she had throughout the interview.
Experience? Yes. These turns were exclusively about clarifying description of directly
apprehended phenomena.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 5
LLC61b: Okay.
RTH62b: And there’s one more real sound, but you’ve turned that down in your imagination, or
whatever. [K nods] [pause] And, given that you’re learning this song, is, is what you’re
hearing what is intended to be heard? I mean, does—does it convey what the music is actually
written? You’re hearing—you’re hearing the right, the right notes?
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K63b: Y—Huh. Like, the right notes as in, like…?
Subjunctifiers? Completely subjunctified; however, this subjunctification came from Kayla not
understanding the question presented in RTH62 rather than from difficulties describing
experience.
RTH64b: As in the way the composer had in mind, or…
K65b: Uh… that’s, that’s a tricky thing about this particular piece ‘cause, like, it was written in,
like, uh, a period where like, um… uh… like, there’s just—there’s not really like a specific
way that the composer had, like, had in mind for it? So, I’ve, I’ve heard a lot of different
recordings, like, uh, just like, with like different tempos and all that, so… there’s no right way
specifically to play it? But, um… I, I have, like, I have a personal, like, thing that like, that it
shouldn’t be played, like, too fast—like it sounds it sounds weird playing it kinda fast.
[Laughs]
Moment? No. Kayla discussed context about the musical piece in general and not about
a specific moment. [It should be noted that Kayla interpreted RTH62b and RTH64b in a
deeper sense than RTH had intended. Her interpretation was reasonable given what
RTH had said. Kayla’s interpretation of RTH’s question led her away from experience
at the moment of the beep.]
Experience? No. Kayla (likely in response to RTH64) talked only about context and
speculations of causation.
Subjunctifiers? High density; nearly all were PNA subjunctifiers. Kayla provided
explanations about the piece, generalities about previous times she had heard the piece,
and her reasoning about how she should play the music—all of which led away from
achieving a high-fidelity description of experience.
EMB CK = 0
EMB RTH = 3
RTH66b: Well, I can accept all of that, but I was, I was asking a more basic question, like, I’m
guessing since you’re reading the music, if it says b-flat you’re supposed to be playing this…
you’re supposed to be playing a note that’s a b-flat [K: Yeah] and if you miss the flat sign
you’d play a b-natural and that would be wrong.
K67b: Yes.
RTH68b: So is the music that you’re hearing right in that respect? That it’s the proper notes…?
K69b: Mhm. [nods affirmatively]
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RTH70b: … the notes as indicated?
K71b: Yes.
K67b, K69b, and K71b:
Moment? Yes; RTH66b clarified DES’ interest in only Kayla’s at-the-moment
experience, and Kayla successfully constrained her report to the moment.
Experience? Yes; K67b indicated Kayla’s understanding of RTH66b’s question, and K69b
and K71b was Kayla’s agreement about RTH68’s proposed description of what Kayla
had been hearing at the moment of the beep.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification. [Note that RTH’s clarification of his ambiguity at
RTH62b and RTH64b leads to a marked reduction in subjunctification.]
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 8
RTH72b: And are you playing the right notes as well?
K73b: Mmm… yes. [Laughs] It’s more so just, I was trying to figure out how to, um, how to,
uh… how to work with the, uh, with the way that it was with like the eighth notes and the
sixteenth notes. It was more so just, like, the timing that they should be. Um—
Moment? Yes. Kayla appeared to constrain her report to a specific moment.
Experience? Yes. This turn only described directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? All were DFS subjunctifiers. Kayla’s difficulty in describing her
“trying to figure out how the music should sound” description was again heavily
subjunctified. However, her subjunctification was now more tied to phenomena: “It
was more so just, like, the timing that they should be” described the (potential)
centrality on timing within her experience.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 5
RTH74b: So the problem isn’t so much in the notes themselves but what to do with them, or...
K75b: Yes.
LLC76b: And is that, like, what to do with them, like, the eighth versus sixteenth and that sort
of stuff—is that directly present in your experience?
K77b: Mhm. [nods]
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K75b and K77b:
Moment? Yes; Kayla appeared to constrain her report to a specific moment.
Experience? Yes; these turns were aimed at only describing directly apprehended
experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification. Note that while Kayla was still discussing the
same “trying to figure out how the music should sound” experience, she was now
unsubjunctified in her report.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 8
LLC78b: And is that, is that part of the hearing or part of the playing or… something—all of
those things?
K79b: All of those things. [smiles]
LLC80b: Okay. So this whole thing is trying—is the trying to figure out what this is, like, how
to play this.
K81b: Mhm. [nods]
K79b and K81b:
Moment? Yes; Kayla appeared to discuss only her at-the-moment experience.
Experience? Yes; these turns were answers to questions (LLC79b and LLC81b) aimed at
creating a high-fidelity description of phenomena.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification. Note that although LLC81b explicitly asked about
Kayla’s “trying to figure out what the music should sound” experience that she had
previously struggled with, Kayla did not subjunctify her response.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 8
LLC82b: And these different pieces kind of go into that?
RTH83b: And what are we playing? What piece is this?
K84b: Uh, Raindrop Prelude. By Chopin.
LLC85b: All right, I think I’m good.
RTH86b: I’m good.

304

K87b: All right.
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Appendix G
Very-First-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Jake
SAM1a: Okay, what was in your experience for beep number one, Jake?
J2a: So, I had it [looks at his notes]—uh, 12:57, I don’t know if the time matters too much.
Um… so the the first time, uh, it beeped, I was actually driving—the person, a friend of mine,
said, “okay, I need to... I need to park the car to get my experiences.” Um… I was actually
thinking, like, immediately, “what is it that I am—that I just experienced?” Um, I was listening
to... a song… um, just before. And, in my head, um... the chorus was playing. Um, I was
thinking about, uh… I was trying to, like, process the fact that, um… what was that beep for
again? It was for the study. So, I was thinking about—so um, when I, when I describe my
inner experiences, am I supposed to describe like, what happens during the beep, or occurring
right before or is there like a certain time frame that I should focus on? Because that, that was
the thing that actually was coming to mind like, it’s like wait, I actually didn’t clarify that this
beep occurred, was, was I supposed to like—okay, that’s what I just, like, was my inner
experience, or, is it what I’m doing, like, right now or should I start, like, monitoring that? So,
actually, that’s kind of an actual question, too, so...
Moment? No. Jake talked about a period of time, ranging from before the beep (“I was
listening to a song just before”), during the beep (“in my head… the chorus was
playing.”), and after the moment of the beep (“’okay, I need to… park the car to get my
experiences.’”; “I was actually thinking… “what is it… that I just experienced?”). Jake
also explicitly stated a lack of understanding about what should constitute the moment
of interest: he asked the interviewers about whether he should describe “what happens
during the beep, or occurring right before or is there like a certain time frame I should
focus on?”
Experience? Ambiguous. Jake described an undifferentiated mixture of context (“I was
actually driving”; “I was listening to… a song”) and potential experience (“in my
head… the chorus was playing”).
Subjunctifiers? High density, nearly were PNA subjunctifiers. The only exception
subjunctifier that might have been a DFS subjunctifier was the “um” and the question
mark within the only possible description of experience-at-a-moment: “in my head,
um... the chorus was playing.”
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 0
SAM3a: Yeah! So, the moment that we’re really looking for. So, say that this here is when the
beep goes off [J: mhm] right when the pen hits the, uh, legal pad [J: mhm], right? [J: mhm]
And then, the beep sounds and then the beep continues to sound, right? [J: mhm] We are
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looking for the moment, like, even the millisecond right before the beep interrupts your
experience.
J4a: [nods] Cool, okay.
SAM5a: And so that’s, that’s the moment that we’re focusing on as to what was ongoing in
your experience [J: mhm] right before it’s interrupted. So, our aim, really, is to… is, is to get
your experience even if you had—if you had no beeper, and we could get inside you and see
how you experience the world [J: Mhm.], that would be ideal, right [J: Ideal? Gotcha.]? So
that’s where—we don’t want to know, we don’t really care about what is going on [J: Gotcha.]
after the beep is sounding.
J6a: Okay, okay. Perfect. Then, that—what was going on was just like the, the chorus of a song
that I was listening to on the, um, on the, uh… um, Bluetooth speakers I was using. [clears
throat]
Moment? Ambiguous. It was unclear whether Jake was describing a single, specific
moment or a period of time (listening to the chorus of any song must take several
seconds).
Experience? Ambiguous. It was unclear whether “what was going on was... the chorus
of the song” described directly apprehended experience or simply described situational
context.
Subjunctifiers? All subjunctifiers were PNA subjunctifiers. “Then, that—what was
going on was just like” included two subjunctifiers (“—“, “like”) that were followed by
a nonspecific description of context or possible experience (“the chorus of the song that
I was listening to”).
CK EMB = 3
RTH EMB = 5
SAM7a: Okay. So right at the moment of the beep, you were listening to a song on Bluetooth.
J8a: Mhm.
SAM10a: Like, playing out of your, like, car stereo?
J11a: [nods] Mhm.
SAM12a: And, it was the chorus that you were listening to?
J13a: Mhm. Or had just listened to, actually. There was nothing—I was not listening to
anything, but it was just playing, kinda, in my head.
Moment? Ambiguous, but growing in specificity. Although Jake did not
straightforwardly cleave to a single, discrete moment, he made a greater differentiation
between what had occurred far before the onset of the beep (i.e., playing the song
through his speakers) and what may have been closer to the moment of the beep (i.e.,
sitting in silence, playing the chorus in his imagination).
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Experience? Ambiguous, but growing in specificity. Jake distinguished that he was not
externally listening to music; however, it remained unclear as to what (if anything) was
directly present to him.
Subjunctifiers? The “kinda” that Jake inserted into his apparent description of innerly
hearing music (“it was just playing, kinda, in my head”) implied that the description of
“playing” should not be understood straightforwardly.
CK EMB = 5
RTH EMB = 5
SAM14a: So this is an inner… inner experience? Like, an inner hearing experience [J: mhm]
where you’re repeating—
J15a (speaking over SAM): I could hear the—yeah, yeah.
SAM16: the chorus in your head?
J17a: Yeah.
J15a and J17a:
Moment? Nonspecific. Although Jake’s description was trending closer to describing a
specific moment, he was merely trending. Listening to the chorus of a song refers to a
span of several to many seconds and is not constrained to a specific moment.
Experience? Impossible to determine. SAM (not Jake) offers the description of innerly
hearing the chorus, which Jake merely agreed to.
Subjunctifiers? “Could hear” implied that the hearing may or may not have been
directly apprehended; thus, these turns were not a straightforward description of
directly apprehended experience.
SAM18a: And how was that—how was that present to you, that chorus?
J19a: I could, like, I had just heard the song and it was a new song, um, from an artist that... I...
have like a, taken a liking to. So, um, so it was pretty, like, clear. Like, auditorily clear. Um,
what I was hearing.
Moment? Nonspecific. Jake appeared to describe a somewhat specific period of time
(e.g., the listening to a song: “I just heard the song”), but did not describe an
unambiguously clear moment.
Experience? Nonspecific. Jake’s description that the hearing was “pretty... auditorily
clear” may describe directly apprehended experience, but much of what he described
was context (“it was a new song, um, from an artist that… [I have] taken a liking to”).
Subjunctifiers? High density, with many PNA subjunctifiers. “I could” was a
subjunctifier that indicated that what followed was merely possible, and ambiguated
whether what followed was or was not directly apprehended. Jake also theorized
causation from context: “I had just heard the song... so, um, so it was pretty, like, clear”
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implied that clear inner hearing must have been present (additionally, it is worth noting
that the auditorily-clear description of the inner hearing “so, um, so it was pretty, like,
clear” was also highly subjunctified, in that it comprised entirely of subjunctifiers save
for the words “it was” and “clear”).
CK EMB = 4
RTH EMB = 6
SAM20a: And—
RTH21a: So, so could I make sure I get the time frame down? [SAM: Sure, yeah] So, in our—
in this time, now this is time going this way [J: mhm] and the beep happens here [J: mhm], and
so what I understand is you’re driving and the song has been playing on the Bluetooth out here
somewhere.
J22a: Mhm. And then I’m not listening to anything, it’s just kind of like, I don’t know, just me
driving. And, um, I’m just listening to the song—well yeah, I’m just… the song is still fresh in
my mind I guess, and so—
Moment? Nonspecific. Although Jake continued to cleave to a relatively (by
comparison to his initial turn) specific period, he did not describe a specific moment.
Experience? Unclear. “I’m just listening to the song” may have described directly
apprehended experience, but all else described context (“I’m not listening to anything
it’s just... me driving”) or was an explanation of experience (“the song is still fresh in
my mind”).
Subjunctifiers? High density, most subjunctifiers were PNA subjunctifiers. Save for the
“um” before Jake’s description of possible inner hearing, all other subjunctifiers
signaled Jake’s imprecision with cleaving to experience-at-a-moment. “It’s just kind of
like, I don’t know, just me driving” was an entirely subjunctified utterance that
ambiguated both the timing and characteristics of any possible experience. Moreover,
“the song is still fresh in my mind I guess, and so” was a doubly-subjunctified
statement, such that “the song is still fresh in my mind… and so—” was a causal
inference and “I guess” implied that all that was stated should not be understood
straightforwardly.
CK EMB = 3
RTH EMB = 3
RTH23a: And, and but you’re not listening to the real song anymore.
J24a: [shakes head] No, no.
RTH25a: So, you’re driving, you hear the song, the song’s over. [J: mhm] And then you’re
driving some more—
J26a: Yeah. [smiles and nods]
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RTH27: And then—
J28a: It’s silence and—
J24a, J26a, and J28a:
Moment? Maybe. Jake demonstrated some temporal specificity by differentiating what
occurred before beep onset versus what was ongoing at the moment of the beep.
RTH29a: The thing beeps, while… [J: While I’m thinking about the song] and you start
thinking—rehearing, or hearing the song again, [J: Yeah] and then the thing beeps during that
time.
J30a: Yeah, yeah [nods]. And it’s gonna be a pretty common thing is, like, the music thing, is,
um—
Moment? No. Jake explicitly described his in-general experience, which was not at all
tied to a specific moment.
Experience? No, Jake described his experience in-general (which inherently was not a
description of a discrete, directly apprehended experience).
Subjunctifiers? None improved fidelity.
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 0
RTH31a: Okay.
J32a: I don’t know if, like, prefacing it, like, changes... perception of it but...
RTH33a: Well, that’s fine.
SAM34a: Okay. And, so… what, what, what words were present, if there were—I mean, you’re
saying—
RTH35a: Or what do you hear?
SAM36a: What do you hear, yeah.
J37a: Uh… it was, uh… Beyonce. Um… singing the chorus of a song called Walk on Water.
So, it was—it was just like, the, um… I forget how the chorus goes, but, um… it was that, it
was that chorus section of, like, Beyonce and stuff.
Moment? Maybe. Jake described only that he was (possibly) listening to the chorus of
Walk on Water, which was descriptive of a many-seconds-long period and not a
moment.
Experience? Maybe. Jake’s described possible inner experience: an inner hearing of
Beyonce singing the chorus of Walk on Water.
Subjunctifiers? Moderately subjunctified with indeterminate subjunctifiers. Jake’s
subjunctifiers may have signaled that Jake’s description-was-falling-short; however,
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the subjunctifiers may have also signaled that Jake failed to apprehend the
phenomenon.
CK EMB = 6
RTH EMB = 3
SAM38a: And was it in Beyonce’s voice that you were hearing it?
J39a: Mhm.
SAM40a: With the same kind of, like, inflections that—
J41a: Intonations... mhm.
SAM42a: Okay.
RTH43a: And you hear the band, and the, the drums, and the guitars, and the violins or
whatever, and the...?
J44a: It was only, uh, it’s a piano background, so it was just piano and her. Yeah.
Moment? Maybe. Jake continued to describe the same, relatively specific period as
previous turns, but he did not a specific moment.
Experience? Maybe. Jake first appeared to describe the actual characteristics of the
song (“it was only, uh, it’s a piano background”), and then implied that that was what
he had innerly heard. Thus, it was unclear whether this turn described context or
directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate; it was possible that this turn described what Jake innerly
heard, or it wass possible that Jake was causally inferring his inner experienced based
on the “real” characteristics of Walk on Water.
CK EMB = 5
RTH EMB = 5
RTH45a: Or you hear piano and her. Just as… she… as you’ve heard the recording?
J46a: Mhm. [nods] Right.
RTH47a: So, it’s exactly like hearing the recording again?
J48a: It’s, yeah. It’s kind of, um… it’s, it’s pretty much identical. Yeah.
J46a and J48a:
Moment? Maybe. Jake appeared constrained to the same, relatively specific period as
previous turns, but he still did not unambiguously cleave to a specific moment.
Experience? Likely. Everything Jake described appeared to be aimed at describing
experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density, but may be comprised of DFS subjunctifiers. RTH47a
asked Jake a yes or no question, and Jake’s response in J48a signaled that RTH47a’s
311

question may not have been entirely fair. “It’s kind of, um… it’s, it’s pretty much” was
an entirely subjunctified statement, suggesting that what followed should not be
understood straightforwardly (that the inner hearing was identical to the actual song).
In other words, Jake may have undermined his description that his inner hearing was
“identical” so that his description was faithful to his actual experience and not simply
confined to RTH’s yes or no question.
RTH49a: And… what’s the difference between “pretty much identical” and “identical?”
J50a: Because there could be, like, been details that, that I could’ve missed that, um… I don’t
know, like a background synth, or, something. Like, um… yeah, I don’t know if I, like, in my
head at the time it captured every detail? But, I, I know that it’s like, if, if I were to, like, like
hear the song again, it’s like, okay, I heard—definitely heard most of it.
Moment? Ambiguous. Jake appeared to refer to the same period as in previous turns.
However, Jake may have also been referring to a hypothetical scenario that was not
constrained to any particular unit of temporal specificity (that is, his description that he
“could’ve missed” aspects of the song or his hypothetical scenario of hearing “the song
again” may have referred to an abstraction of the period/moment and not the specific
period/moment itself).
Experience? Ambiguous. Although “I don’t know if I… captured every detail?” may
have described experience, all else described did not refer to directly apprehended
experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density, mostly PNA subjunctifiers. The opening statement
(“Because there could be, like been details… I could’ve missed”) was problematic as
“could” and “could’ve” implied only that what was said was possible; it did not clarify
what was or was not directly apprehended. Moreover, “if I were to… hear the song
again” described a hypothetical scenario, which is many degrees separated from
describing directly apprehended experience.
CK EMB = 4
RTH EMB = 4
RTH51a: So the question is, does it seem like, to you, as far as your experience is concerned,
I’m hearing that song the same way as it was before? Maybe it’s not exactly the same way
‘cause I’m overlooking the synth or whatever [J: mhm]. But as far as my experience is
concerned, I’m hearing Beyonce and the piano player and… just like I’ve heard it before?
J52a: [Nods] Mhm, correct.
RTH53a: Okay.
SAM54a: And is there, um… anything else in your experience at this moment? Like, you said
you were driving—was that in your experience at that moment, too? Or is that just a fact of the
universe that… you were driving and?
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J55a: Well, when—most of the time when I’m driving—I was pretty close to home, so… it was
more, uh… I guess, like, routine—I wasn’t really thinking about where I was going, I already
knew where I was going. So… I was just kinda like that—
Moment? No. Jake began the turn describing a timeless generalization (“most of the
time when I’m driving”). Even after he constrained his report to a relatively more
specific time (i.e., driving in his car while wearing the beeper), he did not clearly
cleave to a specific moment.
Experience? Not likely. “Most of the time when I’m driving” was a faux generalization
that was not a description of a particularized experience. Moreover, the remainder of
the turn included an undifferentiated blend of causal inferences (“I was pretty close to
home, so...”) and potential descriptions of experience (“I wasn’t really thinking about
where I was going”).
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were PNA subjunctifiers. This turn involved multiple
instances of causal inferences (“I was pretty close to home, so…” and “I already knew
where I was going. So…”) and undermining expressions (“it was more,” “I guess,”
“like,” “I wasn’t really”) that signaled all that Jake said in this turn was not committed
to describing any specific experience.
CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 1
RTH56a: Autopilot?
J57a: Autopilot, mhm.
RTH58a: And, and I think you’ve said that you heard this song in your head. Did you mean that
to be… was like the sound seem it was in here or did, did you mean that metaphorically, “I’m
just hearing it again?” So, does this song have a location?
J59a: That’s a good question. Um, I mean in the same way it’s like—if I were to repeat you
asking that question in my head, um… I, I would say it’s, yeah, in my head. Um… like, it’s the
same type of, um… I can kinda hear it in the same way as if, uh… like, I were to hear anything
else and then have it, like, replay in my head. Uh… it’s kind of—like, if you were talkin’ to
me, um, the same way that it’s like I’m kind of processing it as you’re speaking to me is the
same way that I’m hearing it in my head as… if I were to replay it.
Moment? No. This turn referred to a hypothetical scenario, not a discrete and specific
moment.
Experience? Very likely no. This entire turn was a simile about a hypothetical
circumstance. Although there may have been some small, latent description of
experience, talk about a hypothetical comparison makes any description of experience
unclear, as it is ambiguous as to what (if any) part of the hypothetical refers to actual,
directly apprehended experience.
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Subjunctifiers? The entire turn was essentially a single PNA subjunctifier. “I mean in
the same way it’s like...” implied that all that follows was similar to (but may or may
not be exactly descriptive of) Jake’s directly apprehended experience.
RTH EMB = 0
CK EMB = 0
RTH60a: And I’m with you there, but the question—so, obviously it takes place in your head;
you’re neurons are firing in there, [J: mhm] there’s no question about that, that there’s some
in-the-headness—
J61a: Yeah. I, I, I don’t know if I could describe if it was, like, like… like another, like… if it
was another—like if I could hear it, uh, pinpoint, like, in a specific location or anything? I just
kinda…
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 5
RTH62a: I mean you could be hearing it again on the imagining it coming out of the Bluetooth.
Coming out of your car speakers again.
J63a: [Nods] Mhm.
RTH64a: And I’m not trying to say that’s what I think it is [J: mhm], I’m just tryin’ to say, I
want to know—we want to know—if, if there seems to be a location, if there,… well, first off,
does there seem to be a location, and if so, where is it? And, we understand that this is your
first sampling day, and [J: mhm]… we, uh… you, uh, you probably didn’t expect us to be
asking that question, and, uh…
J65a: Yeah, no, it—it’s an interesting question but, um… I don’t know. The one thing I, I know
I don’t hear is, like, when I replay something I don’t, like—I don’t see her face singing it to
me, I just hear it. Um, I, I don’t, like—when I’m listening to the music, I don’t per se see, see
Beyonce in my head? Uh, seeing it, uh… I don’t know if I could pinpoint an exact location
[RTH: Okay], like, if I were to say in space, uh… since like, okay, it’s in the backside of my
head or it’s, like, in the world that I created in my head. Um…
CK EMB = 0
RTH EMB = 2
RTH66a: So, so let’s have a little conversation about what we’re about here. I don’t particularly
care—we don’t particularly care about whether there’s a location or not.
J67a: Okay.
RTH68a: If there is a location, we would like to know about it. [J: Yeah] But, if there’s not a
location we don’t care about that. [J: mhm] So, in my question about location was, was to try
to sort of open the window of what kinds of things might be experienced, but we—we haven’t
learned how to talk about them yet.
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J69a: [Nods] Mhm.
RTH70a: And… so you said “in my head” and I wanted to know if whether you meant that
literally or metaphorically—
J71a: Yeah, absolutely.
RTH72a: --and, uh… either, either way is totally, totally fine with me.
J73a: Okay [nods]. Um…
RTH74a: And, one more thing I would say [J: I guess...]—the, the general case of how you hear
things, how you hear my voice, how you hear whatever—we’re not too much interested in the
general case, we’re interested in these specific things, which might be very typical to what you
always do [J: Yeah, yeah], or they may be exceptional… we don’t really care about that.
We’re going to let the randomness take care of the, of “this is what I usually do” and then the
randomness will, we’ll see this a lot. [J: Uh huh!] And if it’s unusual, then, then well… so we
want to zero you in—zero us in—on… the particular—the particulars, which is at this point
was, “I was hearing Beyonce and the piano player” and… that’s basically it.
J75a: Yeah, yeah. I, I guess when I say, “in my head,” I mean it… I mean it figuratively. I, I
don’t mean it, like, I hear echoing in my head or anything. Um… yeah.
CK EMB = 1
RTH EMB = 3
RTH76a: Yeah, some people do, some people don’t. Some people say, “I hear it in my head”
and they will tell you it’s, you know, “it’s right in there, this is where I hear it.” [J: mhm]
Other people, you know… “I don’t really know; I don’t care; I’m just hearing it.” And either
way is okay with us. [J: mhm] We don’t know whether it’s important to know that, we’re just
trying to [J: yeah!]—get a view of what it is.
J77a: [Nods] Okay.
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Appendix H
Very-Last-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Jake
AK1b: Number five?
J2b: [Looks downward at notes] Okay, number five. Okay, so, we had the food to go and we
were walking out of the restaurant. And, um… and—[laughs] this one is, uh, kinda funny, but,
uh, I was trying to think of a different topic to distract slash avoid thinking about, um, the idea
of, uh… trypophobia, um, which is the, the fear of, of pores. Um, and in the restaurant I was
talking about—with my little brother—like, I just have kinda this aversion to, like, like, pores
in the skin, right? And we had, um… like, been talking about it and I was just getting kinda
like, like iffy about the whole concept and we had looked up a picture and I had the picture
etched into my mind and, um… and I was like, “okay, we, we—you know—let’s just think
about something else.” And, um… and… I remember trying to think of, like, “what’s, what’s a
different topic other than, you know, this one that seems to be, like, forcing itself into my
mind?” um, when, when it had beeped. So…
Moment? Nonspecific. Jake appeared to describe a somewhat specific moment (that it
had occurred after talking about trypophobia and after seeing a picture); however, it
was unclear whether Jake was describing a discrete moment or a period of several
moments.
Experience? Nonspecific. “Okay, number five...” to “kinda funny” and “Um, and in the
restaurant...” to “we had looked up a picture” all described mostly context. However,
parts of the turn included descriptions that may have described experience (“I was
trying to think of a different topic to distract slash avoid thinking about, um, the idea
of, uh… trypophobia”), although even in these instances, it was unclear how that
experience had been present to him (“I was trying to think of a different topic” may
have indicated he was not thinking.)
Subjunctifiers? Both PNA and DFS subjunctifiers were present. For instance: when
Jake described context, PNA subjunctifiers de-particularized his report as they did not
improve the fidelity of any description of experience (e.g., “like, I just have kinda this
aversion to like, like, pores in the skin, right?”; “we had, um... like, been talking about
it and I was just getting kinda like, like iffy” where all subjunctifiers are italicized). In
contrast, some DFS subjunctifiers may have been improving the fidelity of descriptions
(in that they signaled Jake was, with difficulty, putting words to his experience) but it
was not immediately clear what was or was not directly present in his experience at the
moment of the beep.
CK EMB = 7
RTH EMB = 8
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AK3b: So… before the beep, you guys had been talking about this fear of pores [J: Mhm], with
you and your brother [J: Mhm]. And you looked up a picture [J: Mhm], and then at this
moment you’re walking out—are you guys still talking... about it?
J4b: Yeah? Yeah. Not about that [AK: Okay], but, more about… um… I don’t even remember
what we were talking about, but I remember thinking that I… still have this in my mind—
Moment? Nonspecific. Jake’s description appeared consistent with at-a-moment
experience, but it was unclear whether he was describing a specific moment or a period
of time.
Experience? Nonspecific, but leading towards experience. Jake had been asked by
AK3b a question about the behaviors/events that occurred around the moment of the
beep. Accordingly, Jake made some differentiation between what was (“I... still have
this in my mind”) and what was not (that he was not talking about the picture, nor
attending to the ongoing conversation) directly present to him, all the while ending the
turn by returning to a description of directly apprehended experience (“I remember
thinking that I… still have this in my mind—“)
Subjunctifiers? The turn began with many subjunctifiers (“but, more about... um... I
don’t even remember what we were talking about”), but featured minimal
subjunctification when his report appeared to get closer to describing experience (“I
remember thinking that I... still have this in my mind”).
CK EMB = 7.5
RTH EMB = 8
AK5b: So you’re still being affected by the—
J6b: Correct.
AK7b: Conversation about—
J8b: So I’m just thinking, like… I wanna—I want to talk about something that will get my
mind off of it.
Moment? Nonspecific. It was unclear whether he was describing a specific moment or
a period of time.
Experience? Maybe, but very ambiguous. “I’m just thinking, like...” may have been an
initial attempt to describe directly apprehended experience or may have been a faux
description. Similarly, although “I want to talk about something that will get my mind
off of it” was consistent with Jake’s initial description of wanting to “distract slash
avoid thinking about trypophobia” in J2b, it is possible that this description may have
been an explanation of intentionality or simply a report about the content of his
thoughts (both of which do not describe directly apprehendable experience).
Subjunctifiers? “Like” was the only subjunctifier in this turn. Likely, it was a PNAtype subjunctifier by implying that what followed should not be understood
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straightforwardly. However, it could have also been a DFS subjunctifier by signaling
that Jake had difficulty in describing his experience.
CK EMB = 7
RTH EMB = 6
AK9b: And that’s like an internal thing with you: you’re trying to figure out a different topic.
J10b: [Nods] Correct.
AK11b: Okay. I just want to make sure I wasn’t, like, a conversation [J: It wasn’t, like, external,
yeah, yeah.] the two of you had. Okay. And so… what, how was that present to you? This,
trying to come up with a different topic? Trying to distract yourself? [J: Um—]
RTH12b: And, and is the picture still there?
J13b: Um… I… think the picture… was not there. I, I think it was, um… it was more, I had this
kind of disgust that, uh… I don’t even know if that’s the right word, but just this sense of
disgust? Um, from that conversation. And, um… I remember—you know, just thinking about
what is it that I can… change the topic to, to kind of, get rid of this disgust or avoid or, you
know, like, refocus.
Moment? Nonspecific, but his description was consistent with at-a-moment experience
and appeared constrained to the same moment as in previous turns.
Experience? Likely. This turn was centered on Jake trying to describe his directly
apprehended experience: “I... think the picture... was not there” and “I had this... sense
of disgust” described what was and was not present to him.
Subjunctifiers? High density; most were DFS subjunctifiers. For instance, Jake
explicitly stated his difficulty in describing his experience, saying “I don’t even know
if that’s the right word, but just this sense of disgust?” That Jake’s description of
“disgust” was subjunctified does not negate the fact that he was constraining to his
experience. His subjunctification also mirrored subjunctification used in previous
turns—in J2b and J8b, Jake described “trying to think of a different topic to distract slash
avoid thinking about… trypophobia” and “I want to talk about something that will get
my mind off of [trypophobia]”, respectively, and in J13b, Jake continued to describe this
desire with similar difficulty (“I remember... just thinking about what is it that I can..
change the topic to, to kind of, get rid of this disgust”).
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 8
RTH14b: Okay.
AK15b: So… [sighs]
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J16b: Like, there was no topic that, like, my mind had settled on. It was more of a, I was
considering possibilities of… considering the notion of, of, maybe, maybe I should change the
subject. Or, let’s change the subject.
Moment? Likely. “There was no topic that... my mind had settled on” appeared to
signal Jake’s familiarity with a known moment of experience (specifically, that Jake
cleaved to a specific moment amongst a several-moments-long process of trying-tofigure-out-a-new-conversation-topic).
Experience? Unclear, but growing in specificity. “I was considering possibilities of...
considering the notion of... I should change the subject” may have described an aspect
of directly apprehended experience; however, this report did not explicitly describe
how such phenomena had been directly present.
Subjunctifiers? All appear to be DFS subjunctifiers. Similar to J2b, J8b, and J13b, Jake
subjunctified his wanting-to-change-the-subject experience description: “considering
the notion of, of, maybe, maybe I should change the subject” involved three
subjunctifiers (“of,” “maybe”, “maybe”). The fact that Jake subjunctified this turn did
not diminish the fact that Jake had consistently described the same wanting-to-changethe-subject phenomena over multiple turns. In other words, the subjunctification did
not diminish the fact that he was seemingly describing something that was directly
apprehended, but the description-was-falling-short
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 8
AK17b: So is this a, a thought process? The, the thinking-type experience?
J18b: Um, yeah.
AK19b: And are there words? Specific words present?
J20b: Um… I don’t think so. I—I think it’s… yeah, [shakes head] I don’t think so. I think it’s
more of just um… just… the idea of it.
Moment? Nonspecific, although Jake appeared to describe the same known moment
that he has been described in all previous turns.
Experience? Likely. Jake denied words being present and instead independently
described that it was “more of just... the idea of it.”
Subjunctifiers? Likely DFS subjunctification. Because AK19b presented Jake with a
yes/no question, it is possible the subjunctification in the first two sentences signaled
Jake’s recognition that AK19b’s question was discrepant from his directly apprehended
experience. Moreover, AK19b’s question may have pressured Jake into providing some
sort of answer about words-being-present. Thus, although this turn was heavily
subjunctified, this did not diminish the fact that Jake (a) declined to go along with
AK19b’s suggestion of words and (b) provided his own description of how his
experience had been present to him that differed from DES investigators. Taken
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together, it was likely Jake’s subjunctification in this turn was more in the services of
signaling his difficulty in describing experience rather than to signal his failure to have
apprehended experience in the first place.
CK EMB = 8.5
RTH EMB = 8
AK21b: And is the idea… is it about changing the topic? Is it about distracting myself? Is it
about getting rid of the disgust?
J22b: I think it’s a little bit of everything.
Moment? Unclear.
Experience? Impossible to determine. AK21b presented Jake with several possible
ideas, and Jake responded in a way that left all proposed options open. It is possible
Jake did so because none of AK21b’s ideas were consistent with his experience, or
because Jake did not apprehend his experience at the moment of the beep, or something
else entirely.
Subjunctifiers? “I think it’s a little bit” was an entirely subjunctified statement of PNA
subjunctifiers; the turn was essentially one single subjunctifier that de-particularized
any commitment to describing a specific experience.
CK EMB = 4
RTH EMB = 6
AK23b: Little bit of all of that?
J24b: Yeah.
AK25b: Changing the topic to distract myself from the disgust.
J26b: Correct.
AK27b: That all those things are present and part of this.
J28b: [Nods] Correct, correct.
J24b, J26b, and J28b:
Moment? Unclear. Jake may have been referring to the same moment as in previous
turns, or he may be have been describing a period of time.
Experience? Impossible to determine. It was possible that AK21’s suggestion accurately
captured Jake’s experience; it was also possible that the waters have become too
muddied and that gaining a high-fidelity description of Jake’s beeped experience had
become subject to too much interference to do so.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
RTH29b: And new possibilities? Are they—
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J30b: No, I didn’t get that far.
Moment? Likely. This turn was consistent with the same apparent moment that Jake
described in previous turns, and in particular, this moment described in this turn was
consistent with J16b, in which Jake said that “there was no topic that, like, my mind had
settled on.” Thus, it appeared that Jake was constraining his description to that same
moment.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
CK EMB = 9.5
RTH EMB = 9
RTH31b: Haven’t gotten there yet. Okay.
J32b: I remember thinking even like the beep itself was kind of [smiling], uh, a relief because it
was like, “okay, I don’t even have to think about this beep as much as I had to write it down.”
So…
Moment? If J32b described a moment at all, the moment occurred after the beep.
However, it appeared that Jake presented what occurred after the beep as a way of
further clarifying when the beep had occurred (that he felt “relief” because he did not
have to think about what he should change the topic of conversation to was consistent
with his at-the-moment experience of not yet deciding on a topic). Moreover, Jake did
not appear to conflate his experience at the moment of the beep with his reaction
following the beep: recall that he spent the first turns of the interview describing his at
the moment of the beep experience (i.e., his desire to think of a different subject to talk
about), and did not appear to mistake the moment before the beep with the moment
described in J32b.
Experience? Possibly. Jake described thinking that the beep was a relief, which may or
may not have been directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers? J32b is presented as an alternative data point to better support his
description made from J2b through J30b; as such, J32b is an explanation of experience.
AK33b: So, then also I’m wondering, do you feel... this sense of disgust... in your experience at
this moment as well? I understand you are, like, in a state of—I’m, [J: yeah, yeah] I’m
bothered by this.
J34b: Yeah. Um, that’s a good question. I, I think, um… I, I know earlier, I was, like, kinda
feeling like itchy or uncomfortable. Um, like, even kind of, like, skin crawling sensation, but...
when I was walking out the restaurant, I don’t think so [shakes head]. I think it was… almost
exclusively, if not exclusively, like, a thinking process.
Moment? Maybe. Jake appeared to describe the same moment as in previous turns.
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Experience? Indeterminate, then likely. Jake began the turn with talking about an
indeterminate mixture of context and descriptions of possible experience. However, the
last two sentences of the turn appeared to describe directly apprehended experience.
First, Jake declined AK33b’s suggestion of feeling disgust, and second, Jake clarified
that this was “almost exclusively, if not exclusively, like, a thinking process.”
Subjunctifiers? PNA subjunctifiers at first, then possibly DFS subjunctifiers. Anything
described in the first half of the turn from “Yeah. Um, that’s a good question” to “skin
crawling sensation” was undermined by PNA subjunctifiers. Moreover, this section of
J34b featured a relatively high density of subjunctifiers. In contrast, subjunctifiers within
the second half of the turn (from “when I was walking” onwards) were much less dense
and were DFS subjunctifiers as the subjunctifiers did not detract from the fact that Jake
was describing a thinking process.
CK EMB = 8
RTH EMB = 7
AK35b: Thinking about what new topic could I… think about—
J36b: [Smiles and nods] Correct, yeah.
AK37b: To distract myself from this feeling, okay. And no new possibilities had arrived yet?
J38b: Yeah.
AK39b: Okay. And is anything else in your experience at this moment?
J40b: Um… the only other thing, and it was more automatic because I knew where I was going,
was heading to the car.
Moment? Maybe. Jake appeared to describe the same moment as in previous turns.
Experience? Jake did not describe directly apprehend experience. He appeared to
describe a walking-to-the-car action that he had been doing at the moment of the beep
but had not been directly apprehended (Jake’s use of “more automatic” to describe his
walking-to-the-car indicated that he appeared at least somewhat skillful of
distinguishing directly apprehended experience from all else).
Subjunctifiers? “it was more automatic because” was an entirely subjunctified
statement, but it was likely refining in nature as it communicated what Jake had not
directly apprehended.
CK EMB = 7
RTH EMB = 9
AK41b: And so automatic that it’s not even really in my experience? I’m, I’m heading there,
I’m mostly on autopilot?
J42b: Correct. [nods]
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AK43b: I’m really into this?
J44b: Correct.
RTH45b: So, what’s the word that means fear of pores?
J46b: It’s, uh, trypophobia?
RTH47b: T-R…
J48b: T-R-Y-P-O?
RTH49b: And, and is that something that you’ve characterized yourself? That I have
trypophobia?
J50b: No [shakes head], no. I, I know that that fear exists, and I was talking about, with my little
brother, about how our conversation was like I could never become a dermatologist because I
can’t, I can’t deal with, like, lesions on the skin that are, like, that look like pores. Um, and, I
was telling him about, um, you know that there’s the fear of pores and, and we looked that up
and there was a picture of a person with their skin—and their skin was exactly what I was
telling him about and I can’t—I have a hard time dealing with. And then, that’s how that came
about.
RTH51b: Okay. Alright.
AK52b: Okay.
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Appendix I
Very-First-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Macy
Note: Prior to the start of the very-first-sample interview, Macy stated that she forgot to bring
her notes.
SAM1a: All right, so what was in your experience for beep number one?
M2a: Um, I was really worried that I did it wrong, [laughs] [SAM: Okay] um, just because I
hadn’t—I had turned it on, and hadn’t received a beep yet. Um… so, that’s actually when I
had texted you, saying, “I haven’t gotten it,” something like that. Um… and I was just—I was
worried, um… that I was doing it wrong.
Moment? No. Macy demonstrated little temporal specificity: “I had turned it on, and
hadn’t received a beep yet” referred to a period of time. Additionally, “that’s actually
when I texted you” may or may not have referred to a specific moment, and instead
likely referred to a period of several seconds or minutes.
Experience? Possibly. “I was really worried” may have been an initial attempt at
describing experience, but it also may have been a report of context. All else that she
talked about were either statements of facts (“I had turned [the beeper] on”) or context
(“that’s actually when I had texted you”).
Subjunctifiers? Moderate subjunctification density; most were PNA subjunctifiers.
Everything Macy uttered from “just because” to “something like that” was either
context or causal inferences of experience—none of what she said improved the
fidelity of describing her at-the-moment experience.
EMB CK = 2
EMB RTH = 1
SAM3a: Okay. Okay! So, um… I’m gonna use a kind of a little visual for us to, um, explain
really what the moment of the beep is. Like the precise moment. So, it sounds like before the
beep went off, you had turned on the beeper—obviously—and, as time is kind of marching
along like this [S: Mhm], um, you’re worried that the beeper isn’t going off [S: Working,
yeah], working, um… and then, at some point, you text me [S: Mhm], um, and then… and
then the beep went off [S: The beep went off]. And so, what we’re looking for is the moment,
like the millisecond right before [S: Mhm] that beep goes off [S: Mhm], what was in your
experience.
M4a: Um, it was just… the worry.
Moment? Possibly. Macy appeared to refer to the same instance as in M2a, but it was
unclear whether Macy was describing a specific moment.
Experience? Possibly. “The worry” may have been descriptive of directly apprehended
experience, but it could have also been a report of context.
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Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. Macy’s subjunctifiers (“Um,” “...”) did not
unambiguously undermine her report, but they also did not unambiguously signal an
effort to improve her description of experience.
EMB CK = 5
EMB RTH = 2
SAM5a: The worry?
M6a: Yeah, yeah. It was just the… “oh no, I did this wrong!” kind of thing.
Moment? Possibly. Macy appeared to refer to the same instance as in previous turns,
but it was unclear whether Macy was describing a moment.
Experience? No. “Oh no, I did this wrong!” referred to the content of experience;
Macy did not explicitly describe how any phenomena had been directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers? This turn ended with a PNA subjunctifier (“kind of thing”) that
approximated all that came before it. Thus, this subjunctification decreased the fidelity
of her description of any at-a-moment experience.
EMB CK = 4
EMB RTH = 3
SAM7a: Okay. [Pause] And how would you say that worry was present to you? Was it…
M8a: Whaddaya mean?
Notes: This was a clarification question; as such, no annotation nor EMB ratings were
provided.
SAM9a: Like, you say, um… “Oh no, I did this wrong!” [S: Mhm] Would you say that that
was present to you in words? Or was this worry more of a thought kind of thing?
M10a: It was more of like a, a pressure.
Moment? Likely. Macy appeared to constrain her report to the same moment as in
previous turns.
Experience? Likely. “A pressure” is phenomena that can be directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers?. “It was more of like...” implied a comparison—that what follows may
be more similar to a pressure (but did not straightforwardly imply that a pressure was
directly apprehended).
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 4
SAM11a: A pressure?
M12a: More of like a pressure, like, of…Uunhh! [grimaces and gestures with her hands].
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Moment? Likely. Macy appeared to constrain her report to the same, known moment as
in previous turns.
Experience? Likely; Macy was consistent about describing directly apprehended
pressure.
Subjunctifiers? Similar to her previous turn in M10a, Macy subjunctified her description
of “pressure” by stating it was “more of like” a pressure; note that more of like a
pressure may or may not actually describe a directly apprehended experience.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 4
SAM13a: Okay. And how would you say that pressure felt?
M14a: Like how it manifested?
Notes: This was a clarification question; as such, no annotation nor EMB ratings were
provided.
SAM15a: Or, how—what it felt like in that moment. For you.
M16a: Um… it was just very, um… like, it just made me worry that I wasn’t doing it correctly,
I guess. It was the… like—I don’t know—pressure on my chest kind of…
Moment? Indeterminate. Due to the high subjunctification density, it was difficult to
establish what moment (if any) Macy may have been describing.
Experience? Not likely. Everything except for “pressure on my chest” (which may
describe experience) were subjunctifiers or causal inferences.
Subjunctifiers? High subjunctification density; all were PNA subjunctifiers. Nearly
every word spoken in this turn was a subjunctifier. In particular, “it just made me
worry that I wasn’t doing it correctly” was a causal inference, and “I don’t know” was
an explicit statement that what followed should not be understood straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 5
EMB RTH = 5
RTH17a: So you mean a bodily pressure?
M18a: Yeah.
RTH19a: You mean [S: Like a physical—] a physical, physical [S: Yeah] pressure? Kay.
CK20a: And is that on, like, in the middle of your chest? [S: Yeah, more of like, a, a—] Trunk
area?
M21a: --the chest area. Right in the sternum, kind of.
M18a and M21a:
Moment? Likely. Macy appeared to describe the same moment as in previous turns.
326

Experience? Likely. Macy described a relatively specific location of the bodily
pressure (“right in the sternum). Note that Macy’s description was different than the
location proposed by CK20a (“is that on... the middle of your chest? Trunk area?”),
which suggests Macy was describing a directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. “Kind of” may suggest that the description of “in the
sternum” should not be understood straightforwardly, or it may be modifying the
description.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 9
SAM22a: And how would you—would you say this pressure is something that’s, like, almost
going inward?
M23a: Yeah.
SAM24a: Or is it—
M25a: Yeah, it’s, it’s more of an inward, like, an elephant on your chest.
M23a and M25a:
Moment? Likely.
Experience? Maybe. Macy was consistent in describing a physical chest pressure;
however, note that SAM22a was first to suggest an inward pressure, not Macy.
Subjunctifiers? All subjunctifiers were PNA subjunctifiers. “It’s more of” was an
approximation, not a straightforward description; similarly, “inward, like, and elephant
on your chest” was a simile that lowered the possibility of describing phenomena with
high-fidelity.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 9
SAM26a: Okay.
CK27a: And does the pressure feel like, like a ton—like, a lot of pressure? Like something [S:
Yeah!?] really heavy—
M28a: I mean, it’s not like a ton of pressure, it’s more of like the, the… like, the… [smiles] I
don’t really know how to describe it, it’s like a, um … not a seizure [S makes hand gestures to
her mouth], but like a—
Moment? Likely.
Experience? Maybe. Macy explicitly struggled with describing her experience (“I
don’t really know how to describe it”). Although it was possible that Macy was simply
struggling in describing a known and directly apprehended experience, it was also
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possible that she did not actually apprehend her experience and so was unable to
describe it (or something else).
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate subjunctification throughout; it was unclear whether
Macy was undermining her report or whether she was attempting to improve the
fidelity of her report.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 8
SAM29a: Restriction?
M30a: Restriction, yeah.
SAM31a: Okay.
CK32a: So is pressure and restriction, like—
M33a: They’re—
CK34a: --two ways of saying the same thing? [S: Yeah, yeah]
RTH35a: And… pressure sounds sort of like a flat surface going in [S: Mhm] and restriction
sounds like a clenching up [S: Yeah, it’s like a (compresses her hands together and clicks her
tongue)]. So it is both a—
M36a: Yeah.
RTH37a: --both a crunching up and a pushing in?
M38a: Yes.
M30a, M33a, M36a, and M38a:
Moment? Likely. Macy appeared to refer to the same moment that she has been
describing throughout the majority of her entire interview.
Experience? Maybe; Macy merely assented to queries made by DES interviewers. That
assent may have indicated (but did not confirm) that what was being described was
descriptive of experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 7
RTH39a: And in the same, in the same area?
M40a: About the same area, yeah.
Moment? Likely.
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Experience? Maybe; like previous turns, Macy merely agreed with a description
proposed by RTH39a. Macy did not independently describe the chest pressure as being
in the same area.
Subjunctifiers? This turn was entirely subjunctified: “About the same” ambiguated any
straightforward description of experience.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 8
RTH41a: And, would—and so is that two sort of separate aspects of the same thing? [S: Um…]
I feel a pressure inward and a crunching up?
M42a: I, I would say that they’re about the... same. Like, they’re… parts of the same thing.
Moment? Likely.
Experience? Maybe. Macy again assented to an original suggestion first made by
RTH41a.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. “I would say” involved a subjunctified verb form that
implies all that follows may or may not be contrary to fact.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 9
RTH43a: Okay. But so it’s not—it’s not just two different words for the same thing, it’s two
different aspects—it’s two different aspects of the same thing.
M44a: Uh… yeah? I think I would say that.
Moment? Likely.
Experience? Very unlikely. Only Macy’s concurrence has any possibility of being an
attempt at describing experience. The rest of the turn was subjunctified.
Subjunctifiers? This turn was entirely comprised of subjunctifiers, all of which were
PNA subjunctifiers.
EMB CK = 3
EMB RTH = 7
RTH45a: And both are physical.
M46a: Mhm.
RTH47a: And somehow you know that this about whether you did it right?
M48a: Yes, yes.
RTH49a: How do you know that? Is there something about this experiment/about this
experience that is… a doing it right, not doing it right?
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M50a: Um, I think it was just like more of a worry of, like, “oh my god, I’m gonna mess up
their experiment.” [laughs]
M46a, M48a, and M50a:
Moment? Likely.
Experience? Maybe. Macy in previous turns described worry as potentially being
present, and her description in M50a may have been a first attempt at describing the
worry.
Subjunctifiers? Highly subjunctified, nearly all were PNA subjunctifiers. “Um, I
think...” implied that all that followed should not be understood straightforwardly; “it
was just like more of [a worry]” was an ambiguated comparison and not a
straightforward description; the “like” that preceded “oh my god...” suggested that all
that followed may be similar to (but not exactly) like what was described.
EMB CK = 1
EMB RTH = 3
RTH51a: And is that worry present to you right at the moment of the beep, or is that sort of the
ongoing thing and what’s—
M52a: It was like present at the moment of the beep and ongoing.
Moment? Indeterminate. It is possible that Macy was constraining her report to the
same moment as in previous turns, but it is also possible that Macy’s report was in
reference to talking about an approximate period of time and not a moment.
Subjunctifiers? Very little subjunctification, except for “like” which may have
undermined a commitment to a particularized moment.
EMB CK = 3
EMB RTH = 3
RTH53a: And in what way is it present at the moment of the beep?
M54a: Um, what do you mean?
Notes: This was a clarification question; as such, no annotation nor EMB ratings were
provided.
RTH55a: Well, I could be saying to myself, “geez, I’m worried that I didn’t do it wrong” or, I
just know that I maybe I didn’t do wrong, but there’s no words involved… or, I could see a
picture of disappointed people. I mean I guess there’s a lot of different ways that that could
present itself.
M56a: Um, I mean, like, I was just worried because I—I hadn’t received one yet and so I was
kind of just like the… the anxiety of it. That I wasn’t... it wasn’t, like, beeping correctly.
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Moment? Not likely. Aside the description of “I was just worried”, M56a was primarily
a report of the period leading up to the moment when the beep occurred; Macy
described nearly everything other than the leading edge of the beep.
Experience? Not likely. Although “I was just worried” and “the anxiety of it” may
have been descriptions of experience, these descriptions were indeterminately mixed
with inferences about experience (i.e., that she was worried because something may
have been wrong with her beeper).
Subjunctifiers? Highly subjunctified, nearly all were PNA subjunctifiers. Macy began
the turn with three subjunctifiers preceding her description of (possible) experience:
“Um, I mean, like, I was just worried). The description of “I was just worried” was then
followed by two speculations of causation (“because I—I hadn’t received on yet...” and
“That it wasn’t... beeped correctly”), which both undermined a commitment to a
straightforward description of experience-at-a-moment.
EMB CK = 3
EMB RTH = 3
RTH57a: So that makes it seem like the “not being done correctly” is sort of the context to this
whole—the whole time up until the beep and at the beep, what I feel is the pressure in my
chest—which I know comes from all this stuff.
M58a: Right, right.
Moment? Not likely. Macy did not make any differentiation between the moment of
the beep and all else that came before; that specificity came from RTH57a’s suggestion,
not Macy.
Experience? Not likely. RTH57a presented Macy with a potential summary of her
experience; Macy herself simply assented.
Subjunctifiers? None.
[RTH sneezes twice]
RTH59a: Excuse me. So the—so, so the question is, is there some thinking involved right here
when the beep goes off? Or is that—at the moment of the beep, I just feel it in my chest?
M60a: It was more of that I feel it in my chest—like the [groans] okay.
Moment? Maybe; Macy appeared to be referring to the same known moment as in
previous turns.
Experience? Maybe. It was possible that Macy was describing directly apprehended
experience; it was also possible that the accumulation of suggestions, summaries, and
presuppositions expressed throughout the interview soiled the possibility of a highfidelity description of experience.
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Subjunctifiers? “It was more of” implied that what followed may or may not have been
directly present. Macy further ambiguated her description using a metaphor (“like the
[groans] okay”).
EMB CK = 5
EMB RTH = 7
RTH61a: Okay. I think we’re good.
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Appendix J
Very-Last-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Macy
SAM1b: Okay, so what was in your experience for the last one, beep three?
M2b: Um, the last one—I was, um, laying down and, uh… cat had come and laid down with
me, and my thought at the moment of the beep was, um, there was: “My cat is so cute!” [M
laughs] And, um… seeing her mental image of, like, her… smiling? Like, closed eyes,
smiling. Um, in my head. At the same time.
Moment? Yes. Macy explicitly stated, “my thought at the moment of the beep was...”
and went on to describe two simultaneous experiences that were consistent with
experience apprehended at-a-moment (that is: she did not describe phenomena that
took place over a period of time).
Experience? Yes. “My cat is so cute” and “seeing her mental image of, like, her...
smiling” are descriptions of directly apprehended phenomena.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were DFS subjunctifiers. Where Macy described
experience (e.g., everything after “my thought at the moment of the beep...”),
subjunctifiers were immediately followed by a description of directly apprehended
experience. In other words, the subjunctifiers in M2b always led towards improving the
fidelity of describing the phenomena.
EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 8
SAM3b: Um… so, it sounds like there are two experience that were going on. You have, “my
cat is so cute” and then, also, [M: The visual.] the visual of your, um, cat smiling. Which
would you say is more prevalent, are they 50/50?
M4b: Um, I would say the image is more prevalent.
Moment? Likely; Macy appeared to be describing the same moment as in M2b.
Experience? Yes; this turn was entirely about directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. “Um, I would say” was a subjunctified phrase that may
be undermining the description that followed or may have been an attempt to refine a
difficult-to-describe aspect of experience.
EMB CK = 6
EMB RTH = 8
SAM5b: Okay. By how much, would you say? [M grimaces] 60/40 or 70/30, or?
M6b: Mmm… 60/40’s a little too high.
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SAM7b: Okay.
M8b: Um… probably like 55/45. [Laughs]
M6b and M8b:
Moment? Yes; Macy appeared to consistently describe the same known moment as in
previous turns.
Experience? Yes; everything Macy described was about directly apprehended
experience. Of note, Macy in M6b disagreed with SAM5b’s suggestions of relative
experience strength, and instead independently offered her own relative ratio in M 8b.
Subjunctifiers? All were DFS subjunctifiers. Macy was observed to consistently
subjunctify her description of the relative strength of her experiences across multiple
turns: in M4b, she subjunctified (“Um, I would say...”) when stating which phenomena
was more present. In M6b, she sujunctified again (“Mmm...”) before disagreeing with
suggestions offered in SAM5b. This likely signaled that Macy was attempting to refine
the relative strength of the two directly experienced phenomena with fidelity. This
struggle persisted in M8b, which provides further evidence that Macy was trying with
difficulty to describe her experience.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 8
SAM9b: Okay.
M10b: Like just a smidgen more.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Macy made highly-detailed distinctions in the relative strength of
her directly apprehended experiences.
Subjunctifiers? “Like” was a DFS subjunctifier. It was used entirely in the service of
improving the fidelity of her description of experience.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 9
SAM11b: Okay. Um, and so, um—what do you see?
M12b: Um… so, I’m looking at her—she’s on my arm. Um… and, there’s the background of
my room, my walls are green and, um… I have my drapes down, and then there’s my cat
laying on my arm. Um… looking not at me, but looking… out. Um… and, just, her eyes are
closed. And… she’s smiling.
Moment? Yes; M12b appeared to describe the same moment as previous turns.
Experience? Yes; everything Macy described was about directly apprehended
experience—specifically, what she had innerly seen.
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Subjunctifiers? All were DFS subjunctifiers; every subjunctifier was followed by a
description of inner experience, and no subjunctifier ambiguated what was being
described.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 9
SAM13b: Kay. And this is—this is something you’re actually seeing?
M14b: Yeah. It was something I had seen just a second ago.
Moment? Yes. Macy appeared to make a skilled distinction between the inner seeing
that she described in M12b (i.e., the “it” in M14b) and a separate, external seeing that she
experienced just before the onset of the beep (i.e., “something I had seen just a second
ago”).
Experience? Yes. Although SAM13b’s question was vague (it was unclear whether
“actually seeing” refers only to external seeing or any seeing/visual experience), Macy
explicitly noted that what she had been innerly seeing was also something she had
externally seen “just a second ago.”
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctifiers.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 9
SAM15b: So— [pause]
M16b: It was something I had seen just a second ago, and then I had thought about it at the
beep. Yes.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes; Macy strengthened the explicit differentiation between what
occurred just before the beep (i.e., externally seeing her cat and room) versus what she
directly apprehended at the moment of the beep (“then I had thought about [what I had
just seen] at the beep”).
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 9
SAM17b: Okay, so… at the beep, this is actually something that you’re… [M: Replaying.]
replaying or you’re innerly seeing. [M: Yeah] Of something you had just seen.
M18b: Yes.
SAM19b: Okay.
RTH20b: And just exactly like you were just seeing, as far as you know?
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M21b: Yes. [Nods]
M18b and M21b:
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 8
SAM22b: So you said she was looking—she wasn’t looking at you.
M23b: No.
SAM24b: She was—okay. So it was exactly like what you saw.
M25b: So. [She adjusts her left arm, then her right, then twists her body. She laughs at herself
and her movements.] Sorry, I’m like, I’m trying to recreate it. Um… I was looking at her like
this [M is pretending to look directly at her cat, which was positioned to M’s right side] and
she was looking towards that [straight ahead] way.
M23b and M25b:
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Macy not only described what she saw, but worked hard reposition
her body to recreate the scene.
Subjunctifiers? Low subjunctification density, all of which were DFS subjunctifiers. In
repositioning her body and making comparisons between her recreation and her
experience, Macy was trying to act out a known scene that had occurred at some
specific moment.
EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 9
RTH26b: And she had been looking that way while you actually saw her [M: Yes; M nods], and
now you closed your eyes and—does it seem like you continue to see her? Or does it seem like
you’re now seeing an image of her.
M27b: Um, I, I… I continue to see her.
Moment? Yes. Macy consistently appeared to describe the same moment throughout
the interview.
Experience? Maybe. Macy parroted and assented to descriptions proposed originally
by RTH26b, not herself.
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. “Um, I, I... I” could portend a refining clarification, or
could be an attempt to undermine what follows.
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EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 7
RTH28b: Okay.
SAM29b: Okay. I’m gonna go on to the other portion. [RTH: Okay] So, um… the other portion
is, “my cat is so cute.” How is that present to you?
M30b: Um, it was, um, it wasn’t talking. It wasn’t really hearing, it was just like thinking. The
words were present. They’re, um… it was, uh… I don’t think there was much emotion
attached to it. Um, it was just a recognition of “my cat’s so cute.”
Moment? Yes. Macy’s description in M30b was consistent with the same moment she
described in all previous turns.
Experience? Yes. The entire turn was aimed at describing how “my cate is so cute”
was present.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all subjunctifiers were DFS subjunctifiers. Macy’s main
quibble was in describing a seemingly speech-less, soundless, emotionless recognitionwith-words-present phenomena—her subjunctification appeared to stem from the
difficulty in describing this experience in high fidelity and not from an unfamiliarity
with the phenomena.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 5
SAM31b: So the words are present—are these specific words present? “My cat is so cute”? [M:
Mhm] Versus “My cat is so…” [M: Yeah] something else [M: Yeah].
M32b: Okay, so cute. And, um—
Notes: Macy was cut-off from completing her turn by RTH33b; because her turn was
incomplete, no annotation nor EMB ratings were provided.
RTH33b: And can I—can I make sure that [SAM: Yeah, go ahead]—so I think it’s possible to
have a thought that would be rendered in words, “my cat is so cute,” without those words
being present or any words being present. So I wanna make sure that I understand: is it the
idea—“my cat is so cute”—that is present to me even without any words at all, spoken or
otherwise? Or, is it that these particular exact words are somehow present, even though they’re
not spoken.
M34b: [definitively] The words were present themselves.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Both in M34b and in previous turns (e.g., M30b, M2b), Macy
consistently described directly apprehending words.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
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EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 9
RTH35b: Okay. [Pause] And is there any way to say how these words were present?
M36b: Um… they were, they were just kinda there. Um… like, I know… let me think. ‘Cause I
know, I, like, didn’t hear them, but I didn’t, like, speak them either. I just know that they were
there. Um… [looks quizzical]
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes, but with difficulty. Although Macy had been consistently describing
the words as having been directly apprehended across the entire interview, she
struggled in this turn to describe how the words had been directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers? High density, all were DFS. All subjunctifiers were followed by an
effort to describe how the words were directly apprehended; that is, her
subjunctification was in the difficulty in improving the fidelity of her report. For
example: “Um… like, I know… let me think. ’Cause I know, I, didn’t hear them, but I
didn’t, like, speak them either” involved seven subjunctifiers (“Um”, “...”, “like”, “...”,
“let me think”, “’Cause”, “like”), all of which are followed by describing
characteristics of phenomena (“I know, I... didn’t hear them” and “I didn’t... speak
them either”).
EMB CK = 10
EMB RTH = 9
RTH37b: In a voice? In a… seeing them?
M38b: I guess, I mean I guess it would be in a voice—I mean again, it’s definitely in my own
voice. Um… I—the closest I could think of it being, um, compared to is like talking to myself.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Maybe. It is possible that Macy was refining her description of her
experience, but it is also possible RTH37b’s inquiry may have influenced Macy’s report.
Prior to RTH37b inquiring about a voice, Macy consistently maintained that the words
were not innerly heard or spoken: just one turn prior in M36b, Macy stated that she did
not hear nor speak the words; in M30b, she stated that it “wasn’t talking” and “it wasn’t
hearing”; in M2b, Macy merely stated that “My cat is so cute” was present without
specifying how it was directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers? High density, many were DFS subjunctifiers. “I guess, I mean I guess it
would be” was an entirely subjunctified statement that undermined any commitment to
describing a particularized moment of experience. Macy also ended the turn by stating
a relative comparison to a generalized situation (“the closest I could think of it...
compared to is like talking to myself”) rather than providing a straightforward
description.
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EMB CK = 5
EMB RTH = 6
RTH39b: So you had an example of talking to yourself in the previous beep [M: Right] before
“we got it” [M: Right]. This one’s not like that?
M40b: [Shakes head] It’s not like that, no. Because that was more of an active telling myself,
“okay, I got it.” This is more of a passive, like, “My cat’s so cute!” Recognition almost.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Very likely. Macy made nuanced distinctions between a previous inner
speaking (“that was more of an active telling myself”) and the current inner speaking
(“this is more of a passive... recognition almost”).
Subjunctifiers? Very little subjunctification; only the “like” preceding “my cat’s so
cute” is a subjunctifier, and it acts more as a means of refinement.
EMB CK = 9
EMB RTH = 6
RTH41b: So, I—I guess I’m—I’m haven’t figured it out yet; what you’re trying to say. And I
recognize that this is a totally difficult, maybe impossible task here but… so I think we’ve
established that there are words present [M nods; M: Mhm.], and the words are, “my cat is so
cute” unquote, exactly those words [M nods]. I’m still not sure whether I’m—whether I’m to
understand that these words are present in your voice or whether that’s sort of a metaphor or
sort of like—in my voice.
M42b: Um, it’s in my voice. Um… yeah, I mean, it’s in my voice.
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Maybe. RTH41b continued to express confusion regarding the presence of
an inner voice, which forced Macy to answer in M42b. In other words, Macy discussed
an inner voice as a response to RTH41b; she did not offer this description on her own.
Subjunctifiers? Each sentence in the turn began with the subjunctifier “um,” which
may have signaled that what follows should not be understood straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 9
RTH43b: Okay, so it’s my voice [M: Yup]. These words are in my voice [M nods], but yet I—
they’re not spoken in the same way that it’s, or the “got it!” is [M: Correct]. And, but are they
spoken as opposed to heard using, into the tape recorder and coming back?
M44b: I mean, I guess so? It’s not in the same manner, but, I mean yeah, I guess.
Moment? Yes.
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Experience? Maybe.
Subjunctifiers? High subjunctification density; most subjunctifiers were PNA
subjunctifiers. “I mean, I guess so?” is a strained positive acknowledgement (as
opposed to an unambiguous “yes”). Moreover, “I guess so” was immediately followed
by an explicit disagreement (“It’s not in the same manner”) and a repeated “I mean
yeah, I guess,” which further implied that what Macy was saying should be not
interpreted straightforwardly.
EMB CK = 4
EMB RTH = 5
RTH45b: So somehow it’s spoken.
M46b: Yeah.
RTH47b: But not in the same manner as, “got it” is spoken.
M48b: Correct [nods].
M46b and M48b:
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Likely; Macy assented to descriptions of experience proposed by RTH.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 7
EMB RTH = 8
RTH49b: And, what’s, what’s the difference between those two manners?
M50b: Um… the one—so, the “got it” is more of an active I am talking to myself, I am
reassuring myself that I got—I’ve taken care of it. Um… this one it’s—the way that I feel it’s
more, more passive; it’s not… it’s more fleeting. Um… and it’s not, it’s not really a… hm, I
don’t know how, how to explain it. [Pause] It’s—I can only describe it as passive, like, it’s
like a pacified… [gestures with her hands, as if something is passing by, or flying out an open
window].
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Yes. Although heavily subjunctified, M50b was solely about describing
how “my cat is so cute” had been directly apprehended.
Subjunctifiers? High density; all were DFS subjunctifiers. Macy’s ability to
consistently draw differences between previous instances of inner speaking and “my
cat is so cute” signaled that she likely knew (i.e., directly apprehend) something, but
struggled to put it into words. This was bolstered by the fact that she explicitly stated
this difficulty: “I don’t know how, how to explain it.” Ultimately, Macy’s
subjunctification was a sign of her commitment to describing her experience in high
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fidelity (and not from her ignorance, reliance on presuppositions, a report of
generalized experience, etc.)
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 9
RTH51b: So it’s like something you would say but not to yourself. Just saying it.
M52b: Yeah, just saying it.
RTH53b: Whereas in “got it” is saying and receiving it saying it too.
M54b: Yeah.
M52b and M54b:
Moment? Yes.
Experience? Likely; Macy assented to descriptions of experience proposed by RTH.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
EMB CK = 8
EMB RTH = 8
RTH55b: Okay.
M56b: I hoped that helped. [Laughs]
RTH57b: Well, I’m sure it helped. There’s no question about that. We’re just trying to make
sense of what kind of an experience is about, and…
M58b: Right.
RTH59b: Okay, I’m good.

341

Appendix K
Very-First-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Emma
RTH1a: What’s in your experience at the moment of the first beep?
E2a: Um... and the first beep came up very—fairly quickly after I turned, um, turned it on.
RTH3a: And when was that, was that yesterday or this morning?
E4a: Yesterday, I turned it on at about five-ish and it went off at about 5:28. [RTH: Okay] so it
hadn’t been on that long. Um, I was cooking dinner, um… and then I was thinking—I also notice
I have inner conversations with myself. [Chuckles and smiles] Um... sometimes, like, just
talking to myself sometimes I’m envision I’m talking to somebody else. And, I envision—'cause
I’m probably gonna go get my x-ray done today for my ankle, and I was, like, thinking of what
it would be like to talk to the person, like, explaining well, like, why I wear the big brace while
I’m here on campus and why I wear a little brace at home. And thinking about that ‘cause I’m
scared of falling here on campus. [RTH: Okay] When I walk.
Moment? Mostly no. Most of what was described was about ambiguous or non-existent times.
Emma started with a specific time of day (5:28) and noted that the beep occurred while she
was cooking, but then talked about timeless generalizations (“I notice…”; “sometimes…”),
nonspecific futures (“I’m probably gonna…”), and causation speculations (“’cause I’m
scared…”).
Experience? Mostly no. Most of what was described was about context (“I turned it on at
about five-ish and it went off at about 5:28.”), generalities (“I also notice I have inner
conversations with myself”), and speculations about causation (“And, I envision—cause I’m
probably gonna go get my x-ray done”). However, the description from “I was, like, thinking
of what it would be like to talk to the person” onward may have been an attempt at describing
experience.
Subjunctifiers? High density; nearly all were PNA subjunctifiers. Emma used softening
expressions (“Um”, “like”) and causal inferences (“’cause I’m probably...”) to qualify her
description, such that her turn was in no way committed to describing any specific experienceat-a-moment.
CK EMB = 2
RTH EMB = 5
RTH5a: And so at the moment of the beep, are you... are you engaged in an imaginary
conversation with somebody?
E6a: Yeah.
RTH7a: And... and so we would like to know the details of that conversation… what, what...
who’s talking, and to whom? And...
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E8a: I, I imagine myself talking to a doctor. I imagine male since most of the sports medicine
people I’ve talked to have been male doctors.
Moment? Ambiguous; then No. The turn started out possibly describing a specific
moment (“I imagine myself talking”), but that description may have also described a
long-duration event. Then, Emma began to offer a speculative characterization of a
lifetime of encounters (“most... people I’ve talked to”), which was not about any
particular moment.
Experience? Ambiguous; then No. The turn started out sounding like a specific
experience, but then turned to a speculative hedge.
Subjunctifiers? All were PNA subjunctifiers. The “I imagine” that appeared in the
second sentence signaled that what followed was a hedge, and “since…” was a causal
inference—inferences are not descriptive of experience.
CK EMB = 2
RTH EMB = 5
RTH9a: And so at the moment of the beep, are you seeing a male doctor?
E10a: Yeah.
RTH11a: In your imagination? [E: Yeah] We understand this is your imagination. [E laughs; E:
Yeah] And what exactly do you see?
E12a: Um... I’m in like an x-ray room, or, talking to them explaining why, like, explaining
about why... what’s going on, like, that I fell, I rolled my ankle, and I—they think it might be
fractured, and...
Moment? Possibly. “I’m in like an x-ray room” may have described a possible
moment; however, “talking to them explaining… what’s going on… I fell… they think
it might be fractured” described a process that must have taken place over many
seconds.
Experience? Ambiguous. “I’m in an x-ray room” and “talking to them” may have
described aspects of experience, but the rest of the turn described content and not how
phenomena was directly present.
Subjunctifiers? Moderate density; mostly PNA subjunctifiers. For instance, “talking to
them explaining why, like, why…” involved two subjunctifiers (“like”, “…”) that was
followed by an entirely subjunctified list of the contents of a several seconds-long
discussion (“what’s going on, like, I fell, I rolled my ankle”).
CK EMB = 2
RTH EMB = 4
RTH13a: And, and do you... do you see yourself? Or, do you see just the doctor? Or how does
that work?
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E14a: I, like, see—like, see myself as I’m like sitting there, so I can see, like, my, like,
peripheral vision and, like, I can see myself sitting in the room, but like I’m mostly seeing
what’s around me, not really me. So it’s like I’m looking through my own eyes.
Moment? Ambiguous. Although Emma appeared to describe a discrete moment of
inner seeing, her report included mutually exclusive descriptions of third-person and
first-person seeing—as such, it was difficult to determine whether Emma was talking
about a general period of time (e.g., her experience across several seconds) or of a
single moment.
Experience? Ambiguous. The turn was contradictory: she first stated seeing in the
third-person (“I... see myself as I’m like sitting there”), but then later described seeing
in the first-person (“it’s like I’m looking through my own eyes”).
Subjunctifiers? Indeterminate. It was possible that Emma used subjunctifiers as a
means of signaling her description-falling-short; however, an alternative (and probably
more likely) possibility was that Emma used subjunctifiers as a means of signaling the
phenomenon-was-not-apprehended (PNA subjunctifiers). Emma did not appear to
constrain her report to known experience, as her subjunctification significantly departicularized any straightforward description of a single experience-at-a-moment. “So
I can see, like, my, like, peripheral vision and, like, I can see myself” was a heavily
subjunctified description of an apparent third-person seeing that involved four
subjunctifiers (“can”, and three “likes) and was immediately followed by another
heavily subjunctified description that described a contradictory first-person seeing
(“but like I’m mostly seeing what’s around me, not really me”).
CK EMB = 2
RTH EMB = 4
RTH15a: So it’s as if you were in the room [E: Yeah], but you don’t see yourself, you see what
your eyes would see? [E: Yeah] So you don’t see yourself at all, you see the... doctor as if you
were there looking at the doctor [E: Yeah], is that right? And... and you describe a
conversation where, about, well, I fell down, and whatever [E: mhm], and that would seem to
be—that description, I would think in real life would take ten or fifteen or thirty seconds to,
to... [E: Yeah] to accomplish. And we are very interested in what’s going on right at the
moment of the beep. So I’m... I’m understanding you to be saying, I’m, I’m imagining seeing
the doctor, and I see this room... and then the beep happens [E: mmm], and then you stop the
beep [E: mhm]. What—what part of that experience is right here, right here at the leading edge
of the beep, so to speak? Just before the beep interrupts you?
E16a: Um... um, right at the beep… right when the beep went off, I was like… I, like, had it in
my pocket without the headphones in, and I heard something, like, “wait what is that?” And…
then I’m like, “wait, is it the beeper?”, and then I pulled the beeper out of my pocket and I
heard it beeping and then I turned off the button so, like, the beeping, like, stopped—like it
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made me pulled me out of, like, the conversation and maybe—or “what am I—what am I
hearing?” [RTH: Okay] And then… I’m like, “oh, it must be the beeper.”
Moment? No. She did not wear an earphone while sampling and was not sure when the
beep occurred. For instance, Emma described her reaction to the beep (i.e., after the
moment of the beep; “right when the beep went off... I heard something”) and a period
of a few seconds following the beep sounding (“I pulled the beeper out of my pocket...
I turned off the button... the beeping, like, stopped”). However, she then returned to her
(potential) experience that occurred at an unknown moment/period before the beep
sounded (“it... pulled me out of... the conversation”), which further obscured the
timeline surrounding the exact moment of the beep.
Experience? No. Emma described (possible) experience that occurred before, during,
and after the beep. Moreover, there was no clear differentiation between directly
apprehended experience (such as hearing the beep) from context (such as her
description of turning the beeper off) and content (her report of “wait what is that?” did
not at all describe how that was present to her).
Subjunctifiers? High subjunctification density; nearly all were PNA subjunctifiers.
Subjunctifiers were not reliably followed by descriptions of directly apprehended
experience, and as such, the subjunctifiers led to an ambiguous description of
indeterminable things (i.e., possible experience, presuppositions, context). For
instance, “I was like... I, like, had it in my pocket” involved three subjunctifiers (“like”,
the vocal pause (“...”), and the second “like”) that was followed by a description of
context.
CK EMB = 0.1
RTH EMB = 2
RTH17a: So what I’m understanding there is that I, I’m seeing an image, the beep occurs, I’m
not sure about the beep, the beep occurs somewhere in here [E: Yeah], and then I go back and
try to reconstruct?
E18a: Yeah.
Moment? No. Emma (by answering affirmatively to RTH17’s characterization of her
beep one sampling process) acknowledged that she was unsure when the precise
moment of the beep occurred.
Experience? No, impossible. Emma agreed with RTH17’s characterization that she
relied on reconstruction after the beep had sounded in order to attempt to reconstruct
what had been in her ongoing experience.
RTH19a: Okay. So... one of the things you’re gonna find in this conversation is that we are very
particular about trying to get the beep—trying to get exactly what was happening at the beep
[E: Okay]. And I think that that will be much easier for you if you will wear the b—wear the,
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the... [E: The headphones] the headphones. I don’t care whether you wear the headphones that
we gave you—did we give... did we give you?
SAM20a: I think she—you said that you...
E21a: I have my own.
SAM22a: Right.
RTH23a: Okay. So wearing your own headphones is fine. But, the... but the, the... what you
gave is a great example of why it is that we think that the headphones is a good idea, because,
the—that part of, well, “is that the beep? Is that the beep?” That—you lose what’s... what’s
actually in experience while that’s going on [E nods], and we think if you would wear, the, the
earphone, that beep will sort of get injected right into your experience and it’ll be easier for
you to say, “well, right at the moment of the beep [E: Okay], this is what’s going on.” [Pause]
So, I’m—I’m interested in the... one more aspect of the visual... of the visual experience. So...
or, or of this experience. So at the moment of the beep, are you talking, or is the doctor
talking?
E24a: I was talking.
RTH25a: And is—does the doctor talk in this experience, or is it a you-doing-the-talking?
E26a: Uh, the doctor didn’t talk at all.
RTH27a: Okay. And... and you—you’re talking... does this appear like, “I am seeing a situation
in which I am talking”? Or does it seem like “I’m in my imagination talking at this moment”?
E28a: It feels like... I’m in a situation talking.
RTH29a: Okay. And—and that talking... does that talking seem like, feel like, is apprehended
like you’re talking out loud?
E30a: It can feel like—[RTH: Like talking—like talking to me?]
E31a: Yeah.
RTH32a: Okay. And, and I guess I want us to make one more distinction, and, actually... I want
us to make a lot of distinctions but the one that occurred to me right now is... between what
you usually do and what you’re doing at the moment of the beep. We would like you to focus
on what was happening at the moment of the beep whether or not that is typical of what... of
what your experience [E: Okay] usually is. So maybe usually you do, you do it one way—
that’s fine, we’re not disagreeing with that. But, if it’s true that that’s what you usually do,
then our random samples will show that [E: mhm]. And if it’s... and, and, and, I would say that
some people are mistaken about what their usual characteristics are, and so—so we would
like... what we call “bracket” or set aside the “usually” part and focus just on the... on what
happens at that particular moment [E: Yeah]. Whether it’s typical, whether it’s atypical [E:
mhm], just what’s happening at the moment of that the beep... goes. [Pause] So I’m thinking
that that’s pretty good about beep number one, we ought to go on to talk about beep number 2
unless there’s anything else about that that we... that I haven’t asked yet.
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E33a: No, I think that’s good. It’s at that point I’m like, “Let’s not have it in my pocket”
[smiles]; just leave it where it can—where I’ll be able to hear it better, so then I set it on the
counter while I was cooking, and... then—
RTH34a: Well, that’ll be an improvement [E: Yeah], that’s good. But putting it actually right in
your ear, that will even improve that.
SAM35a: Alright.
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Appendix L
Very-Last-Sample Annotated Interview Transcript for Participant Emma
SAM1b: Okay. What was in your experience for beep number 4?
E2b: [looking at notes] I was, uh, feeling chest... chest pain.
Moment? Probably. Emma appeared zeroed-in on one experience. (Said in another
way: Emma did not report on a process that had to have occurred over a period of time,
or on her experience as-a-whole).
Experience? Yes. This was straightforwardly descriptive.
Subjunctifiers? All were DFS subjunctifiers. The two subjunctifiers (“uh”, “...”) were
followed by a description of directly apprehended experience—that is, Emma’s
subjunctifiers led towards improving the fidelity of experience.
CK EMB = 7
RTH EMB = 8
SAM3b: Okay. And so, at the beep... [E: Um...] how was it... what were you... what was
present? Like... [SAM’s voice trails off and E and SAM laugh]
E4b: Um, I was kinda like... feeling that it was there. Not, not like, at the moment of the beep
but I was really like thinking about it, I was just kind of... I know it’s there, but I’m not, like,
analyzing it at the—like, at the moment of the beep.
Moment? Very likely. Emma made distinctions about what was present to her in
relation to the beep (“I was kinda like... feeling that it was there. Not, not like, at the
moment of the beep”), and reported on a moment that appeared to be clearly known to
and apprehended by Emma.
Experience? Yes. Emma’s turn clarified the previous description—that her experience
was of a feeling of chest pain, not thinking. There was no reporting of anything that
was not immediately present to her at the precise moment of beep six, such as context,
generalizations, or presuppositions.
Subjunctifiers? High subjunctification density; all were DFS subjunctifiers. That is, her
subjunctifiers were all followed by descriptions of directly apprehended experience—
her subjunctification was in the service of honing the fidelity of her report. For
example: “Um, I was kinda like... feeling that it was there?” involved four
subjunctifiers (“um,” “kinda, “like,” “...”) that modified her description of feeling chest
pain.
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 8
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SAM5b: Okay. So, right here... right before the beep, and the beep catches you... what is...
what’s present?
E6b: I’m, like, aware that, there’s... the pain in my chest.
SAM7b: Okay. And... what is “aware?” What do you mean by “aware,” I guess is a...
E8b: Yeah... kinda—
SAM9b: Like are you feeling it? And you’re not...
E10b: I’m, like, feeling it but I’m not... like, really, that engaged on thinking about it.
E6, E8, and E10:
Moment? Yes. Emma seemed to consistently describe the same moment in every turn.
Experience? Yes. Emma seemed to consistently describe the same experience (the
sensation of chest pain).
Subjunctifiers? High density, but all subjunctifiers were DFS subjunctifiers; they were
tied to phenomena and led towards higher-fidelity descriptions of experience.
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 8
SAM11b: Okay. And then how is the pain present?
E12b: It’s a dull, achey.
Moment? Yes. Emma seemed to consistently constrain her report to the same known
moment as in all previous turns.
Experience? Yes. This turn entirely described directly apprehended experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 8
SAM13b: And.. it’s, located... all over your chest?
E14b: Just the center.
Moment? Yes; Emma appeared to continually constrain her report to the same moment
as in previous turns.
Experience? Yes; this turn was entirely descriptive of experience.
Subjunctifiers? No subjunctification.
CK EMB = 10
RTH EMB = 9
SAM15b: Center?
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E16b: So, like, here. [Points to center of sternum]
Moment? Yes; same moment as in other turns.
Experience? Yes; this turn was entirely descriptive.
Subjunctifiers? Emma used a single subjunctifier (“like”) that acted as a DFS
subjunctifier—that is, she uses it to modify her description of the location of her chest
pain.
CK EMB = 9
RTH EMB = 9
SAM17b: Okay.
RTH18b: And, is the—so the previous beep, we talked about the hearing of the construction.
But not really attending to it.
E19b: Yeah.
RTH20b: Is that the same—more or less the same kind of a deal; a different sensory deal here?
E21b: I think so.
RTH22b: So I’m... I’m hearing construction, or I guess I’m hearing the construction, or I’m
feeling my chest... sort of the same deal?
E23b: I think so.
RTH24b: Okay.
E19, E20, E21, and E23b:
Moment? Yes. She seemed to continually talk about the same moment in each turn.
Experience? Yes. Her report at each turn included only descriptions of experience.
Subjunctification? Very little subjunctification. Emma continued to report
straightforwardly.
CK EMB = 7.5
RTH EMB = 8
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4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455030
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Education:
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Las Vegas, NV
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University of Southern California
B.A. Psychology with honors, summa cum laude
B.A. Narrative Studies, summa cum laude

Los Angeles, CA
2013 – 2017

Clinical Experience:
2021 – Present

Student Clinician
Department of Veterans Affairs Southern Nevada Health Care
System, Primary Care Mental Health Integration (PCMHI)
Las Vegas, NV
• Site Description: PCMHI is based upon a co-located, collaborative
care model within a VA primary care outpatient clinic. The
mission of PCMHI is to assist primary care staff (physicians, nurse
practitioners, physician assistants, nurses, pharmacists,
nutritionists, social workers, and administrative support assistants)
in providing holistic care to Veterans, focusing on both physical
and behavioral health.
• Responsibilities: Provided same-day and scheduled brief,
measurement-based individual psychotherapy (20-30 minutes, 4-6
sessions) for treatment of various mental health (e.g., anxiety,
depression, PTSD, stress) and behavioral health (e.g., insomnia,
tobacco cessation, diabetes management, chronic pain, postpartum
depression) concerns; provided group psychotherapy addressing
insomnia, stress management, and grief.
• Clinical Supervisor: Elizabeth Briggs, Psy.D.

2020 – Present

Student Clinician
The Private Practice of John Matthias, Ph.D.
Las Vegas, NV
• Site Description: Forensic and clinical private practice.
• Responsibilities: Assisted in an ongoing psychological evaluation
of a murder case, including examining ethical issues, performing
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psychological testing and assessments relevant to murder,
developing an in-depth case conceptualization, and writing and
completing a full psychological report for the court to be utilized
towards a plea agreement or in a trial.
Clinical Supervisor: John Matthias, Ph.D.

2020 – 2021

Student Clinician
Department of Veterans Affairs Southern Nevada Health Care
System, Addictive Disorders Treatment Program (ADTP)
North Las Vegas, NV
• Site Description: Hospital-based inpatient, residential, and
outpatient addictive disorders treatment program treating a diverse
Veteran population with substance use/gambling disorders and
other co-occurring problems.
• Responsibilities: Provided individual and group psychotherapies
(e.g., Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Substance Use Disorders,
Intensive Outpatient Program, Seeking Safety, Gambling) for
outpatient patients, and group psychotherapy within an inpatient
psychiatric ward.
• Clinical Supervisor: Alexandria Moorer, Psy.D.; Jason Mouritsen,
Psy.D., ABPP

2019 – 2020

Student Clinician
The Evidence Based Practice of Nevada (The EBP)
Henderson, NV
• Site Description: The EBP is a group private practice with a
mission to address the behavioral healthcare crisis in Nevada by 1)
providing state-of-the-art, evidence-based behavioral healthcare for
children, adolescents, adults, and families and 2) providing stateof-the-art training in empirically-supported behavioral health
practices to trainees of all levels. All EBP practitioners are highlyspecialized, licensed psychologists who are dedicated to improving
the face of behavioral healthcare in Nevada through clinical
training and community activism.
• Responsibilities: Provided individual, couples, and tele-mental
health therapy services.
• Clinical specialization track: Anxiety, sleep, and trauma-related
disorders
• Clinical Supervisor: Jordan Soper, Psy.D.

2018 – 2019

Student Clinician
The Partnership for Research, Assessment, Counseling, Therapy and
Innovative Clinical Education (PRACTICE) at UNLV
Las Vegas, NV
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2015 – 2016

Site Description: Department-sponsored community mental health
training clinic. The PRACTICE provides services to all age groups
with a diverse set of mental health concerns. The PRACTICE was
the 2019 recipient of the Association of Psychology Training
Clinic’s Clinic Innovation Award – Training; this national award
recognizes one training clinic annually for its leadership in
innovations that impact student’s training.
Responsibilities: Provided individual, group, and tele-mental
health therapy services. Co-led Dialectical Behavior Therapy
(DBT) adult psychoeducational group and interpersonal process
group. Conducted psychological assessments.
Clinical Supervisors: Noelle Lefforge, Ph.D., Amy Black, Ph.D.,
Michelle Paul, Ph.D.

Behavioral Health Intern
Hawaii Pacific Neuroscience
Honolulu, HI
• Site Description: Interdisciplinary neurological clinic specializing
in dementia and related memory disorders, Parkinson’s and
movement disorders, headache and chronic pain, stroke and
neurologic restoration, and sleep disorders.
• Responsibilities: Trained to evaluate common neuropsychological
assessments for dementia and TBI evaluation. Conducted
standardized clinical intake interviews for new patients.
• Clinical Supervisors: Katrina Moss, Psy.D., Thomas Harding,
Psy.D., & Don “Keith” Pedro, Psy.D.

Clinical Supervision and Mentorship Experience:
2021 – Present

Graduate Student Mentor
Consolidated Students of UNLV (CSUN) and the Graduate and
Professional Student Association of UNLV (GPSA)
Las Vegas, NV
• Provided formal academic and professional development
mentorship to UNLV undergraduate students in Psychology

2020

Graduate Student Clinical Supervisor
The Partnership for Research, Assessment, Counseling, Therapy and
Innovative Clinical Education (PRACTICE) at UNLV
Las Vegas, NV
• Provided formal clinical supervision to first-year clinical
psychology practicum students for the Summer of 2020

Research Experience:
2021 – Present

Project: Inner Experience in Grapheme-Color Synesthesia
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Role: Principal Investigator
• Investigating the inner experience of those with grapheme-color
synesthesia using descriptive experience sampling (DES)
• Advisor: Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D.
2018 – Present

Project: First-Day Expositional Interviews, Iterative Training, and
Participant Skill in Descriptive Experience Sampling
Role: Primary Investigator
• Assessing changes in participant’s skill during their participation in
DES sampling projects
• Advisor: Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D.

2017 – 2020

Project: Validity of First-Person Psychological Methods
Role: Research Assistant
• A collaborative theoretical project examining the validation of
first-person psychological methods, descriptive experience
sampling, and psychometrics
• Advisor: Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D., Kimberly Barchard, Ph.D.

2017 – 2018

Project: Multimethod Investigation of Pristine Inner Experience
Role: Research Co-Facilitator
• A comparison of various introspective methods (e.g., descriptive
experience sampling [DES], experience sampling, daily
questionnaires), and the implications each method offers
• Advisor: Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D.

2017 – 2018

Project: Inner Experience of Individuals Receiving Psychotherapy
Role: Research Co-Facilitator
• Investigating the inner experience of those currently receiving
psychotherapy using descriptive experience sampling (DES)
• Advisor: Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D.

2016 - 2017

Project: Comparing Measures of Attention from the Mini-Mental State
Examination
Role: Principal Investigator
• Senior Psychology honors thesis investigating equivalency of
attention and calculation items for the MMSE by sex and education
• Advisor: Margaret Gatz, Ph.D., Jo Ann Farver, Ph.D.

2015 - 2017

Project: California Teacher’s Study
Role: Undergraduate Research Manager, Research Assistant
• Developed criteria to evaluate neuropsychological test results
• Conducted literature review on neuropsychological scoring
methods for Necker Cubes
• Responsible for scheduling lab meetings, oversee undergraduate
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research assistants, and manage scoring discrepancies
Advisor: Margaret Gatz, Ph.D., Carol McCleary, Ph.D.

2015 - 2016

Project: Twin Study of Sex Differences in Dementia and Alzheimer’s
Disease
Role: Research Assistant
• Conducted in-depth literature review
• Participated in study development and composition
• Advisors: Christopher Beam, Ph.D., Margaret Gatz, Ph.D.

2015 - 2016

Project: Tracing a Dementia Kindred
Role: Principal Investigator
• Developed an independent research project to trace dementia
symptoms and etiology in two Japanese-American families with an
unusually high prevalence of dementia.
• Conducted interviews with caregivers of affected individuals
• Developed a literature review of familial AD studies
• Advisor: Margaret Gatz, Ph.D.
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Beam, C. R., Kaneshiro, C., Jang, J. Y., Reynolds, C. A., Pedersen, N. L., & Gatz, M. (2020). A
twin study of sex differences in genetic risk for all dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, and non-AD
dementia. Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 66. doi: 10.3233/JAD-191192
Beam, C. R., Kaneshiro, C., Jang, J. Y., Reynolds, C. A., Pedersen, N. L., & Gatz, M. (2018).
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Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 64, 1077-1083. doi: 10.3233/JAD-180141
Manuscripts: Under Review
Lapping-Carr, L., Krumm, A., Kaneshiro, C., & Heavey, C. L. Introspection as a tool in
emotion research. (Manuscript submitted to Emotion Review).
Research Presentations
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Kaneshiro, C., & Hurlburt, R. T. (2022, April). Evaluating Descriptive Experience Sampling
Iterative Training: Do Participants Become More Skilled Over Time? Poster presentation
at The Science of Consciousness Conference, Tucson, AZ.
Krumm, A. E., Kaneshiro, C., & Hurlburt, R. T. (2021, June). A Complete, Unabridged, “Preregistered” Descriptive Experience Sampling Investigation: The Case of Lena. Invited
Participation at the 24th annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of
Consciousness, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Barchard, K. A., Kaneshiro, C., Krumm, A. E. (2020, February). Evaluating Validity is
Harmful. Poster presentation at the American Association of Behavioral and Social
Sciences, Las Vegas, NV.
Kaneshiro, C., Lapping-Carr, L., Krumm, A. E., Moynihan, S. A., Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey,
C. L. (2018, May). Can First-Person Methods Reliably Apprehend Inner Experience?
Lessons from Eyewitness Testimony. Poster presentation at the UNLV 21st Annual
Graduate & Professional Student Research Forum, Las Vegas, NV.
• 1st place winner for Outstanding Presentation in Social Sciences Poster Sessions
Kaneshiro, C., Lapping-Carr, L., Krumm, A. E., Moynihan, S. A., Hurlburt, R. T., & Heavey,
C. L. (2018, May). Can First-Person Methods Reliably Apprehend Inner Experience?
Lessons from Eyewitness Testimony. Poster presentation at the Association for
Psychological Science 30th Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA.
Krumm, A.E., Lapping-Carr, L., Kaneshiro, C., Moynihan, S.A., Heavey, C.L., & Hurlburt,
R.T. (2018, May). Subjective Experience is Not All the Same: Private Phenomena vs.
Inferred States. Poster presentation at the Association for Psychological Science 30th
Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA.
Kaneshiro, C. (2017, April). Comparing Measures of Attention from the Mini-Mental State
Examination. Poster presentation at the University of Southern California Undergraduate
Research Symposium, Los Angeles, CA.
Kaneshiro, C. (2016, April). Tracing a Dementia Kindred. Poster presentation at the University
of Southern California Undergraduate Research Symposium, Los Angeles, CA
Teaching Experience:
2019 – Present

Graduate Student Instructor
PSY 101: General Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Fall 2019, Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Spring 2021, Fall 2021, Spring 2022
• Independently taught two sections of PSY 101 to undergraduate
UNLV students; developed curriculum, lectures, exams, and
homework assignments
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2020

Assistant Question Bank Author, Psychology: Themes and Variations
• Created questions for complex learning activities on Weiten’s
Psychology: Themes and Variations, 11th edition

2017 – Present

Graduate Teaching Assistant
PSY 210: Introductory Statistics
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Fall 2017, Spring 2018, Summer 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021
Supervisor: Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D.
• Assisted in various class operations, such as proctoring exams,
grading assignments, hosting weekly office hours

Professional Service
2022 – Present

Subcommittee Member, American Psychological Association of
Graduate Students (APAGS) Advocacy Coordinating Team (ACT)
• Served on the APAGS ACT Subcommittee tasked with engaging
in Federal legislative advocacy and raising awareness on behalf of
the science and profession of psychology; in the interest of
individuals studying, researching, and practicing psychology; and
on behalf of individuals who are recipients of psychological
services.

2020 – Present

State Advocacy Coordinator, Nevada Psychological Association
(NPA)
• Served on the NPA Executive Board as a student liaison
representing all psychology students in Southern Nevada
• Participated as the student representative of NPA at the 2021
Practice Leadership Conference

2019 – 2020

UNLV Campus Representative, Nevada Psychological Association
(NPA)
• Served on Southern NPA Region Board as a liaison between the
NPA and the graduate and undergraduate students of UNLV

2015 - 2017

President, Psi Chi International Honors Society in Psychology, USC
Chapter

2014 - 2015

Founder/Executive Director, USC Ink
• Instituted service-learning organization that paired student
volunteers with residents at a local nursing home to provide social
interactions and produce creative pieces representing personally
significant narratives of senior residents.

Awards and Honors:
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2022

Outstanding Contribution to the Nevada Psychological Association
• This award honors a psychologist whose work in the association
has been of benefit to the organization.

2022

Asian American Psychological Association (AAPA) Graduate Student
Leadership Institute 2022
• Award granted to Asian American and Pacific Islander psychology
graduate students interested in leadership and advocacy and who
demonstrate strong leadership potential.

2013 - 2017

USC Associates Trustee Scholarship
• 4-year, full tuition academic scholarship awarded to the highest
ranked incoming freshman each fall based on exemplary
leadership, community service, and academic excellence.

2017

Jimmy Gauntt Memorial Award
• Awarded to five graduating students majoring in English or
Narrative Studies annually as nominated by faculty in the
Department of English for outstanding scholastic and academic
achievement in literature and the arts.

2017

University of Southern California Renaissance Scholar
• Designation awarded to students who have excelled academically
while pursuing at least two widely separated fields of study with at
least a 3.5 GPA in each of the certified programs.

2016

Phi Beta Kappa

2015

Psi Chi International Honors Society in Psychology

Professional Affiliations
2021 – Present

Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness

2020 – Present

American Psychological Association of Graduate Students

2020 – Present

Society of Clinical Psychology

2020 – Present

Society of Clinical Geropsychology, Division 12

2019 – Present

Nevada Psychological Association

2019 – Present

American Group Psychotherapy Association

2017 – Present

Hawaii Psychological Association

2015 – Present

American Psychological Association
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Notable Trainings and Experiences
Spring 2022
(1 hour)

E Kilohi Mai (Look in This Direction): A Brief Survey of a
Hawaiian Healing Paradigm
Keoko Kikaha Pai Baclayon, University of Hawaii at Manoa
• Workshop aimed to help providers understand critical
foundations of traditional Native Hawaiian beliefs through
discussion of Hawaiian healing paradigms.

Spring 2022
(1 hour)

Evaluating and Treating Nightmares
Ami Student, Psy.D., VA VISN 20 Mental Illness Research,
Education, and Clincal Centers (MIRECC)
• Knowledge-based training on the etiology, assessment, and
treatment of nightmares in clinical settings, with an emphasis
on PTSD and nightmares.

Spring 2022
(2 hours; Event Moderator)

Suicide Prevention and Awareness in the Time of COVID-19:
Caring for Our Patients and Ourselves
Megan Freeman, Ph.D., Nevada Psychological Association
• Workshop addressed evidence-based updates on current
trends in suicide in Nevada and across the US, evidencebased information about changes in national and
international prevalence of behavioral health concerns, and
actionable steps to better manage suicidality within the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Winter 2021
(1 hour)

Addressing Race-Based Stress and Racial Trauma in Veterans
of Color: A Group Intervention
VA Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention

Winter 2021
(2 hours)

High Risk Medications and Polypharmacy for Non-Prescribers
Alexander Sasha Rackman, M.D., Rush University Medical Center
E4 Center of Excellence for Behavioral Health Disparities in Aging
• Discussed understanding principles of safe medication use,
identification of high-risk medication use, and a review of
interdisciplinary strategies that can be used to promote
medication safety in older adults.

Fall 2021
(1 Hour)

Suicide Risk Assessment: What Psychologists Want to Know
William T. Tsushima, Ph.D., Hawaii Psychological Association
• Presentation outlining suicide in Hawaii and the US, best
practices of suicide screening tools, and a discussion of bestpractices in discussing suicide with patients.

Fall 2021
(2 hours)

Cannabis Use and Misuse Among Older Adults: Emerging
Trends and Implications for Healthy Aging
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Fred Blow, Ph.D., Rush University Medical Center E4 Center of
Excellence for Behavioral Health Disparities in Aging
• In response to rapidly changing cannabis legalization across
the US, this presentation examined trends in cannabis use
nationally and reviewed the emerging evidence regarding
cannabis use and misuse among individuals as they age.
Fall 2021
(10 hours)

Culturally-Responsive Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)
with Older Adults
Ann Steffen, Ph.D., Dolores Gallagher-Thompson, Ph.D., Rush
University Medical Center E4 Center of Excellence for Behavioral
Health Disparities in Aging
• 5-part series reviewing beginning treatment with older
adults; emotion-, behavior-, and cognitive-focused CBT
strategies; and termination processes for CBT within diverse,
older adult populations.

Fall 2021
(8 hours; Event Moderator)

Helping Clients with Substance Abuse Disorders:
Treatment Recommendations for Clients with Co-Occurring
Mental Health Issues
Shane Kraus, Ph.D., Nevada Psychological Association
• Overview of best evidence-based clinical practices for the
treatment of addiction disorders, including a review of the
etiology, prevalence, assessment practices, and clinical
guidelines for substance abuse and addiction disorders.

Fall 2021
(24 hours)

Primary Care Mental Health Integration (PCMHI) Competency
Training
Department of Veteran Affairs VISN 21
• Intensive, 4-day staff training in best practices around the
PCMHI model of care. Included extensive roleplays,
consultation, and live assessment of PCMHI psychotherapy
model to ensure fidelity to treatment.

Summer 2021
(2 hours)

Military Culture and Mental Healthcare
Jason Mouritsen, Psy.D., Robert Moering, Psy.D., VA Southern
Nevada Healthcare System
• Presentation addressing unique cultural considerations
impacting mental health treatment within active-duty and
veteran populations.

Summer 2021
(1.5 hours)

Psychodynamic Psychotherapy in Pain Management: A MultiModal Approach
Marilyn S. Jacobs, Ph.D., American Association of Pain Psychology
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Presentation aimed to explain the basic concepts of
psychodynamic psychotherapy and how these are applied in
contemporary psychotherapy orientations (specifically in the
context of pain care) and instructions on how to prepare an
interdisciplinary pain management treatment plan using an
integrated psychodynamic model.

Spring 2021
(1 hour)

Integrating Motivational Interviewing (MI) With CognitiveBehavioral Interventions to Maximize Client Outcomes
Sylvie Naar, Ph.D., Hawaii Psychological Association
• Presentation providing an overview of MI and change
language within CBT treatment with particular emphasis on
interactions of MI and culture.

Spring 2021
(1 hour)

Healing Fractured Communities: Coming to Terms with
Systemic Trauma in Japanese-American Communities
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), American
Psychological Association, Heart Mountain Wyoming Foundation
• Panel presentation that discussed a sociocultural review of
Japanese immigration and forced internment in the US and
how such histories impact the mental health of contemporary
Japanese Americans, Asian Americans, and BIPOC
communities in light of anti-Asian hate crimes from the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Summer 2020
(1 hour)

The Unconscious: What Took So Long, What We Know, and
Clinical Implications
Joel Weinberger, Ph.D., Hawaii Psychological Association
• An introduction to contemporary empirical research on the
unconscious and the role the unconscious plays in
psychotherapy treatment.

Spring 2020
(1 hour)

Physician Specific Psychotherapy
Steven Graybar, Ph.D., Whitney Owens, Psy.D., The PRACTICE
• Discussed specific clinical concerns when working with
physicians, such as physician-specific stressors, personality
features, and best practices.

Spring 2020
(2 hours; Event Moderator)

Be the Helper: Implementing Psychological First Aid During
Covid-19 Crisis
Noelle Lefforge, Ph.D., Nevada Psychological Association
• Introduction to Psychological First Aid (PFA) and Skills for
Psychological Recovery (SPR) to support mental health
providers in offering these services during and after crises,
particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.
380

Spring 2020
(2 hours)

What’s New and What’s the Same About Group Psychotherapy
Irvin Yalom, M.D., Molyn Leszcz, M.D., American Group
Psychotherapy Association
• Addressed new developments in group psychotherapy
explored through writing the 6th edition of The Theory and
Practice of Group Psychotherapy.
• Extended discussion on relationships and life informed by
Yalom’s 2020 book, A Matter of Life and Death.

Spring 2019, Spring 2020
(32 hours)

American Group Psychotherapy Association (AGPA) Connect
Conference: Two-Day Institute Participant
American Group Psychotherapy Association
• 2-day, experiential, interdisciplinary, small group, processbased experience aimed at learning about group processes
and oneself as well as an opportunity for personal and
professional renewal.

Fall 2019
(20 hours)

Comprehensive Training in Dialectical Behavioral Therapy
(DBT)
Alan Fruzzetti, Ph.D., Armida Fruzzetti, Ph.D., Nevada
Psychological Association
• Comprehensive 2-day training focused on DBT, introducing
DBT theory, structure, targets, treatment strategies, skills,
skill training, and skill coaching.

Spring 2019, Spring 2020
(16 hours)

Interprofessional Education Day
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
• Annual integrated care workshops with UNLV medical,
nursing, psychology, physical therapy, and social work
students aimed at increasing awareness of interprofessional
education, roles, responsibilities, and understanding of
interprofessional team functioning to better serve patients.

Fall 2018, Spring 2019
(4 hours)

Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT)
Debbie Joffe Ellis, LPC, The PRACTICE
• An introductory lecture on core concepts of REBT.

Fall 2018
(16 hours)

Introduction to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)
Steven Hayes, Ph.D., Praxis
• Two-day workshop on experiential understanding of six
basic processes of ACT’s Psychological Flexibility Model,
their relationship with Relational Frame Theory (RFT), case
conceptualization, treatment planning.
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